



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.


We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>






Al
M
DF



THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.



THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

85121

VOL. XXII. NEW SERIES.

74

JANUARY—APRIL,

MDCCCLXXIV.

LONDON:
BURNS, OATES, & CO., 17 & 18, PORTMAN STREET,
AND 63, PATERNOSTER ROW.
DERBY: RICHARDSON & SONS.
DUBLIN: JAMES DUFFY; W. B. KELLY; McGLASHAN & GILL.
BALTIMORE: KELLY, PIET & CO.
MONTREAL, CANADA: D. & J. SADLER & CO
1874.

LONDON
WYMAN AND SONS, PRINTERS, GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS, W.C.

CONTENTS.

ART. I.—MR. MILL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.

Mr. Mill's Autobiography	1
His aggressive and affirmative philosophical position	15
His position examined on mathematical axioms and the rule of certitude	17
His attempted distinction between two kinds of complex ideas	27
Summary of the preceding argument	29
Other propositions concerning necessary truth	ib.
Can the uniformity of nature be proved by experience ?	32
Mr. Mill's reply to the DUBLIN REVIEW on this question	33

ART. II.—TAINÉ'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.

The literature of a nation the reflex of its feelings	39
Periods of a nation's literature	41
General character of M. Taine's work	42
His view of Protestantism	46
Origin of civilization	48
M. Taine on the Saxon character	50
On the Normans	53
M. Taine on the Schoolmen	56
The Renaissance in England	58
The age of inventions	60
The Renaissance in Poetry	61
Shakespeare	65
Final Summary	67

Specimens of American Catholic poetry	320
The poems of Oliver Wendell Holmes	321
Their pathos	322
And their good common sense	324

ART. III.—MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF FREEWILL.

Mr. Mill's theory of determinism stated in detail	326
Great part of this theory may be accepted as true	333
Exact point at issue	334
Determinism opposed to observed facts	337
Determinism and fatalism	346
Answers to objections	347
Statement of two further objections	360

ART. IV.—MR. JERVIS ON THE JANSENISTIC AND GALILCAN MOVEMENT.

Prejudice of Mr. Jervis against the Jesuits	362
Difference between Catholic principles of government and Cæsarism	362
Opposition of the French Parliament to the Jesuits	363
Richelieu and the Church	365
Shortlived rupture between France and Rome	366
Jansenius and Saint Cyran found a new school of theology	366
Saint Cyran appointed Director of Port Royal	368
He is imprisoned in Vincennes	369
Condemnation by Innocent X. of seven propositions drawn from Jansenius's "Augustinus"	372
Pascal's "Provincial Letters"	372
Desecration of Port Royal	373
Condemnation of the Jansenists by Alexander VII.	374
Judicial proceedings against the Jansenists	376
Absolute despotism of Louis XIV.	378
Fracas in Rome between the French ambassador's retinue and the Pope's guard	379
Secularization of the convent of Narbonne	385
The Assembly of Clergy	386
Its deliberations	388
Increased feeling of the clergy in favour of Rome	391
The declaration of 1682	392
The rise of Cartesianism	395
Margaret Mary Alacoque	396
Licentious state of society after the death of Louis XIV.	399
The expulsion of the Jesuits	400

Contents.

iii

ART. V.—CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.—MR. FITZJAMES STEPHEN.

The liberalistic theory on toleration	402
Cæsarism a reaction against this	403
The Falck laws	404
The Archbishop's Essay	409
Mr. Fitzjames Stephen	413
His doctrine on a supreme being	415
His doctrine on morality	416
His doctrine on the sanction of morality	417
Congeniality of his general doctrines with his Cæsarism	420
The Archbishop's reply to Mr. Stephen	421

ART. VI.—RINUCCINI'S IRISH NUNCIATURE.

Character of Rinuccini	424
The Pope's Instructions to him	426
Difficulties of his task	427
His arrival in Ireland	430
Ormond and Glamorgan	432
Sir Kenelm Digby's negotiation	436
Rinuccini's regard for Owen O'Neill	438
The new Confederation of Kilkenny	440
Difficulties of Rinuccini's position	442
Meeting of the General Assembly	443
Rinuccini's interdict	444
His departure	446
Estimate of his Nunciature	448

ART. VII.—THE FALL OF MR. GLADSTONE'S GOVERNMENT.

Causes of the loss of authority in the Government	450
The reconstruction in August	452
The dissolution	452
Mr. Disraeli's position	454
His policy	455
The Education question and the new Parliament	456
The Irish elections	457
Limerick and Louth	459
Mr. Disraeli's Government of Ireland	460

ART. VIII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Archbishop of Westminster's Sin and its Consequences	462
Essays on Religion and Literature	464
Prospectus of S. Joseph's Theological Library	464

The Oxford Undergraduate of Twenty Years ago	466
Rev. F. Humphrey's Mary Magnifying God	468
Rev. F. Purbrick's May Papers ; or, Thoughts on the Litanies of Loreto	470
Miss Ramsay's Life of Thomas Grant, first Bishop of Southwark	471
Bishop Hedley's Who is Jesus Christ ?	473
Mr. St. George Mivart's Man and Apes	475
Life of the Blessed John Berchmans	483
Life of the Blessed Peter Favre, of the Society of Jesus	483
Life of S. Philip Benizi	487
" Vitis Mystica ; " or, the True Vine	488
Rev. F. Lancicius's Meditations for every Day in the Year, and for the Principal Feasts	490
L'Abbé de Madonne's Ignace Spencer et la Renaissance du Catholi- cisme en Angleterre	491
Rev. F. Coleridge's Sowers and Reapers	492
Rev. F. Philpin de Rivieres' Holy Places	493
Dr. Newman's Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical	494
God our Father	495
Dr. Sweeney's The Pope and the Emperor	495
Meditations for the use of the Clergy for every Day in the Year	496
Dr. Carpenter's Principles of Modern Physiology	496
Mr. Bellasis's Cherubini : Memorials illustrative of his Life	497
Ebba	498
Rev. F. Valroger's La Genèse des Espèces	498
Rev. R. F. Wilson's Life of S. Vincent de Paul	501
Mr. Blunt's Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought	501
Consolation for the Sick and Afflicted	502
Mrs. Cashel Hoey's Nazareth	502
Holy Places	502
Mr. Nevins's The Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Chris- tians	503
Mr. Potter's Rupert Aubrey of Aubrey Chase	503
Mr. Fairplay's Notes of the Wandering Jew ; or, the Jesuits and their Opponents	503
Mr. Miles's The Truce of God	504
Simple Tales	504

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1874.

ART. I.—MR. MILL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.

Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : Longmans.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL. Fourth edition. London : Longmans.

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL. Eighth edition. London : Longmans.

IT is impossible to pursue our controversy with Mr. Mill, without some preliminary notice of the very remarkable autobiography, which has appeared in this last quarter. We will not ourselves, however, make any comment on Mr. Mill's personal qualities as therein exhibited : because (1) our argument concerns his philosophy, not himself ; and because (2) any attempt at subtle appreciation of character is wholly beyond the present writer's power of thought and expression. We will supply our omission however as best we can, by placing before our readers large part of a very able criticism which appeared in the "Spectator" of Oct. 25th, and with which on the whole we concur :—

That this curious volume delineates, on the whole, a man marked by the most earnest devotion to human good, and the widest intellectual sympathies, no one who reads it with any discernment can doubt. But it is both a very melancholy book to read, and one full of moral paradoxes. It is very sad, in the first instance, to read the story of the over-tutored boy, constantly incurring his father's displeasure for not being able to do what by no possibility he could have done, and apparently without any one to love. Mr. James Mill, vivacious talker, and in a narrow way powerful thinker as he was, was evidently as an educator, on his son's own showing, a hard master, anxious to reap what he had not sown, and to gather what he had not strawed ; or, as that son himself puts it, expecting "effects without causes." Not that the father did not teach the child with all his might, and teach in many respects well ; but then he taught the boy far too much, and expected him to learn besides a great deal that he neither taught him nor showed him where to find. The child began Greek at three years old, read a good deal of Plato at seven, . . . began logic at twelve, went through a "complete

VOL. XXII. NO. XLIII. [*New Series.*] B

course of political economy" at thirteen, including the most intricate points of the theory of currency. He was a constant writer for the "Westminster Review" at eighteen, was editing Bentham's "Theory of Evidence" and writing habitual criticisms of the Parliamentary debates at nineteen. At twenty he fell into a profound melancholy, on discovering that the only objects of life for which he lived,—the objects of social and political reformers,—would, if suddenly and completely granted, give him no happiness whatever. Such a childhood and youth, lived apparently without a single strong affection,—for his relation to his father was one of deep respect and fear, rather than love, and he tells us frankly, in describing the melancholy to which we have alluded, that if he had loved any one well enough to confide to him, the melancholy would not have been,—and resulting at the age of eighteen in the production of what Mr. Mill himself says might, with as little extravagance as would ever be involved in the application of such a phrase to a human being, be called "a mere reasoning machine,"—are not pleasant subjects of contemplation: even though it be true, as Mr. Mill asserts, that the over-supply of study and under-supply of love did not prevent his childhood from being a happy one. Nor are the other personal incidents of the autobiography of a different cast. Nothing is more remarkable than the fewness, limited character, and apparently, so far as close intercourse was concerned, temporary duration, of most of Mr. Mill's friendships. The one close and intimate friendship of his life, which made up to him for the insufficiency of all others, that with the married lady who, after the death of her husband, became his wife, was one which for a long time subjected him to slanders, the pain of which his sensitive nature evidently felt very keenly. And yet he must have been aware that though in his own conduct he had kept free from all stain, his example was an exceedingly dangerous and mischievous one for others, who might be tempted by his moral authority to follow in a track in which they would not have had the strength to tread. Add to this that his married life was very brief, only seven years and a half, being unexpectedly cut short, and that his passionate reverence for his wife's memory and genius—in his own words, "a religion"—was one which, as he must have been perfectly sensible, he could not possibly make to appear otherwise than extravagant, not to say an hallucination, in the eyes of the rest of mankind; and yet that he was possessed by an irresistible yearning to attempt to embody it in all the tender and enthusiastic hyperbole of which it is so pathetic to find a man who gained his fame by his "dry-light" a master;—and it is impossible not to feel that the human incidents in Mr. Mill's career are very sad. True, his short service in Parliament, when he was already advanced in years, was one to bring him much intellectual consideration and a certain amount of popularity. But even that terminated in a defeat, and was hardly successful enough to repay him for the loss of literary productiveness which those three years of practical drudgery imposed. In spite of the evident satisfaction and pride with which Mr. Mill saw that his school of philosophy had gained rapid ground since the publication of his "Logic," and that his large and liberal view of the science of political economy had made still more rapid way amongst all classes, the record of his life which he leaves behind him is not, even in its own tone, and still less in the effect

produced on the reader, a bright and happy one. It is "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," and of thought that has to do duty for much, both of feeling and of action, which usually goes to constitute the full life of a large mind.

And besides the sense of sadness which the human incidents of the autobiography produces, the intellectual and moral story itself is full of paradox which weighs upon the heart as well as the mind. Mr. Mill was brought up by his father to believe that Christianity was false, and that even as regards natural religion there was no ground for faith.* But in the meantime, he is most anxious to point out that religion, in what he thinks the best sense, is possible even to one who does not believe in God. That best sense is the sense in which religion stands for an ideal conception of a Perfect Being to which those who have such a conception "habitually refer as the guide of their conscience : " an ideal, he says, " far nearer to perfection than the objective Deity of those who think themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with suffering and so deformed by injustice as ours." Unfortunately, however, this " ideal conception of a perfect Being " is not a *power* on which human nature can lean. It is merely its own best thought of itself ; so that it dwindles when the mind and heart contract, and vanishes just when there is most need of help. This Mr. Mill himself felt at one period of his life. At the age of twenty he underwent a crisis, which apparently corresponded in his own opinion to the state of mind that leads to " a Wesleyan's conversion "

It is clear that Mr. Mill felt the deep craving for a more permanent and durable source of spiritual life, than any which the most beneficent activity spent in patching up human institutions and laboriously recasting the structure of human society could secure him ;—that he himself had a suspicion that, to use the language of a book he had been taught to make light of, his soul was thirsting for God, and groping after an eternal presence, in which he lived and moved and had his being. What is strange and almost burlesque, if it were not so melancholy, is the mode in which this moral crisis culminates. A few tears shed over Marmontel's " *Mémoires*," and the fit passed away :—

"Two lines of Coleridge, in whom alone of all writers I have found a true description of what I felt, were often in my thoughts, not at this time (for I had never read them), but in a later period of the same mental malady :—

'Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve,
And hope without an object cannot live.'

In all probability my case was by no means so peculiar as I fancied it, and I doubt not that many others have passed through a similar state ; but the idiosyncrasies of my education had given to the general phenomenon a special character, which made it seem the natural effect of causes that it was hardly possible for time to remove. I frequently asked myself if I could or if I was bound to go on living, when life must be passed in this manner. I generally answered to myself, that I did not think I could possibly bear it beyond a year. When, however, not more than half that duration of time

* This is certainly an under-statement, as we shall show presently in the text.—ED. D. R.

had elapsed, a small ray of light broke in upon my gloom. I was reading, accidentally, Marmontel's '*Mémoires*,' and came to the passage which relates his father's death, the distressed position of the family, and the sudden inspiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he would be everything to them—would supply the place of all that they had lost. A vivid conception of the scene and its feelings came over me, and I was moved to tears. From this moment my burden grew lighter. The oppression of the thought that all feeling was dead within me, was gone. I was no longer hopeless; I was not a stock or a stone. I had still, it seemed, some of the material out of which all worth of character and all capacity for happiness are made. Relieved from my ever-present sense of irremediable wretchedness, I gradually found that the ordinary incidents of life could again give me some pleasure; that I could again find enjoyment, not intense, but sufficient for cheerfulness, in sunshine and sky, in books, in conversation, in public affairs; and that there was once more excitement, though of a moderate kind, in exerting myself for my opinions, and for the public good. Thus the cloud gradually drew off, and I again enjoyed life; and though I had several relapses, some of which lasted many months, I never again was as miserable as I had been."

And the only permanent instruction which this experience left behind it seems to have been curiously slight. It produced a threefold moral result:—first, a grave alarm at the dangerously-undermining capacities of his own power of moral analysis, which promised to unravel all those artificial moral webs of painful and pleasurable associations with injurious and useful actions respectively, which his father had so laboriously woven for him during his childhood and youth; and further, two notable practical conclusions;—one, that in order to attain happiness (which he "never wavered" in regarding as "the test of all rules of conduct and the end of life"), the best strategy is a kind of flank march,—to aim at something else, at some ideal end, not consciously as a means to happiness, but as an end in itself,—so, he held, may you have a better chance of securing happiness by the way than you can by any direct pursuit of it; and the other, that it is most desirable to cultivate the feelings, the passive susceptibilities, as well as the reasoning and active powers, if the utilitarian life is to be made enjoyable. Surely a profound sense of the inadequacy of ordinary human success to the craving of the human spirit was never followed by a less radical moral change. That it resulted in a new breadth of sympathy with writers like Coleridge and Wordsworth, whose fundamental modes of thought and faith Mr. Mill entirely rejected, but for whose mode of sentiment, after this period of his life, he somehow managed, not very intelligibly, to make room, is very true; and it is also true that this gave a new largeness of tone to his writings, and gave him a real superiority in all matters of taste to the utilitarian clique to which he had belonged,—results which enormously widened the scope of his influence, and changed him from the mere expositor of a single school of psychology into the thoughtful critic of many different schools. But as far as we can judge, all this new breadth was gained at the cost of a certain haze which, from this time forth, spread itself over his grasp of the first principles which he still professed to hold. He did not cease to be a utilitarian, but he ceased to distinguish between the duty of promoting your own happiness and of promoting anybody else's, and never could make it clear where he found

his moral obligation to sacrifice the former to the latter. He still maintained that actions, and not sentiments, are the true subjects of ethical discrimination; but he discovered that there was a significance which he had never before suspected even in sentiments and emotions of which he continued to maintain that the origin was artificial and arbitrary. He did not cease to declaim against the prejudices engendered by the intuitional theory of philosophy; but he made it one of his peculiar distinctions as an experience-philosopher, that he recommended the fostering of new prepossessions, only distinguished from the prejudices he strove to dissipate by being, in his opinion, harmless, though quite as little based as those in ultimate or objective truth. He maintained as strongly as ever that the character of man is formed by circumstances, but he discovered that the will can act upon circumstances, and so modify its own future capability of willing; and though it is in his opinion circumstances which enable or induce the will thus to act upon circumstances, he taught and thought that this makes all the difference between fatalism and the doctrine of cause and effect as applied to character. After his influx of new light he remained as strong a democrat as ever, but he ceased to believe in the self-interest principle as universally efficient to produce good government when applied to multitudes, and indeed qualified his democratic theory by an intellectual aristocracy of feeling, which to our minds is the essence of exclusiveness. "A person of high intellect," he writes, "should never go into unintellectual society, unless he can enter it as an apostle; yet he is the only person with high objects who can ever enter it at all." You can hardly have exclusiveness more extreme than that, or a doctrine more strangely out of moral sympathy with the would-be universalism of the Benthamite theory. In fact, as it seems to us, Mr. Mill's unquestionable breadth of philosophic treatment was gained at the cost of a certain ambiguity which fell over the root-principles of his philosophy,—an ambiguity by which he gained for it a more catholic repute than it deserved. The result of the moral crisis through which Mr. Mill passed at the age of twenty may be described briefly, in our opinion, as this,—that it gave him *tastes* far in advance of his philosophy, foretastes in fact of a true philosophy; and that this moral flavour of something truer and wider served him in place of the substance of anything truer and wider during the rest of his life. . . .

On the whole, the book will be found, we think, even by Mr. Mill's most strenuous disciples, a dreary one. It shows that in spite of all Mr. Mill's genuine and generous compassion for human misery and his keen desire to alleviate it, his relation to concrete humanity was of a very confined and reserved kind,—one brightened by few personal ties, and those few not, except in about two cases, really hearty ones. The multitude was to him an object of compassion and of genuine beneficence, but he had no pleasure in men, no delight in actual intercourse with this strange, various, homely world of motley faults and virtues. His nature was composed of a few very fine threads, but wanted a certain strength of basis, and the general effect, though one of high and even enthusiastic disinterestedness, is meagre and pallid. His tastes were refined, but there was a want of homeliness about his hopes. He was too strenuously didactic to be in sympathy with man, and too incessantly analytic to throw his burden upon God. There was something

overstrained in all that was noblest in him, this excess seeming to be by way of compensation, as it were, for the number of regions of life in which he found little or nothing where other men find so much. He was strangely deficient in humour, which, perhaps, we ought not to regret, for had he had it, his best work would in all probability have been greatly hampered by such a gift. Unique in intellectual ardour and moral disinterestedness, of tender heart and fastidious tastes, though narrow in his range of practical sympathies, his name will long be famous as that of the most wide-minded and generous of political economists, the most disinterested of Utilitarian moralists, and the most accomplished and impartial of empirical philosophers. But as a man, there was in him a certain poverty of nature, in spite of the nobleness in him,—a monotonous joylessness, in spite of the hectic sanguineness of his theoretic creed,—a want of genial trust, which spurred on into an almost artificial zeal his ardour for philosophic reconstruction; and these are qualities which will probably put a well-marked limit on the future propagation of an influence such as few writers on such subjects have ever before attained within the period of their own lifetime.*

Our own comments on the autobiography shall be confined to one or two points, on which it illustrates (as we think, very instructively) Mr. Mill's habits and character, as a thinker on philosophy and religion. And firstly the present work makes it abundantly clear, that we were correct in our estimate of his opinion on religious subjects. By "deism" is commonly understood the doctrine, that an infinitely perfect Being is Author of the universe, but that this Being has made no revelation to mankind. Mr. Mill considers this doctrine no less obviously irrational and immoral, than Christianity itself. His father, he says (pp. 39-40), "found it impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness. His intellect spurned the subtleties by which men attempted to blind themselves to this open contradiction." And in this passage, as our readers will have observed, Mr. Mill not only narrates as a fact his father's unbelief, but adds on his own account the statement, that Theism is "an open contradiction." In p. 46 he says that "the ideal of good" framed by such thinkers as himself, "is usually far nearer to perfection, than the objective Deity of those who think themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with suffering and so deformed with injustice as ours." And in p. 70 he laments that "those who

* This criticism of the autobiography was the earliest which appeared; and we think it superior to any which has followed, unless we except a singularly fair and discriminating one, published in the January "Blackwood." We write of course without having seen the new numbers of the "Edinburgh" and "Quarterly."

reject revelation, very generally take refuge in an optimistic deism, a worship of the order of nature and the supposed course of Providence, *at least* as full of contradictions and perverting to the moral sentiments as any of the forms of Christianity, if only it is as completely realized." Moreover, any one who reads the volume will see, that these passages express what was his own doctrine from first to last. If then by the term "God" be understood an "infinitely perfect Being"—Omnipotence of course being included in "Perfection"—nothing can be clearer, than that Mr. Mill throughout his life confidently denied the existence of God. He implies indeed (p. 39) that "dogmatic atheism" is absurd: but he himself was in the ordinary sense of the term a "dogmatic atheist"; because he confidently denied the existence of any such Being, as Him who is ordinarily called "God."

It may be worth while to add, that he not only rejected deism as confidently as he rejected Christianity, but that he thought Christianity the less unreasonable of the two. His father "spoke with respect" of Butler's "Analogy" (p. 38), which

kept him, as he said, for some considerable time, a believer in the divine authority of Christianity, by proving to him, that whatever are the difficulties in believing that the Old and New Testaments proceed from, or record the acts of, a perfectly wise and good Being, the same and still greater difficulties stand in the way of the belief that a Being of such a character can have been the Maker of the universe. He considered Butler's argument as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly just and benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this, can say little against Christianity, but what can, with at least equal force, be retorted against themselves (p. 39).

In this last sentence, as in a former instance, the author is avowedly expressing what is his own opinion as well as his father's. In his view then, the deistic theory is not only faulty on the same ground with the Christian, but has the *additional* faultiness of adducing arguments against Christianity which are equally destructive of deism itself.

Further,—from the very first opening of his reason to the day on which this autobiography was concluded,—no shade of doubt on the absolute and even obvious certainty of atheism seems to have even momentarily crossed his mind. At one critical period of his life (see p. 132-146) he was led to question profoundly the whole basis, on which he had been so carefully trained, and which he had hitherto assumed as indubitable. He was impelled by the very strongest motives to look in every possible direction for some relief; and yet there was one

direction in which he never thought of looking, viz., belief in God.* No one more heartily denounced than he all habit of passive acquiescence (as he would call it) in tenets once learned; yet his faith in atheism seems really to have rivalled, in firmness, tenacity, undoubtingness, unfaltering persistency, the faith of Catholics in the great verities of their creed. Of every other tenet which he held, he felt it his duty again and again to re-examine the grounds: but the truth of atheism was too self-evident in his view to need re-examination. Catholics, in accordance with their fundamental principles, hold the truth of Catholicity firmly and irrespectively of inquiry;† while Mr. Mill chose, *in the very teeth* of his fundamental principles, to hold the truth of atheism firmly and irrespectively of inquiry.

And at last what was the intellectual foundation of this blind persistency? Strange to say of a phenomenistic philosopher, it was his absolute trust in the self-evident character of a certain alleged axiom. He had been taught from childhood to account it a self-evident contradiction in terms, that a world so abounding in evil as this can have been created by a Being infinite at once in love and in power. It is meant by the very term "Infinite in love,"—so he had been taught to think—that such a Being imparts all the happiness He possibly can; and it is meant by the very term "Infinite in power," that He *can* impart all the happiness He may wish. Looking then at the experienced facts of life, he held that the affirmation of God's Existence is not merely a statement open to innumerable objections and surrounded by innumerable difficulties,—though this also he *would* have said—but a direct contradiction in terms; as though one spoke of a crooked straight line or a round square. We on our side maintain, not only that his thesis is indefensible, but that it will not bear a moment's consideration. We are not able indeed to draw out an intelligible argument on this head, until we can discuss the matter as a whole; until we are directly engaged in that theistic controversy, on which this series of articles is intended to converge. Even when we *are* engaged in that controversy, we are not so insane as to imagine that we can explain *how* it is, that such a world as this can have proceeded from an infinitely loving and powerful Creator. Nay the Catholic is not called on to show positively, that any given objection of antitheists is invalid; because it is

* He says in one place (p. 43), "I am one of the very few examples in this country, who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it."

† In a former number (April, 1871, Art. I.) we gave grounds for regarding this as a thoroughly reasonable process.

rather *their* business to prove it *valid*.* The Catholic begins by drawing out the direct proof of God's Existence,—a proof of the most urgent, immediate, irrefragable, irresistible character that can well be imagined; which penetrates the inmost depths of the human heart, and which reasonably convinces million millions of men, who would be wholly incapable of understanding its scientific analysis. Of course,—on the imaginary supposition that any argument could be adduced on the opposite side which demonstratively disproves God's Existence—absolute scepticism must result; and the Catholic philosopher is therefore required further to answer any such alleged argument. But here his obligation manifestly ends. We do not for a moment deny, that the task incumbent on him is arduous, and requires care; though it can most certainly be achieved with triumphant success: but we maintain that to answer *Mr. Mill's* thesis, is a task of no arduousness at all. It may be arduous (though it is super-superabundantly practicable) to answer this or that objection, which professes to show *by a train of reasoning* that such a world as this cannot have proceeded from an infinitely perfect Being; but it is most easy to answer *Mr. Mill's* allegation, that this impossibility is a *self-evident axiom*.

Now, before going a step further, we must emphatically premise one explanation. That *Mr. Mill's* irreligion was due to grave personal sin on his part, we hold with firmest faith; because the Church teaches that there is no invincible ignorance of God. But if it be asked in what particular acts or omissions that sin consisted, we must reply that it is God only Who knows men's thoughts; and that we must renounce absolutely and heartily all notion of forming any judgment whatever on such a question. It is not however at all inconsistent with this profession, to point out that in this, that, and the other particular, *Mr. Mill's* procedure was evidently faulty; because in no one instance do we hazard a conjecture, that in that particular case he was acting culpably and against light. And it is plainly of moment to show that his procedure *was* fundamentally faulty, in order that his authority may be estimated at no more than its true value.

Now certainly there was one knowledge which, before all others, it behoved him to acquire; viz., the true character of the religion professed by his fellow-countrymen. There was one Man, says *Mr. Mill* himself ("On Liberty," p. 47), "who

* So as regards e.g. Transubstantiation. Catholic philosophers do not profess to show, that this dogma is reconcilable with reason: they content themselves with showing, that it cannot be *proved* irreconcilable therewith.

left on the memory of those who watched His life and conversation such an impression of His moral grandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to Him as the Almighty in person ; " God in human nature. What is more obviously incumbent on an inquiring student, than to study carefully the religion taught by this Man ? Nor are there wanting the most authentic possible records of that teaching. S. Paul e.g. would surely be as important an author to master, as Demosthenes, Tacitus, Juvenal, Quintilian (pp. 20, 21). Still more important to study would be the extant memoirs of that Man, to Whom we have already referred ; as such memoirs were recorded by disciples " who witnessed His life and conversation," and on whom " such an impression of His moral grandeur " was produced. Now we are not professing here to set forth, how such studies might have assisted in drawing Mr. Mill from darkness to light ; we are but alleging his utter neglect of them, as proving his profound prejudice and obduracy on things religious.

In no other way will the fact of this utter neglect be more vividly impressed on the imagination of our readers, than if we briefly recount the course of his studies : and this also on other accounts is a matter of some interest. By the time he was eight years old (p. 8) he had read Herodotus, Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Cyropædia*, parts of *Diogenes Laertius*, *Lucian* and *Isocrates* (p. 5) ; the histories of *Robertson*, *Hume*, *Gibbon*, *Watson*, *Hooker*, and much of *Rollin* ; *Plutarch's Lives* ; *Burnett's History of his Own Time* ; a large portion of the *Annual Register* (p. 7) ; *Millar's Historical View of the English Government* ; and numerous books of adventure and of amusement (pp. 8, 9). He says, indeed (p. 43), that he " has mentioned at how early an age his father made him a reader of ecclesiastical history " : but on looking back at the earlier passage to which this refers, we find that what he has mentioned in this line consisted only of *Mosheim's History* ; *M'Crie's Life of John Knox* ; and *Sewell's* and *Rutty's Histories of the Quakers* (p. 8). At about the same period (p. 43) his father " taught him to take the strongest interest in the Reformation, as the great and decisive contest against priestly tyranny for liberty of thought." Mr. Mill also (ib.) learned his father's account of " what had been thought by mankind on the impenetrable problems," of which Christianity is one attempted solution. From these studies he proceeded (p. 11) to *Virgil*, *Horace*, *Phædrus*, *Livy*, *Sallust*, *Ovid*, *Terence*, *Lucretius*, *Cicero*, *Homer*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Aristophanes*, *Thucydides*, *Xenophon's Hellenics*, *Demosthenes*, *Æschines*, *Lysias*, *Theo-*

critus, Anacreon, Dionysius, Polybius, Aristotle's *Rhetoric** (p. 11), and Mitford's *History of Greece* (p. 12). He also read some of Milton's poetry, Goldsmith's, Burns's, Walter Scott's, Dryden's, Cowper's, and Campbell's; also Joyce's *Scientific Dialogues*, and various treatises on chemistry (pp. 16, 17). At twelve years old he began *Logic* (p. 18), and at the same age he read the Athenian orators, Tacitus, Juvenal, and Quintilian (p. 21). At about the same period (p. 24) he studied very carefully his father's *History of British India*; and must have possessed therefore (we may mention by the way) a far more accurate knowledge of Hindoo theology than he ever had of Christian. Then he advanced to political economy (p. 28). Later on came a little psychology (p. 62); and he then embarked on a course of jurisprudence and Bentham (p. 64). To these he added (pp. 68, 69) Locke, Helvetius, Hartley, Berkeley, Hume's *Essays*, Reid, Dugald Stewart, and some of Brown. He also read an anonymous work against "optimistic deism" (pp. 69-71), which "contributed materially to his development." He says expressly (p. 71): "I have now, I believe, mentioned all the books which had any considerable effect on my earlier mental development"; and adds: "From this point I began to carry on my intellectual cultivation by writing still more than by reading." It is an undeniable fact then, that when he first began his irreligious crusade,† he had never given himself ever so superficially, either to a study of Christian doctrine, or to an examination of the arguments adduced for God's Existence. And his conduct was even more remarkable at the mental crisis to which we have already referred, when he was carried off violently from his old moorings, and was looking everywhere for a haven of rest. He was led to seek refuge in various teachings of Coleridge, of Maurice, of Sterling: but the thought did not so much as occur to him, that anything solid could be said in behalf of what they, one and all, accounted the centre of their whole life, their belief in Christianity.

A curious fact indeed may be adduced from this volume, in further confirmation of our remark on the complete absence of Christianity from his thoughts. We have already pointed out how high was his estimation (if we may use such words

* F. Newman says (*"Idea of a University,"* p. 100) that the classics have in France subverted the spread of deism: the elder Mr. Mill seems to have used them in the interest of atheism.

† It may most truly be called this; because from the first it was the aim of his publications, to promote the radical reform of society on some irreligious basis or other.

without profaneness, even when recounting an infidel's opinion) of our Blessed Lord's character and work. On the other hand, he states (p. 113) that he had obtained most valuable culture "by means of reverential admiration for the lives and characters of heroic persons, especially the heroes of philosophy": and he mentions two objects of this reverential admiration in particular; viz., Socrates and Turgot. It did not enter his mind apparently, to regard the Founder of Christianity as even occupying a high place among the heroic benefactors of mankind.

One cannot be surprised then at that ignorance of the most elementary Christian doctrines, which meets one in every corner of his writings where he mentions Christianity at all. Of this we will cite an instance, which occurs in the present volume. We extract the passage to which we refer, italicising one clause.

Of unbelievers (so called) as well as of believers, there are many species, including almost every variety of moral type. But the best among them, as no one who has had opportunities of really knowing them will hesitate to affirm, are more genuinely religious, in the best sense of the word religion, than those who exclusively arrogate to themselves the title. The liberality of the age, or in other words the weakening of the obstinate prejudice which makes men unable to see what is before their eyes because it is contrary to their expectations, has caused it to be very commonly admitted that a deist may be truly religious: but *if religion stands for any graces of character and not for mere dogma*, the assertion may equally be made of many whose belief is far short of deism. Though they may think the proof incomplete that the universe is a work of design, and though they assuredly disbelieve that it can have an Author and Governor who is *absolute* in power as well as perfect in goodness, they have that which constitutes the principal worth of all religions whatever, an ideal conception of a Perfect Being, to which they habitually refer as the guide of their conscience; and this ideal of Good is usually far nearer to perfection than the objective Deity of those, who think themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with suffering and so deformed by injustice as ours (pp. 45-6).

No doubt, by the word "religion," are meant certain "graces of character, and not mere dogma." But what graces? Would Mr. Mill have used the word "religion" to express justice as such? or benevolence as such? or veracity as such? or fortitude or temperance as such? Of course there would be no sense in his doing so. What is ordinarily meant by "religion" as a grace of character, is the habit of communion with God. A person is more "religious," in proportion as he more has his thoughts fixed on God's presence; in proportion as the whole stream of his life is devoted to the end of loving and obeying God. It is most intelligible then to say that a deist

can be "religious"; and all those indeed must think the saying true, who consider (as we do) that there may be invincible ignorance on the divine origin of Christianity. Such a saying results from faithfulness to the rules of logic, not from so-called "liberality" or "weakening of prejudice." But what can possibly be meant by an *atheist* being "religious"? How can any man remember God's presence, if he do not believe that God exists? how can he devote his life to loving and obeying God, if he thinks there is no God to be loved and obeyed?

When first we hear it then, such language seems simply astounding: but on consideration, one comes to see what it indicates. It indicates that Mr. Mill had no notion of what it is which Christians mean, when they speak of "religiousness" or "piety." Had it not been for Mr. Mill's case, we should have said that even those who do not practise religion, know well what is *meant* by these terms; but Mr. Mill, while leading a life of laborious study, remained to the end of his life profoundly ignorant of the very existence of what the whole world around him knew to be among the most widely extended and powerful springs of human conduct. And this was the man who sat in judgment, as if from an elevated pedestal, on the acts and motives of saintly persons; who claimed superiority over the prejudices of the vulgar; who condescendingly patronized the mediæval Church; who was kind enough to see even in modern Catholicity much which he was happy to approve, though far more which he was obliged to condemn.*

It may seem heartless if, while making these comments, we do not pause for a moment to bewail the hard lot of one, by nature so teachable, loving and sensitive, placed from his birth under the iron yoke of that bigoted and intolerant atheist his father, and indoctrinated by him so carefully in paganism. But (as we have already said) we are attempting no appreciation whatever of his personal character; we are but mentioning this or that fact, which bears importantly on the value of his speculations whether in the sphere of religion or philosophy.

For indeed, even in the matter of social philosophy, how fatal to his intellectual character is what we have just mentioned! He was ignorant (as we have said) of the very existence of what is among the most widely extended and powerful

* Observe e.g. such a sentence as this: "There are men who, not disguising their own unbelief, have written *deeper and finer things* in vindication of what religion has done for mankind, than would have sufficed to found the reputation of some of its most admired defenders." ("Dissertations and Discussions," vol. ii. p. 122.)

springs of human conduct. The main purpose of his life was to act directly or indirectly on the convictions and actions of his contemporaries. To do so with any hope of success, it was necessary that he should clearly understand their *existing* motives, impulses, instincts. And yet, in one very prominent particular, he was as ignorant of the moral world in the midst of which he passed his days, as though he had never read of the past nor lived in the present.

Then again—considering he claimed to take a leading position in metaphysics and psychology—how noteworthy was his ignorance of what Catholics have done in that direction. For many centuries a series of men, admitted by Mr. Mill himself to be powerful thinkers, had concentrated their intellectual energy on the work of raising an edifice of theological science, on the basis of the scholastic philosophy. We should not have been surprised, however profoundly Mr. Mill might have differed from them: what does surprise us is, that he took no pains to know them. What would he have thought of himself, if he had written his work on Hamilton, without acquiring a knowledge of Kant's philosophy? Of course, whether Kant be or be not intellectually superior to the giants of scholasticism, is a matter of opinion: but it is a matter of undeniable fact, that the latter immeasurably surpassed him in the influence of their speculations on the whole course of thought and of society for many centuries. Yet, undeterred by this crass ignorance, Mr. Mill permitted himself very freely to criticise the intellectual characteristics of those very centuries.

It will be said perhaps, that at all events other antitheistic philosophers of the day are no less unacquainted with Catholic theology and philosophy than Mr. Mill. We heartily endorse this remark. Their dense ignorance of Catholicity is a mark of their crooked and perverse intellectual habits, which can be appreciated by the most ordinarily educated Catholic. In fact they are less acquainted with Catholicity, and have far less wish to be acquainted, than had Mr. Mill himself.* But then the latter always laid claim to exceptional large-mindedness, and honestly believed such claim to be legitimate. He accounted himself "much superior to most of his contemporaries in willingness and ability to learn from everybody" (p. 242). He professed "great readiness and eagerness to learn from everybody, and to make room in his opinions for

* Mr. Mill's autobiography has not unnaturally caused for the moment a reaction against him, even as compared with other writers of the same school. We look forward to a reaction against this reaction. To our mind no one of the rest approaches him, either in intellectual clearness, candour and ability, nor, again, in zealous philanthropy.

every new acquisition by adjusting the old and new to one another" (p. 252). He was eager to learn from every quarter, except only the Catholic Church.

There are other passages in the autobiography besides those we have mentioned, which bear importantly on Mr. Mill's philosophical tenets: but (with one exception to be immediately mentioned) they will be more conveniently considered in subsequent articles; especially when we come to handle again his utilitarian tenets. We therefore proceed to resume our controversy with him, at the point where we left off last July.

The principal topic with which we were occupied in our July article, was a consideration of Mr. Mill's reply to the arguments we had adduced against him, on the necessary character of mathematical axioms. It might appear on the surface, that this is somewhat a subordinate question, in its bearing on the very vital points at issue between Mr. Mill and ourselves: but we replied in July (p. 4) that Mr. Mill "would have been the last to make this complaint." Our statement is fully borne out by the autobiography. He accounted the controversy between intuitionism and phenomenism far more fundamental than any other, in matters no less of social than of strictly philosophical speculation; and he accounted the discussion on the necessary character of mathematical axioms to be the very turning point of this controversy. The former opinion is expressed in p. 273; and in p. 226 he declares, that "the *chief strength*" of the philosophy which he assails "in morals, politics, and religion, lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make to the *evidence of mathematics* and the cognate branches of physical science." "To expel it from these," he adds, "is to drive it from its *stronghold*"; and by parity of reason, if we *maintain* it in these, we maintain it in its stronghold. No one then could have a stronger conviction than Mr. Mill himself, on the vital character of the issue which we joined with him in July. On that occasion we candidly expressed our opinion, as to the utterly worthless character of his reasoning. "We are deliberately of opinion," we said (p. 5), "that not one of his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly one of them the most superficial appearance of force." "The whole mass of human knowledge," we further alleged (p. 25), "is made," by him, "utterly dependent on what is about the most gratuitous and arbitrary theory which can well be imagined." And we added, that Mr. Mill's death had been to us a severe controversial disappointment. We had been eager to engage in a hand-to-

hand conflict with so distinguished a champion, not on a few questions only, however fundamental, but on the whole mass of philosophical speculation, which leads onward to that one supreme issue, the Existence of a Personal God. We were full of confidence that a signal triumph must result to the cause of truth, if we could induce Mr. Mill to put forth his utmost strength on the other side.

At the same time we are glad to think, that the keystone of his whole philosophical position lies in those very doctrines, on which he lived to publish his reply to our adverse arguments. Every philosopher of the present day has his "aggressive" as well as his "affirmative" position. You understand his "aggressive" position, so far as you understand what those tenets are which he desires to overthrow; and you understand his "affirmative" position, so far as you understand what those tenets are which he desires to establish in their place. Now Mr. Mill's "aggressive" position mainly consisted, (1) in his denying the cognizableness of any necessary truths; and (2) (as a means for that denial) in his denying the competence of men's existent faculties to avouch truth finally and without appeal. Whereas then he regards the very "stronghold" of necessists to be their view of mathematical axioms, we may fairly say that the keystone of his "aggressive" position consists (1) in his doctrine on mathematical axioms, and (2) in his doctrine on the rule of certitude. On the other hand his "affirmative" position mainly consists in his claim to substitute a body of science built exclusively on experience, for a body of science purporting to be built partly on necessary truth. But no body of science can possibly be built on the exclusive basis of experience, unless the philosopher first establishes on grounds of experience the uniformity of nature; or what Mr. Mill calls "the law of universal causation." Mr. Mill himself admits this, as heartily as we maintain it. The keystone then of Mr. Mill's "affirmative" position lies in his doctrine, that the uniformity of nature can be proved by experience; while the keystone of his "aggressive" position lies (as we have seen) in his respective doctrines, on mathematical axioms, and on the rule of certitude. And it so happens that these are the very three doctrines, on which he expressly replied to our adverse arguments. In our article of last July we commenced our rejoinder on that reply, and on the present occasion are to complete it. It is certainly a great matter of regret to us for the sake of truth, that such rejoinder must now necessarily be final; and it would have been a matter of keen interest to us, to know how he would have encountered our remarks.

Our last article was much longer than we could have wished ; but we were very desirous of drawing out uninterruptedly our whole counter-argument, on the necessity of mathematical axioms. To prevent our article however from swelling to an absolutely intolerable length, we were obliged to omit all *summary* of our lengthened reasoning. And we feel this to have been so great a disadvantage, that one of our first procedures on the present occasion will be in some degree to supply that deficiency.

Before commencing this however, we shall make a little further comment on a position of Mr. Mill's, which we criticised in July (p. 45). Our readers, on referring to our previous remarks, will see that he makes two statements. Firstly, he says that "wherever the present constitution of space exists," the axioms of geometry are cognisable to mankind as "*conclusions* from that conception." Secondly he adds, that we have ample reason to know,* that the same "constitution of space, which exists on our own planet, exists also in the region of the fixed stars." Now what does he mean by this extremely vague term "constitution of space"? We can fancy his indignation, if one of his *opponents* had used so vague a term as this without explanation. Yet we affirm with some confidence, that Mr. Mill has nowhere even attempted to explain what he meant by the term ; and we doubt indeed whether he ever used it, except in the two notes, replying to our own criticism, which he inserted in the latest edition of his respective works on "Logic" and on "Hamilton."

There is only one meaning which we can think of, as intended by this phrase. We must suppose that he accounts "the present constitution of space" as existing, wherever the three dimensions—length, breadth, height—are predicable of all material objects. But if this were his meaning, he would hold that a man can "conclude" the truth of geometrical axioms, "from his very conception" of length, breadth, and height. This however is the precise point at issue between him and his opponents ; and if such were his meaning, he would be saying in so many words that his opponents are in the right and he in the wrong. We would beg our readers to look back at our whole July criticism in pp. 44, 5. For our own part, we believe this is one of the cases—far more numerous throughout Mr. Mill's works than might be supposed—in which his spontaneous reason is too strong for his artificial and elaborated philosophy.

* His word is to "believe" : but on looking at the context, our readers will see that he certainly means "know."

We will next direct our readers' attention to a remark we made a page earlier. We observed how difficult it is to know what *is* Mr. Mill's positive thesis, on the cognisableness of mathematical axioms; and also to know what are the *grounds* alleged by him for such thesis. He declares again and again, that the universal truth of these axioms, throughout the planet Terra at least, is irrefragably proved by universal experience. Yet what does he himself say on another occasion? "That all metals sink in water, was an uniform experience from the origin of the human race down to the discovery of potassium in the present century by Sir Humphrey Davy. That all swans are white, was an uniform experience down to the discovery of Australia" ("Logic," vol. i. p. 305). What stronger ground then has he for his conviction that over the whole earth trilaterals are triangular, than his ancestors had for their entirely mistaken conviction, that over the whole earth swans are white and metals sink in water? How can he even guess that in some newly-discovered country a tree may not be found, which shall possess the capability of being formed into quadrangular trilaterals, or into pairs of straight lines of which each pair shall enclose a space?

Mr. Mill, however, is much less anxious to state and establish his positive than his negative thesis, on mathematical axioms: and unless his whole fabric of philosophy is to collapse,* he must prove that these axioms are *not* self-evidently necessary. We on the contrary, as zealous impugnors of his philosophy, have been bent on proving the contrary. And the general argument we have used, may be thus syllogistically stated.

Whatever the existent cognitive faculties of mankind testify, is instinctively † known by mankind as certainly true.

But the existent cognitive faculties of mankind testify, that any given mathematical axiom is self-evidently necessary.

Ergo, &c.

Now it is most surprising that a writer, generally so clear as

* This must not be understood in too extreme a sense. In October, 1871, we said (p. 287) that, on such a supposition, "his works might still be admitted to contain a large mass of valuable philosophical matter, *as we think indeed they do*; but his philosophy *as a whole* would be at an end." This is precisely what we still think.

† We had at first said "self-evidently"; but in our July article we found it more convenient to appropriate that phrase in a different sense. See pp. 29, 30. We think the word "instinctively" the best substitute, as expressing the irresistible and (as it were) piercing character of the convictions to which we refer. Let any reader consider the keen certitude with which he knows that he experienced those sensations of ten minutes back, which his memory vividly testifies,

Mr. Mill, should so long have left it uncertain, *which* of these two propositions it is which he denies: see e.g. the mutually contradictory propositions, which we quoted from him in July (pp. 21-23). Such however being the case, we entered at length into the proof of *both* the above premisses. But after reading the autobiography, we can hardly doubt that it is the former of the two premisses against which Mr. Mill protests.* We shall not therefore here attempt to epitomize our argument for our minor premiss; but we shall content ourselves on that head with referring our readers to the whole course of our July remarks, from p. 26 to p. 43. We will but briefly say here, that it would certainly be a bold step to deny this premiss. Take any man of ordinary thoughtfulness and education; and ask him whether it is within the sphere of Omnipotence, to enclose a space by two straight lines, or to create a quadrangular trilateral: there can be very little doubt what his spontaneous answer will be. We here then assume Mr. Mill to accept our minor premiss; we assume him to concede that, if mankind trust their existent faculties, it is impossible for them to doubt the self-evident necessity of any given mathematical axiom.

Mr. Mill then, we take it, would have argued in some such manner as this: and we confine ourselves for clearness' sake to geometrical axioms, because whatever is said of them may so easily be applied to arithmetical. "From the first moment "when an infant begins to move his arms and legs," Mr. Mill would say, "he is beginning to acquire knowledge on the elementary truths of geometry. Before arriving at the age of "reason, he has been completely saturated with his experience, "that two intersecting straight lines always diverge, and that "a straight line is the shortest path between two points. No "wonder then that, when he comes to use his faculties, they "are not only unable to conceive any thought contrary to this "uniform experience,—but have even been so moulded by "that experience, as to pronounce its various particulars so "many self-evidently necessary truths."

Our answer to this view of things is virtually contained in our July article: but none the less it may be of important service, if we reproduce it under a different arrangement. We say then, that two different replies may be made to Mr. Mill's reasoning, as here drawn out. It may be replied (1), that no such experience of geometrical axioms as an adult has acquired, could possibly produce on his faculties such a result as Mr. Mill contends for. And it may be re-

* See particularly a passage in pp. 225, 6, which we shall quote in a later part of our article.

plied (2), that the testimony of each man's existent faculties is his infallible rule of certitude;* and that he has no legitimate appeal from their present to their past avouchment. If either of these replies be substantiated, Mr. Mill's argument falls entirely to the ground: but we are confident that *both* can easily be substantiated; and we shall proceed at once to do so. It is the second on which we are far the more anxious to fix our readers' attention; but it will be more convenient if we begin with the first.

We are assuming then Mr. Mill to agree with ourselves, that men's existent faculties avouch the self-evident necessity of some given geometrical axiom. But he maintains that this avouchment of theirs can be explained, by the constant and unmistakable experience of that axiom which every adult has gone through. We reply that their avouchment is *not* thus explainable. It is quite untrue, we say, that any experience of any geometrical axiom, which an adult has had in his childhood, has any tendency so to affect his faculties, as that on that account they shall pronounce such axiom to be a necessary truth. There were three different arguments adduced by us in July for this proposition, either of which alone would be conclusive.

I. According to Mr. Mill, such unintermittent and unmistakable experience as I have had of any given geometrical axiom, suffices to make it impossible for me to doubt, if I trust my existent faculties, that the reversal of that axiom is beyond the sphere of Omnipotence. But if this were so, it must follow that in proportion as I have more accumulated experience of any truth, in that proportion I find it more *difficult* (if I trust my existent faculties) to regard the reversal of that truth as within the sphere of Omnipotence. But is this anything like the case? Most evidently not. Suppose I have only once or twice in my life tasted beet-root; while on the other hand (of course) times without number I have felt fire to burn, and seen wood float on water while stones sink therein. Yet most assuredly I have not to the very smallest extent any greater difficulty in supposing that an Omnipotent Creator could prevent fire from burning or could support stones in the water, than in supposing that He could alter the taste of beet-root.

II. Let us take, as an instance of a geometrical axiom, the proposition that two parallel straight lines will never meet;†

* For the words "rule" and "motive" of certitude, see July, p. 7.

† We define a "straight line" to be "a line which pursues throughout the same direction"; and we define "parallel straight lines" to be "straight lines which pursue the same direction with each other."

and let us take as our instance of an obvious physical fact, the warmth-giving property of fire. No one who reflects will doubt, that an English child's experience of the latter truth is (to say the least) every whit as constant and uniform as his experience of the former. Yet when he comes to the age of reason, he pronounces that the former is a necessary truth; whereas he would be simply amazed at the allegation, that an Omnipotent Creator could not on any given occasion deprive fire of its warmth-giving property.

Now Mr. Mill himself admits this latter fact; but he has a reply. "Fire," he says ("On Hamilton," p. 339), "it is true, will, under certain needful conditions, give warmth; but the sight of fire is often unattended with any sensation of warmth. . . . The visible presence of fire and the sensation of warmth are not in that invariable conjunction and immediate juxtaposition, which might disable us from conceiving one without the other, and which might therefore lead us to suppose their conjunction a necessary truth." He indicates here, we suppose, such apparent exceptions to the warmth-giving property of fire, as take place when, being out of doors, one sees a fire through the window without receiving warmth from it. And so (ib.) his general proposition is, that in order to generate the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity, "the experience must not only be constant and uniform, but the juxtaposition of the facts in experience must be immediate and close; as well as so free from even the semblance of an exception, that no counter-association can possibly arise." Wherever then there has been in past experience even the *semblance* of an exception—according to Mr. Mill—there no conviction of self-evident necessity will arise. To this we answered, that (on his own showing) there has been in past experience the semblance of an exception to the axiom, that two parallel straight lines will never meet. "In the case of parallel lines," he says ("On Hamilton," p. 335), "the laws of perspective do present such an illusion," or semblance of exception: "they do to the eye appear to meet in both directions." He does not himself then attempt to maintain his own thesis; for his own thesis was, that in order to generate the conviction of self-evident necessity, there must have been freedom from all semblance of exception in past experience. And he fails entirely therefore in accounting for the fact, that mankind regard the geometrical axiom as self-evidently necessary, while they do *not* so regard the warmth-giving property of fire.

The only answer Mr. Mill can give to this is ("On Hamilton," p. 335, note), that, as regards the axiom, the apparent

exception is such, that its "illusory character is at once seen, from the immediate accessibility of the evidence which disproves" it. But it is obviously undeniable, that, in the case of a fire seen from out of doors, precisely the same explanation can be given. When a fire is looked at from out of doors, there is an illusory exception (no doubt) to the warmth-giving property of fire; but its "illusory character is at once seen, from the immediate accessibility of the evidence which disproves" it.

We sum up then this argument. If my past experience of parallel straight lines can have generated in my mind (as Mr. Mill maintains it has) a conviction, that the fact of their never meeting is a self-evidently necessary truth;—then my past experience of fire would equally have generated in my mind a conviction, that its warmth-giving property is a self-evidently necessary truth. That the latter supposition is mistaken, Mr. Mill of course fully admits; it follows therefore that his own supposition is equally false, and that this fundamental principle of his philosophy is an error.

We added in July, that Mr. Mahaffy has mentioned another instance of illusion, as besetting men's experience of geometrical axioms. I take a straight stick; and by manipulating it I add to the store of experience which I already possess, that a straight line is the shortest path between two points. I plunge halfway in the water this "shortest path between two points," and the said path appears crooked. Just as when I look at a fire through the windows, I have a momentary illusion, that fire does not give warmth;—so on this occasion I have a momentary illusion, that the shortest path between two points is crooked. The former illusion is neither stronger nor more persistent than the latter. If therefore my past experience have not generated in me a conviction that the warmth-giving property of fire is a self-evidently necessary truth,—how can it be my past experience which has generated in me a conviction, that this geometrical axiom is self-evidently necessary? Let some disciple of Mr. Mill's attempt a reply.

III. Lastly, there is more than one geometrical axiom, which I have never known by experience at all; and in regard to which therefore, it is manifestly impossible, that my cognitive faculties can have been moulded by experience into its avouchment. Of this kind is the axiom which we took as our specimen in July, that "all trilaterals are triangular." It is not only that students had not *formulized* this truth before they met with it in their Euclid, but the great majority of them never *knew* it. Observe the contrast between this axiom on the one hand, and a truth which men really

have known by un-formulized experience on the other. The proposition was once placed before me for the first time in a formulized shape, that "horses differ greatly from each other in colour." Though (by hypothesis) I have never before expressly contemplated this proposition, I at once recognize it as expressing a freshly familiar truth; a truth vividly known to me by every day's experience. On the other hand most of those who have not studied the elements of geometry—when first they are told that all trilaterals are triangular,—as simply receive a new piece of information, as they did when they heard that war had been declared between Prussia and France. But that which is received as a new piece of information, cannot possibly have been already known to them by past experience.

This last argument is indubitably valid as against Mr. Mill: because, throughout his reply to us, he fully admits that the triangularity of trilaterals is a veritable axiom; a part of the geometrical basis, and not of the geometrical superstructure. His disciples might imaginably allege, that it is no axiom at all; but only a spontaneous inference, imperceptible as such by reason of its rapidity, from certain genuine axioms. If they do allege this, they are called on to state what those axioms are, from which the proposition could be deduced; and we entirely deny the possibility of their doing this. However, even on the supposition of their success, the two *first* arguments we gave (either of which is alone decisive) would remain unaffected.

We have now then made good our first reply to Mr. Mill. We have shown, we trust, conclusively, that no such experience of geometrical axioms as adults have acquired in their youth, could possibly produce on their cognitive faculties any such effect, as Mr. Mill's argument supposes. But we think it of immeasurably greater importance to establish against him our second reply; to establish against him the thesis, that the actual testimony of each man's existent faculties is his infallible rule of certitude, and that no legitimate appeal lies from their present to their past avouchment. We consider this thesis (as we have often said) to be of inappreciable moment: because its scope extends far beyond the mere question of mathematical axioms; and its rejection would issue by necessary consequence, in bringing down human knowledge to a level below that of the brutes. We reasoned on this head against Mr. Mill in July, from p. 6 to p. 26; and our present business is merely to epitomize our former argument.

The thesis then which we defend, as at once so certain and

so fundamental, is this ; that what each man's existent faculties actually testify, is instinctively known by him as certainly true. It is by no means easy to understand, what is the adverse theory advocated by Mr. Mill. If we were to take literally some of his strange expressions quoted by us in July (pp. 22, 3), we should understand him as maintaining a singular theory enough. We should understand him as maintaining, that no declaration of a man's cognitive faculties is trustworthy, unless it be a declaration which these faculties would have uttered, when he was "an infant," when he "first opened his eyes to the light"; that no argument is valid, unless it would have been recognized as valid by a new-born infant; that no avouchment of memory concerning the past may reasonably be trusted, unless the memory of a new-born infant would have safely carried him so far back. But we will do our author more justice than he has done himself, and state his proposition in a form less revolting to common sense. We will understand him then to mean, that it is not what my faculties actually testify, that I can with reason regard as certainly true; but rather what they *would* have testified, had they grown to maturity according to their own intrinsic laws of development, without being denaturalized and artificialized by that great body of experience, which has accumulated round them during their long infancy. Now it will be very useful for the purpose of our present argument, if we devise some *name* to express the human faculties in this purely imaginary condition. Let us call these the "*pure* human faculties": and the point at issue may then be stated thus. On our part we contend, that the rule of certitude is the *actual* avouchment of man's *existent* faculties; whereas Mr. Mill contends, that it is the *hypothetical* avouchment of man's "*pure*" faculties.

We argue firstly against Mr. Mill's theory, as we have often argued before, that it lays the axe to the root of all human knowledge whatever; that, if it were sound, no human being could know anything as certain or even as probable, except only the facts of his momentarily present consciousness. He could not e.g. apprehend the smallest sentence spoken to him: for what he at this moment hears is only the *last* word of the sentence; and how can he know what were the *earlier* words? Indubitably indeed the first step (whatever it may be) which he has to take, in order to arrive at any knowledge whatever,* is only rendered possible by his trusting the avouchment of his memory. But how could Mr. Mill consider such

* For merely to experience the facts of his momentarily present consciousness, is not to possess knowledge at all.

trust reasonable? We say that the actual avouchment of his existent faculties—and of his memory inclusively—is instinctively known by each man as certain; but this is precisely what Mr. Mill denies.

In fact Mr. Mill's position reminds one more of some amusing Irish bull, than of grave philosophical disquisition. I encounter the familiar features of an old friend. Have I a right to regard it as certain, or even probable, that I ever saw those features before? In other words, can I reasonably believe those past phenomena to have occurred, which my memory most distinctly avouches? The answer to this question, according to Mr. Mill, depends on the further question, whether my memory would have made the same avouchment, had it not become (as Mr. Mill would say), artificialized and denaturalized. A true disciple of Mr. Mill's, then, if he is so circumstanced, will not believe that he ever saw his friend before, until he has first examined the above-named preliminary question. But how can he so much as *begin* to examine it, without trusting his existent memory? Yet it is *unreasonable* in his view to trust his existent memory, until he has gone through that very investigation, which is impossible *without* that trust. He has no means therefore whatever of arriving at any reasonable trust in the avouchments of his memory; his knowledge accordingly is confined to the experience of his momentarily present consciousness, and is inferior to that of the very brutes.

The same argument may be exhibited in a somewhat different shape. How did Mr. Mill arrive at his theory, that his existent faculties cannot be trusted? By certain trains of reasoning. But such trains of reasoning had no meaning; except for two assumptions: (1) the assumption that logical reasoning is valid; and (2) the assumption that Mr. Mill on every occasion could trust his memory of what he had previously observed or established. But these assumptions were the most arbitrary and gratuitous of inventions, unless he had been first of all warranted in trusting his existent faculties, whether of reasoning or of memory.

We have already said, that his position reminds one of what Englishmen tell as an amusing Irish bull. All the world knows the story of the Irishman, who stood in the coffee-room of a hotel, professing only to warm himself at the fire, but in reality also occupied with reading a letter which another guest was writing to a friend. The writer, observing this, proceeds to add on paper: "I should express myself more fully on this matter, if there were not a blackguard in the room, looking over my shoulder at everything

I write." "You insolent liar," exclaims the self-convicted Irishman. His blunder was precisely this; that his denial of the allegation made against him was directly based on an admission of his truth. Just so Mr. Mill's denial of our thesis is directly based on his affirmation of it. His belief that it is true, is the principal premiss which leads him to the conclusion that it is false.*

But now further. Mr. Mill's argument implies, that at all events, if it could be shown that his "pure" faculties would have declared the necessity of mathematical axioms, he would no longer deny the latter doctrine, but on the contrary accept it.† Yet on what ground would it be reasonable *then* to accept it? How could he know e. g. that Professor Huxley's suggestion is not true? that the human faculties have not been purposely made deceptive, by some mendacious creator of mankind? But this is only one of a hundred hypotheses which may most easily be imagined, all of them inconsistent with the supposition, that man's "pure" faculties would be trustworthy; and on what ground would Mr. Mill be warranted in assuming, that all these hypotheses are false? On what ground could he assume the proposition that (by some totally unknown law) the human faculties so proceed in their operation that—if sensible experience were only away—they would invariably declare what is objectively true? On what ground could he take for granted that which, from his point of view, is surely a most startling proposition? *We* are under no such difficulty; because on our view each man knows instinctively on each

* What has been urged by us, in this and several preceding articles, on the absolute necessity of assuming the veracity of memory, will be found (we think) a preservative against many false philosophies. For instance, there is a philosophical tenet beginning to show itself, which would deprive the human faculties of their due authority, on the ground, that any given avouchment which they may put forth is but the result of certain physical antecedents e. g. in the nervous system. In reply, we will concede for argument's sake the fact alleged; because we maintain that no inference could be drawn from the fact, such as these philosophers suppose.

If they are to escape the most flagrant and monstrous inconsistency, they must refuse to trust any given act of memory, until they can know that it is not the result of physical antecedents. But they cannot even begin to inquire how far this is the case, without trusting other acts of memory equally unauthenticated; and so on ad infinitum.

As modern philosophy proceeds, it will be seen (we predict) more and more clearly, that the received Catholic doctrine on the rule of certitude is the one impregnable fortress, from which every irreligious philosophy can be defeated and overthrown.

† "The verdict of . . . our immediate and intuitive conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal. The next question is, to what does" this intuitive conviction "bear witness." "Mill on Hamilton," p. 158.

occasion that his existent faculties avouch truly. Mr. Mill rejects this, the only possible foundation for human knowledge; and substitutes in its place absolutely nothing.

Such are the arguments which we expressed in July, against Mr. Mill's aberration on the rule of certitude. We do not however admit, that he gives in the autobiography at all a true account of his opponents' doctrine. We cannot even understand what he means, when he says (p. 274) that they deem "intuition" to "speak with an authority higher than that of our reason": for what is intuition except one *part* of reason? And when he accuses them (p. 226) of regarding as "intuitive every inveterate belief of which the origin is not remembered," we must at all events make one explanation. In July, 1871 (p. 64), "we fully admitted, that again and again inferences are so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most easily mistaken for intuitions; and that we have no right of alleging aught as certainly a primary truth, without proving that it cannot be an opinion derived inferentially from experience." What those truths are which a man's existent faculties avouch, this is a matter for keen psychological investigation; and on which, without such investigation, we admit that very serious mistake is abundantly possible.

And this brings us to another matter, of much importance in our controversy with Mr. Mill. He distinguishes ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 441) two essentially different kinds of what he calls "complex ideas": (1) those which *consist* of simpler ones, and (2) those which have been *generated* by simpler ones. The idea of an orange e.g., he says, is complex in the former sense: it "really *consists* of the simple ideas of a certain colour, a certain form, a certain taste and smell, &c., because we can, by interrogating our consciousness, perceive all these elements in the idea." But he considers that, by a process of what he calls "mental chemistry," some idea may *result* from the combination of certain past ideas, which idea nevertheless *in its present state* is incapable of analysis. Whether the fact be so, is a very interesting psychological question, on which we need not here attempt to pronounce. But as a matter of language, we should call such ideas (if they exist) "simple," not "complex." And as a matter of philosophy, we should confidently deny that the question here raised by Mr. Mill can give any help in deciding, what it is which man's existent faculties testify.

We shall best illustrate what we here mean, by reverting to a former discussion of ours with Mr. Mill, on the foundation of morality (Jan. 1872). We devoted some pages of that article (pp. 48-51) to establish the conclusion, that the idea

"morally good" is perfectly simple: and then, from that conclusion, we drew the further inference, that certain moral truths are self-evidently necessary. Mr. Mill's reply to that argument would probably be (see "Logic," vol. ii. p. 443, note), that the idea "morally good" is *not* perfectly simple; because, though it does not *consist* of simpler ideas, it was originally *generated* by such. In company with Mr. Hutton, we entirely deny that such can possibly have been the case: as we stated in p. 61. But what we are here pointing out is, that such an allegation is utterly irrelevant. Let it once be admitted that, so far as the *existent* human faculties are concerned, "morally good" is an idea incapable of analysis; the conclusion inevitably follows (as we showed in the article) that the existent human faculties declare certain moral truths to be self-evidently necessary. But it is what his faculties *do* declare—not what under imaginary circumstances they *would* declare—which alone is known by each man to be infallibly true.

Our present business is not with Mr. Herbert Spencer: but we may mention by the way, that (if we rightly understand his various statements) his distrust of the human existent faculties exceeds even Mr. Mill's. He will not even accept, as certainly true, what he admits that his "pure" faculties would unmistakably declare; because he considers that he may *inherit* faculties, which have been denaturalized and artificialized by *ancestral* experience. Our whole answer to Mr. Mill contains à fortiori an answer to Mr. Spencer.* And it is no small testimony to the strength of Theistic philosophy, that its two ablest assailants in our time have been driven to take refuge in different phases of a theory, so manifestly absurd and self-contradictory.

Here then we close what is necessarily our final reply to Mr. Mill, on what we have called the keystone of his "aggressive" philosophical position; viz. his respective doctrines on mathematical axioms and on the rule of certitude. In our article of last July we treated these two questions in their logical order, and commenced with the latter: whereas on the present occasion, for the sake of varying our treatment, we have proceeded inversely; we have traced back our difference from him on mathematical axioms, to our difference from him on the rule of certitude. We will sum up under five questions,

* We would refer our readers to a masterly article on Mr. Spencer in the "Quarterly" of last October. We heartily concur with it from first to last, except indeed that its eulogy of Mr. Spencer's *ability* seems to us a little beyond the mark. Mr. Spencer's reply to it in the "Fortnightly" of December entirely misses its point.

and so (we hope) give our readers an intelligible conspectus of the whole.

Question 1st. Do the existent human faculties pronounce that mathematical axioms are self-evidently necessary? We reply most confidently in the affirmative, and we argued in that sense in July last from p. 26 to p. 43. Mr. Mill, if we may judge from his autobiography, does not himself venture to answer this question in the negative.

Question 2nd. Can this avouchment of the human faculties have been produced by the mere agency of past experience? We answer confidently in the negative; Mr. Mill confidently in the affirmative.

Question 3rd. Supposing that the said avouchment *could* have been thus produced, would this circumstance afford any justification for doubting its certain truth? Mr. Mill answers this question in the affirmative; we in the negative. We maintain that the avouchment of each man's existent faculties is his one infallible rule of certitude; and that a denial of this truth would degrade his knowledge to a level below that of the brutes.

Question 4th. Mr. Mill implies that he accepts, as certainly true, whatever his faculties *would* have declared, had they not been denaturalized and artificialized by past experience. Does he give any reason for this opinion? None whatever. He is wholly silent on the motive of certitude.

Question 5th. What ground do we give for our own doctrine, that whatever any man's existent faculties avouch, is known by him as certainly true? We allege that in each separate case this is known instinctively: and we give, as our illustration of the term "instinctive," the keen and instinctive certitude, with which each man knows himself to have experienced what his memory clearly and vividly testifies.

We have been speaking on necessary truth in general, and on the self-evident necessity of mathematical axioms in particular. One or two further questions had better be considered, before we finally turn from this matter; though Mr. Mill is not directly concerned with them.

I. One of these has been suggested to us by a non-Catholic correspondent. He objects altogether to our taking mathematical axioms as a sample of what we allege about necessary truths in general. "Lines and angles," he argues, are but imagined by geometricians. No fair parallel can be made (he thinks) between such mere notions on one hand, and facts on the other hand—such e.g. as human actions—which have a real objective existence. Our correspondent does not deny,

that there are various hypothetically necessary truths, concerning these imaginary lines and angles: but he denies that this furnishes any kind of presumption or even illustration, in favour of there being e.g. a necessary morality in human actions. He is well aware that on this matter he has Mr. Mill for his opponent, no less than ourselves; and in fact we could answer him at every point, without going further for materials than Mr. Mill's "Logic." Mr. Mill holds, that every true proposition concerning angles and lines represents real objective truth. We will not however here draw out Mr. Mill's (to our mind) conclusive argument for this opinion; because to do so would carry us a great deal too far. We content ourselves with three replies, either of which by itself appears to us decisive.

Firstly, we point to arithmetical truths. Let there be 16 rows of pebbles each containing 18: it is a necessary truth, that the whole number is 288. Omnipotence could divide one pebble into two, or create new pebbles; but it is beyond the sphere of Omnipotence to effect that, so long as there remain 16 rows of 18 pebbles each, the whole number of pebbles should be either more or less than the sum of two hundreds eight tens and eight units. Is not this an external objective fact, if there be any such in the world? And the number of such arithmetical facts is simply inexhaustible. Then secondly take the theorems—inexhaustible in number—of solid geometry. Omnipotence e.g. can make a perfectly accurate parallelopiped: but it cannot make one, which shall not possess all the properties proved by geometers. And thirdly, every proposition which concerns *areas* may be most easily converted into a proposition of solid geometry.* Even then if it were true that lines and angles are mere geometrical notions, there remains an inexhaustible number of mathematical propositions, which indubitably concern objective and external facts. All these possess the attribute of necessity; and they may very fairly be made samples of *other* necessary truths, which also concern objective external facts.

II. We now pass to an objection, which may imaginably be made from an entirely different quarter; though no such objection has happened to come within our knowledge. On

* Here is one instance of what we mean. Take a right-angled triangle, and erect squares on all the sides as in Euclid I. 47. Suppose this figure to move parallelly with itself, and a solid figure is of course the result. Omnipotence can create such a solid figure with perfect accuracy: but Omnipotence cannot effect, that the portion of it generated by the square of the hypotenuse shall be either greater or less than the sum of those two portions generated by the squares of the sides.

this, as on other occasions, we have often given, as a special explanation of the term "necessary," that the reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence. It is possible that here and there some Catholic may have been startled by this expression, as though it implied some disparagement of God's Attributes. Now since a very few words will suffice to remove any such misapprehension, those few words had better be inserted.

On a former occasion (July 1869, p. 154) we laid down the following proposition, as that for which in due time we shall contend. We consider, with FF. Kleutgen and Liberatore, that all necessary truths are founded on God's Essence; that they are what they are, because He is what He is. Let us suppose then any Catholic to make the objection we suggested above. We would ask him, whether there is any disparagement to God's Attributes, in saying that He cannot destroy Himself; that the destruction of God is external to the sphere of Omnipotence. On the contrary, he will answer, God's Attributes *would* be intolerably disparaged, if He were *not* accounted Indestructible: Existence is involved in His Essence. Secondly, we would ask, whether there is any disparagement of God's Attributes, in saying that He cannot change His Nature; that He cannot make Himself e.g. mendacious, unjust, unfaithful to promises. On the contrary, the Immutability of His Nature is perhaps what is in my mind more than anything else, when I speak of His Greatness. But if He cannot change His Nature, it follows that He cannot change what is *founded* on His Nature; that He cannot change necessary truths. In saying then that the reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence,—so far from disparaging God's Attributes, we are extolling the Immutability of His Nature.

III. We must preface our next inquiry by a short preliminary statement. It is alleged by various phenomenists, that there are no ideas in the mind, except copies in various combinations of what has been cognised by the senses.* We need hardly say how intensely we deny this, though we are not here considering the question at any length. Take e.g. the idea "morally good." We have maintained in a former article (Jan. 1872) that it is perfectly simple; and that perhaps no other idea can be named, so constantly recurring in one or other shape. Here we may add, that there is no idea pos-

* This is not however Mr. Mill's opinion: for (not to mention other exceptions he would make) we have already recounted his doctrine, that many an idea is generated by "mental chemistry" from other ideas, which nevertheless does not *consist* of those ideas, nor is now any *combination* of them.

sessing more special characteristics of its own, more readily and vividly cognizable; while most certainly it is no copy, or combination of copies, of anything experienced by the senses.* In a future article we hope to defend a similar proposition, in regard to the idea "cause"; and in like manner the idea "necessary" is certainly no copy, or combination of copies, of anything cognized by the senses.

The question for which we have been preparing the way, is (as far as we see) of no practical importance; but for the sake of clearness, it may be worth while briefly to enter on it. Is the idea "necessary" a simple or complex idea? We suggested on a former occasion (Oct. 1869, p. 151) that it is complex; and that a "necessary" truth precisely means a truth "of which there is no *cause*." Subsequent reflection has induced us to doubt the truth of this suggestion; and has inclined us to the opinion, that the idea "necessary" admits no such analysis, and is in fact altogether simple. Take the proposition, "every necessary truth is uncaused." Is this a purely explicative proposition?† Does the word "uncaused" merely express, what was already in my mind when I used the word "necessary"? or on the contrary, does it add something to the former idea? If our reader gives the former answer, he holds the opinion which we suggested in 1869; if he gives the latter answer, he holds the opinion to which we now rather incline.

We now pass to what we have called the keystone of Mr. Mill's "affirmative" position. His whole positive doctrine from first to last depends on the proposition, that the uniformity of nature can be proved by experience. We did not deny (Oct. 1871, pp. 313-317) that this uniformity could be proved by introducing premisses of that kind which Mr. Mill rejects; but we denied that it can be proved (as he is required on *his* principles to prove it) from experienced phenomena

* The following passage from F. Kleutgen's work on the scholastic philosophy will illustrate our meaning. We translate it from the French translation. The author is assailing the doctrine of innate ideas:—

"But," it will be said, "should we be able on sight of an individual action to conceive a maxim of morality, if we did not possess already certain notions relative to the moral order? Assuredly no. . . . But are we at liberty thence to infer, that the mind finds in itself as *innate* those earlier ideas, or else that it must have received them from some external source [*d'ailleurs*]? Not at all; for it is sufficient that the mind possesses, besides sensibility, a higher power of knowledge, reason. . . . As we perceive in the object, by means of the senses, those phenomena which correspond to the nature of the senses; so we know, by the reason, that which is exclusively within the sphere of that faculty."—Diss. i. n. 643.

† For "explicative" and "ampliative" propositions, see last July, p. 29.

alone. In the new edition of his "Logic" Mr. Mill replies to our criticisms (vol. ii. pp. 109—111); and what we have now to do, is to rejoin on his reply.

"All physical science," we said (p. 311), "depends for its existence on the fundamental proposition, that the laws of nature are uniform": by which proposition "we mean, that no physical phenomenon takes place without a corresponding physical antecedent, and that the same physical antecedent is invariably followed by the same physical consequent." Mr. Mill professes to establish conclusively, on mere grounds of experience, that such is the fact; at all events throughout the whole of this planet. ("Logic," book iii. chap. 21.) "His reasoning," we said (pp. 314, 5), "amounts at best to this. If in any part of the world there existed a breach in the uniformity of nature, that breach must by this time have been discovered by one or other of the eminent men who have given themselves to physical experiment. But most certainly, adds Mr. Mill, none such has been discovered, or mankind would be sure to have heard of it; consequently, such is his conclusion, none such exists." Mr. Mill tacitly admits, that we have stated his argument quite correctly. We then thus proceeded:—

Now in order to estimate the force of this argument, let us suppose for a moment that the fact were as Mr. Mill represents it: let us suppose for a moment that persons of scientific education were unanimous in holding, that there has been no well-authenticated case of a breach in the uniformity of nature. What *inference* could be drawn from this? Be it observed, that the number of natural agents constantly at work is incalculably large; and that the observed cases of uniformity in their action must be immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of the whole. Scientific men, we assume for the moment, have discovered that in a certain proportion of instances,—immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of the whole,—a certain fact has prevailed; the fact of uniformity: and they have not found a single instance in which that fact does *not* prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in inferring from these premisses that the fact is *universal*? Surely the question answers itself. Let us make a very grotesque supposition, in which however the conclusion would really be tried according to the arguments adduced. In some desert of Africa there is an enormous connected edifice, surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain reasonable beings who are unable to leave the enclosure. In this edifice are more than a thousand chambers, which some years ago were entirely locked up, and the keys no one knew where. By constant diligence twenty-five keys have been found, out of the whole number; and the corresponding chambers, situated promiscuously throughout the edifice, have been opened. Each chamber, when examined, is found to be in the precise shape of a dodecahedron. Are the inhabitants justified on that account in holding with certitude, that the remaining 975 chambers are built on the same plan?

Mr. Mill frankly replies :

Not with perfect certitude ; but . . . with so high a degree of probability, that they would be justified in acting upon the presumption until an exception appeared.

This we of course quite admit ; but it falls very far short of Mr. Mill's thesis, and he therefore thus proceeds :—

Dr. Ward's argument, however, does not touch mine as it stands in the text. My argument is grounded on the fact that the uniformity of the course of nature as a whole, is constituted by the uniform sequences of special effects from special natural agencies ; that the number of these natural agencies in the part of the universe known to us is not incalculable, nor even extremely great ; that we have now reason to think that at least the far greater number of them, if not separately, at least in some of the combinations into which they enter, have been made sufficiently amenable to observation, to have enabled us actually to ascertain some of their fixed laws ; and that this amount of experience justifies the same degree of assurance that the course of nature is uniform throughout, which we previously had of the uniformity of sequence among the phenomena best known to us. This view of the subject, if correct, destroys the force of Dr. Ward's first argument.

We do not see, on the contrary, how it touches our argument ever so faintly. Mr. Mill accounts it to be proved by experience, that certain "natural agencies" produce certain "special effects." We totally deny that this has been proved, or that it *can* be proved, on mere grounds of experience. There are none of these natural agencies which can be cited more favourably for Mr. Mill's purpose, than that of gravitation. We ask then this simple question. How could Mr. Mill show by mere experience, that particles throughout the earth (and universe) attract each other in that particular way, which is spoken of as "the law of gravitation" ? What we said on that general truth the uniformity of nature,—we say equally on that particular truth the law of gravitation. The number of particles of matter in the universe is incalculably large ; and the observed cases of their acting according to the law of gravitation, must be immeasurably fewer than one thousandth part of the whole. Scientific men have discovered that in a certain proportion of instances—immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of the whole—a certain fact has prevailed ; the fact of gravitation : and they have not found a single instance, in which that fact does not prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in inferring from these premisses, that the fact is certainly universal ? Why Mr. Mill has already answered in the negative a question precisely equivalent. The very same reasoning which showed how impossible it is to prove by experience the uniformity of nature in general, shows equally how impossible

it is to prove by experience the law of gravitation in particular. And the same remark is applicable to all the other "natural agencies" which Mr. Mill commemorates. His attempted answer only avails to exhibit, more pointedly than it might have been seen before, the extraordinary weakness of his case.

Our second argument was the following:—

But secondly it is as far as possible from being true, that men of scientific education are unanimous in holding that there has been no well-authenticated case of breach in the uniformity of nature. On the contrary, even to this day the majority of such persons believe in Christianity, and hold the miracles revealed in Scripture to be on the whole accurately reported. The majority of scientific men believe, that at one time persons, on whom the shadow of Peter passed, were thereby freed from their infirmities; and that at another time garments, brought from the body of Paul, expelled sickness and demoniacal possession. (Acts v. 15; xix. 12.) Will Mr. Mill allege that S. Peter's shadow, or that garments from S. Paul's body, were the *physical cause* of a cure, as lotions and bandages might be? Of course not. Here then is a series of physical phenomena, resulting without physical cause; and Catholics to this day consider that breaches in the uniformity of nature are matters of every-day occurrence. Even then if it were true—it seems to us (as we have already said) most untrue—that Mr. Mill's conclusion legitimately follows from his premisses,—still he cannot even approximate to *establishing* those premisses, until he have first disproved Catholicity and next disproved the whole truth of Christianity.

Mr. Mill thus replies; the italics being his own:—

Dr. Ward's second argument is, that many or most persons, both scientific and unscientific, believe that there *are* well-authenticated cases of breach in the uniformity of nature, namely miracles. Neither does this consideration touch what I have said in the text. I admit no other uniformity in the events of nature than the law of Causation; and (as I have explained in the chapter of this volume which treats of the Grounds of Disbelief) a miracle is no exception to that law. In every case of alleged miracle, a *new antecedent* is affirmed to exist; a *counteracting cause*, namely the volition of a supernatural being. To all, therefore, to whom beings with superhuman power over nature are a *vera causa*, a miracle is a *case* of the Law of Universal Causation, not a deviation from it.

What an astonishing collapse is here both of memory and of scientific intelligence! Firstly, of memory. Nothing can be more express than Mr. Mill's words, where he is first occupied with setting forth the uniformity of nature. "When in the course of this inquiry," he says ("Logic," vol. i. p. 376), "I speak of the cause of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon . . . the causes with which I concern myself are not efficient but physical causes.

. . . Between the *phenomena* which exist at any moment and

the *phenomena* which exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession." Is a volition then of the Invisible God a *phenomenon*? Mr. Mill laid down at starting, that he recognizes no causes which are not phenomena; and now he tells us that *God's volition* may count as a cause.

Secondly, what a collapse of scientific intelligence! Mr. Mill professes to lay down a doctrine on the uniformity of nature,* which shall suffice as a reasonable basis for physical and other science. Yet what is the view he now professes? He now advocates no doctrine inconsistent with the supposition, that there may be as many deities on Olympus as Homer himself believed in; and that each one of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the course of nature, every minute of every day. In all these cases "the volition of a supernatural being" might count as "a new antecedent," "a counteracting cause": so that every arbitrary and irregular phenomenon so brought about "is a case of the law of universal causation," as he says, and "not a deviation from it." Why it is plain that if such constant interference took place, there would be no "course of nature," nor what he ordinarily calls "causation," at all; and physical science would vanish from the sphere of human knowledge. In other words, if we are to trust his present language, he does not profess to prove that there is any uniformity of nature whatever, or that physical science can reasonably exist.†

It is quite true (as Mr. Mill implies in the words we have quoted) that, in his comment on Hume's argument against miracles he had made the very same blunder which he now repeats. We have always attributed the former blunder to the same cause, to which we also attribute the one before us. Mr. Mill, we think, held so disparaging an estimate of the philosophy which admits the existence of miracles, that in dealing with it he was satisfied with the first plausible argument which came to hand; and did not trouble himself to examine its merits very closely.

We further adduced a third argument:—

But the strongest objection against the sufficiency of Mr. Mill's argument still remains to be stated. "All our interest," says Mr. Bain most truly, "is concentrated on *what is yet to be*; the present and the past are of *value only* as a clue to the events *that are to come*." Let us even suppose then for argument's sake, that Mr. Mill had fully proved the past and present uni-

* He calls it "the law of universal causation"; but we cannot ourselves use this term, because of the vital difference with Mr. Mill on "causation," which we are to set forth in a future article.

† It may most fairly be asked, how belief in the Christian miracles is consistent with belief in the existence of physical science. We answered this question however directly and expressly, in April 1867, pp. 291-294.

formity of nature: still the main difficulty would continue; viz., how he proposes to show that such uniformity will last one moment beyond the present. It is quite an elementary remark that, whenever a proposition is grounded on mere experience, nothing whatever can be known or even guessed concerning its truth, except within the reach of possible observation. For this very reason, Mr. Mill professes himself unable to know, or even to assign any kind of probability to the supposition, that nature proceeds on uniform laws in distant stellar regions. But plainly there are conditions of *time*, as well as of *space*, which preclude the possibility of observation; and it is as simply impossible for men to know from mere experience what will take place on earth to-morrow, as to know from mere experience what takes place in the planet Jupiter to-day.

Here is Mr. Mill's reply, with his own italics:—

Dr. Ward's last, and as he says, strongest argument, is the familiar one of Reid, Stewart, and their followers—that whatever knowledge experience gives us of the past and present, it gives us none of the future. I confess that I see no force whatever in this argument. Wherein does a future fact differ from a present or a past fact, except in their merely momentary relation to the human beings at present in existence? The answer made by Priestley, in his examination of Reid, seems to me sufficient; viz., that though we have had no experience of what is future, we have had abundant experience of what *was* future. The "leap in the dark" (as Professor Bain calls it) from the past to the future, is exactly as much in the dark and no more, as the leap from a past which we have personally observed, to a past which we have not. I agree with Mr. Bain in the opinion that the resemblance of what we have not experienced to what we have, is, by a law of our nature, presumed through the mere energy of the idea, before experience has proved it. This *psychological* truth, however, is not, as Dr. Ward when criticising Mr. Bain appears to think, inconsistent with the *logical* truth that experience does prove it. The proof comes after the presumption, and consists in its invariable *verification* by experience when the experience arrives. The fact which while it was future could not be observed, having as yet no existence, is always, when it becomes present and *can* be observed, found conformable to the past.

This rejoinder is more surprising than even the two former. Any one who attentively peruses it, will see that it comes to this. We say that, on Mr. Mill's theory, no one, during this year 1874, has any solid ground whatever for supposing as even probable, that fire will burn or water will quench thirst in the year 1875. Mr. Mill replies, that at the end of 1875 he *will* have ground for knowing that such *has* been the case during that past year. Dr. Bain says very truly, that "the present and past are of value only as a clue to" the future; and we argued that, on Mr. Mill's theory, they are no clue whatever to the future. That is true, replies Mr. Mill; but still what is now future will be known, as soon as it shall have become past.

Let us observe what comes of this. We find from his autobiography that "the principal outward purpose of his life" (p. 67) was so to act on mankind through the laws of human nature, that various intellectual, political, and social results might ensue, which he regarded as ameliorations of unspeakable moment. Nevertheless,—according to the very principles which he accounted to be essentially involved in such amelioration,—he had no ground whatever, at any one moment, for thinking it (we will not say certain, but) ever so faintly probable, that the laws of human nature were in future to continue the same. And yet if they did *not* continue the same, his whole life would have been one sustained blunder.

We made one final comment on Mr. Mill's treatment of these subjects, which he has left entirely unnoticed.

In considering the question "on what grounds we expect that the sun will rise to-morrow," Mr. Mill ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 80) falls into a mistake very unusual with him; for he totally misapprehends the difficulty which he has to encounter. He argues—we think quite successfully—that there is a probability amounting to practical certainty that the sun will rise to-morrow, *on the hypothesis that the uniformity of nature so long continues*. But the question he has to face is, what reason can he have for knowing, or even guessing, that the uniformity of nature *will* so long continue? And to this, the true question at issue, he does not so much as attempt a reply.

Nothing then can be more conspicuous and undeniable, than Mr. Mill's break-down in what is the one keystone of his "affirmative" philosophical position. He professes to build a philosophy on the exclusive basis of experience; and he heartily admits that such construction is impossible, unless the philosopher first establishes the uniformity of nature. But if he establishes that truth on some *other* basis than experience, he does *not* build his philosophy on the exclusive basis of experience. Mr. Mill then is required by his principles, to prove the uniformity of nature from the mere facts of experience; and we have now seen how pitiably he fails in his attempt. We are very confident that, where he has failed, no other phenomenist will succeed; but if any one makes the attempt, we promise beforehand to meet him straightforwardly and publicly. Meanwhile we consider ourselves to have shown, that nothing at all events can be more ignominious than Mr. Mill's philosophical position, whether on its "aggressive" side or its "affirmative."

The article of ours to which Mr. Mill replied, was followed (Jan. 1872) by another on "the foundation of morality." In our next number we hope to supplement that article, by one encountering him in full detail on that most vital theme, his denial of freewill.

ART. II.—TAINE'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.

History of English Literature. By H. A. TAINE. Translated by H. VAN LAUN, one of the Masters at the Edinburgh Academy, with a Preface by the Author. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas. 1871.

THE literature of a nation, taken as a whole, may be looked upon as the expression of its mind and heart, and of all that goes to make up its character. We say, taken as a whole, for it by no means follows that in the history of a nation the literature of each particular period is an *exact* reflection either of the intellectual tendencies, or the spiritual aspirations, or the prevailing passions, or the leading desires, or the moral state even of that period itself; still less of those abiding qualities which, through all the modifications of time, have preserved their continuity. It is a clue, and nothing more, to guide us amid the intricacies of a particular phase of a nation's life; it is not, and never can be, a clear index of that which underlies all phases and modifications,—the character of the nation as a whole. The intellect, and heart, and moral state of each particular period are no doubt more or less reflected in its literature; but in every period there are other influences at work, more powerful even than these, without which its literature would be but the transitory manifestation of the state of mind or humour into which it may have fallen, or have been hurried, not the faithful expression of its whole character during that particular stage of its history. Nay, it often happens that these transitory changes owe their origin far more to the ages that have gone before, than to the period which witnesses them.

As with a man, so with a nation. In the course of a man's life circumstances may arise, say, for instance, when a youth is just entering upon manhood, which may enlighten or obscure his intellect, as the case may be, soothe or excite his passions, influence his whole mind for good or evil, and then either superinduce a momentary calm or hurry him into a course of action or betrayal of feeling which, far from being true indexes of his usual state of mind or heart, or of his real character, are but exceptional instances of that "variableness and shadow of turning" which are inseparable from every creature; although it may well be that these sudden changes both have their root in the far-distant past, and may deeply influence

his future life, and carry their traces with them even to the hour of his death. How unfair it would be to form an estimate of the actual state of mind and heart, still less of the permanent character of a youth who, standing on the threshold of manhood, is betrayed through momentary forgetfulness, sudden temptations, the circumstances into which he has fallen, the companions who for a time surround him, or even some weakness of his nature which he has never probed by self-examination or has neglected to amend, into words of sin or deeds of evil, which his higher or better nature leads him to condemn, although from which he may never rise again; or is subdued into a state of peaceful quiet, never, or but rarely, perhaps, experienced before, of which he would be the first to confess that, even under the most favourable influences, it would not last for long. We have to take into consideration his natural disposition, his general strength or weakness of character, his early training, the education of his boyhood, the influences to which he has been habitually subjected, the associates with whom he has been for the greater part of his life connected, and even the hereditary qualities of the family to which he belongs, before we can venture to affirm or deny that the youth is actually what at first sight he appears to be from the extraordinary change which is then smoothing or ruffling the current of his life. Still, of course, as we have hinted, we must not lay too great stress upon these influences, or count too reliantly upon them. There is no such thing as any iron law of necessity, which, notwithstanding here and there some transitory variation, forces a man to develop his life in the original mould into which he has been cast, and which after-circumstances have but enlarged and strengthened. No promise of permanent development in good has been made to any man, any more than there exists any blind destiny which insures for him, beyond hope of redemption, a continuance in evil. The mould may be broken by any change, and what, under other circumstances, might have been only transitory, may become permanent; so that the latter state of a man's life may be better or worse than the first.

All this is obvious; but what we contend for is, that at no particular period of his life can the actual state of his mind or heart—still less of his permanent character—be adequately judged from his subjection to influences which for the moment seem to have gained the upper hand. It is only when he has ceased to live that we can judge the whole man. So is it with a nation, which, like the individual, has its youth, its manhood, and its old age. When a nation has advanced far into its manhood, still more when it is entering upon its old age, and

yet still more when its life is over, we are able to sum up all the qualities and characteristics which its history has mirrored forth, and to form our estimate accordingly. The same is true of the literature of a nation, taken as a whole, or at least in greater part; for, as we have said, looked at in this light it is the expression of its mind and heart and character, and therefore the brightest mirror of its chief qualities and characteristics. Yet when we come to look narrowly into particular periods of its history and literature, the same rule no longer serves us in our scrutiny; for just as we can never be sure when a sudden change passes over a man's outward behaviour, though the change itself may take its rise from his past life, that it is any true index to his real character, even at the moment of the change; so is it no proof when certain influences—themselves, it may be, the effects of past causes—appear to be uppermost in a nation's literature at any particular period of its history, that its intellect, or heartfelt desires, or true character, are adequately reflected even at the time when it is most subjected to the influences in question. A nation, like an individual, may at different stages of its life give way to sudden impulses, or be hurried into sudden actions, or be subdued into unlooked-for calms, all of which are reflected in the literature of those periods, and which outwardly seem to manifest its true character at the moment, and even perhaps to afford us glimpses of its permanent character; but if we look more closely, we shall find that, as in the case of an individual, a number of subtle influences are also at work, which, if left out of consideration, will make our judgment both unsatisfactory and unjust. There is ever more beneath the surface than what outwardly appears, and it is often far more by what underlies than by what is uppermost in the current of a nation's literature, that we can form the truest estimate of the literature itself, even on the very spot to which we may have been drawn by the sight of what is floating on the surface. The natural qualities, the strength or weakness of a people, its early culture, its later civilization, the influences—religious or moral—which have habitually moulded its higher life, the example of other peoples with whom it has most been brought in contact, the hereditary characteristics of the race or races from which it has sprung; all these will be found silently at work, either side by side with or underneath those other transitory influences which, at any given period of a nation's literature, are most vividly perceived, and therefore most keenly felt.

On the other hand, in forming our judgment of the literature of a nation at any particular period, we must not rely too

much upon these influences, all-important though they are. There is no destiny irrevocably to shape a nation's literature any more than a man's life. Neither race nor international intercourse, nor religion, nor morality, nor civilization, nor culture, nor qualities of heart and mind, can insure by any law of necessity the gradual, unfailing development of a nation's literature either for good or evil. Changes in themselves but transitory may exercise a permanent effect upon it; its sweet waters may become bitter, and its bitter waters sweet, while its outflowing into the ocean of the world's thought may be lit up or obscured by a sunshine or a darkness which were absent at its first welling-forth from the rock from which it took its rise. Still, we say,—and we wish our readers to keep this in mind during the whole course of this article—that not from the influences to which a nation's literature seems outwardly to be most subjected during any given period of its history, can the actual state of its mind or heart, and therefore far less its permanent character, be adequately judged.

These thoughts have been forced upon us by the study of M. Taine's "*History of English Literature*," which offers, perhaps, the most comprehensive estimate of the subject that has yet been formed. The work has been received in England with general favour, and has met with admirers even in quarters from which we should have expected an adverse criticism. For our own part, we are forced to confess that we do not share in this admiration, although we can quite understand the motives that have called it forth. The brilliancy and the originality of the style, the philosophical observation, the deep thought, not in all cases logical, but always striking, the minute delicacy with which the author has, as it were, photographed the several authors whom he has charmed up before us, his complete mastery of the subject, together with the additional fact that the author himself belongs to a nation the inhabitants of which have seldom been able to appreciate either England or Englishmen;—all these are more than enough to account for the very high opinion which English critics, with few exceptions, have formed of this remarkable work. But when we have given this meed of praise—and we give it cordially,—we have little else to say in favour of M. Taine's "*History of English Literature*." Admirable as we have said in his portraiture and appreciation of individual authors, he seems to us incapable of forming general judgments upon the literature of whole periods; while his estimate of English literature in general we can only regard as an utter failure. It will not be difficult to offer reasons for our unfavourable opinion. The principles which

have guided M. Taine in his examination of English literature seem to us altogether untrustworthy, the philosophical views from which they spring absolutely untenable, because radically false. Clinging tenaciously to his philosophy and his principles, M. Taine has found himself compelled to force upon particular periods of our literature an interpretation which they will not bear, and yet, strange to say, to sum up the whole subject in a way which will be found antagonistic to his interpretation of each separate period. He has, indeed, fallen into the two very errors against which we warned our readers at the outset. He has looked upon the literature of each period as far too an exact reflection of the actual mind and heart and character of the nation during that period. On the other hand, paradoxical though it may appear, leaving out of consideration, or at most, when it suits his purpose, but lightly touching upon, the many other influences which, although unseen, were at work, he has all through the work, and especially in his summary, laid far too great stress upon certain natural qualities of race, by attributing to them an irresistible force in the development of the English nation and its literature. We shall see this more clearly as we go along. Meanwhile we have only to add that, in judging of particular periods, M. Taine has not always availed himself of the best or latest information to be obtained upon the subject, and has even been guilty of the grave error of citing only such writers as happen to be prejudiced in favour of the particular view which for the moment he is himself advocating. These two great errors, which go far to destroy the value of M. Taine's whole work, are but the result of his philosophy.

Lucid as M. Taine undoubtedly is when describing men, their manners, customs, style of life, and literary labours, it is not easy to discover from this work his exact philosophical opinions; here his clearness fails him, and his style becomes cloudy and obscure. Still we think the following extracts will show that we were justified in making the above remarks.

Agreeing with the statement that "a work of literature is not a mere play of imagination, a solitary caprice of a heated brain, but a transcript of contemporary manners, a type of a certain kind,"—a statement with which we will not quarrel, provided that the existence of other influences, some of them having their source not in the present but in the past, and all of them—be it also admitted—more or less contributing to the production of every work of literature, our author goes on to treat of the first step in history, if we would realize the past reconstruction of the outer man.

What is your first remark, he says, in turning over the great stiff leaves of a folio, the yellow sheets of a manuscript,—a poem, a code of laws, a declaration of faith! This, you say, was not created alone. It is but a mould, like a fossil shell, an imprint, like one of those shapes embossed in stone by an animal which lived and perished. Under the shell there was an animal and behind the document there was a man. So do you study the document only in order to know the man. The shell and the document are lifeless works, valuable only as a clue to the entire and living existence. We must rush back to this existence, endeavour to re-create it. It is a mistake to study the document as if it were isolated. That were to treat things like a simple pedant, to fall into the errors of the bibliomaniac. Behind all we have *neither mythology nor languages, but only men, who arrange words according to the necessity of their organs, and the original bent of their intellects*. A dogma is nothing in itself; look at the people who have made it. . . . Nothing exists except through some individual man; it is this individual with whom we must become acquainted. When we have established the parentage of dogmas, or the classification of poems, or the progress of constitutions, or the modification of idioms, we have only cleared the soil: genuine history is brought into existence only when the historian begins to unravel, across the lapse of time, the living man, toiling, impassioned, intrenched in his customs, with his voice and features, his gestures and dress distinct and complete, as he from whom we have just parted in the street. (Vol. i. pp. 1, 2.)

Again:—

A language, a legislation, a relation is never more than an abstract thing; the complete thing is the man who acts, the man corporal and visible, who eats, walks, fights, labours. *Leave on one side the theory and the mechanism of constitutions, religion, and their systems*, and try to see men in their workshops, in their offices, in their fields, with the sky and earth, their houses, their dress, cultivations, meals, as you do when, landing in England or in Italy, you remark faces and motions, roads and inns, a citizen taking his walk, a workman drinking. Our great care should be to supply as much as possible the want of present, personal, direct, and sensible observation which we can no longer practise; for it is the only means of knowing man. Let us make the past present. In order to judge of a thing, it must be before us; there is no experience in respect of what is absent. Doubtless this reconstruction is always incomplete; it can produce only incomplete judgments; but to that we must resign ourselves. It is better to have an imperfect knowledge than a futile or false one; and there is no other means of acquainting ourselves approximately with the events of other days than to see approximately the men of other days. (Vol. i. pp. 3, 4.)

Now we are not quite sure, that when in this particular passage M. Taine says that "the reconstruction of the past is always incomplete, and can produce only incomplete judgments," he refers to the difficulty we all feel in perfectly realizing the past, or to the absence of language, legislation,

constitutions, religions, and their system, which in his reconstruction of the outer man of the past ought to be excluded. More probably it is the former to which he refers ; but whether or not, we hold that it is impossible to form a just or adequate estimate of even the outward aspect of any period of history, or of literature, if we exclude those often deeper influences which make them to be what they are. To borrow his own illustration—we see in England citizens taking their walk, and workmen drinking. We leave England and land in France, and we see the same thing ; but we shall never understand the difference of the way in which French citizens take their *promenade*, and English citizens their Sunday stroll ; or again French workmen merrily drink their wine in the *auberge* or at the *marchand du vin*, and English labourers gloomily bouse over their beer in the village pothouse, without also taking into account, to some extent at least, the religion of each people, and even the political constitution under which they severally live. But if this be so in little things, how much more true is it of whole periods of history and of literature, in which so much of the past goes to make up the present. Surely, from the passages just quoted, it will be seen that M. Taine, while excluding many influences which do not always rise to the surface, expects to find more from the mere outward aspect of the past than it is capable of presenting, if these influences be left out of account. Yet even in those passages there are traces, notwithstanding, of an apparent contradiction arising from the other and opposite error, to which we called attention, and which we shall now proceed to notice.

“ Behind all,” says M. Taine, “ we have neither mythology, nor language, but only men, who arrange words and imagery according to the necessities of their organs and the original bent of their intellects.” These words, coming as they do at the very beginning of the volume, are almost the keynote of the whole work. They are illustrated by the following extracts. Passing to the second step in the reconstruction and realization of the past,—the discovery of the invisible man under the visible, he observes :—

All these externals (i.e. words, gestures, motions, clothes, houses, furniture, dress, habits, tastes, writings, &c.) are but avenues converging to a centre : you enter them simply to reach that centre ; and that centre is the genuine man—I mean that man of faculties and feelings which are produced by the inner man. We have reached a new world, which is infinite, because every action which we see involves an infinite association of reasoning, emotion, sensation, new and old, which has served to bring it to light, and which, like great rocks, deep-seated in the ground, find in it their end and their level.

As we quote these words merely for the sake of the unity of the thought, we need not add to them, but will pass on to the next stage of reconstruction :—

When you have observed and noted in man one, two, three, then a multitude of sensations, does this suffice or does your knowledge appear complete? Is a book of observations a psychology? It is no psychology; and here, as elsewhere, the search for causes must come after the collection of facts. No matter if the facts be physical or moral, they all have their causes; there is a cause for ambition, for courage, for truth, as there is for digestion, for muscular movement, for animal heat. Vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar, and every complex phenomenon has its springs from other more simple phenomena on which it hangs. Let us then seek for the simple phenomena for moral qualities, as we seek them for physical qualities. (Vol. i. p. 6.)

M. Taine then proceeds to illustrate the way by which we are to search for these simple phenomena by the example of the religious music of the Protestant Church. The inner cause, broader than its effects, which has produced those grave and monotonous melodies, is the general idea of the true external worship that man owes to God. It is this idea which has changed the architecture of the old Catholic churches, removed images and pictures, shut up the worshippers in high pews, and otherwise regulated the general surroundings. But this again springs from another more general cause,—the idea of human conduct in all its comprehensiveness, internal and external, by which man is kept face to face with God; and it is this which has produced the distinguishing features of Protestantism and changed religion into a morality. Yet this, again, depends upon a still more general idea,—that of moral perfection, such as is met with in the perfect God, the unerring judge, the stern watcher of souls, before whom every soul is sinful, worthy of punishment, incapable of virtue or salvation, except by the crisis of conscience which He provokes and the renewal of heart which He produces. Here we have the master idea which erects duty into an absolute monarch, and which prostrates all ideal models before a moral model.

Here we track the root of man; for to explain this conception it is necessary to consider race itself, that is, the German, the Northman, the structure of his character and intelligence, and his general processes of thought and feeling, the sluggishness and coldness of sensation which prevent his falling easily and headlong under the sway of pleasures; the bluntness of his taste, the irregularity and revolutions of his conception, which arrest in him the birth of fair dispositions and harmonious forms; the disdain of appearances, the desire of truth, the attachment to bare and abstract ideas,

which develop in him conscience, at the expense of all else. Then the search is at an end ; we have arrived at a primitive disposition, at a trait proper to all sensations, to all the conceptions of a century or a race, at a particularity inseparable from all the motions of his intellect and his heart. *Here lie the grand causes, for they are the universal and permanent causes, present at every moment, and in every case everywhere and always acting, indestructible, and in the end infallibly supreme, since the accidents which thwart them, being limited and partial, end by yielding to the dull and incessant repetition of their force in such a manner that the general structure of things, and the grand features of events are their work, and religions, philosophies, poetries, industries, the framework of society and of families, are in fact only the imprint stamped by their seal.* (Vol. i. p. 7.)

It follows then, according to M. Taine, that there are certain universal and permanent causes, always and everywhere acting, which are not only indestructible, but end by becoming infallibly supreme ; religions, philosophies, literatures, political constitutions being nothing more than the impressions left by them on the nations which they influence. We need hardly point out that such a view is utterly incompatible with, and destructive of, the idea of Divine Revelation, the very object of which is to mould the destinies of the human race in general, and of nations in particular, into subjection to the will of the Great Ruler of the universe. It makes, indeed, all religion entirely subjective and natural, and the idea of God himself dependent upon the primitive disposition of man. Furthermore such a view imposes upon the intellect and heart of a nation an iron severity of development in a particular line, which is by no means borne out by history. The very religious attitude of the England of the present day, half leaning to infidelity, half turning back towards Catholicism, is a standing contradiction to M. Taine's philosophical view of its history and literature. In the sentence which we have marked by italics we have the explanation of the apparent contradiction into which M. Taine falls even before he begins to apply his philosophy. For if religions, philosophies, poetries, industries, constitutions, are but the imprints of the universal and indestructible causes which ultimately prevail in every nation, and which are found present at every moment and everywhere, and in every case always acting, they cease to be anything more than outward signs of the necessary development of the national type, and comparatively of no higher value than any other merely outward actions. Still, according to M. Taine's own hypothesis, and taking them as mere outward forms of inward tendencies, we should have thought that even in the reconstruction of the outer man of the past, the theory and mechanism of religions and constitutions and literatures ought not to be left

out of account, for without them, as we have said, we can form no adequate estimate even of the outer man. Indeed, when M. Taine comes to describe the men and writers of particular periods, with one notable exception, he gives full weight to this influence; so much so, that, were it not for that one exception, and the untenable nature of his philosophical views with regard to the origin of religious systems and the intellectual and moral development of nations, we should not have ground for complaint. That one exception relates to the influence of the Catholic religion, the influence of which M. Taine undervalues and makes light of on almost every possible occasion, and this to such an extent that he seems to have invented his whole philosophical system in order the better to enable him to ignore it. There are few works we have ever met with, not excepting even those written by the most bigoted Protestants, which so overflow with anti-Catholic bigotry and intolerance as this "*History of English Literature*." But we shall see this still more clearly as we advance. Meanwhile it will be worth while to have M. Taine's philosophical view as to their origin.

There is then, he says, a system in human sentiment and ideas; and this system has for its motive power certain general traits, certain marks of the intellect and heart common to men of one race, age, or country. As in mineralogy the crystals, however diverse, spring from certain physical forms, so in history, civilizations, however diverse, are derived from certain essential forms. The one is explained by a primitive geometrical element, as the others are by a primitive psychological element. In order to master the classification of mineralogical systems, we must first consider a regular and general solid, its sides and angles, and observe in this the numberless transformations of which it is capable. So if you would realize the system of historical varieties, consider first a human soul generally, with its two or three fundamental faculties, and in this compendium you will perceive the principal forms which it can present. After all, this kind of ideal picture, geometrical as well as psychological, is hardly complex, and one speedily sees the limits of the outline in which civilizations, like crystals, are constrained to exist. (Vol. i. p. 7.)

Our author then proceeds to find in man at first sight, certain images or representations, which exist for a time, are effaced, and return after he has been looking at any sensible object. Of this subject-matter, the development will be two-fold,—speculative or practical, according as they resolve themselves into a *general conception* or an *active resolution*. In this limited circle, which forms an abridgment of the whole man, human diversities meet, all the operations and processes of the human machine being transformed, according to the clearness or confusion, or faintness or violence, or calm-

ness of the representation, which in its ulterior development will affect the whole human development. Thus the intellect will follow the nature of the *general conception* into which the representation resolves itself, assuming, as the case may be, either a positive and practical, as may be seen by the example of the Chinese, Aryan, and Semitic races,—language, religion, poetry, philosophy shaping themselves accordingly,—or a poetical and ideal bent. In this interval, the particular representation and the universal conception, and according to the way in which man arrives at the latter, whether, viz., by a continuous process, or a quick intuition, a regular development or a sudden reflection, are found the germs of the different human differences. “Some races, as the classical, pass from the first to the second by a graduated scale of ideas, regularly arrayed, and general by degrees; others, as the Germanic, traverse the same ground by leaps, without uniformity, by vague and prolonged groping. Some, like the Roman and the English, halt at the first steps; others, like the Hindoos and Germans, mount up to the last.”

Again, if we turn to the passage from the representation to the *active resolution*, we shall find, he tells us, elementary differences of the like importance and the like order, dependent upon the nature of the impression, “whether sharp, as in southern climates, or dull, as in northern; according as it results in instant action, as among barbarians, or slowly, as in civilized nations; as it is capable or not of growth, irregularity, persistence, and connections.” Hence the whole network of human passions, the chances of peace or war, the source of toil and action. Disturbing causes, however, may enter in; new elements may mingle with the old; forces from without, such as change of climate consequent upon emigration, conquest, and the rest, may counteract the formation, and the whole economy, intelligence, and organization of society may be changed. But in each case the mechanism of human history, according to M. Taine, is the same, the original mainspring being some very general disposition of mind and soul, innate and appended by nature to the race, or required or produced by some circumstance acting upon it. Thus in the course of time the nation is brought into a new condition, religious, literary, social, economic; a new condition which in its turn under fresh combinations, produces another condition, sometimes good, sometimes bad, sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly, and so forth; so that we may regard the whole progress of each distinct civilization as the effect of a permanent force, which at every stage varies its operation by modifying the circumstances of its action.

We need not follow our author further, for we have already quoted more than enough for our purpose. We have only to request our readers to bear in mind that M. Taine recognizes no essential distinction between religions and literatures, which, together with music, the fine arts, philosophy, science, state-craft, industries, and every other kind of human production, have for their cause some distinct moral disposition, or combination of moral dispositions, dependent upon race, epoch, and circumstances, and more especially upon race. Nay, of the two, the literature of a nation, being an apparatus of more extraordinary and delicate sensibility by which to unravel the changes in a nation's history, is of far more importance than its religion; since the articles and catechism of the latter serve only to show us its spirit roughly and without delicacy. It will be clear therefore to every Catholic reader that an author imbued with such views is incapable of duly or adequately appreciating the history or literature of any nation, however successful he may be in his judgment of individual writers, for he must necessarily ignore the one great element given to man, primarily indeed, to transform his spiritual and moral nature, but, secondarily, to perfect all the faculties both of his mind and body. Once exclude the idea of Divine Revelation, the message of a Creator ever interested in His creatures' progress; once reduce religion to the mere ordinary level of a production of the human mind, and the philosophy of history becomes an enigma; nor can we ever hope to interpret and understand the changes of a nation's intellect and heart, as reflected in its literature.

This radical and fatal error of M. Taine's philosophical system can be clearly traced in his appreciation of every period of English literature. Thus in treating of the source, and in speaking of the Saxon and Norman influences, and of the new tongue which sprang from the intermingling of the two races, ever eloquent, brilliant, and telling, when declaring to us on the one hand, the soil, sea, sky, climate, of the old Saxon fatherland and of the new country, the bodily structure of the Saxon race, its noble instincts with regard to the individual, the family, and the State, both in Germany and in England, its earnestness, which led it out of idle sentiments to high and noble ones, its fearlessness of danger and disregard of death, its greatness of heart and generosity, and its truthfulness; or, on the other hand, the character of the Normans, their taste and architecture, their spirit of inquiry, their chivalry and amusements, their natural logic, clearness, grace, delicacy, refinements, cynicism, their position in England and their tyranny; or once more, the men themselves who

first helped to develop the new tongue, he becomes not only unjust, incorrect, but even blind to the true nature of the period itself whenever the shadow of the Catholic Church falls across his path. It is through sheer force of mood and clime, according to him, that the Saxons embraced Christianity. Owing to natural affinities, the religion of Christ took root, but it produced no change in their native genius. Now, although, of course, as Catholics, we hold that neither races nor individuals can naturally dispose themselves for the reception of what is supernatural and gratuitous, yet we do not deny that certain races, like certain individuals, may from their natural disposition offer fewer obstacles than others to the reception of Christianity; but to say that it was through sheer force of natural affinities or mood, or clime, that the Saxons became Christians is not only contrary to historical evidence, but contradicted even by M. Taine's own description of their character. Nay, noble as the Saxons were in many respects,—generous, earnest, truthful, were there not also other points in their character calculated rather to hinder than further their conversion?—points which, when developed in their after-history, make, to our mind, the Anglo-Saxon race perhaps of all races the most out of harmony with the true spirit of the Gospel. Hear what M. Taine himself says of them:—

Behold them now in England, more settled and wealthier; do you look to find them changed? Changed it may be, but for the worse, like the Franks, like all barbarians who pass from action to enjoyment. They are more gluttonous, carving their hogs, filling themselves with flesh, swallowing down deep draughts of mead, ale, spiced wines, all the strong, coarse drinks which they can procure, and so they are cheered and stimulated. Add to this the pleasure of the fight. Not easily with these instincts can they attain to culture: to find a natural and ready culture we must look amongst the sober and sprightly population of the south. Here the sluggish and heavy temperament remains long buried in a brutal life; people of the Latin race never at a first glance see in them ought but large, gross beasts, clumsy and ridiculous when not dangerous and enraged. Up to the sixteenth century, says an old historian, the great body of the nation were little else than herdsmen, keepers of beasts for flesh and fleece; up to the end of the eighteenth, drunkenness was the recreation of the higher ranks; it is still that of the lower; and all the refinement and softening influence of civilization have not abolished among them the use of the rod and the fist. If the carnivorous, warlike, drinking savage, proof against the climate, still shows beneath the conventions of our modern society and the softness of our modern polish, imagine what he must have been when landing with the band upon a wasted or desert country, and, becoming for the first time a settler, he saw for the first time the common pastures of the border country, and the great primitive forests which furnished stags for the chase and acorns for his pigs. (Vol. i. pp. 27-8.)

Surely,—even were it theologically tenable, that man by nature can produce the commencement of faith, an error condemned by the second Council of Orange—an animal race like this was hardly formed by natural affinities, or mood, or clime, to embrace a religion which teaches that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven”; nor, having embraced it, would it be an easy task for that religion, supposing it to be of mere human origin, to sink deep down into such fleshly hearts. The story of King Edwy and Elgiva on his coronation-day may almost be taken as a type of the natural affinities by which the whole race, supposing this to be possible, could be bound to Christianity. If the animal man was subdued at all, it was by the Divine power alone; the old animal is ever reappearing. At Bristol at the time of the Conquest, as we are told by Wolstan, it was the custom to buy men and women in all parts of England, and to carry them to Ireland for sale. The buyers usually made the women pregnant, and took them to market in that condition in order to insure a better price. “You might have seen with sorrow long files of young people, of both sexes and of the greatest beauty, bound with ropes and daily exposed for sale . . . They sold in this manner as slaves their nearest relatives, and even their own children.”

Or, take again the independence, and stubborn self-will of the Saxon race. “The modern Englishman,” says M. Taine, “existed entire in this Saxon. If he bends, it is because he is quite willing to bend.” Yet love of independence and self-will are hardly the most favourable of dispositions—even if natural dispositions could merit grace for the reception of a faith which tells us that “except we become as little children we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.” It was precisely these which tore England from the Church three hundred years ago, and it is still these which keep her children now at this very moment subject to the gross inclinations of the animal man.

On the other hand, M. Taine is unfair in understating the influence of the Christian religion upon the Saxon race and its literature. If in one place he tells us that the Saxon readily inclined to the new faith, in another he speaks of him as having been covered over with only a thin crust of Christianity, while he cannot find that the new faith has exercised any high influence over the Saxon poetry. “The two religious poetries, Christian and pagan, are so like, that one might make a common catalogue of their incongruities, images, and legends.” In reading the hymns of Cædman he is reminded of the songs of the servants of Odin, only toned now and clad in the garments of monks. Their poetry is the same. The Christian’s God is still Odin, the Christian

hymns embody the pagan ; nay, in *Beowulf*, altogether pagan, the Deity is more highly serene, differing only when compared with the God of the Christian *Adhelm*, as the peaceful *Bretwalda* differs from an adventurous and heroic bandit-chief. Now, no doubt the imagery of the old pagan mythology lingered in the Saxon mind long after its reception of Christian truth ; but no one can compare, say for instance the poetry of *Beowulf* the pagan and that of *Cædman* the Christian herdsman, without perceiving how, while the old barbarian vigour and sublimity remained, a light and a glory, a tenderness and a sweetness have also entered in, of which the pagan poet was unable even to conceive. If he wrote of the terrors of the judgment to come, and the fearfulness of the punishments of hell, much also did he write with surpassing tenderness, as *Bede* remarks, of the sweetness of the heavenly kingdom, and the loving kindness of God. But in what, according to M. Taine's view, does the god of the pagan Saxon differ from that of the Christian ? Are they not both conceptions of the same Saxon mind, modified only by epoch and circumstances ? It is the same with the literature which sprang up a hundred and fifty years after the Saxon invasion and the introduction of Christianity with the writings of *Bede*, *Alcuin*, *Erigena*, *Alfred*, and others. To these M. Taine can only be unjust ; while as for the poor monks who after *Alfred's* time gathered up and noted questionable events with monotonous dryness, he dismisses them with a smile of compassion, nothing more. Even when making allowance for the dangers and difficulties of the times, he adds, with a sneer for the father of English history, Venerable *Bede*, that if left to itself that humble literature would have come to nothing.

As with the Saxons so with the Normans. Our narrow limits will not of course allow us to point out our author's general inability to reorganize and lay before us the true character of the period which witnessed the intermingling of the two races, especially when religion or literature enters in. We must content ourselves with one or two examples. So strong is M. Taine's belief in the overpowering permanent influence of race, that he finds an essential difference between the Saxon and Norman conception of our Blessed Lady. At p. 45 he had already told us that the Saxons possessed "the idea of God, the grand God of the Bible, omnipotent and unique, who disappears almost entirely in the Middle Ages, obscured by His rank and His family. They did not blot Him out under pious romances, by the elevation of the saints, or under feminine caresses, to benefit the Infant Jesus and the Virgin." And so again, at p. 77, in speaking of the chivalric

veneration of Our Lady as breathed forth in Norman hymns, he adds, that nothing could be more different from the Saxon sentiment, which is altogether Biblical. He gives the following as a specimen :—

“ Blessed beo thu lavedi,
 Ful of hovenen blisse,
 Swete flur of parais,
 Moder of milternesse. . . .
 I-blessed beo thu, Lavedi,
 So fair and so briht,
 Al min hope is uppon the,
 By day and bi nicht. . . .
 Bright and scene quen of storre,
 So me hiht and lere.
 In this false fikele world
 So me led and steore.” *

In order to prove the incorrectness of M. Taine's assertion, which rests, as we have said, upon his preconceived views, we will give the hymn of S. Godrich, who wrote nearly a century before the hymn above given was composed. We leave our readers to judge whether there is less of chivalric devotion and loving tenderness in the undoubtedly Saxon hymn :—

“ Sainte Marie, clene Virgine
 Moder Jhesu, Christes Nazarene,
 On fo schild, help thin Godric
 Onfang, bring hegelish with the in Godes riche,
 Sainte Marie Christes bur,
 Maidenenes clenched, moderes flur,
 Dilie min sinne, ric in min nod
 Bring me to winne with the selfd God.”

Take again another instance of our author's unfairness. In bringing forward such works as Wycliffe's Translation of the Bible and the “Vision of Piers Plowman,” which of course are extolled to the skies as harbingers of the liberty of action and liberty of mind which are afterwards to appear, he passes over in silence writings like those of Walter Hilton and Mother Juliana of Norwich, and many others which we now know of, which surely he himself must also have known of at least before his “History of English Literature” was published. Yet we can hardly wonder, for these writings would have borne witness to the sound Catholic feeling which lay deep down, hidden under the scum which came so readily to the surface at the

* Time of Henry III. “Reliquiæ Antiq.,” edited by Messrs. Wright and Halliwell.

time of which he is speaking. Even Chaucer, with all his faults, was remarkable for a singular and tender devotion to our Blessed Lady. We should have thought, too, that he might have spared us the usual flourish of trumpets in connection with Wycliffe's Translation of the Bible. Not so:—

In vain, he says, the doctors state that they have authority for their words,—there is a word of greater authority, to wit, God's. We have it in the fourteenth century, this grand word. It quitted the learned schools, the dead languages, the dusty shelves on which the clergy suffered it to sleep, covered with a confusion of commentaries and fathers. Wiclif appeared and translated it like Luther, and in a spirit similar to Luther's.

Yet "long before Wycliffe's days," as Sir Thomas More assures us, "the whole Bible was by virtuous and learned men, translated into the English tongue, and by good and godly people with devotion and soberness, well and reverently read," although not a word about these translations have we been able to find in M. Taine's work, for a complete list of which we must refer our readers to an article published in this Review, July, 1872. So clearly has this fact been established that it is probable that the authorized Protestant translation is far more a modification of old Catholic versions than a new translation.

In like manner, when endeavouring to bring Chaucer and his contemporaries before us in a vivid manner, M. Taine, true to the working of his erroneous system, either on one side totally ignores the influence of the past, or, on the other, utterly despises it. Distinguishing, perhaps rightly, between the poetry and the prose of the father of English song, he discovers, as to the former, that he has experience and invents. In the latter he no sooner enters on his subject than S. Thomas, Peter Lombard, the Manual of Sins, the treatise on definition and syllogism, the army of the ancients and the fathers, enter his brain and speak in his stead. "For an instant (in his poetry), by a solitary leap, he entered upon the close observation and the genuine study of man; but he could not keep his ground, he did not take his seat, he took a poetic excursion, and so we followed him." Here we have two errors; he forgets that the very same principle which showed itself in Chaucer, in his observation both of men and of nature, had been working for ages; and at the same time he shows himself utterly incapable of appreciating the true value of scholastic thought. The two errors are intimately bound up one with the other. Had he attempted to master the collective wisdom of the great scholastic doctors, he could not fail to have perceived that while engaged in the study of divine

things they had also by their subtle analysis of the human mind, its faculties and their working, prepared the way for the observation of the outer man, which form Chaucer's especial glory. There must ever be a certain order in the process of human thought, and it was only natural that the study of man's Creator and Redeemer, and of his own mind, should have preceded that of man's outer life and manners; and so of the whole man. Nay, without the previous study, the observation of the latter would hardly have been possible, for the same reason. It is manifestly unfair to suppose that the thoughts of the learned would not in due time have been directed to the latter, just as it is no less unfair to ascribe it as the special glory of modern thought that it has been so directed. Had the Reformation never occurred, the observation of both the whole man and of nature would necessarily have followed in due course, nor would it have been less perfect because shorn of the dangers that have attended the divorce between faith and reason, which was the result of that great convulsion. Did space allow, we could show that all through the scholastic period signs were not wanting which foreshadowed the coming change.

But what shall we say of his contempt for scholastic thought ! without which, we do not hesitate to affirm, the discoveries of modern science, and even the chief glories of our later literature, could have had no existence; for we agree with Mr. Carlyle in thinking that without the English Catholicism of the Middle Ages Shakespeare himself would have been impossible. He is its outcome and its fruit, its summing up. And what is true of Shakespeare is also true, although in a less degree, of Chaucer. Speaking of scholastic thought he says :—

What has become of these all-important thoughts ? What labour worked them out ? What studies nourished them ? The labourers did not lack zeal. At Oxford there were 30,000 scholars. No building in Paris could contain the crowd of Abelard's disciples ; when he retired to solitude they accompanied him in such a multitude that the desert became a town. No suffering repulsed them When the terrible encyclopedia of Aristotle was introduced, all disfigured and unintelligible, it was denounced. . . . Heavy and awkward as was the instrument supplied to them—I mean syllogism, they made themselves masters of it, rendered it still more heavy, used it upon every object, in every sense. (Vol. i. p. 133.)

Here, at least, we may observe in passing was the principle of investigation and observation, though as yet undeveloped and not properly directed. But to continue :—

They constructed (he tells us) monstrous books by multitudes, cathe-

drals of syllogism of unheard-of architecture, of prodigious exactness, heightened in effect by intensity of intellectual power, which the whole sum of human labour has twice only been able to match. These young and valiant minds thought they had found the temple of truth ; they rushed at it headlong, in legions, breaking in the doors, clambering over the walls, leaping into the interior, and so found themselves at the bottom of a moat. *Three centuries of labour at the bottom of this black moat added no single idea to the human mind.* (Vol. i. p. 133.)

When we remember that S. Thomas alone, while summing up in one all the wisdom of ancient philosophy, and pressing it into the service of faith, also anticipated, at least in principle, the leading difficulties of modern thought, we shall be able to value M. Taine's estimate at its proper worth. But when he goes on to add that scholastic thought dried up the deep spring, whence flow all poetic streams, we need only point to Dante as a refutation of his assertion. Dante whose "*Divina Commedia*" is simply the "*Summa*" of the Angelic Doctor set before us in raptures of divinest love and ecstasies of divinest poetry. Far from drying up the deep well of poetry, scholastic thought did but deepen the channels through which at the proper moment its sparkling and refreshing waters were to flow and fertilize the world. Destroy all the deep thoughts about God and the holy angels and the mind of man, which we owe to the great mediæval doctors and the discussions of the schools, and the stream of poetry would now be running shallow and impure. We are not wrong, therefore, in saying that the whole superstructure of modern thought rests, as on its foundation, on the intellectual labours of the Middle Ages. To say that the schoolmen often degenerated into trivialities and useless disputations, is simply to say that they were men ; while it was from the very exuberance of their intellectual vigour that they left behind them those "heaps of scholastic rubbish," as M. Taine is pleased to call them, which so readily provoke a smile from our modern men of science. Wherever valuable ore is extracted from the earth, there on every side are seen high mounds of displaced and comparatively useless earth, and the deeper the mine the higher will be the mounds. Wherever the ore is smelted there also must be heaps of dross. What wonder then if the dross and refuse of mediæval investigation appear prominent in the writings of such men as Gower, Occleve, Lydgate, and Hawes? These are not the true fruit of scholastic wisdom, nor do they form the true scholastic phase of poetry. In England the real results of mediæval learning are to be found in the works of Spenser, Shakespeare, and even Bacon, dressed, it is true, in much that is beautiful of the spirit of the Renaissance, although at

the same time, to a certain extent marred and disfigured by the excessive naturalism and sensuality, and forgetfulness of higher wisdom which attended the development of the Renaissance, and still more by the corroding influence of Protestantism. For just as in Italy without the previous investigation of the Middle Ages, the Italian mind would never have been capable of appreciating, still less of overvaluing, as it actually did, the beauties of classical art and literature, so in England would it have been the same. To our own mind there is no more unphilosophical or untruthful view of history than that which looks at the new birth of literature, either in Italy or in England, as an isolated fact unconnected with the past, an influence superinduced solely from without, rather than as a link in the long chain of the intellectual training of both nations, firmly welded together with all the preceding links, although of course, at the same time, embellished or disfigured, as the case may be, by external circumstances.

We shall see this more clearly in criticising M. Taine's views of the Renaissance in England. Now, indeed, is his philosophy seen at its worst, and his bitter animus against the Catholic Church more unmistakably revealed. It is M. Taine's deliberate opinion that for seventeen centuries the sad thought of the decadence of man had weighed upon the spirit of man. He attributes the birth of this idea to Greek corruption, Roman oppression, and the dissolution of the old world. The philosophers tried to escape from it by insensibility, amazement, ecstasy. Religion, coming afterwards, proclaimed that the end was near, and the kingdom of God at hand. For a thousand years universal ruin forced the gloomy thought deeper down into the hearts of men, and when at last man roused himself up by sheer force of arms in the feudal state out of utter misery, even then he could rise to no higher destiny than the obedience of the monk or the dreams of fanatics. From the fourth century the dead letter took the place of the living faith. The clergy ruled the people and the Pope the clergy. Christian thought was directed by theologians, theologians by the Fathers. Faith was reduced to the performance of works, and works were accomplished by the performance of ceremonies. Religion became crystallized, while the contact of the barbarians overlaid it with a layer of idolatry. Christendom became a theocracy, the Scriptures were prohibited, relics worshipped, indulgences purchased. "Under this constraint," he tells us, "a thinking society had ceased to think; philosophy was turned into a text-book, and poetry into raving; and mankind, slothful and crouching, made over their conscience and their conduct into the hands of their

priests, and were as puppets, capable only of reciting a catechism or chanting a hymn. At last invention made another start, and it makes it by the efforts of the lay society, which rejected theocracy, kept the State free, and which presently discovered, or re-discovered, one after another, the industries, sciences, and arts. All was renewed; America and the Indies were added to the map; the shape of the earth was ascertained, the system of the universe propounded, modern philosophy was inaugurated, the experimental sciences set on foot, art and literature shot forth like a harvest, religion was transformed; there was no province of human intelligence and action which was not refreshed and fertilized by the universal effort. It was so great that it passed from the innovators to the laggards, and reformed Catholicism in the face of Protestantism which it formed. It seemed as if men had suddenly opened their eyes and seen. This was Europe's grand age, and the most notable epoch of human growth; to this day we live from its sap, we only carry on its pressure and efforts." (Vol. i. pp. 143-4.)

Is it possible, we ask, to conceive a more complete reversal of the true state of things, a more thorough mis-reading of all history? The idea of the decadence of man existed long before Greek corruption, or Roman oppression, or the dissolution of the Roman empire. The earliest historical records bear witness to its existence, the tradition of the whole human race confirms it. Before the time of Christ, it was only the hope of a coming Redeemer, whether explicitly believed in by the chosen people, or dimly shadowed forth in the pagan mythologies, which kept the old world alive at all. But when the Redeemer *had* come, the idea of the decadence of man, except when unaided by Him, passed away for ever, at least among all those who believed in His words, or lived with His life. Man was no longer fallen; he had risen, and not only risen; he had been lifted above himself, and been made a partaker of the Divine nature. Hope had returned once more to the old world, for it knew that, however long the struggle, the day would surely come when all its kingdoms would become the kingdom of God and of His Christ. The Roman world melted away before the religion of the world's Saviour, and although the corruption of its dissolution, as well as the savage nature of the barbarian elements which took its place, delayed for a while the fulfilment, and even the development of the world's hope, it was never for a moment quenched. Christendom was formed, and the theocracy of the Middle Ages shadowed forth the full and perfect victory of the God-man by which the life of renewed man is to endure for ever,

Under the influence of His unerring Church, the intellect of Christendom was formed and strengthened, and its heart lifted up to higher and nobler aims than before it had ever dreamed of.* The foundations of philosophy, literature, and art were laid. Nay, the superstructure was not only beginning to rise in the beauty of its glorious architecture, but so high had it already risen, that men could almost realize in their minds the perfect proportions of the majestic whole.

Then came a change; "inventions," to use M. Taine's words, "made another start." But who gave the power to invent? Whence the power to profit by the invention? Who but that Church, who, the true mother of mankind, had renewed the face of the earth? Whence came the power, but from the re-invigorated intellect which she had formed, the re-created heart which she had spiritualized? Had man fallen so low, as M. Taine supposes, he could not have invented at all. To do so would have been a miracle, for which, however, no explanation is offered by his philosophy. Industries, arts, sciences, far from being discovered, or re-discovered by the lay society which rejected theocracy, are the discoveries of the Church alone, who both gave them birth and watched over their infancy. All the glories of modern science and civilization owe their origin to her; literature itself is indebted to her for its inspiration. So true is this, that when afterwards lay society rebelled against the Church, the work of human progress was marred, and indefinitely delayed; and it is just because at the present time this fatal rebellion still continues, that not only Christendom is in ruins, all order and authority gone, but science is leading men back into the darkness of paganism, art is seducing them into sensualism, and civilization is itself at stake, while literature has lost the salt which kept it from corruption. Had this rebellion never broken out, industries, arts, sciences, would have flourished all the same, but, restrained within their own proper channels, they would then have fertilized, not corrupted the earth. At the present moment there is only one chance left to the Christian world, and that is to return to its allegiance to the Church of the Living God. The Renaissance, according to M. Taine, is the return to the senses and the natural life. Be it so; but then, unless always watched over with the greatest and most constant care, it is a departure from supernatural life, a turning from the Creator to the creature. To M. Taine this, indeed, matters but little; for him there is no supernatural; but to ourselves

* See article on "Mediæval Times, their Position in Church History," DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1872.

it matters much. But let us see how M. Taine applies his principles to England. "When human power," he says, "is manifested so clearly, it is no wonder if the ideal changes, and the old pagan idea recurs; it returns bringing with it the worship of beauty and vigour." Asking himself by what means it was propagated in England as well as in Italy, he satisfies himself with the answer that men's condition had improved, and they felt it. We too are satisfied, for his reasoning is just. As soon as man begins to feel his own power, and to glory in it, whenever he feels himself surrounded by natural prosperity, and to indulge in it, the temptation will also arise to forget the Author of all power and all good things, to love the present life alone, and to attribute his present happiness not to its true Giver, but to his own genius, his own energy, and his own faculties. These become his gods whom he serves and worships. But the point we now have to consider is whether the writings of the Earl of Surrey, Sydney, Spenser, Shakespeare, Bacon, and other great authors of the period, owe so much to the pagan Renaissance as to enable us to regard them as its sole creations. For our own part, in opposition to M. Taine, we hold, and hold most strongly, that they do not. The real life, the healthy vigour, the manly earnestness, the higher beauty, the love of nature and its study, which burst upon us at this period of English literature, we consider to be the direct product of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages; the dress alone which clothes them, and the ornaments, too often meretricious, which adorn them have been lent them by the Renaissance. As time goes on, the old Catholic idea, together with its influence, will fade away, and English literature will become artificial, lifeless, unnatural, unreal; and it will only be when the study of old Catholic times and institutions revives, that, so far as our lighter literature is concerned, a healthier spirit will be manifested, too soon, however, again to fade away.

Take for instance, Surrey. Even M. Taine is obliged to confess that the mystical tradition exercises a stronger influence over him than any love of woman, however pure. He attributes this indeed to northern melancholy, and he traces the same sombre tint in the poetry of Sydney, Spenser, Shakespeare. But the stern poetry of Ecclesiastes which Surrey translated into verse, is quite distinct from the gloom of pagan Teutonic mysticism. "Is it not singular," asks our author, "at this rising dawn to find such a book in his hand! Surrey's finest verses bear witness thus soon to his serious bent, this instructive and grave philosophy." Not singular, truly, according to our view, for the old Catholic

atmosphere, although gravely tainted, still surrounded him, and he still could breathe it, and live to higher feelings than those of earth.

“For I assure thee, even by oath,
And thereon take my hand and troth,
That she is one of the worthiest,
The truest and the faithfulest,
The gentlest and the meekest of mind,
That here on earth a man may find.
And if that love and truth were gone,
In her it might be found alone,
For in her mind no thought there is,
But how she may be true I wis ;
And tenden thee and all the heal,
And wishes both thy health and weal ;
And loves thee even as far forth than
As any woman may a man.”

“Certainly,” remarks M. Taine, “he is not thinking here of any imaginary Laura. The poetic dream of Petrarch has become the exact picture of deep and perfect conjugal affection, such as yet survives in England ; such as all the poets from the authoress of the ‘Nut-brown Maid’ to Dickens, have never failed to express.” We should not ourselves go so far as this in reference to our more modern poets, especially those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ; but this we do say, that perfect conjugal affection is not the ideal of the Renaissance, but of that Church which had formed the England of the past by teaching that man and wife are one flesh, because God and man are one Christ, and because the heavenly Bridegroom and His earthly Bride are one. When that teaching shall have utterly died away from England’s mind, the immoral and sensation novel will appear, and the Divorce Court will follow.

So again with Sydney. His love-songs and word-portraits, as M. Taine calls them, may indeed be full of pagan, although high Platonic fancies, but the higher beauty of Christian love shines through and over them.

“Leave me, O love, which reachest but to dust,
And thou my mind aspire to higher things :
Grow rich in that which never taketh rust ;
Whatever fades, but fading pleasure brings.
O take fast hold, let that light be thy guide,
In this small course, which birth draws out to death ! ”

“Divine love,” observes M. Taine, “continues the earthly love ; he was imprisoned in this, and frees himself. By this

nobility, these lofty aspirations, we recognize one of those serious souls of which there are so many in the same climate and race. Spiritual instincts pierce through the dominant paganism, and ere they make Christians, make Platonists." Is it so? To us it seems that Christianity underlies the Platonism, which forms but a thin upper crust upon its surface; and, moreover, in spirit at least, it is the Christianity of the Middle Ages, before the narrowness of Protestantism had made its love first selfish and then sensual.

Now let us turn to another striking phase of the literature of this period, its truthful love of nature. All through the fifty-two years during which two hundred and thirty-three poets sang, we meet with it more or less. These poets wrote not of the beauties of nature, as do those of a later period, sitting in their town garret, or artificial grotto; but they gaze on the ever-changing English landscape, and gather in its freshness and distil it for us in most delicious verse. No one has better described the charms of their poetry than M. Taine, for, as we have said, whenever he sets before us individual authors, he forgets his philosophy, and we have hardly a fault to find. But does this love of nature spring from the Renaissance? The old gods, it is true, reappear, as in Spenser's *Faërie Queen*, and Drayton's *Polyolbion*, and Shakespeare's *Tempest* and *Cymbeline*, and Greene's *Never too Late*; but the charms of nature do not assemble, as M. Taine supposes, to do honour to the gods, for the gods themselves are introduced simply to do honour to nature. They are altogether accidental, secondary. It is the pure, fresh love of nature for its own sake which breathes in every line, and this love of nature, far from being a gift of the Renaissance, has been handed down to them from those old religious orders which chose the fairest scenes in England for their abbeys and their minsters, and, imitating the example of S. Francis of Assisi, rapt in ecstasy amidst the herdsmen of his own Umbrian hills, tried to love God better by loving also the creatures He has made. Not that in these poets the love of nature assumed a distinctively Christian form, but that it sprang itself from the influence and the teaching of the Christian past. It was not the study of the gods of paganism, mingling with and hallowing, as they are supposed to do by the classical poets, the fairest scenes of nature, that taught them this; but they went out, each man for himself, Spenser amidst the fresh green of the fairest island in the Western Sea, Shakespeare among the oaks of Arden, Ben Jonson in the forest of Sherwood, and, ravished with the scene, they sang accordingly. The spirit of the Renaissance inspired the worship of form,

not that of landscape. In architecture it had produced the regular line and the beauty of proportion. But the love of nature, so conspicuous with the poets of whom we are speaking, sprang from those old Gothic forefathers, who raised to the living God temples, whose vaults represented the forest-trees, and whose columns were crowned with the foliage and the fruits of earth. It did not indeed spring forth at once,—the English mind was then engaged with other subjects,—but the seed was sown then, and in due time it brought forth its fruit. Whence does Spenser derive his inspiration? “Spenser,” says M. Taine, “had a soul captivated by sublime and chaste beauty, eminently Platonic,—one of those lofty and refined souls, most charming of all, who, born in the lap of nature, draw thence their mother’s milk, but soar above, into the regions of mysticism, and mount instinctively in order to open out the confines of another world.” Surely had our author purposely tried, he could hardly have described for us a poet more unlike those of the pagan Renaissance. The poems are varnished over, it is true, with a thin coating of the beauty of pagan mythology, mixed up, however, with that of mediæval chivalry; but even according to M. Taine, it ends in Christianity. His worship for beauty is worthy, he tells us, of Dante; “and this because he never considers it a mere harmony of colours and form, but an emanation of unique, heavenly, imperishable beauty, which no naked eye can see, and which is the prime work of the great Author of the worlds.”

“For it is heavenly born, and cannot die,
Being a parcell of the purest skie.”

As with beauty, so with love. Love, as sung by Spenser,—we quote again M. Taine’s own words,—“dwells in God, and is God Himself descended in bodily form to regenerate the tottering world and save the human race.” Most true; but then all this breathes the spirit of the religion of the Incarnate God, not that of the Renaissance.

Turning now for a moment to the prose authors, what shall we say of Francis Bacon? M. Taine does not praise him too highly, although, of course, he is one of the worthies of the Renaissance. “He pointed out the route,” he says, “but did not travel it; he taught men to discover natural laws, but discovered none.” We will judge him even less highly, for no one can study his writings without perceiving that in much that regards both his principles and his method,—nay even in minuter details, he has been anticipated by his namesake Roger Bacon in those Middle Ages which M. Taine condemns not only as dark, but as having produced absolutely nothing to further the progress of human thought.

And what of the greatest glory of our literature, William Shakespeare? Is he too the offspring of the Renaissance? It barely touched even the hem of his garment. He is before all and above all an Englishman, who sums up in his dramas the *practical* wisdom of the Catholic past, thoroughly digests it in his own soul, and re-creating it by the power of his imagination, leaves it as a legacy to all future generations of Englishmen and women,—nay, to the world at large. M. Taine is not a warm admirer of Mr. Carlyle, but there are few, we think, who have read the latter's estimate of Shakespeare who will not also agree with him in his remark already quoted, that he is the interpreter of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages.

"As Dante, the Italian man, was sent into our world to embody musically the religion of the Middle Ages, the religion of our modern Europe, its inner life; so Shakespeare, we may say, embodies for us the outer life of our Europe as developed then, its chivalries, its courtesies, humours, ambitions, what practical way of thinking, acting, looking at the world, men then had. As in Homer we may still construe Old Greece, so in Shakespeare and Dante, after thousands of years, what our modern Europe was, in faith and in practice, will still be legible. Dante has given us the faith, or soul; Shakespeare, in a not less noble way, has given us the practice or body. This latter also we were to have, a man was sent for it—the man Shakespeare. Just when that chivalry-way of life had reached its last finish, and was on the point of breaking down into slow or swift dissolution, as we now see it everywhere, this other Sovereign Poet was sent to take notice of it, to give long enduring record of it. . . .

"In some sense it may be said that this glorious Elizabethan era with its Shakespeare as the outcome and flowerage of all which had preceded it, is itself attributable to the Catholicism of the Middle Ages. The Christian faith, which was the theme of Dante's song, had produced this practical life which Shakespeare was to sing. For religion then, as it now and always is, was the soul of poetry, the primary vital fact in man's life." ("Hero-Worship," sect. iii.)

Charmed as M. Taine is with the spirit of the pagan Renaissance, he is not blind to the evils which it produced in Italy. Most unfairly, however, he attributes these evils to the influence of the Church, and especially to the Roman Pontiffs, forgetful that if the Church had not countenanced the Renaissance, so far as she could do this without compromising higher interests, although, indeed, she ever endeavoured to restrain the movement within due limits—the evils would have been a hundredfold greater than they were. But his condemnation is exaggerated and unjust. Foul stories raked up from the writings of Luther, or other pre-

judiced and one-sided authors, are set before us. Even the old fable about Alexander VI. and Lucretia comes to life again in his pages. It is true that he traces the root of the evils he condemns to the bad and false conception of man inherent in all southern civilizations; but to show also that the Catholic Church is tainted with the same vice is to him evidently a labour of love. We need not wonder, therefore, at the spirit in which he views what he calls the *Christian Renaissance*, or the Reformation, whether in Germany or in England, for to him the Reformation is a new birth both to liberty and justice, in harmony with the genius of the German people, not an unjust rebellion against the truth, which in its principle, at least, involves utter license, and the dissolution of all authority. In England, he would have us believe, Protestantism is a thing to be admired. Even its idea of sin, repentance, and moral renovation ennobles man, and introduces a sort of impassioned gravity into all the important actions of his life. The English translation of the Bible, the Liturgy of the English Church, are sufficient to inspire a new and healthy vigour among the English people, although we may well smile when we remember that the words of the marriage service, which in M. Taine's eyes are genuine words of loyalty and conscience, excluding all mystic languor, as well as the noblest of the prayers of the English Liturgy, have simply been translated word for word from the offices and ritual of that elder Church which M. Taine seems to hate with such perfect hatred. If such be his view of Protestantism, our readers can imagine the spirit in which he criticises the early religious literature of Protestant England. We need not follow him, even did time allow us. Enough for us to say, that true to his philosophy the Protestant idea, even when resulting in Puritanism, was, after all, only what the clime demanded and the race suggested. We cannot, however, refrain from quoting his words, in which he sums up the position which Milton occupies in our literature, for indirectly they will serve our purpose:—

In his works we recognize two Englands: one impassioned for the beautiful, devoted to the emotions of an unshackled sensibility and the fancies of pure imagination, with no law but the natural feelings, and no religion but natural belief voluntarily pagan, often criminal, such as it is exhibited by the superb powers of poets which covered the ground for the space of fifty years. The other fortified by a prevalent religion, void of metaphysical invention, altogether political, with worship and law, attached to measured, sensible, useful narrow opinions, praising the virtues of the family, armed and stiffened by a rigid morality, driven into prose, raised to the highest degree of power, wealth, and liberty. For this sense,

this style, and these ideas are monuments of history ; they concentrate, recall, or embrace all the past and the future ; and in the limits of a single work are found the events and the feelings of several centuries and of a whole nation. (Vol. I. p. 486.)

Our space forbids us to touch upon M. Taine's estimate of the literature of the classic age, or to follow him through all the baseness, cruelty, debauchery, and immodesty of the Restoration, with its raw element of worldliness, which from the seventeenth century down to our day has exercised so powerful an influence for evil in England as well as in France. Nor can we notice the book which he devotes to the consideration of modern life, although we should have no difficulty in showing that, owing to his preconceived views on the influence of race and climate, and his rejection of all supernatural religion, he is unable to grapple with the real difficulties of the several periods, or to present us with their true solution. We will conclude by placing before our readers his final summary :—

As the basis of the present as of the past ever reappears an inner and persistent cause,—the *character* of the race; transmission, and climate have maintained it ; a violent perturbation,—the Norman Conquest—warped it ; finally, after various oscillations, it was manifested by the conception of a special ideal, which gradually fashioned or produced religion, literature, institutions. Thus fixed and expressed, it was thenceforth the mover of the rest ; it explains the present, on it depends the future ; its form and direction will produce the present and future civilization. Now that great historic violences,—I mean, the destruction and enslavement of peoples,—have become almost impracticable, each nation can develop its life according to its own conception of life ; the chances of a war, a discovery have no hold but on details ; national inclinations and aptitudes alone now draw the great features of a national history ; when twenty-five millions of men conceive the good and useful after a certain type, they will seek and end by attaining this kind of the good and useful. The Englishman has henceforth his priest, his gentlemen, his manufacturers, his comfort and his novel. If you wish to see in what sense this work will alter, you must seek in what sense the central conception will alter. A vast revolution has taken place during the last three centuries in human intelligence,—like those regular and vast uprisings which, displacing a continent, displace all the prospects. We know that positive discoveries go on increasing day by day, that they will increase daily more and more, that from object to object they reach the most lofty, that they begin by renewing the science of man, that their useful application and their philosophical consequences are ceaselessly unfolded ; in short that their universal encroachment will at last comprise the whole human mind. From this body of invading truths springs in addition an original conception of the good and useful, and moreover, a new idea of state and church, art and industry, philosophy and religion. This has its powers, as the old idea had ;

it is scientific, if the other was natural ; it is supported on proved facts, if the other was upon established things. Already their opposition is being manifested ; already their results begin ; and we may affirm beforehand, that the proximate condition of English civilization will depend upon their divergence and their agreement. (Vol. ii. pp. 335-6.)

Such is the heartless philosophy which M. Taine has brought to bear upon the history of the English nation, and of its literature. Untenable, whether we regard the facts recorded in the history of the nation itself, or the deeds and powers of the human mind in general, for which, if we may judge from the past,—and how otherwise, setting aside revelation, can we judge ? there is no ceaseless, uninterrupted progress it holds forth indeed, but a prospect full of gloom for the England of the future. The future has but a poor chance. But to those who hold, like ourselves, that as long as there is upon earth a teacher sent from God to mould the destinies of nations for their own good as well as for His glory, to counteract the influences of race and climate, to overcome the perturbations and vicissitudes of time, to inspire their literatures with the love of all that is good, and beautiful, and true, and pure and noble, so long will there be ever at hand for preservation the means of repeated renewal, however frequent the decay, the future of England is still full of glorious promise. For three hundred years, indeed, she has deliberately torn herself away from this divine teacher, but once again the Church of the living God is in the midst of her, holding out to her the hope of renewed life and vigour, and the advantages of true civilization. It is for England to decide whether she will accept them.

We have only to add that in our review of M. Taine's work we have been obliged to confine our remarks to the consideration of the general principles upon which it has been written. It would have been for us a pleasanter task to notice the brilliant and vivid way in which he unfolds the merits or demerits of individual authors, and in which he has, we may safely say, never been surpassed,—in a future article we may perhaps be allowed to do so—but we have felt it to be our first duty to enter our earnest protest against a philosophy so utterly destructive of the true life both of a nation and a literature.

ART. III.—USURY AND THE CANON LAW.

1. *Zins und Wucher*. Von Dr. F. X. FUNK. Tübingen, 1868.
2. *L'Usure et la Loi de 1807*. Par M. CHARLES PERIN. (Reprinted from the *Revue d'Économie Chrétienne*, Jan., 1865.
3. *History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*. By W. E. H. LECKY. Chapter VI.

IN an article on usury in the last number of this REVIEW we endeavoured to escape from the maze of ambiguous terms which surround the question. We distinguished three senses of the word interest: the economical sense, or the share of capital in the gain which it has co-operated with labour in producing; the popular sense, or a periodical payment in consideration of a claim, not to this or that specific object, but to so much value; and the old legal sense, or recompense for the loan of coin so far as allowed by the civil law. Usury we found had four senses: the modern legal sense, or interest in the popular sense, when greater than allowed by the civil law; the old legal sense, or recompense for a loan of a coin when greater than allowed by the civil law; the wide ecclesiastical sense, or all gain from a loan of fungible things, that is, all *lucrum ex mutuo*; and the narrow ecclesiastical sense, or all wrongful *lucrum ex mutuo*. This last sense expressed usury considered as a sin, and we set forth the new view of this sin, according to which it would consist in making profit by way of contract out of another's distress. We had occasion to observe how untrue was the statement that the Church had ever forbidden interest in the first or second of the senses which we have given, how incorrect to say that she had forbidden it even in the third sense. We saw that the real object of her prohibition was all gain from a *mutuum*; and this is the prohibition which in the present article we propose to examine.

It will be remembered that we drew a distinction between two very different kinds of loans.* This is so important for the present historical discussion that we will restate the distinction. One kind of loan, which we called commercial, is where the two parties are on terms of equality, and where the one borrows of the other in order to employ what he has

* DUBLIN REVIEW, Oct., 1873, pp. 342-344.

borrowed in production. It is one form of transfer of capital; and the lender has a just claim to share the gain, which by lending he has co-operated in producing. Very different is that other kind of loan, which we called necessitous. In this case the borrower is in distress, and borrows in order to obtain the necessities of life. There is no juridical freedom here, and the lender, as we showed at length, can make almost any condition he pleases. Nor can there be any question of dividing the gain; for since, *ex hypothesi*, the loan is employed towards consumption, there is no gain to be divided. If then the lender make such a loan the source of a revenue, there ensues what may be called an economical contradiction. The borrower previously found his revenue insufficient for his own wants; now, with no fresh source of revenue opened, he has, not merely to supply his own wants, but, in addition, to pay the lender. This is the intolerable situation which has ever roused the indignation of Christian moralists. The gain of the lender flows in apparently without any source. Here indeed we witness the "unnatural fecundity of barren coin." Here truly is practised that "damnable agriculture," as S. Chrysostom sternly says,* "without plough, without rain, without land, wherefrom naught shall be reaped but tares to be cast into the eternal flames." Of course there *is* a source to the lender's gain, and it is in the wretched borrower being compelled to sink into the depths of misery and crime to avoid which he originally borrowed. He must sacrifice external decencies. He must sell the last remnant of furniture. He must engage in some degrading occupation, or, being plundered himself, take vengeance on society and become a thief. Or he must make his wife and children a source of profit, though their health be ruined by premature or excessive labour. Perhaps he may sink even lower, and force his daughters into a life of shame, or where possible sell his whole family into slavery. In these ways, and many others like to these, he supplies the profit of the lender. Yet whatever he does, he will hardly ever be able to pay back the principal and be free; since from the nature of the case the interest (in the popular sense) which he pays must be very high. For even supposing the lender was content with the ordinary profit among honest traders, he could not as a commercial speculation lend to a poor man in distress except at a very high rate of interest, so as to compensate for the very bad security. Thus the borrower is almost doomed to ruin. In old Rome the situation often ended in the borrower

* Cited by Perin, *L'Usure et la Loi de 1807*, p. 11.

becoming the slave of the lender. In modern times the end is most often in the gaol or the workhouse, the lender indeed losing his principal, but not till he has got back, in the shape of interest, the amount of the principal several times over. It may seem amazing that age after age the poor continue borrowing, when ruin is so surely the result.* But this fact, which cannot seriously be contested, will appear less strange if we remember how hard it is under the pressure of distress to regard the future, how prone we are to purchase present relief at any price; how easily delusive hopes of future gain disturb our judgment; how often each thinks that some lucky change will carry him through where all others have failed; how artful are the wiles of lenders; how ignorant and simple are most of the poor in regard to business and law. Indeed, in almost all these loans there is fraud as well as extortion, so that to these detestable lenders Dante has rightly given their place in hell in the lowest rank of the "violent," and next to the "frodolenti,"† since they have defrauded as well as plundered their victims. We see then that while commercial lending enriches individuals and the community, necessitous lending (as far as made a profitable trade of and not as a mere work of charity) is the fruitful source of misery and crime; nor is it possible, without accurately distinguishing these two classes of loans, to understand the enactments of the canon law or any other law on lending coin.

We are now able to explain without difficulty the ecclesiastical prohibition of *lucrum ex mutuo* in a certain class of cases. A loan of oil, bread, and the rest of those fungible things which are consumed in the first use *naturaliter*, can hardly be other than a necessitous loan. It is not for production but for consumption that such things are lent. Consequently, when the *mutuum* consisted of such things, it could be presumed to be a necessitous loan, and the prohibition of *lucrum ex mutuo* was clearly but an application of the natural law, which forbids profit to be made out of another's distress or simplicity. But when the *mutuum* consisted of that fungible thing which is consumed not *naturaliter* but *civiliter*, in other words, when it consisted of coin, the justice of the prohibition does not thus appear on the surface. For according to our present experience

* The class of small peasant proprietors is especially exposed to extortionate and fraudulent lenders. Thus in France and India this evil is very prevalent; in England much less so.

† *Inferno*, Cantos xi. and xvii.

a loan of coin can serve a productive purpose, and the lender is thus entitled to a share in the gain, in other words, to receive interest in the economical sense—the interest of his capital. Consequently the prohibition of *fœnus* or gain from a loan of coin bears the appearance of an injustice towards capitalists and of a violation of the rights of property. And these are precisely the charges which are brought against the legislation of the Church by those who make their own age the measure of the past. Unfortunately they have not always been answered in the right fashion, and many of the defenders no less than the adversaries of the Church have spoken of Moses or the Councils as though they had legislated in our own century. But can laws be understood without some knowledge of the subjects whom they are to oblige, of the objects to which they are to apply? Will the mere study of the letter disclose the spirit? Will not rather such study be fruitless, and result in no real apprehension of bygone legislation, but in a useless acquaintance with legal formulæ, which are meaningless in the abstract, significant only in their concrete application?

The need of treating the question of usury historically is strongly insisted upon by Dr. Funk in the work which we have placed at the head of this as of our former article. "We need not stop," he says, speaking of the unhistorical method, "to inquire what claims to be called accurate and scientific can be made by a method, which makes the present, with its social characteristics—unlimited right of alienation, personal right of labour, free competition, highly developed home and foreign trade, and a great accumulation of capital—which makes, we say, the present the measure of a past age, which has quite opposite characteristics—inalienability of landed property, labour fast bound in corporations, limitation of home and foreign trade, and poverty of capital."* But if we recognize these and other distinctions between the present and the past, the former prohibitions of the Church and their subsequent withdrawal, far from presenting any difficulty, will but form one more link in the chain of proof that the Church has been created not for one age or for one state of society, but for all. The principles of justice and of charity which she upholds, from the very fact of their being immutable, require the legal forms in which they find their expression to be changed with the changes of society.† We proceed then to give the historical explanation of the ecclesiastical prohibition of *fœnus*, and our remarks will be little more than a

* Zins und Wucher, p. 92.

† Ibid. p. 49.

résumé of the second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters of the second part of Dr. Funk's treatise.

We have already adverted to the fact that in certain conditions of society, coin only facilitates consumption not production, and that the loan of it is therefore not commercial or productive.* It follows that in such states of society all *foenus* or gain from a loan of coin can be presumed to be a gain from a necessitous loan, and therefore wrongful. Now this was the condition of society in the Christian world precisely during those times in which the Church issued her prohibition of *foenus*. We live in so different an age, that it is hard to realize that there was a time when a man who had obtained a loan of coin could buy no capital with it; could employ it to set up neither in farming nor in business. But so it was.† Land was not to be bought, or at least only on the rarest occasions, and even then with great difficulties. Fixity of tenure was the rule for all cultivators. A loan for the purpose of buying land was, as Roscher tells us,‡ in this period almost unheard of. And not only was the possession of land as it were crystallized, but so also were trades. Each trade was confined to a guild, whose members alone could practise it; and membership was not bought or sold at pleasure. Any attempt to set up a 'rival establishment' was promptly suppressed. Indeed often the practice of the special industry distinguishing some great city was forbidden in all the neighbouring villages and small towns. And thus we may say that, in general, productive commodities were not to be obtained with coin. Consequently a loan of coin could be presumed to serve only for consumptive purposes, and any gain from it to be therefore usurious. Justly then such gain was forbidden by the Church, and this prohibition was "neither the result of an unsound Christian rigorism, nor a drag on commerce, nor a measure of injustice against the propertied classes, nor an exaggerated care for the poor, nor a token of the rule of communistic ideas, nor a result of complete economical ignorance, but the legal expression of the economical situation."§ "This prohibition," says Arnold of Basle, "expresses the fact that money had not yet acquired the quality of capital, and consequently could bring no interest; so that if any one in spite of this made money bring him in a revenue, he was guilty of usury. This sounds strange to us, since we are accustomed to connect the words capital and

* DUBLIN REVIEW, Oct., 1873, pp. 333-344.

† Funk, part ii. ch. ii. pp. 48-59.

‡ Nationalökonomie, § 190. § Funk, p. 55.

money. But it was quite natural in an age when a man's means were reckoned by his land, and when the only available medium of exchange consisted in the produce of cattle-breeding and agriculture."* "When commerce," says Corbière, "was little developed, when nations were occupied habitually with agriculture or war, men only borrowed out of necessity. Lending was only to the poor, or at least to those in difficulties; whereas now such lending is exceptional, being generally to the rich, to great manufacturers, to powerful companies. It is destined, not to relieve one in misfortune, or to enable the modest funds of a trader to sustain a sudden requisition, but to increase the fortune of a capitalist. See the immense difference in the two situations. In the old state of things oppressive interest [not interest at all in the economical sense] was taken when charity required the loan to be gratuitous; while now the interest is not only moderate, but also springs from loans, which result in the increase of the public fortune and in the individual gain of the borrower."† Indeed before the times of fiefs and guilds, in antiquity as opposed to the Middle Ages, perhaps through the presence of slavery, so disastrous both to labour and capital, the same phenomenon appears. The loan of coin was habitually made only to those in distress. And thus the opposition between the ancient and modern view of receiving gain from the loan of coin "receives its natural solution from a true appreciation of history; for each view has been occasioned by the contemporary economical nature of lending."‡

By the light then of history we can discern the true nature and meaning of the prohibitions of *fœnus* in the Old Testament, in the Fathers, and in the Canons. "The Mosaic prohibitions," says Schegg, "of receiving any remuneration for a loan§ proceed from the principle that only the poor have need of borrowing: we must not refuse to lend to them, and much less turn the occasion to our own enrichment. Lending as a duty of charity must necessarily exclude all gain on the part of the lender. The debt must not increase of itself (*durch sich selbst wachsen*), for in this way poverty would only become greater and more universal, a danger against which the Mosaic legislation has everywhere taken the most admirable care."|| And thus in most passages of the Old

* Zur Geschichte des Eigenthums, p. 92. Funk, p. 55.

† L'Economie sociale au point de vue chrétien, vol. i. p. 332.

‡ Lassalle, Arbeit und Capital, p. 164. Funk, p. 95.

§ So we have ventured to translate "Verbote des Zinsnehmen (des Wuchers)."

|| In Wetzler und Welte, Kirchenlexicon, word, Wucher bei den Hebräern.

Testament which enjoin gratuitous lending we find intimated the poverty of the borrower. E.g., Exod. xxii. 25 (*populo meo pauperi*), Levit. xxv. 35, 36 (*attenuatus frater*), Ezech. xviii. 8, 13, 17 (*a pauperis injuria*), Ps. lxxi. 13, 14 (*pauperi et inopi*). In other and fewer passages, as Ps. xiv. 5, liv. 12, though the poor are not expressly mentioned, it does not follow that the loan is not presupposed to be necessitous. The real difficulty indeed would appear to be, not the prohibition, but the permission of *fœnus*—*Fœnerabis alieno*, Deut. xxiii. 19, and *fœnerabis gentibus multis*, Deut. xxviii. 12. Perhaps it was granted because among the commercial Egyptians and Phœnicians, coin had assumed as at present the qualities of capital.

In the New Testament there is no general prohibition of *fœnus*. The passage "*mutuum date nihil inde sperantes*" Luc. vi. 35, is, according to Vignon,* clearly not a precept but a counsel; just as the shortly preceding passages, "*qui te percutit in maxillam, præbe et alteram*," and "*qui aufert quæ tua sunt ne repetas*," are counsels not precepts, and do not take away the right of self-defence and the right of property. If, however, it is thought better to interpret the passage as a precept, there seems no difficulty. We can say that the distress of the borrower is here presupposed, and we can translate '*mutuum*' as '*a necessitous loan*.'

As to the Fathers and the Councils, the former in their denunciations of *fœnus* have always, according to Hefele,† necessitous lending in view; and Dr. Funk questions whether a single passage can be produced where they declare that to receive interest from a productive loan is sinful.‡ S. Gregory of Nazium says that the *fœnerator* "makes gain not from the cultivation of the earth but from the wants of the poor";§ S. Chrysostom, that he "seeks gain from the ruin of others, and grows rich through another's poverty";|| S. Basil, that "he grows rich through the misery of others, draws advantage from the hunger and nakedness of the poor, is inaccessible to sentiments of humanity."¶ Similarly we can gather from incidental expressions in the decrees of the Councils, that the offence they have in view is the making profit out of another's distress. Thus of the two œcumenical councils of the Middle Ages which denounced usury, the 2nd Lateran (an. 1139) speaks of the *insatiabilem fœneratorum rapacitatem*, and the 2nd

* Du Prêt à Intérêt, p. 65 (Paris, 1859). Cf. Funk, p. 220.

† *Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte*, vol. i. p. 35. Funk, p. 222.

‡ P. 222. § Orat. 15. || Hom. in S. Matt.

¶ Cited by Perin, *L'Usure et la Loi de 1807*, p. 9.

Lyons (an. 1274) of *usurarum voraginem quæ animas devorat et facultates exhaurit*.*

We may say then, that the ecclesiastical prohibitions of *fœnus* were the legal form in which the Church applied the immutable principles of morality to the existing economical situation. She upheld the gratuitousness of the *mutuum*, because in those days the *mutuum* was not a commercial, but a necessitous loan. Even if a commercial loan *could* have been effected in this way, it never actually *was* so effected; and thus the *mutuum* belonged to those economical transactions which charity often commanded to be made, and which justice always forbade to be a source of profit.

But the world was not to stand still. Commerce developed; manufactures arose; the crystallized condition of labour and capital came, whether for better or for worse, to an end, and both assumed the character of mobility, which at present distinguishes them. In a word, a complete economical revolution took place; not truly in a day, but in the space of several centuries; and by no means uniformly, but varying in different lands, and progressing faster in towns than in the country.† Such has been the change; and to this change the Church, as we shall see, has ever admirably corresponded, never sanctioning laws that might seem to make her a partner in the oppression of the poor, and yet never infringing on the rights of the rich. When coin first assumed the character of potential capital, two courses lay open to her. The one was to give up the legal principle of the gratuitousness of the *mutuum*; the other was to place the newly-arisen phenomenon of commercial loans of coin under some different legal form. To take the first course would have been to give a shock to the legal system of Europe, and to effect at a blow a revolution in law, while the corresponding economical revolution, which was to take centuries in its accomplishment, had only reached the first stage. And, as Hergenröther says,‡ “it was not the business of the Church to anticipate the development of economical life. She had only, as it went on, to guard her principles, which were those of Christian charity, forbidding us to make profit out of the necessity of our fellow-men.” She chose then, the second course, and leaving intact the formal doctrine

* Cf. Vignon, l.c., p. 88, seq. Also Catechismus Romanus, pars iii. c. viii. 11. “*Fœneratores in rapinis acerrimi, et acerbissimi, qui miseram plebem compilant, ac trucidant usuris.*”

† Funk, pp. 60-62.

‡ Katholische Kirche und christlicher Staat, Essay I. § 19, p. 29. In two pages the author of these admirable essays compresses an extraordinary amount of information on the subject of usury.

of the gratuitousness of the mutuum and the unlawfulness of *fœnus*, gave in two ways ample scope for the productive loan of coin. First, by recognizing the possibility that side by side with the mutuum could exist certain titles justifying the reception of *fœnus*; secondly, by recognizing certain contracts, by which what was really an onerous loan of coin could be effected. By these means she fully corresponded to the course of economical development; and finally, in the second quarter of the present century, when the old economical situation, if anywhere present, was an exception to the general rule, she has sanctioned, as we shall see, through the decisions of the Penitentiary and the Holy office, the reception of more than the principal of a mutuum without the presence of any of the recognized titles. These titles, and the contracts enabling coin to be lent onerously, we will briefly consider.

The earliest recognized of the titles was *periculum sortis* or risk, which found its place in the Decretals of Gregory IX.,* and which, after being tacitly approved by the fifth Lateran Council, was openly sanctioned by Innocent X. Two other titles, *damnum emergens* and *lucrum cessans*, can be traced back almost as far, since we find in S. Thomas's Summa the recognition of the one explicitly† and of the other at least implicitly.‡ *Damnum emergens* was any loss the lender incurred by making the loan; *lucrum cessans* was any gain he would have obtained if he had not made the loan. Besides the three titles which we have mentioned, and which afforded ground for what was called *usura compensatoria*, a fourth gained recognition chiefly through the influence of the Roman law. This was *pœna conventionalis*, and consisted in the debtor paying something more than the principal if he failed to restore the principal by the time agreed. This title was the ground for what was called *usura moratoria* or *punitoria*. On the claims of the so-called *titulus legis* to be reckoned among the titles and to have been sanctioned by the Church, we will speak presently.

So much for the titles. Turning now to the contracts by means of which a revenue could be drawn from a loan of coin, we observe as one of the most conspicuous, the *census realis* or rent. According to Azorius, "est census [realis] jus percipiendi annuam pensionem ex re utili et fructifera, certa et designata alterius."§ The holder of the superfluous coin transferred it to the holder of some productive commodity,—a farm for example, in consideration of a periodical payment to be defrayed out of the produce of the aforesaid farm. This was

* C. 19, x. h. t. 19, 19.

† 2, 2, qu. 62, 4, 2.

‡ 2, 2, qu. 78, 2, 1.

§ Institutiones moral., t. iii. p. 775.

very different from receiving *fœnus* from a loan, where the borrower had no productive commodity from which to draw the *fœnus*. The *contractus censualis* was indeed a contract of loan, but the loan could not be necessitous; for it implied that the borrower was in possession of a productive commodity, and in the vast majority of instances would serve towards production. Nor let it be objected that, according to the state of society which we have previously described, productive goods could not be bought with coin. For—at least in the fifteenth century, when popes Martin V. and Calixtus III. sanctioned the census—this only applied to those who were unpossessed of any productive goods; those, on the contrary, who possessed them were enabled to obtain with coin other productive goods. Doubtless with the same sum the same physical objects could be bought by the mendicant as by the lord of the manor or by the master of a trade. But whereas by the two last these objects could be employed in production, by the mendicant they could be employed either not at all or else only in consumption. Of little service was a plough, for example, or a harrow, to one who neither possessed nor was able to obtain a rood of land; and to no other purpose than to personal consumption could fuel, for example, be employed by one who neither possessed nor was able to obtain a bakehouse, a foundry, or the like. And thus we see that, at least as far as the agricultural classes were concerned, there was no need in this stage of economical development to give up the presumption that gain from a loan of coin was usurious; for whenever it was not so, the transaction assumed the form of the *contractus censualis*, which was allowed.*

A second contract by which a revenue could be drawn from the transfer of coin was *societas*, defined by Azorius: "*duorum pluriumve conventio voluntate contrahendæ societatis honestæ ex pecuniis, opera, industria, et bonis singulorum inter ipsos communibus ad uberiores quæstum et commodiorem usum.*"† The usefulness of this contract, especially for commerce, is obvious. One partner could give his head, another his hands,

* Pope Pius V., while confirming the census realis (which is what we have described) forbade the *census personalis*, which was grounded, not on a *res fructifera*, but on personal labour. And rightly he forbade it; for (as we have seen) all employments wherein a man's labour would bring him such a revenue as would enable him to pay his creditor, were closed to outsiders, and not to be bought for coin. He could doubtless become a servant. But then, whether his office was to plough his master's field or mind his master's falcons, though receiving food, lodging, and clothing, he would receive nothing which would enable him to pay the census to his creditor. Rightly then could the censual contract in this case be branded as usurious. It could scarcely arise except from the lender taking advantage of the borrower's distress.

† L. c. p. 744.

a third his purse. Intellect, industry, and opulence could co-operate. So Zech calls this partnership "a most useful contract; first, because all, though unengaged in commerce, can in this way acquire a just gain from their coin (ex pecuniis); secondly, because many to whom coin alone is wanting to enable them to engage in commerce, can in this way, to the good of the commonwealth, exercise their industry, which else had languished."* It should be observed that the condition "ut quis socius subeat onus damnorum et expensarum, quæ intuitu societatis adveniunt,"† was justly held to be indispensable. Otherwise the most flagrant usury might have been practised under cover of this contract. The Jew might have said to the distressed peasant: "Here is the coin which you require; but mark, it is no case of a mutuum but of societas. We are partners. I supply the capital, you the labour. As to the profits, mine shall be fixed, yours fluctuating. I require merely 200 p. c. on my contribution to the common fund. Not a farthing more will I ask whatever you may gain, but not a farthing less whatever you may lose."

A third contract enabling an onerous loan of coin to be made was the *contractus trinus*, which became common in the 15th century, especially in Spain,‡ and which the Church tacitly sanctioned; for the theologians, having long disputed about its legitimacy, Benedict XIV., in his encyclical *Vix pervenit*, expressly refused to condemn it, and by implication forbade its supporters to be censured.§ We cannot better describe it than in the words of the same pope. "Titius enters

* See the treatise "Rigor moderatus Doctrinæ Pontificiæ circa Usuras" in Migne, *Theologiæ Cursus complet.*, t. xvi. p. 906.

† Gury, *Compendium Theol. moral.*, pars i. n. 917.

‡ Funk, p. 84. Yet this contract, according to Mr. Lecky, was the fruit of Jesuit casuistry. He says (*Rationalism*, ii. p. 267, 4th edition): "The casuistry of the Jesuits was soon applied to the subject, and two or three circuitous ways of obtaining interest became popular, which gave rise to long and virulent controversies." And then in a foot-note: "One of these was elaborately discussed by Concina in a treatise called, *De Usura trini Contractus* (Romæ, 1748)." In common histories we read that the Society of Jesus was formed in 1534 and sanctioned in 1540. But Mr. Lecky, who has consulted "all the writings of the . . . mediæval theologians," and if not all, at least "nearly every book that has ever been written on the Canon law" (pp. 254-255), has doubtless among these writings found traces of the Jesuits in the 15th century.

§ "De contractu autem, qui novas has controversias excitavit, nihil in præsentia statuimus."—"Quod si disputatio insurgat, dum contractus aliquis in examen adducitur, nullæ omnino contumeliæ in eos confingantur, qui contrariam sententiam sequuntur, neque illam gravibus censuris notandam asserant, si præsertim ratione, et præstantium virorum testimoniis minime careat; siquidem convicia atque injuriæ vinculum christianæ charitatis infringunt, et gravissimam populo offensionem et scandalum præ se ferant."

on a contract of *societas* with Sempronius, a merchant, to whom he hands over 1,000 crowns, out of which he has good reason to expect (*probabiliter sperat*) that he will make for himself 130 crowns. But fearing lest perchance he lose, besides the expected gain, even the principal, he makes a second contract with Sempronius, surrendering to him 60 crowns of the expected gain in order that whatever be the result of the commercial enterprise, he may be secure of his principal of 1,000 crowns. But further, thinking a small and certain gain preferable to one larger but uncertain, he makes a third contract with Sempronius, surrendering to him 20 more crowns of the expected gain, on condition that whether the enterprise succeed or fail, Sempronius shall pay him the remaining 50. As a result of these three contracts, Sempronius finds himself bound to repay within a certain time to Titius the principal of 1,000 crowns, and in addition an increase of 50.* From this description it is clear, first, that the transaction, though nominally composed of three contracts,—viz., one of *societas* and two of *assecuratio* or insurance, is really nothing more than a loan of coin; but secondly, that this loan is commercial not necessitous, and in consequence that the real moral ground for the prohibition of taking any increase on the principal is absent.

From the consideration of these contracts and titles which we have briefly described, we see how wide a field was open for commercial as opposed to necessitous lending, and how unfounded is the charge that the legislation of the Church was a drag on commerce and industry. Further, when in the present century the fitting time had arrived, she issued, not indeed a formal definitive repeal of the prohibition of *fœnus*, but a provisional repeal in the decisions of the Penitentiary and the Holy Office. For this is indeed the meaning of these decisions, which have, however, been gravely misapprehended by certain writers. One is as follows:—"Decreta Congreg. S. Officii (die 31. Aug. 1831) a S. P. Pio VIII. approbata super sequentibus dubiis: 1° Utrum confessarius possit in conscientia denegare absolutionem presbyteris, qui contendunt, legem principis esse titulum sufficientem percipiendi aliquid ultra sortem absque alio titulo vel lucri cessantis vel damni emergentis? 2° Utrum debeat? Resp. ad utrumque: Non esse inquietandos, quousque S. Sedes definitivam decisionem emiseric, cui parati sint se subicere; adeoque nihil obstande eorum absolutioni in sacramento pœnitentiæ." Both previously and subsequently to this decision the Penitentiary

* De Synodo Diœc., lib. x. c. 7, 2.

replied to analogous questions—"non esse inquietandum quousque S. Sedes definitivam decisionem emisit" (16 Sep. 1830), and "fideles hujusmodi [who take fœnus with no title but that of the civil law], qui bona fide ita se gerunt, non esse inquietandos?"* (11 Nov. 1831.) From these decisions Gury † draws the unwarrantable conclusion that the Church has recognized the so-called *titulus legis*, which means that if every other ground for the permission to exact fœnus be absent, the permission of the law of the State is sufficient to justify it in *foro conscientię*. But this conclusion has neither reason nor the authority of the Holy See upon which to rest: not reason; for a natural and divine law cannot be repealed by a positive and human law; nor the authority of the Holy See; for firstly, if the alleged recognition of the *titulus legis* had been intended, the aforesaid decisions must have been couched in other terms; ‡ and secondly, if any doubt could have remained on the subject, it ought to have been dispelled on the 7th March, 1835, by the answer of the Penitentiary to the Bishop of Viviers. He had inquired about the conduct of those persons who said simply that the civil law by itself was sufficient title for receiving *lucrum ex mutuo*, without mentioning the clause "*parati esse debeant stare mandatis S. Sedis.*" To this Eminentissimus Pœnitentiarius Major answered that "*S. Pœnitentiariam haudquaquam voluisse responsis illis quæstionem a theologis agitatum de titulo ex lege principis desumpto definire, sed solummodo normam proposuisse, quam confessarii tuto sequerentur erga pœnitentes, qui moderatum lucrum legis principis statutum acciperent bona fide, paratique essent stare mandatis S. Sedis, ac proinde minime probari posse illorum concionatorum agendi rationem, qui absolute docent in sacris concionibus licitum esse lucrum ex mutuo percipere titulo legis civilis, reticitis enunciatis conditionibus.*" These decisions then of the Holy See, if their real nature be considered, are a recognition of the change in the economical state of things; the change by which the simple loan of coin can be presumed to be commercial instead of, as in old times, necessitous. They are not concessions to the spirit of the age (to use the current jargon); they do not grant in practice what in principle is forbidden; much rather are they the practical application of the principles which have ever guided the Church, and which for the very reason, that amid the changes of society and civilization, they

* See the decisions in Gury, l. c. pars i. n. 876-879. Also in the appendix to Vignon. † L. c. n. 862, seq.

‡ Funk, p. 137, note.—Hätte die Entscheidung *nothwendig anders lauten müssen*. He discusses the question of the *titulus legis*, pp. 135-139.

lie outside the legislation of the Church, is excellent, though not reached by the proper way. And rightly he holds with others,* that a productive loan and a lease are from a moral point of view identical.

In striking contrast to Mastrofini is a third view, which is perhaps still the commonest among moralists, and which may be called the theory of titles—*tituli ab usura excusantes*. Here we must not confuse the action of the Church, which has, as we have seen, at certain periods of history admitted various titles justifying the reception of *fœnus*, with the doctrine of those moralists who have endeavoured to give, with the aid of these titles, a permanent solution of the question of lending coin. Their doctrine is briefly this: *fœnus* is of itself unlawful, but can be justified by the presence of any of certain titles, viz., *damnum emergens*, *lucrum cessans*, *periculum sortis*, and *pœna conventionalis*. Some add as a fifth title *titulus legis*, the inadmissibility of which we have already shown. But why, it may be asked, is *fœnus* per se unlawful? In answer two reasons are given,—the natural gratuitousness of the contract of *mutuum*, and the natural sterility of coin. Thus Azorius says that “a gain cannot be exacted for the fruit, or use, or emolument of coin lent (*pecuniæ mutuatæ*): on the one hand, because the use of the coin is transferred, together with the dominium of the coin, to the borrower; on the other hand, because coin produces from itself no fruit and emolument: therefore there is nothing in a *mutuum* for which gain can be exacted beyond the *mutuum* itself.” †

Before examining these two grounds of the theory of titles, let us observe the dilemma, or rather the trilemma, in which it places its supporters. They must either keep close to their theory, like their rigorous Pagès, and then they come into collision not merely with the economical requirements of the time but also with the decisions of the Holy See; or they must admit the *titulus legis* and the capacity of the civil law to make black white; or lastly they must stretch their theory, and say that the title of *lucrum cessans* can now always be presumed, and then they contradict one of the grounds of their theory; for if it be admitted that we can presume this title to be present, what is this but to admit that we can presume coin will bring in a revenue to the holder, in a word, will be productive; so that their argument hardly escapes being as follows: “Coin can be presumed to be sterile; therefore gain from it is unlawful without a special title; yet no special title is needed at

* E. g. Probst, *Katholische Moraltheologie*, vol. ii. p. 145. See Funk, p. 186.

† L.c. t. iii. p. 70. †

present, for at present coin can be presumed not to be sterile." We should also observe another serious *ex consequente* objection to this theory, namely its inefficiency against real usury. In the historical application of the titles as recognized by the Church the danger of their abuse was avoided, firstly by various restrictions to which the moralists subjected them, and secondly by the at least tacit condition that they were not to be applied in the case of lending to those in distress.* But if these titles are to be raised into an exclusive theory, if they alone are to be the test of the presence or absence of usury, we may say with Mastrofini that "though so recommended to avoid usury, these titles, while removing the name of usury, often aggravate its effect; like to those remedies about which we are in doubt whether they have not done as much harm as good."† There are occasions, as Vignon remarks,‡ when the want of a sum of money can induce a loss, or cause to be missed a gain, far greater than the whole amount of the aforesaid sum. In such a case by the theory of titles the lender could claim over 100 per cent., alleging, and alleging truly, the presence of *damnum emergens* or *lucrum cessans*. And it is plain that the greater the distress of the borrower, the greater as a rule would be the *foenus* that could be demanded on the plea of *periculum sortis*. It would seem that these very abuses of the titles were in the mind of Benedict XIV. when, in that admirable encyclical, which seems framed so as to meet every possible case, he warns us not to think that in lending coin or corn, or things like to these, there is always some title present or some contract other than the *mutuum*, so that we may always make a profit; but much rather that we are often bound to lend to another gratuitously.§

So much for the consequences of the theory of titles. But the consequences are not all that is amiss. The grounds of the theory are untenable. These, as we have seen, are two,—

* Funk, p. 80.

† L.c. § 588.

‡ L.c. p. 156.

§ Sed illud diligenter animadvertendum est, falso sibi quemquam et nonnisi temere persuasurum, reperiri semper ac præsto ubique esse vel unum cum mutuo titulos alios legitimos; vel secluso etiam mutuo, contractos alios justos, quorum vel titulorum vel contractuum præsidio, quotiescumque pecunia, frumentum, aliudve id generis alteri cuicumque creditur, totius semper liceat auctarium moderatum ultra sortem integram salvamque recipere. Ita si quis senserit, non modo divinis documentis et catholicæ ecclesiæ de usura iudicio, sed ipsi humano, communi sensui ac naturali rationi procul dubio adversabitur. Neminem enim id saltem latere potest, quod multis in casibus tenetur homo simplici ac nudo mutuo alteri succurrere, ipso præsertim Christo domino edocente: Volenti mutuari a te, ne avertaris (Matt. v. 42), et quod similiter multis in circumstantiis, præter unum mutuum, alteri nulli vero juxtaque contractui locus esse possit.

of these assertions. First then as to the *transitus dominii*. Here we find ourselves in one of the most intricate labyrinths of jurisprudence. It would require a long article to discuss the question satisfactorily. Fortunately, however, a few remarks will suffice for our present purpose, since, as we hope to show, it is irrelevant to the onerousness or gratuitousness of the loan, whether the *transitus dominii* occurs or not. Much has been written on either side, often with no little acrimony, since the middle of the 17th century, when Salmasius styled the notion of the *transitus dominii* an "*absurdissima opinio*." Those who have followed Salmasius seem to have forgotten the distinction between *jura in re* and *jura ad rem*, between rights availing against all the world, and those availing only against certain persons. If the right of property is a *jus in re*, it would seem difficult to escape admitting the *transitus dominii* in a *mutuum*. For where is the determinate object to which the lender can be said to have a right against all the world? All he has is a claim against the borrower, that is, a *jus ad rem*. Yet, on the other hand, the juridical defenders of the *transitus dominii*, in their zeal for the Roman law, have overlooked a formal error in the Roman notion of property. The right and the object of property were confused, and dominium was classed under things corporeal. Doubtless this classification expresses, as Therring well says, an *historical truth*, since it corresponded to the old mode of thought, according to which the right was, so to speak, absorbed in the material object.* But in a scientific theory of jurisprudence it can have no more place than our own English distinction of real and personal property. We must distinguish rights, the objects of rights, and the subjects of rights (i.e. persons). The objects of rights are either things corporeal or things incorporeal (acts and forbearances); but rights themselves, if they are to be called 'things' at all, can only be things incorporeal. From the foregoing Dr. Funk draws the following conclusion :

If [the right of] property is a *res incorporalis*, there is no absolute necessity for affirming the *transitus dominii* in a contract of *mutuum*. We can do so, since, as regards the object of the contract, it is irrelevant whether we assume the *transitus dominii* or not, the only difference being as to who is to bear the loss of any accident to the object lent. The *transitus dominii* is doubtless *advantageous*, giving to the borrower greater independence and freedom of disposition over the object ; but it is not *necessary*. For by the

* *Geist des römischen Rechts*, vol. ii. p. 464. Cf. Arnold, *Cultur und Rechtsleben*, p. 331. Also Austin's *Jurisprudence*, 3rd edit. pp. 371-372.

distinction between [the right of] property and its object, the foundation on which rests the necessity of the *transitus domini* gives way, and its opposite becomes at least logically possible.*

Let us, however, concede that the *transitus domini* takes place in a *mutuum*; for the question of the lawfulness of *lucrum ex mutuo* will not be affected by the concession. The solitary reason for the conclusion that because in a *mutuum* the dominium of the object lent is transferred to the borrower, the lender must have no share in any gain resulting from it, is the maxim *res fructiferat domino*. But if the matter is to be decided by maxims, we will reply: *scienti et volenti non fit injuria*. Why should two parties, if on terms of equality, be prevented from making a contract to their mutual advantage and to the injury of no third party? Why should a man be prevented sharing a gain which by the transfer of his property he has co-operated in producing? Or, to use Corbière's retort,† if he may make a profit by ceding merely the right of use, as when he lets out a horse or a carriage, why may he not much more make a profit by ceding not merely the right of use but the right of property in addition, as when he lends coin? And again, if the maxim *res fructiferat domino*, most useful in its proper application, is so extended as to pronounce that the dominus alone, *volens nolens*, is to reap all the fruit of his property, must not the tenant surrender to the landlord all gain he makes from the farm, or shop, or factory, which he rents?

We think we have now shown that the second foundation of the theory of titles, that is, the natural gratuitousness of a loan of fungible things, is no more solid than the first foundation, that is, the natural sterility of coin. But again we must insist on the fact that the assertion of the natural gratuitousness of the *mutuum* expressed a great truth. It was not the assertion that was wrong, but only the formal arguments of certain moralists to prove it. The real meaning of the expression 'natural gratuitousness of the *mutuum*' was the natural gratuitousness of a necessitous or consumptive loan. And the real meaning of the expressions 'a gain *ipsius ratione mutui*,' or 'solius causa mutui,' or 'vi mutui ipsius' was gain that was not interest of capital or wages of labour, but shameful profit drawn from the weakness, or distress, or simplicity of a fellow-creature.

* Pp. 184-185.

† *Economie sociale*, vol. i. p. 314. "Certes, si un voiturier rend un service en cédant seulement l'usage de son véhicule, le banquier le rendra bien plus complet en transmettant conjointement la propriété et l'usage de son numéraire."

Having completed the examination of the theory of titles, we have likewise come to the end of the negative portion of our task ; for any rational view of the legislation of the Church on usury different from the three which we have examined, will we think be found to be only a modification or combination of one or several of these three. And as none of these are tenable, we reach the conclusion that the only tenable view is the one, the truth of which we have already endeavoured on positive grounds to establish ; and this is the historical view. Here then we might terminate this article ; for as to the insults and reproaches cast upon the Church for her legislation on usury, we have already given them more than sufficient reply. Idle indeed is it to argue with those who are ignorant of the first principles on which the argument must rest, or with those who either know not or will not know the meanings of the words they use. Yet in order to give our readers some idea of the style and science of those who have presumed to sit in judgment on the Church, we will give two extracts, the one from Bentham relating the birth, the other from Mr. Lecky relating the decease, of what they imagine to be the superstition of usury. After what we have said in this and our former article, these passages will scarcely require any comment. First then let us hear Bentham.

In the conceptions of the more considerable part of those through whom our religion has been handed down to us, virtue, or rather godliness, which was an improved substitute for virtue, consisted in self-denial : not in self-denial for the sake of society, but of self-denial for its own sake. One pretty general rule served for most occasions : not to do what you had a mind to do ; or, in other words, not to do what would be for your advantage. By this of course was meant temporal advantage : to which spiritual advantage was understood to be in constant and diametrical opposition. . . . Now to get money is what most men have a mind to do ; because he who has money gets, as far as it goes, most other things that he has a mind for. Of course nobody was to get money : indeed why should he, when he was not so much as to keep what he had got already ? To lend money at interest is to get money ; or at least to try to get it : of course it was a bad thing to lend money upon such terms. The better the terms the worse it was to lend upon them : but it was bad to lend upon any terms, by which anything could be got. What made it much the worse was, that it was acting like a Jew ; for though all Christians at first were Jews, and continued to do as Jews did, after they had become Christians, yet in process of time it came to be discovered that the distance between the mother and the daughter church could not be too wide.*

In this way then the 'prejudice' against usury arose ; Mr. Lecky shall relate its decline and fall.

* Defence of Usury, Letter X. : "On the grounds for the prejudice against usury."

This [the encyclical *Vix pervenit*] appears to have been the last official utterance of the Church upon the subject, and although isolated theologians for some time attempted to stem the tide, their voices soon died away before the advancing spirit of rationalism. Year by year what the old theologians had termed usury became more general. The creation of national debts made it the very pillar of the political system. Every great enterprise that was undertaken received its impulse from it, and the immense majority of the wealthy were concerned in it. Yet though it had long been branded as a mortal sin, and though mortal sin implied eternal separation from the Deity and the endurance of eternal and excruciating sufferings, the voice of the Church was silent. The decrees of the Councils remained indeed unchanged; the passages in Scripture and from the Fathers that had so long been triumphantly adduced, continued precisely the same; but the old superstition faded steadily and almost silently away, till every vestige of it had disappeared.*

Our readers can easily judge from these two extracts the amount of knowledge in history, economy, and theology, possessed by the writers. For Bentham indeed something is to be said. We can at least understand his point of view; we can find some excuse for his blunders in the backwardness of economical and historical science when he wrote; and his coarse humour gives our lower nature a certain gratification. But what are we to think of the flowery eloquence of Mr. Lecky—of Mr. Lecky, who, disdaining (not to say misunderstanding and misrepresenting) Bentham's utilitarianism and upholding a lofty code of morals, has yet no reproach for the extortionate oppressor of the poor; who affecting to know political economy, appears far less acquainted with the nature of money and capital than S. Thomas, whom he attacks; who, professing acquaintance with "all the writings of the Fathers, of the mediæval theologians, and of the theologians of the time of the Reformation," and also with "nearly every book that has ever been written on the Canon law,"† is unacquainted, if we may judge from his writings, with any single one of the numerous works on usury that within the last hundred years have been published by Catholic authors; who out of his own or Bentham's brain invents a superstition and fastens it on mankind, in order to have the satisfaction of telling them that every vestige of it has disappeared; and who crowns his unnumbered confusions of terms, suppressions of the truth, misstatements, insults, and calumnies with the bold untruth that 'the voice of the Church was silent.'

Yet after all Mr. Lecky is an avowed enemy of the Church, against whom her enemies have ever held all weapons to be lawful. But what is to be said of the following passages from

* Hist. of Rationalism, vol. ii. p. 268.

† Ibid. p. 254.

Janus. "The popes condemned all taking of interest, but the most elaborate banking business was carried on under their very eyes, and in close connexion with the Curia :—" * "—the gross hypocrisy exhibited [by the Popes] in declaring the taking of interest a mortal sin, while the papal usurers and brokers exhausted the churches and corporations in all countries with usurious imposts, and, beginning from London, had made every English bishopric tributary to them." † Here the author, professing to be a Catholic, not merely joins the vulgar herd of calumniators, but stoops to a verbal trickery which we think Mr. Lecky would have disdained to use, even against the Holy See. To levy taxes, howsoever unjust and oppressive they may be, is not to commit usury, nor can taxgatherers, in that capacity, be called usurers. And thus, whereas in the first of the two passages we have cited there is only the common confusion of interest and usury and the various senses of these words, in the second there is a superadded absurdity, which only escapes notice through the word 'usurious' being sometimes used in slovenly language as synonymous with 'oppressive,' and without any special regard to contracts or loans. But as a formal proof of the 'hypocrisy' of the popes, it would be as reasonable to say they were hypocrites, because, while denouncing adultery as a mortal sin, the 'papal adulterers' exhausted the churches in all countries with 'adulterous' imposts.

As a conclusion we will sum up in sixteen propositions the main results of this and of our former article.

1. The old conception of the sin of usury was that it consisted in all wrongful gain from a loan of fungible things. This view of it had in former times several practical advantages.

2. At present it seems better to define usury as all gain made by way of contract out of another's distress.

3. As such it would apply not merely to the contract of *mutuum* but to all contracts, and in this would be wider than the sin of usury according to the old view; but from another aspect would be narrower, as being inapplicable to any fraudulent gain.

4. The point especially to be regarded in order to decide as to the absence or presence of usury should be the situation of the parties, whether, that is, they are on terms of equality, or, whether one party through distress is in a position of essential inferiority.

5. Civil laws professing to regulate what they call the rate

* Janus, 2nd English edition, p. 178.

† Ibid. p. 218.

of interest, have no essential but only an historical and accidental connection with civil laws directed against the sin of usury. The current arguments against 'usury laws' apply for the most part only to regulations by law of the rate of interest, and affect not the question whether the State should leave unpunished that wrongful appropriation of another's property constituted by usury.

6. Interest and usury have had, and still have, various meanings, all of which require to be distinguished, if any profitable discussion is to take place.

7. Most of the attacks on the Church for her treatment of usury rest mainly on a confusion of these various meanings.

8. The lending operations of modern commerce being almost entirely carried on without the intervention of coin, would almost entirely have lain outside the former legislation of the Church on the contracts of *mutuum* and *foeneratio*.

9. Any economical terminology, if only faithfully adhered to, will enable us to dissolve the verbal and unsubstantial difficulties which surround the legislation of the Church, and to reach the one real and substantial difficulty.

10. This consists in the prohibition issued by the Church in olden times, of receiving back more than the principal for a loan of coin; which prohibition is now virtually repealed.

11. This law of its repeal is unintelligible if we pay no regard to history. The Church, if the economical world is subject to no change, can hardly be acquitted of injustice and inconsistency. In other words, if we assume an absurdly false premiss, we can hardly escape an absurdly false conclusion.

12. But if we regard history, and pass from the region of hypothesis to the region of fact, we shall see that both the law, the derogations from it, and the abrogation of it, were equally called for, equally just, were consistent with each other, and in correspondence with the economical requirements of different periods.

13. The denunciations of usury and the decrees against it must be distinguished from the reasons alleged for these denunciations and decrees. As is known, only the actual definition of an oecumenical council or the Pope *ex cathedrâ* is divinely preserved from error, and not the grounds given for the definition. The grounds therefore given for the decrees against usury, though we by no means surrender their defensibility, we are not called on to defend; much less to defend the commentaries of the moralists, who, like other men, are exposed to error.

14. It is false to say that the Church has ever forbidden the transfer of capital from one person to another, and the recep-

tion of the interest of capital; or that her legislation on usury has been a drag on commerce; or that she has 'cursed the material development of civilization'; or that she has ever declared that 'nobody was to get money'; or that she has ever 'given her sanction' to any 'prejudice'; or that she has changed her principles of morality; or that she now concedes in practice what she condemns in theory.

15. Her legislation on usury is much rather a token of her guidance by a higher power. Though for many centuries little or nothing was known of economical phenomena, though there was no one to explain in correct economical language how the attitude of the Church was truly in harmony with the condition of society, this harmony has in the various stages of economical progress never been interrupted.

16. Moreover, the names of the popes and the councils by their decrees against usury are 'inscribed on a fair and everlasting monument.' For these decrees witness how in all ages the rulers of the Church have made the cause of the poor and distressed, of the widow and the orphan, their own; how well they have fought the fight against all kinds of plunderers and oppressors; how faithfully they have fulfilled the mission of the Church to raise up the mass of men from the misery and degradation which is their lot in all pagan societies, whether in the old times or in the new.

Since writing the above article we have received a volume by the Abbé Jules Morel, entitled "*Du Prêt à Intérêt, ou des Causes théologiques du Socialisme.*" Paris: Lecoffre. 1878. It consists of three parts. The first is a reprint of a series of articles published in the "*Univers*" in 1872. The second and chief part is a justification of the view of interest and lending taken in those articles. The third is an appendix on the question of the direct or indirect power of the popes over civil rulers. With this last part we are not here concerned, but only with the author's treatment of usury and interest. If we had had any doubts as to the need of treating this question historically, they would have been dispelled by this book, which we may characterize as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the unhistorical method. It is also a striking example of the danger of beginning a discussion without first defining the chief terms that are employed. There is a significant resemblance between the method and the result of Mr. Lecky and the Abbé Morel. Both treat usury and interest as identical terms, not to speak of using many ambiguous terms, such as capital, loan, money, without defining them, and the

result is a complete and hopeless confusion of the most opposed economical and moral transactions, and consequently the same perverse and unwarrantable interpretation of the papal and conciliar definitions and decrees as to *mutuum* and *usura*. Further, both measure all economical transactions by one standard, without regard to time or place. Neither seems to have the least idea of the great truth that many institutions and social arrangements, which would be a crying injustice or intolerable burden in one age, are just and necessary in another age; e. g. payment of wages in kind instead of in money (a modern form, the "truck system"), tithes, laws against forestalling, and the like. Moreover both interpret in about the same way the decrees of councils and popes, and thus both arrive at the same conclusion that the development of modern commerce has been made in the teeth of the Church, and that the whole system of credit, which is the very life of modern commerce, is in radical opposition to the Church's teaching. Here at last the two authors part company. Mr. Lecky prefers commerce to Catholicism; the Abbé Morel vice versa.

Before criticising further the author's theory, we will say a word on his own criticisms of rival theories. Here we are for the most part fully at one with him. He singles out two writers especially to do battle with: the French cardinal de la Luzerne, who published in 1823 a treatise on usury in five volumes; and the Italian priest Mastrofini, whom we have mentioned in our article, and who published the first edition of his work in 1828. The view taken by these writers was mostly similar. Both realized the productiveness of coin in modern times, and the need and justice of the modern system of credit and finance. But both were utterly in the dark as to economical history, and did not dream that there was a time when coin could well enough be called and treated as sterile. The great difficulty then which they had to solve lay in the decrees of popes and councils. These unfortunate documents had to be adapted somehow or other to their theory, and the violent process by which the adaptation was accomplished is well shown up by the Abbé Morel. They shuffle, now about the application of papal bulls and encyclicals, now about the interpretation of decrees of councils, who say indeed that they condemn usury, but mean that they allow usury when it is moderate. The Cardinal de la Luzerne, being a Gallican, boldly censures the Popes; Mastrofini says they meant well, and deserve our pity for the gloomy age in which they lived. Our author deals with these vagaries as they deserve. He also has some good remarks (in ch. xi.)

against what we have called the theory of titles. Further we are glad to find that he utterly rejects (ch. viii.) the view of Gury and others as to the *titulum legis*, based on the arbitrary fiction that the civil ruler, in virtue of his *dominium eminens*, transfers the *fœnus* from the borrower to the lender *pro bono publico*. The fallacy that the Holy See has given any sanction to this view is well exposed. We give a short extract as to the *titulum legis*, which we will not spoil by translating. "La loi naturelle, ou Dieu créateur, a fait les usures illicites; la loi divine, ou Dieu révélateur, a fait les usures illicites. Vous croiriez que le prince est obligé de respecter cette double loi? Pas du tout, le prince n'a qu'un mot à dire: Et moi je les permets; et aussitôt les usures deviennent licites. Ce qui revient à dire que Dieu avait daigné exprimer sa volonté, mais qu'il avait sousentendu: à moins qu'il ne convienne autrement au prince, auquel cas je retire ma législation comme un vassal devant son suzerain" (p. 195).

But it is easier to pull down than to build up, and the Abbé Morel's own theory fairly takes away our breath. The heading of his last chapter runs thus: "The abolition of interest would bring back the golden age"; and the law which he proposes in grim earnest is that all who work or cause work to be done on Sundays shall be stoned to death, as under the old law, and that all who lend at interest shall undergo the same fate (p. 322). We are at present only concerned with the second of these proposals; and here we must observe that many times the space we can give would be needed to explain the confusions and fallacies which lead him to so strange a conclusion. He has the crude and confused notions of economical science which indicate that his sources of information have been only newspapers and conversation. Indeed he seems to make no claim to have studied this science, and there is no citation from or allusion to any single modern economical writer in the book. So we meet the common row of popular fallacies as to a universal fall of prices (p. 4), invasion of foreign goods (p. 14); one generation shifting payment to the next (p. 138); some gains being due entirely to man's exertion, nature giving no help (p. 200), and so on. But his *chef-d'œuvre* is his view of credit. He inveighs (*passim*) against the whole monetary system of modern commerce resting on banks and exchanges, and in a marvellous passage (pp. 291, 292) affects to demonstrate how the whole advantage in the 'inhuman' contract of loan (*prêt*) must be on the side of the lender. Within the space of twenty-two lines he repeats six times the dictum: *Le prêteur gagne toujours et ne perd rien*—good news by the way for Mexican

and Spanish bondholders. But why then is any one so foolish as to borrow? It would, indeed, says the Abbé, be incomprehensible, did we not know that the sight of gold disturbs the reason of him who has none; he is seized with frenzy. Coined money has a diabolical or elflike quality (*qualité diabolique ou féérique*). The borrower is fascinated. There is no more equality between him and the lender than between the bird and the serpent (p. 128). Their relations are those of the white man and the savage to whom he is selling brandy (p. 293). Strange is it that the whole tribe of British merchants, borrowers every one of them, thrive so well, in spite of being befrenzied and fascinated. Perhaps the bad spirits have less to do with cheques and notes than with coin. But we must not weary our readers with any more of this sort of thing, and we pass over also many wild statements in total disregard of facts (examples on pp. 2, 4, 130, 321). It should be observed that the Abbé Morel's view of lending is exactly the converse of Bentham's. Bentham regarded all loans as though they were commercial loans, and was blind to the nature of necessitous lending. The Abbé Morel regards all loans as though they were necessitous, and is blind to the nature of commercial lending. The former perverted the maxim: *scienti et volenti non fit injuria*; the latter ignores it.

So much for the Abbé Morel's economical science, the shortcomings in which we should be much less disposed to censure were there not in his own language excellent works by Catholic authors which he might have made use of. On the very paper cover of his book is to be found the advertisement of M. Perin's admirable treatise on wealth in Christian societies, wherein these very questions of credit, banks, speculation, &c., are treated at length (bk. iii. ch. ii.) from what the non-Catholic press would call the ascetic and clerical point of view.

But there are failings worse than economical failings in the Abbé Morel's theory. Let no one suppose that if he assented to the strange notions about lending which we have described he would be clear of his difficulties as to usury. The eleventh proposition at the end of our article here finds its confirmation. Mastrofini and De la Luzerne had to explain the conduct of the Church in past times, which contradicted *their* theory; the Abbé Morel has to explain the conduct of the Church in modern times, which contradicts *his* theory; and thus he has to adopt those lax interpretations which he censures in them, and to construct a theory of history still more startling and unhistorical than theirs. At any rate he does not hide the facts, of which we select the three most notable. A decision

of the Propaganda in 1645, confirmed by Innocent X., allowed the Chinese converts to take 30 p. c. in consideration of the extreme risks which capital was exposed to in China. The triple contract which our author maintains to be rank usury Benedict XIV. refused to condemn. Between 1822 and 1832 the Roman Congregations, in a series of decisions, have permitted the practice of what he likewise styles usury to both clergy and laity. He himself thus states the difficulty: "Si l'Eglise a déclaré que l'usure était un péché et sa doctrine une hérésie, comment tout le monde fait-il aujourd'hui l'usure sans hérésie et sans péché?" His answer may be summarized as follows. Since the golden Middle Ages the world has been going fast to the bad. As depravity has advanced, the noble theory of usury has been more and more impaired by degenerate theologians, and the Church has had step by step to concede *ad duritiam cordis* the practice of this vice, wisely mindful of the texts, "*non potestis portare modo*," and "*oportet sapere ad sobrietatem*" (pp. 277—281). She has had to throw her superfluous baggage overboard in the storm (p. 215). The fatal revolution of 1830 has driven her to her last concession. Can Antichrist and the end of the world be far off? (p. 225).

This is indeed a consolatory view! And again we note its significant correspondence with the view taken by the rationalists. It is but the reverent way of expressing what they express irreverently when they say that for some centuries past the old pope and superstition have retired growling from one position after another before the victorious advance of reason and culture. Truly an exalted philosophy of Church history! Truly a fair picture of the immortal, ever youthful, unconquerable Bride of Christ!

But even with this miserable (we need not add utterly unhistorical) explanation we cannot rest. How, it will be asked us, do you pretend to change the natural law? How can a horrible crime, known to be such (as you have admitted) by the light of reason, odious even to the pagans, punished with extremest rigour by popes and councils, how can such a crime be now permitted to the very priests of the altar? In vain the Abbé Morel attempts to answer by adducing the concessions *ad duritiam cordis* made to the Greeks, of marriage of priests, use of leavened bread for the Sacrament, and dissolution of marriage in case of adultery; or toleration of Gallicanism, though it was heresy after the Council of Florence (pp. 280—284). These examples are *nihil ad rem*. We do not know matters of faith and discipline by the light of reason, but we do know that it is wrong to make gain out of the distress and

simplicity of others. Because the Pope may remit the positive ecclesiastical law, can he therefore remit the natural law? But then, says our author, if the Jews, Protestants, and Free-thinkers were all practising usury, and the Catholics alone were forbidden to do so, the latter would become paupers. On the same grounds, the Catholic tradesmen of London might send to Rome for permission to use false weights and adulterate their goods. See the pass to which we are brought, and mark the morality of the following passage, where the Church is supposed to be addressing the wicked modern world:—"As to my faithful, whom I have allowed to submit to the financial conditions you impose on them, you know well that the retaliation they make on you affects not the equilibrium of your transactions, and that the interest which they take from you, though very important for them, has utterly no effect on the general situation. Marvel not then if I, who hold my powers from Him who has le haut et le bas domaine over all creatures, have made use of this dominion, which He can delegate to me at need, to regulate matters for the time being as I have done with equity and moderation" (p. 289). What is this but the permission to sin if no great (temporal) harm comes of it, and the renewal of the *titulum legis* and of the *dominium eminens*, though in favour not of the prince but of the Pope.

We cannot conclude without expressing the pain which this book has caused us. The author admits the troubles of conscience which his articles in the *Univers* aroused (Preface, p. ii.), and we think his treatise on usury will not tend to remove them; nor, we fear, will the enemies of religion fail to use this work in support of their insolent assertion that there is opposition between Science and the Church. We regret the more what we must call M. Morel's signal breakdown on one particular question, because no one is more alive than ourselves to the great services he has rendered by some of his other works.

ART. V.—MR. JERVIS ON THE CHURCH OF FRANCE.

History of the Church of France, from the Concordat of Bologna, A.D. 1516, to the Revolution. By the Rev. W. HENLEY JERVIS, M.A. London. 1872.

WE noticed this work on its first appearance (see our Number for last January, pp. 259—264). But Mr. Jervis treats matters so interesting to Catholics, and his language throughout is so temperate and moderate, that we are sure our readers will be glad if we make his learned volumes an occasion for viewing the facts he has recorded, from a Catholic standpoint.

He has undertaken to prove from history and Catholic tradition, the truth of a false theory, and he has proved just the reverse. He guards his readers against "confounding the Gallicanism of the seventeenth century, which arose from the absolutism of the Crown, with that primitive organization which," he supposes, "has in all ages confronted the absolutism of Rome." Genuine Gallicanism, he tells us, "is the right of the Gallican Church (as of all national churches) to administer its own government within" the limits "determined by the canons of councils and the practice of the purest ages of antiquity,"* to hold councils, to exercise metropolitan jurisdiction, and to elect its own bishops by the free suffrages of the clergy and laity.† All this, except the election of the episcopate by plébiscite, is the ordinary rule and practice, so far as secular governments permit, of the Catholic Church; and we doubt whether Mr. Jervis himself would like to commit the selection of his own bishop to the lay population of our large towns and rude country districts. But he further insists that this government shall be carried on without the interference of Rome, which, he takes for granted, was the universal practice in primitive times, before the commencement of "the evolutionary process," on which he supposes that the existing system is based.‡

Mr. Jervis evidently wishes to deal fairly with his subject; but the exigencies of his own position and of his theory constantly lead him into contradictions and false history. For instance, he allows that Christianity "is to a certain extent plastic in application," and "admits of some variety in out-

* Vol. i. p. 14.

† Ibid. pp. 16, 24.

‡ Ibid. p. 15.

ward development and administrative detail."* And yet he protests against the assumption, that the Pope may adapt "the legislation of primitive times" to "the successive needs of the Church."† He allows that "from the time of Leo the Great the Popes possessed a generally acknowledged patriarchal authority throughout the Gallic Church."‡ And yet he opposes as innovations the claims of later Pontiffs to similar authority. He states that "the doctrine, that no council was legitimate unless sanctioned by the Holy See," was "a new principle propounded by Nicholas I. and his successors, on the strength of the pseudo-decretals;"§ whereas it may be traced back to the fourth and fifth centuries, when it was referred to as a well-known law of the Church.

As Mr. Jervis does not give us the date of his primitive period of Gallican liberty before Rome claimed her present authority, we can answer him only from general history. We are the better entitled to do so, because he very properly claims for the Gallican Church only those common rights which, he supposes, are "the Divinely bequeathed heritage" || of the Church universal. Let us see then what were the claims and the action of Rome in primitive ages.

Neander, whose Protestantism, erudition, and honesty render him an unimpeachable witness, tells us that "very early indeed Roman bishops assumed, as successors of S. Peter, a paramount authority in ecclesiastical disputes;" that about A.D. 190 Pope Victor excommunicated the Churches of Asia Minor; and Tertullian, in his Montanistic writings, complained that the Roman bishops were in the habit of issuing peremptory edicts on ecclesiastical matters, of trying to make themselves considered as "bishops of bishops," and of already appealing to the authority of their predecessors. Also, that in the third century S. Cyprian styled the Roman Church "the principal Church, whence sacerdotal unity proceeds;"¶ that Pope Stephen reversed the sentence of the Spanish Ecclesiastical Court on two bishops who had appealed to him; and that in opposition to S. Cyprian and Firmilian, he decided authoritatively that baptism must never be repeated.**

In the fourth century Julius I. reprov'd the Church of Antioch for a "violation of the canons, in neglecting to request his attendance at the Council" they had lately held, "seeing that the ecclesiastical law (*canon ecclesiasticus*) declared invalid all decisions that were not sanctioned by the Bishop of

* *Ibid.* p. 1.† *Ibid.* p. 32.‡ *Ibid.* p. 9.§ *Ibid.* p. 44.

|| P. 12.

¶ Ep. 55, ad Cornel.

** "Church Hist.," sec. 2, p. 298, ed. Bohn.

Rome.”* The Council of Sardica, A.D. 347, also legislated on the subject of appeals to Rome.

In the fifth century there are the letters of Innocent I. about appeals, A.D. 404, and the appeals of Patroclus and Celidonius, which Mr. Jervis mentions.† There is also the evidence of S. Patrick, who was educated in Gaul, as to the opinion then prevalent there. When S. Germanus urged him to go and preach in Ireland, he prayed to be allowed first to go to Rome to receive authority from thence.‡ In his celebrated Canon he decreed that difficult cases should be “sent to the See Apostolic, that is to say, to the Chair of the Apostle Peter, which hath the authority of the city of Rome;” § and his legacy to his children was, “The Church of the Irish is a Church of Romans; as ye are Irish so be ye Romans.” || At the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, Dioscorus was ejected from his seat among the Fathers, because he had dared to hold a Council without the authority of the Apostolic See, “which was not permitted and had never been done;” ¶ and on the other hand, Theodoret was admitted to sit in the Council, contrary to the Emperor’s orders, because “the most holy Archbishop Leo had reinstated him in the episcopal dignity.”** S. Leo’s letter to Flavian was also received by the Council as an authoritative definition of the faith.†† A few years later, A.D. 484, Felix III. excommunicated and degraded Acacius, Patriarch of Constantinople; ‡‡ and some of the Eastern clergy having considered it strange that he should have written in his own name alone, a Council at Rome answered that it was the custom for the Pope to do so, on account of our Lord’s promise, “Tu es Petrus,” &c. §§ Pope Gelasius, writing on the same subject about A.D. 493, said, “They oppose the canons to us, though they ignore what they say. . . . The canons themselves refer the appeals of the whole Church to the examination of this Chair. They decree that from it there is no further appeal, and by it the whole Church is judged; it goes for judgment to none, nor can its judgment be judged, nor its sentence dissolved.” |||

As Mr. Jervis grants that from the middle of this century the papal authority was generally acknowledged by the Gallic Church, we need not follow further this chain of evidence, that

* Socrates, “Hist. Eccles.” l. 2, c. 17.

† Vol. i. pp. 5-7.

‡ Probus, Act. SS. Mart., 17, Comment. Prev.

§ Usher, “Religion of the Ancient Irish,” p. 84. Ap. Moran, “Essays on the Early Irish Church,” p. 121.

|| Dicta S. Patritii, from the Book of Armagh. Ap. Moran, p. 23.

¶ Labbe, t. 4, p. 96.

** Ibid. p. 102.

†† Ibid. p. 868.

‡‡ Ibid. p. 1074.

§§ Ibid. p. 1126.

||| Ibid. p. 1169.

the claims of Rome to supremacy date from the earliest Christian ages.

The providential object of the pastoral charge and of the promise of infallibility in matters of faith, given to S. Peter by our Lord, may be clearly seen in the history of the Church for nearly a thousand years from the conversion of Constantine. The preservation of the faith during the perilous period of the first General Councils, is due to the courage of the Popes in resisting the heretical tendencies of the Imperial Court, to their exercise of authority in confirming and condemning Councils, and to their acknowledged supremacy as successors of S. Peter and Vicars of Christ.

Under the first Frankish dynasty, whose history is full of outrages against churches and abbeys, and the massacre, exile, or spoliation of bishops and priests, Popes, by their frequent correspondence with successive princes, by their legates, by their delegated jurisdiction to metropolitans, and by their protection of religious communities specially committed to their charge, mitigated in some degree the lawlessness of the barbarians, and kept up the courage of heroic men in their unceasing struggle against physical force. But after two centuries the case became desperate. The churches and abbeys in the fairest provinces of Gaul were burnt, and the clergy and monks killed by the Saracens; on their retreat the ravaged lands were given to Charles Martel's victorious followers; bishoprics and benefices were filled by laymen and blood-stained and immoral clergy; Pagan rites were openly celebrated; and Christianity was fast dying out. Happily, Rome's supreme jurisdiction was still acknowledged; and from Rome proceeded that unparalleled revival, of which S. Boniface and Charlemagne were the instruments. Notwithstanding Mr. Jervis's perverted theory, he judges so fairly of this period, that we cannot do better than quote his comments on it.

It will scarcely be denied, on a candid consideration of the circumstances, that such action was originally taken by the Popes out of zeal for the efficient administration of the Church. Contemporary evidence shows, that the intervention of Rome was occasioned by the incapacity and unfaithfulness both of the civil authorities and of the local episcopate.*

And again,

The Crown was powerless to protect the Church; while the great lay vassals struggling among themselves for ascendancy, had every inducement to embarrass its action. The Popes saw that Rome at such a moment was the true rallying point, the true source of moral regeneration:

* Vol. i. p. 28.

To rivet more closely the links which bound all orders of ecclesiastics to the See of Peter, was to concentrate, and therefore immeasurably to increase, the energies and resources of the Church. This policy—often so severely reprobated as an inexcusable usurpation—does not appear to have sprung from any deliberate design either to intrude upon the just prerogatives of the Crown or to curtail the liberty of the Church, according to the sense in which it was then understood. The problem of the moment was how to save both Church and State, by enabling them to make head against the surging flood of semi-barbarian revolution. It was a necessity, at such a crisis, that the ecclesiastical element, as embodied in the Papacy, should assume grander and more dominant proportions, in order to avert a general cataclysm.*

Is it credible that, after having thus clearly perceived the office of the Papacy in the Christian economy, Mr. Jervis should inveigh against later Popes for intruding "new principles," and usurping "as a right what their predecessors had resorted to under circumstances of exceptional urgency"?† Does he think that the Church's Divine organization is so defective, that its head is compelled in cases of urgency to outstep the legitimate bounds of authority and save Christianity by illegitimate acts? Or does he forget that the Church's battle with the world, the flesh, and the devil, is always urgent; and that the Pope's supreme jurisdiction was not more needed at that time than it has been in the revolutionary period from the outbreak of Protestantism to the present day?

During the long troubles which succeeded Charlemagne's death, Rome, through her wide-spreading ecclesiastical organization, saved Europe from relapsing into anarchy and Paganism. By the Truce of God she checked the lawless passions of the semi-barbarians. By the Crusades she retarded for centuries the advance of the Mahometans. By her priests, her monks, and her schools, she moulded society into a Christian form. Thus, from the time of S. Boniface to the death of S. Louis, the Christian idea, emanating from Rome, governed Europe.

But with Philip the Fair, A.D. 1276, a new era began. Physical force and political considerations took the place of the restraints of conscience and the Christian law of justice and charity. The formation of an absolute monarchy was the dominant idea of Philip and his successors; and as the Church was the most formidable obstacle to their ambition, the overthrow of its supremacy and influence was necessarily their constant aim.

Philip began the great battle by striking at the very root of the principles on which Christian society was founded. He

* Vol. i. pp. 31-32.

† Ibid. p. 24.

did not dispute the notorious fact, that the privileges of the clergy rested on the legislation of his predecessors during many centuries. But he denied the policy of these privileges from a worldly point of view; and he openly asserted his intention to change the whole system, to ignore Christian ideas of justice and religion, and to govern solely according to natural principles of selfishness and expediency. In fact, he set the example which Bismarck is following. He asserted his right to tax the clergy, disputed the Papal jurisdiction, prohibited the usual payments to the Pope, and forbade the French bishops to attend a Council at Rome to which they were summoned. The clergy at first resisted; but terrified at Philip's despotic temper, and dreading a conflict, not only with the Crown, but with the barons and Third-Estate who supported it, they soon gave in to the king's demands. They wrote a pathetic letter to the Pope, beseeching him to consult their safety by revoking the orders he had sent them to repair to his presence; but Boniface only replied by reproaching them for their pusillanimity. In defiance of the king's prohibition, four archbishops, thirty-five bishops, and six abbots appeared in Rome at the appointed time.* Had the whole French clergy shown the same spirit and emulated S. Thomas of Canterbury, the history of France and of Europe would have been far different from what it has been. But Philip knew how to make the most of the advantage they had given him. He modified his tactics, and set himself up as the champion of the liberties of the Gallican Church. Thus was first sounded that fatal watchword of schism and heresy.† The clergy fell into the snare so artfully laid for them, lost the reality of liberty in the pursuit of its shadow, and after five centuries of servitude to the Crown, during which the Catholic faith in France was brought to the verge of extinction, expiated their error on the revolutionary scaffold.

As for Boniface, he answered Philip as all his predecessors had done, and threatened a bull of excommunication and deposition. Philip arrested the Nuncio, and declared his intention to summon a General Council. "What!" exclaimed Boniface contemptuously, "Do they demand a Council to sit in judgment on the Pope? No Council can be assembled but by me and with me." The result was the seizure of Boniface at Anagni on the 7th of September, A.D. 1303, and the death of the outraged Pontiff a month later. The following remarks of Mr. Jervis, with the exception of a few words, are much to the point:—

* Vol. i. pp. 64-66.

† Ibid. p. 68.

Boniface certainly "was not chargeable with seeking to *abridge* the liberties of the Church, as they were then established by general usage. It was the King not the Pope, who was labouring to extinguish the immunities immemorially enjoyed by the ecclesiastical order. The 'liberty of the Church,' in the sense in which it was invoked by Philip and other subsequent monarchs of like character, signified in reality that the clergy, instead of being as heretofore dependent on the Pope, were to be practically subject to the Crown. In the very act of redressing grievances arising from a jurisdiction which, though wrongly exercised, was in its essence real and true, they substituted for it the yoke of another jurisdiction which had no legitimate foundation whatever."*

Boniface's successor, Benedict XI., filled the Papal Chair scarcely more than eight months; and on his death Philip managed that the choice of the Conclave should fall on his own subject, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Clement V., who took up his residence at Avignon. Then came the seventy years of the second Babylonish captivity, as the Italians were wont to style the sojourn at Avignon. During this time the College of Cardinals, the richest benefices, and the highest ecclesiastical offices, were filled almost exclusively by French nobles. French monarchs made the Church the tool of their rapacity and ambition, and held the Popes themselves in splendid captivity. Meanwhile the moral influence of S. Peter's Chair was lessened, and Christendom languished.

At length S. Catherine of Siena induced Gregory XI. to return to Rome in January, A.D. 1377. On his death in the following year, a Neapolitan, Urban VI., was elected amid the clamours of the Romans that none but an Italian should be chosen. After some months the French cardinals, disgusted at the Pope's sternness, his threats of reform, and the prospect of a prolonged absence from France, retired to Fondi, and on the plea that the Conclave had not been free, elected as Pope the Cardinal of Geneva, Clement VII., who returned to Avignon. Thus began the Great Schism, which lasted till the election of Martin V., A.D. 1417. It was a terrible misfortune to the Church through the relaxation of discipline, and to all Europe by the loss of its accustomed head and the divisions to which it gave rise.

Many attempts were made to restore unity; and, among others, a Council, chiefly composed of French clergy, met at Pisa, A.D. 1409, and added to the confusion by electing a third Pope. At length the Council of Constance met, A.D. 1414. The Emperor Sigismund, representatives of all the nations of Europe, and eighteen thousand clergy of different ranks

* Vol. i. p. 68.

attended; but as all who were present, both clerical and lay, were allowed to vote, as had been done at Pisa,* it was evidently not an ecclesiastical synod, according to the definition of Chalcedon, "A synod is composed of bishops, not of clerics."† Its mixed character, however, must have contributed to the restoration of unity. The Pisan Pope, John XXIII., publicly and solemnly promised to abdicate whenever his rivals should do so. He then fled from Constance, but was captured and imprisoned. The Council sat in judgment on him and deposed him, and on May 29th he accepted the sentence and abdicated. The Roman Pope, Gregory XII., voluntarily abdicated. But the Avignon Pope, Benedict XIII., refusing, the Council on its side expressly refused to recognize him as successor of S. Peter. Meanwhile the representatives of the nations initiated the reform of the whole Church. The cardinals and French ambassadors, with the exception of Gerson, disputed their right to do so; but at last, for peace sake, they took part in the discussion under a secret protest.‡ The French doctors, D'Ailly and Gerson, were the master-spirits in the subsequent discussions, and advocated in the most violent form the opinions in derogation of the Pope's authority, which were afterwards known as Gallicanism. The Council also condemned Huss and his followers, and the doctrines of Wickliff. Finally, after three years, they took steps for the election of a Pope. On the 11th of November, A.D. 1417, Otho Colonna, Martin V., was unanimously elected in Conclave with the usual forms by twenty-three cardinals and thirty bishops, deputies from the five great nations, who assisted in order the better to secure their submission.‡

We could not satisfactorily encounter Mr. Jervis's arguments on the Council of Constance unless we treated the subject at a length which would be out of all possible proportion to the general design of our article. We will confine ourselves, therefore, to two remarks. In the first place, we have shown on former occasions, by help of Abbé Bouix and F. Ramière, how certain it is that Martin V., in confirming certain decrees of the Council, gave no countenance whatever to the Gallican doctrine (see our Number for April, 1869, pp. 477-9; and for April, 1870, pp. 529, 530). In the second place, to our mind it is perfectly clear (though we know we are here at issue with some writers of great authority), that the true Pope throughout had been Urban VI. and his successors; and consequently that the Council did not commence the election

* Von der Hardt, t. 2, pars 8, c. 16. † Labbe, t. 4, pp. 111, 115.

‡ Von der Hardt, t. 4, p. 97.

of a Pope, until the Holy See was actually vacant by the resignation of Gregory XII.*

The Council of Bâle was opened A.D. 1431. The spirit of the few bishops, almost exclusively French, who attended it, was in inverse ratio to their numbers; and after a series of disputes with Pope Eugenius, he transferred it to Ferrara, A.D. 1437. At Ferrara, and afterwards at Florence, was held that General Council, in which the Churches of the West and the East met for the last time, and consummated the union which, within fifteen years, was so mournfully broken by the fall of Constantinople, and the new schism initiated by the Mahometan conqueror. Before its close the Churches of Alexandria, of the Ethiopians, Syrians, Armenians, Maronites, and Chaldeans renewed their communion with the Chair of S. Peter.

Meanwhile, at Bâle, eight bishops and a medley of inferior clergy of all grades constituted themselves a Council, and went through the farce of anathematizing the Council at Ferrara and Florence, summoning the Pope to appear before them, deposing him as contumacious, and electing an anti-Pope, A.D. 1439. Their choice fell on Amadeus VIII., Duke of Savoy, who five years before had abdicated in favour of his sons, and retired with two gentlemen and twenty servants to a lovely estate called Ripaille, in order to lead an eremitic life. In this retreat he chiefly distinguished himself by keeping a most luxurious table, whence arose the French phrase to express feasting, "*faire ripaille*." He took the name of Felix V.; but his authority never extended beyond his own dominions and some of the Swiss cantons; and in the year 1449 he made his submission to Eugenius's successor, Nicholas V.

During the foregoing disastrous period the French kings and clergy took advantage of the opportunity to realize their notions of liberty. But the clergy soon discovered that without the protection of Rome they were helpless against the Crown. Their synods were summoned by royal authority and invaded by laymen of birth and official position; their decisions were invalid till approved by the King's Council; statute law took the place of canonical; discipline was impeded; the nominees of the sovereign monopolized the best benefices; the Parliaments extended their jurisdiction, and the power of the clerical order rapidly declined.†

Charles VII. supported the Pseudo-council of Bâle, which was composed of French clergy, but without breaking entirely

* Pallavicino, l. 18, c. 13, n. 2.

† Jervis, vol. i. pp. 48, 84.

with the Pope. Not content with this anomaly, he held a mixed national council at Bourges, A.D. 1438, whence issued the celebrated Pragmatic Sanction. This enactment adopted the decrees of Bâle against the Pope, and ordered that all offices should be filled by election by the cathedral, collegiate and conventual chapters, though the king and other princes might occasionally *recommend* or *request* the promotion of persons of special merit.* "So that it appears on the whole," as Mr. Jervis says, "that while the French professed great zeal on this occasion for the dogma of the superiority of a General Council over the Pope, the principle practically illustrated at Bourges was that of the supremacy of a *National Council* over every other ecclesiastical authority."†

Successive Popes denounced the Pragmatic Sanction, and a Council of Lateran condemned it; but notwithstanding, it was carried into practice throughout France for about eighty years, and effectually severed the French clergy from all connection with Rome. The pretence of free election was discarded. The lower clergy and people took no part in the episcopal elections, which were confined almost exclusively to the cathedral chapters, and were decided by simony and violence. As to the abbeys, monks sunk in ignorance and sensuality, elected the most ignorant and sensual of the community, and made them swear beforehand that they would not attempt the restoration of discipline. Bishops were for the most part worldly and voluptuous great nobles, whose least vices were love of wine and the chase; and the abbots followed in the steps of the bishops.‡

Mr. Jervis allows that the position assumed by the Gallican Church at this juncture was peculiar, questionable, and anomalous; but he reconciles himself to it in consideration of "the strange necessities of the time," and "its practical advantages."§ The necessities of the time were not greater than those which S. Thomas of Canterbury triumphantly combated, which Irish priests, for centuries, have heroically defied, and which the German episcopate is now so bravely facing. As to the practical advantages, we are unable to discover them, and we should have supposed that Mr. Jervis had been equally unsuccessful; for he acknowledges that—

The uniform tendency of legislation in France from the fourteenth century downwards, was to reduce the Church into subservience and subjection to the Crown. Under colour of repressing Ultramontanism, protecting the

* Jervis, vol. i. p. 99.

† Ibid. p. 98.

‡ Martin, "Histoire de France," part 4, l. 46.

§ Vol. i. pp. 95, 97, 98.

Gallican liberties, and reforming abuses, the State succeeded in transferring to itself nearly the whole of the external dominion enjoyed by the hierarchy during the preceding ages. *

Thus matters remained till the year 1516, when Francis I., on the specious pretence of restoring to the Pope his former jurisdiction, obtained from him the Concordat, which regulated the relations of France with the Holy See until A.D. 1802. Its most important article was that by which, on the one hand, the Pope's supreme jurisdiction was secured, and on the other, the king obtained the right of nomination to all the bishoprics, abbacies, and benefices in France, with a few exceptions, subject to the Pope's veto, and if not filled by a certain time, to his nomination. The patronage of ten archbishoprics, eighty-three bishoprics, and five hundred and twenty-seven abbacies, enabled Francis to exercise over the nation an absolute authority then quite unknown in Europe. It also gave him the power to carry out a reform in the Church not inferior to that effected by Charlemagne. But engrossed by petty political rivalry, corrupted by a profligate life, selfish, heartless, frivolous, and irreligious, Francis was incapable of so grand a conception, and regarded his enormous Church patronage only as an instrument to further his despotic rule, or minister to his pleasures. As to the Church, she scarcely suffered more by the abuse of patronage under the Concordat, than she had done under the Pragmatic Sanction. But she gained immensely during the storm that was gathering round her, by being once more firmly anchored to the Rock of Peter.

The year after the Concordat of Bologna was signed, Luther affixed his theses on the door of the church of Wittemberg. The new opinions found a quick response from the classical scholars deeply imbued with the spirit of Paganism, whom Francis had drawn to his court. Their first apostle in France was Lefèvre, a native of Etaples, and professor of theology in Paris. He had already incurred the censure of the Sorbonne, and in order to avoid further trouble, he now found it prudent to retire to Meaux, where under the patronage of Briçonnet, the Bishop, he gathered round him a knot of kindred spirits, Farel, Roussel, and others. The Cordeliers of Meaux complained to the Sorbonne about their opinions, and they were compelled to disperse. Most of them retired to Strasburg; and after some time Farel went to Switzerland, where he preached with great success. In 1534 he was joined by Calvin, who also had been compelled to fly from France, and who henceforth was the head of the party.

* Vol. i. p. 71.

Geneva was now in the midst of a political struggle to throw off the joint yoke of its bishop and the Duke of Savoy. The moment was favourable for the French preachers; for Protestantism has always been allied to political movements, and has never taken root in any country, such as Italy and Spain, where it did not find this support. Very soon all good Catholics were regarded as public enemies, while the Eidgenots or sworn liberal confederates, were supposed to be Protestants. A series of sanguinary conflicts ended in the triumph of the liberals. Calvin now took the lead of the government, and imposed on the city his five points of doctrine, and his tyrannical system of discipline. An inquisitorial watch was kept on every detail of social and personal life, and the slightest infraction of morality or deviation from Calvinistic orthodoxy, was severely punished. To Calvin, Protestantism owes its permanency. Lutheranism and its kindred sects would probably have died out, like the Gnostic, Arian, and Pelagian heresies; but Calvinism took an iron grasp on every country where it found an entrance, and kept its hold for centuries. Before long it spread into France, and made rapid progress, chiefly among the noble and learned classes. Henceforth, Geneva was like a hostile border fortress, ever ready to send fresh assailants into France and to shelter refugees.

During the reigns of Francis I. and Henry II. ceaseless efforts were made to repress the new opinions. A few of the bishops sympathized to a certain degree with them; but the great body of the clergy, both bishops and priests, remained untouched by them. In proportion as it became clear that the innovators aimed at nothing short of total religious revolution and separation from the visible Catholic body, the Church and nation rallied round the Chair of S. Peter with the greatest zeal and earnestness. The Sorbonne especially distinguished itself by the watch it kept on heretical books and heterodox opinions and practices, of which as early as A.D. 1544, it promulgated an index. Augustinians, Carmelites, Cistercians, Minorites, and Dominicans came under its lash or awoke its suspicion. But in spite of its vigilance and the severity with which the heretics were punished by death and confiscation of goods, the heresy spread more and more. Even in the time of Francis I. entire towns, as Caen, Rochelle, Poitiers, showed a decided leaning to it; and by the reign of Henry II., the Protestants were calculated at four hundred thousand. In the year 1555 a congregation in Paris ventured to perform a baptism; and in 1559 the discipline of Geneva was introduced into the French congregations—a measure

which, by its political bearings, was an encroachment on the civil government.

Meanwhile the conduct of Francis was most scandalous. Priding himself on being the patron of learning and enlightened thought, and irritated at the assumption of authority by the Sorbonne, he used his despotic power to thwart the measures taken for the preservation of the faith. He established for his favourite scholars the Royal College and a royal printing press, both in opposition to the Sorbonne and University. When the Sorbonne condemned Luther's writings, they were praised at court. When Beda, Syndic of the Sorbonne, wrote against Erasmus and Lefèvre, and the Sorbonne condemned Erasmus's Colloquies, Francis forbade the circulation of Beda's book, appointed Lefèvre tutor to his son, and ordered 24,000 copies of the Colloquies to be printed. Berquin he twice liberated from prison and invited to preach at court; though with characteristic heartlessness, in order to win popularity, he afterwards gave him up to be burnt. He allowed his sister Margaret to be the open patroness of the Huguenots at his court, and after her marriage in that of Béarn, when she made Roussel Bishop of Oléron. His conduct, however, fluctuated with political exigencies, and after 1534, when he had become alarmed by the excesses of the Anabaptists in Munster, he gave free course to the repressive measures of the Sorbonne. But still his personal influence told against religion. While he persecuted Protestants in France, from political motives he lent them his aid in Germany. While he aspired to be the leader of Christendom, and claimed privileges from the Pope as the eldest son of the Church, he formed a close alliance with the Turks, till then deemed impossible, and thwarted the Pope's plans for reform through a General Council; and when the Council actually took place he allowed only four French prelates to attend. But above all, he did serious damage to religion by the open licentiousness of his life and his court, and his shameful distribution of Church patronage through favourites and mistresses, to servile clergy, irrespective of their learning or morality, and even to soldiers and children.

Henry II. was a graver character than his father, and cordially assisted in the punishment of heretics. But he followed in his father's steps as regarded the alliances with the Turks and the German Protestants, and also in his profligate life, his abuse of Church patronage, and his relations to the Pope, absolutely forbidding the French bishops to attend the Council of Trent. So irreligious and selfish was his whole conduct, that it was generally believed that the persecution of

Huguenots was stimulated by the greed of the court for confiscations.

In July, A.D. 1559, Henry II. died, and his son and successor, Francis II., being only sixteen, and weak in mind and body, the government fell into the hands of the Guises, the uncles of his beautiful wife, Mary Queen of Scots. The Guises were the younger branch of the family of Lorraine, which claimed descent not only from the Carlovingians, but also from a rival of Clovis. Its present heads were Francis, Duke of Guise, and his brother, the Cardinal of Lorraine. The Duke, surnamed *Balafré*, was very popular on account of his conquest of Calais and other military feats, and of his generous and chivalrous nature. The Cardinal was remarkable for great ability, eloquence, and insinuating address. As Archbishop of Rheims he was a pattern to his Order. He enforced discipline, held provincial Councils, founded a university, a seminary, and a convent for monks, and also improved his diocese by draining morasses and erecting many fine buildings.* But he was not popular, for he was thought to be selfish, and to identify the interests of the Catholic Church with those of the house of Guise. He took the lead in the administration, and rested his authority on the repression of heresy. Religious meetings, even in secret, were forbidden, and men of rank, who had previously been overlooked, were now dragged to execution. The finances being in great disorder, he made numerous retrenchments, which added to his unpopularity. Moreover, he had to encounter the jealousy and enmity of the princes of the blood, the Montmorencis, S. André, and other great nobles. The Huguenots formed a plot to seize the king, first at Blois, and afterwards at Amboise, on March 17th, A.D. 1560, and thus to get the government into their own hands. Condé, however, shrank back at the moment of action, and it proved a complete failure. Notwithstanding, it is worthy of note, because it was the first act of the Wars of Religion, and in the eyes of the government and the nation it identified the Huguenot cause with sedition. Mr. Jervis very justly remarks :—

This character—impressed upon it by the misguided counsels and fanatical excesses of its friends—it never afterwards lost ; indeed, the subsequent course of events developed it more distinctly. Those who study dispassionately the records of the time can scarcely avoid the conclusion that it was

* Ranke says that the Venetian ambassadors unanimously depict him thus. The gross immoralities mentioned in Brantôme, which have often been imputed to him, are those of his uncle, in the time of Francis I. —“Civil Wars in France,” vol. i. c. 10.

the turbulent and offensive attitude maintained by the Huguenots towards the civil power, even more than any prejudice arising from religion, that brought about their decisive overthrow as a party, and the ultimate triumph of the ancient faith.*

Notwithstanding the failure of the conspiracy of Amboise, the Huguenot agitation continued. At a meeting of Notables, in August, 1560, Coligni presented a petition from the Huguenots of Normandy, which, he said, fifty thousand persons were prepared to sign. Montluc, Bishop of Valence, openly advocated Protestant opinions. Marillac, Archbishop of Vienne, proposed the holding of a National Council in spite of any opposition that the Pope might offer. The Cardinal, hard pressed, promised to summon the States-General and a National Council, and meanwhile issued an edict suspending all corporal punishment for simple heresy. He hoped, however, to strike down the Huguenot leaders before the States should assemble. The Bourbon princes were invited to court. Condé was arrested, imprisoned, and tried for treason; and the King of Navarre was watched and guarded. The unexpected death of Francis II., on December 5th, A.D. 1560, alone saved Condé's life.

Charles IX. being only eleven years old, Anthony de Bourbon, King of Navarre, was appointed Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, but the administration virtually passed into the hands of the Queen-Mother, Catherine de Medici. She was a woman of great ability, passionate nature, and intense selfishness. Love of power was her ruling motive of action, and the King of Navarre being too weak to cope with her, she alone governed France during Charles's reign.

There were at this time three parties in the kingdom. The Catholics were headed by the Guises; the Huguenots were led by the King of Navarre, the Prince of Condé, and the Châtillons, better known as Admiral Coligni, Francis d'Andelôt, and Cardinal Châtillon; and a third party, called that of the Politicians, was composed of all who were disgusted with the existing despotism, and of free-thinkers, imbued with the spirit of Paganism. Its present head was the Chancellor L'Hôpital, a man of low birth, who had raised himself by his talents. His sole object was what he deemed national liberty, and he looked down with contempt on the disputes of Catholics and Protestants alike. His family were Huguenots, and some called him a Huguenot, but others, with more reason, an atheist. Notwithstanding, the Huguenots allied themselves with him. Though they gained in physical force by this

* Vol. i. p. 135.

alliance, yet the substitution of a political for a purely religious aim, was morally injurious to their cause, and has left a blot on their fame.

Catherine at once took L'Hôpital for her chief adviser. Wide apart as were their ultimate objects, the immediate aim of both was to induce the religious parties to compromise their differences and live together in peace. Catherine even cherished the wild notion of uniting the princes of Europe in a league, in order to compel the Pope to make concessions on the points on which she fancied that he had hitherto been unreasonably obstinate.*

The States-General met at Orleans, on the 13th December, 1560. L'Hôpital opened them by a speech of a democratic tone. He exhorted them "not to exchange the name of Christians for the diabolical names of Lutherans, Huguenots, Papists—names of sedition and treason;"† hinted that the reform of the clergy would be the most effectual weapon against heresy; and pointed out that theological controversies could be decided only by a council.‡ The Nobles and Third Order, besides suggesting many civil reforms of a revolutionary character, united in demanding the confiscation of Church property to pay the debts of the Crown and for other national purposes, the election of bishops by the laity as well as the clergy, the reform of the clergy by the State, the prohibition of payments to the Pope, absolute religious freedom, and the admission of the Huguenots to the National Council. In January, 1561, appeared the "*Ordonnance d'Orléans*," which granted most of the above demands, though considerably toned down and limited. Bishops were to be elected by the laity conjointly with the clergy, all payments to the Pope were forbidden, and many enactments were made on ecclesiastical and spiritual matters, extending even to the administration of the Sacraments. A few months later the Royal Council required from the bishops a categorical statement of the ecclesiastical property in their several dioceses, as if with a view to spoliation. Happily, the government was too weak to carry its measures into effect, and practically all went on as before.

Mr. Jervis considers that this legislation was in the right direction.§ But all the attendant circumstances plainly show that its object was a subjection of the Church to democratic pressure, and the extinction of all positive Christianity. In fact the States demanded, and the *Ordonnance* tended towards what the Jacobins accomplished in 1789.

* Ranke, "*Civil Wars in France*," vol. i. c. 14.

† Martin, part v. l. 52.

‡ Jervis, vol. i. p. 136.

§ Ibid. p. 137.

A National Council had been summoned at the earnest desire of the Huguenots, but the Pope, Pius IV., complained indignantly to the French ambassador that his permission had not been previously asked; adding, "If every prince were to take upon himself to hold Councils in his own dominions, the Church would soon become a scene of universal confusion."* The Council was therefore turned into a conference between the leaders of both parties, which took place at Poissy, in August, 1561. Just before it met Catherine wrote to the Pope a letter, evidently dictated by her Politico-Huguenot advisers, in which she enlarged on the notorious abuses in the Church, and the number and importance of the Protestants; but consoled herself with the reflection that they were not Anabaptists or Free-thinkers, or propagators of monstrous and pestilent opinions; and she suggested certain desirable reforms, such as the disuse of images, the exorcism in baptism and like ceremonies, Holy Communion under both kinds, and the discontinuance of the feast of Corpus-Christi, then recently introduced into France. Such a letter from such a quarter naturally created great alarm at Rome; and a special legate, Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, was despatched to prevent the conference if possible, but he arrived too late.

The Colloquy of Poissy proved, however, a very harmless affair. After the preliminary proceedings Theodore Beza attacked the doctrines of transubstantiation and consubstantiation, and was answered by the celebrated Lainez, afterwards the second General of the Jesuits. An attempt was made to agree on a formula which would satisfy both parties; but this proving hopeless, the prelates drew up a clear statement of the Catholic doctrine, which they forwarded to the Queen, with a request that Beza and his associates might be ordered to accept it under pain of banishment. This naturally brought the conference to an end.

Soon after the close of the Colloquy at Poissy, the Cardinal of Lorraine, attended by fourteen bishops, three abbots, and eighteen doctors, set out for the Council of Trent. The Cardinal's arrival was looked forward to with anxiety, for there were rumours that he would demand the cup for the laity and the disuse of images,† would re-open the question about the superiority of the Council to the Pope,‡ and would be accompanied by so many prelates that he would have the casting voice in all the divisions. A letter from himself, however, reassured the Pope; for he said, that venerating as he did the

* Jervis, p. 138.

† Pallavicino, t. iii. l. 18, c. 8, n. 2.

‡ Ibid. l. 18, c. 17, n. 16.

Apostolic See above all things after God, he would do nothing that could displease His Holiness.* But the general distrust continued. He arrived on the 23rd of December, 1562, and the Fathers went out some distance to meet him, and led him back to the city with the highest honours. Pallavicino says, that his majestic and cordial bearing, and an inexpressible look and tone of voice, which conveyed irresistibly the assurance of uprightness and truth, at once changed the previous terror into joy.†

The hopes that the Cardinal's appearance had inspired were not disappointed. The supremacy of the Pope over the "Universal Church," and the source of episcopal jurisdiction, were the questions most warmly contested by the French prelates. The Cardinal frankly avowed his approval of the canons of Constance and Bâle, and assured the legates that not a single French bishop would accept a decree opposed to them, that the French ambassadors would protest, and that a new source of discord would be added to the existing misery in France. But throughout he evinced the most obsequious deference to the Pope's judgment and the authority of the Church.‡ The questions were referred to the Pope, who objected strongly to compromising differences by the use of equivocal language which would hereafter give trouble, and recommended that the Fathers should decree in plain words only that on which they agreed, and leave *in statu quo* all on which they disagreed. Though nine-tenths of the Council were prepared to decide both points in favour of the Holy See, yet, at the Cardinal's request and from fatherly compassion for France, the Pope deferred their decision to a future time.§ The Cardinal, on the other hand, was so indefatigable a mediator between dissentient parties, that the legate styled him an angel of peace; || and the Pope said that the agreement in the Council was chiefly attributable to him.¶

The Council, at is close, solicited "from the Pope a confirmation of its edicts, and expressly declared that all canons of reform, whatever might be implied in their words, were prepared with a perfect understanding that no portion of them should be construed so as to affect the dignity of the Holy See."** In the "acclamations" by which the sittings were closed, and which were composed and intoned by the Cardinal of Lorraine, Pius IV. was styled Pontiff of the Holy and

* Pallavicino, l. 18, c. 13, n. 4.

† Ibid. l. 18, c. 19, n. 21.

‡ Ibid. l. 19, c. 16, n. 9.

§ Ibid. l. 24, c. 14, n. 12.

|| Ibid. l. 19, c. 12, n. 9.

¶ Ibid. l. 22, c. 1, n. 5.

** Sessio 25, c. 21, ap. Ranke, "Hist. of Popes," l. 3, sec. 6.

Universal Church (*Pontefice della Sacra ed Universale Chiesa*), and thus "it appeared that he attributed to the Pope the supremacy over the Universal Church, which he and the French prelates had formerly contested."* Some months earlier, eight French bishops suspected of heresy, among whom were Cardinal Châtillon and Montluc, Bishop of Valence, had been summoned to appear before the Inquisition at Rome, and on their non-appearance they were suspended and degraded on the 22nd October, 1563. This case strikingly proves the necessity for the discretionary power to try cases in the first instance, which has always been claimed by Rome, but is objected to by Mr. Jervis as contrary to Gallican liberties.† It would obviously have been impossible under existing circumstances to try these bishops before any tribunal in France, while at the same time it was the imperative duty of the Chief Pastor of the Christian flock to protect the sheep from heretical shepherds.

During the sitting of the Council, the Court of France had manifested its usually bad spirit, and had frequently sent orders to the French ambassadors and bishops to offer all possible opposition to every measure which they deemed a violation of Gallican liberties. At its close, the Nuncio applied to the Government to publish its decrees; but the demand was evaded for some time, and at length absolutely refused. Permission, however, was granted to the bishops to give effect within their dioceses to such canons as were not repugnant to the laws of the realm.‡ But the French prelates had learned wisdom from the past, and regarding the Tridentine decrees as the palladium of their liberty, they repeated the demand frequently from 1567 to 1615, at which last date, being hopeless of success, they entered unanimously into a solemn engagement to observe all the ordinances of the Council, and to enforce them to the utmost of their power throughout their dioceses.§

Meanwhile, religion in France was in a most alarming condition. Immediately after the death of Francis II. fifty preachers issued from Geneva and carried their doctrines throughout France. The Huguenots held their meetings publicly, insulted processions, seized churches, desecrated altars, and broke crucifixes and images. At the Court the King of Navarre boasted, that "within a year he would cause the Gospel to be preached throughout the kingdom." Meat was eaten freely during Lent. Huguenot preachers held

* Pallavicino, l. 24, c. 8, n. 10.

† Vol. i. p. 163.

‡ Jervis, vol. i. p. 169.

§ Ibid. vol. i. pp. 169, 286.

meetings openly in the apartments of Condé and Coligni. While Mass was being said in a chapel in the Court of Offices, Catherine and the Court went to hear Montluc, Bishop of Valence, preach Huguenot doctrines in the grand drawing-room at Fontainebleau. The education of the royal children was committed to Protestants. The King mimicked the ceremonies of Mass, and his brother Henry burnt the Catholic books of devotion. Cardinal Châtillon having on Easter Sunday celebrated the Lord's Supper in Huguenot fashion at Beauvais, of which he was bishop, the inhabitants broke into his palace and killed a schoolmaster who defended him. Hereupon L'Hôpital issued, without the usual registration by the Parliament, an edict forbidding all acts of violence, and mutual abuse "by the words Papist, Huguenot, and similar names," releasing all who were in prison for religion, and permitting exiles to return on condition that henceforth they lived "catholicly."*

The Parliament, greatly irritated at the infraction of its rights and the tone of the edict, compelled Catherine, by its repeated remonstrances, to sanction a counter-edict, known as that of July, 1561, which forbade the Huguenot assemblies, especially for the administration of the Sacraments. L'Hôpital, however, in publishing it, mitigated its penalties, and Coligni declared that it was not possible to carry it into execution.

In dismissing the prelates at Poissy, Catherine promised them that the edict of July should be observed. To the Protestants she promised the contrary; and to them she kept her word. She invited Beza and his friends to assist her in carrying out her views of pacification. The result was the edict of January, 1562, which required the Huguenots to give up the churches they had seized, but granted them religious freedom, on condition that they should not make regulations, appoint officers, or hold synods without the King's permission, thus giving them a civil status, and taking them under the royal protection. The possibility of there being two religions was as inconceivable to the Huguenots as to the Catholics, to moderate men as to zealots. The Huguenots, scarcely escaped from persecution, even petitioned for the punishment of "all atheists, libertines, Anabaptists, Servetists, and other heretical and schismatic sects."† Catherine's policy, therefore, only offended both parties, and increased the general religious excitement.

In this emergency, Guise, the Constable Montmorenci, and S. André, henceforth called the Triumvirs, forgot their

* Martin, part 5, l. 52.

† Ibid.

old rivalry amid the dangers that threatened their common faith, and formed a league in its defence. By flattering the ambition of the King of Navarre, who was always vacillating between the religious parties, they induced him to join them. Guise took possession of Paris, which was henceforth the citadel of the faith. Then, anticipating Condé, the Triumvirs carried off Catherine and her sons from Fontainebleau to Paris, and informed her that her authority would not be disturbed so long as she lent her aid to the maintenance of religion.

An accident brought matters to a crisis. On the 1st March, 1562, a Huguenot meeting was being held in a barn near Vassy, in Champagne, when the Duke of Guise happened to pass through the town; and the principal inhabitants begging him to disperse the assembly, he consented to do so. But some of his people preceded him, and before his arrival got into a quarrel with the Huguenots. As he was about to enter the barn he received a wound in his cheek, whereupon his followers fell upon the Huguenots, and, in spite of his prayers and threats, killed sixty and wounded more than two hundred.

The Huguenots had long been organized with a view to turning their religious constitution at any moment into a political and military one. Condé's letters now created a general rising, and almost simultaneously the Huguenots seized Tours, Poitiers, Blois, Rouen, Dieppe, Havre, Caen, Bayeux, Lyons, and many other towns in the west and centre, where they had comparatively few adherents. In Languedoc, at least half the towns, and in Dauphiné, Gascony, and Guienne almost the whole, joined them. In Provence they held only a few small places; while Champagne, Picardy, Isle-de-France, Brittany, and Burgundy, were almost entirely Catholic.

No words can describe the horrors to which France became a prey for about thirty years. The whole country was deluged with blood, and ravaged by fire and violence. Families were divided; brother fought against brother; and the blood of relatives was shed by combatants on both sides. The Constable was one of the Triumvirs, but two of his sons were Huguenots, and the two others Politicians. The Comte de Tende led the Huguenots in Provence, and his son, the Catholics. In Guienne it was proposed that the House of Valois should be dethroned in favour of Condé. In Dauphiné the Baron d'Adret spread terror by monstrous cruelties which have immortalized his name. Blaise Montluc, the royalist general, was scarcely less dreaded; and numberless others

followed their example. But there was a marked difference in the mode of warfare on the opposite sides. The Catholics carried on war according to the established, though inhuman usage of the time, and executed the laws of the realm against rebels and heretics with extreme severity. But the Huguenots added to the unavoidable miseries of war, savage excesses contrary to both nature and religion. They demolished a hundred and fifty cathedral and abbey churches, many of them priceless monuments of art, besides numberless parochial churches in all the towns that they captured. In the district of Beauce three hundred, and in the dioceses of Uzès, Viviers, Nîmes, and Mende five hundred perished. In Orleans not a single church escaped; and convents, colleges, and libraries everywhere shared the same fate.* Priests and monks were butchered by thousands, often with tortures, to make them tell where they had concealed relics. In November, 1563, the Cardinal of Lorraine told the Council of Trent that within the last few weeks three thousand religious had suffered cruel martyrdom in France.† Crucifixes and statues of our Lady were dragged with insults through the streets. Altars, fonts, and sacred vessels were profaned. Hosts and relics were burnt, while the mob danced the *farandole* around the pyre. And when they had sated their bigotry on the living, and all that was holy and venerable, they turned with demoniac fury against the dead. The ashes of S. Irenæus and S. Martin were thrown into the Loire. The heart of Francis II. was burnt. The tombs of the Bourbons and the Valois, of Louis XI. and Jeanne, first wife of Louis XII., of Rollo, William Long-sword, and Richard Cœur-de-Lion, of William the Conqueror and Queen Matilda, were sacked, and their remains desecrated. Nay, even the monument of Joan of Arc, to whom, though she had saved the throne of the Valois, France owed her national existence, was hurled from the bridge of Orleans.‡

The first War of Religion began in April, 1562. The Huguenot leaders entered at once on that course of disloyalty to their country which marked their subsequent career. They gave up Havre to the English, and prepared to place the whole of Normandy in their hands. But though the sudden outbreak of the Huguenots had taken Guise by surprise, yet it did not throw him into confusion; and before very long he checked their treason by a course of brilliant successes, which restored the chief towns in the west and centre to the King.

* Jervis, vol. i. p. 215.

† Pallavicino, l. 24, c. 3, n. 7.

‡ Martin, part 5, l. 53.

He took Rouen by storm, and the King of Navarre, being wounded before its walls, died soon after. He won a great battle at Dreux, in which S. André fell, and Montmorenci and Condé were taken prisoners. He then undertook the siege of Orleans, the capture of which would have terminated the war. But ever since the affair at Vassy he had been a marked man. During the siege of Rouen a Huguenot gentleman had attempted to assassinate him; and on the 19th February, 1563, another Huguenot gentleman, Poltrot-de-Mercy, after preparing himself for the deed by a day of prayer, wounded him by a pistol-shot, of which he died on the 24th. Poltrot accused Coligni of having instigated the deed; and though the latter denied all participation in it, there is no doubt that he, as well as the preachers, were aware of Poltrot's intention, and though they did not encourage him, they did not prevent him, nor warn the Duke.

In March, A.D. 1563, was concluded the pacification of Amboise, which guaranteed to the nobles and gentlemen holding fiefs the free exercise of religion in their houses, and to the *bourgeoisie* the same privilege where their religion had hitherto been practised. In other places their meetings could be held only in suburbs of a single town in each *bailliage*, but in Paris the Huguenot meetings were totally prohibited. Havre, however, had still to be re-taken from the English; and Condé had the baseness to appear in arms against the allies whom he had so recently placed within its walls. Notwithstanding the cessation of regular warfare, the fermentation throughout the country continued, and outbreaks of popular violence were frequent. The Venetian, "Correro," says, that "he was not acquainted with a single person who was not in a kind of fury on account of either his own affairs or those of his friends."*

Catherine had hitherto favoured the Huguenots because she thought they were the stronger party. She now discovered that the great majority of the nation were zealous Catholics, and she changed her policy. Moreover, the death of Guise and Navarre, and the divisions in the Montmorenci family, led her to hope that she should be able to manage the Catholic party more easily than she could Condé and Coligni, who sought to create an *imperium in imperio*, and were even suspected of aiming at the throne. She took the Cardinal of Lorraine into her favour. The king and his brothers once more received a Catholic education. The terms of the Peace of Amboise were no longer observed.

The result was the Second War of Religion, which broke

* "Civil Wars," l. 4, c. 14.

out in September, 1567. A bloody battle was fought at S. Denis, and though the Huguenots were defeated, the Catholics suffered severely, and Montmorenci was mortally wounded. In March, 1568, peace was made at Longjumeau on the same terms as at Amboise. But Catherine had no intention of observing it. She only took advantage of it to garrison the towns which the Huguenots evacuated, and to plan a *coup d'état* to seize all the Huguenot leaders, who, however, escaped her snares.

The Third War of Religion began before the close of the year. In May, 1569, the young Duke of Anjou, afterwards Henry III., defeated the Huguenots at Jarnac, where Condé was killed; and again in October at Moncontour. But though the Huguenots were always unsuccessful in the field, they held their ground in Rochelle and other fortified towns. Peace was again concluded at S. Germain, in August, 1570, and the Huguenots not only obtained the former concessions, but were left in possession, for two years, of the fortified towns of Rochelle, Montaubon, Cognac, and La Charité.

In 1572 Catherine planned the marriage of her youngest daughter with Henry of Navarre, the celebration of which became the occasion of the massacre of S. Bartholomew. It is now generally acknowledged that this deed was not a plot long premeditated with Spain, but that it originated on a sudden impulse with Catherine alone. Since the preceding September Coligni had been in Paris, and had devoted himself to gaining influence over the weak young king, and persuading him to invade the Netherlands in aid of the Protestant cause. He was so successful, that Catherine, who had long hated him, now began to fear him as her rival. She therefore proposed to Guise's widow, Anne d'Este, to gratify her oft-repeated demand for the punishment of her husband's murderer. On the 22nd of August, as the Admiral quitted the Louvre, a shot was fired at him from a window; but it only wounded him in his hand and arm. Had he been killed the affair would have ended; but as he had escaped and accused her to the King, she became alarmed for herself. She got up a story that the Huguenots had formed a conspiracy to seize the King and the Government; and on this ground she urged him to kill all the Protestant leaders in the city. Charles long hesitated, for he was attached to Coligni; but when at length she reproached him with cowardice, he adopted the proposal with all the passionate violence of his nature. Then began the massacre, which the long-pent fury of the populace swelled into proportions that had not been anticipated. The victims would have been far more numerous had not the Duke of

Guise and other Catholic nobles opened their hotels in Paris to the fugitives, and checked murderous outbreaks in the provinces of which they were governors.

The Fourth War of Religion began the following year, and at the same time a very formidable union was formed between the Huguenots and the Politicians, who were led by Damville de Montmorenci. Democratic principles were openly avowed; the most violent revolutionary pamphlets were circulated; not only absolute religious freedom, but the cessation of taxes was demanded; and even a republic was discussed. The Duke of Anjou distinguished himself in the conduct of the war, and especially in the sieges of Rochelle and Sancerre. But Catherine, jealous of his military reputation, got him chosen King of Poland, and thus weakened the royal forces.

Charles IX. died a few months after, A.D. 1574, and the Duke of Anjou was recalled, and succeeded as Henry III. He began his reign with the promise of a vigorous government, which would redress all political disorders, and maintain the faith both at home and abroad. But his vices, the weakness of his character, and the influence of his mother, soon drew him back into the existing feeble and unprincipled policy. He surrounded himself with worthless favourites, by whose counsels he was guided, and on whom he lavished honours and wealth; and the vices of his court can be compared only to those of the Pagan Cæsars. He took no decided steps to terminate the war, which devastated the country till it was suspended in 1576 by the Peace of Monsieur, which was confirmed in 1577 by that of Bergerac. By this treaty the Huguenots obtained the unlimited exercise of their religion throughout the kingdom, with the exception of Paris and the royal residence; the establishment of mixed courts to try all causes between Huguenots and Catholics; the legitimatization of marriages of priests and monks who had become Calvinists; and the possession of an increased number of cautionary towns. Thus, after fifteen years of falsehood, irreligion, and bloody massacre, Catherine's policy ended by securing the triumph of heresy.

The Catholics had long banded themselves into associations for mutual protection, but the triumphant position now granted to the Huguenots led to the formation, in 1576, of the League, which extended all over the kingdom, and afterwards became so famous. From this time the royal authority existed but in name. The League and the Politico-Huguenot Union divided the kingdom between them, and ruled in the places in which they were respectively dominant. Bands of military adventurers roamed through the country, and a general state of

anarchy prevailed. Thus matters went on for about eight years, till the death of Henry's only surviving brother, the Duke of Alençon, or Anjou, which took place in June, 1584, brought affairs to a crisis. Henry of Navarre was now the first prince of the blood, and the King being disposed to favour his claims to be his heir, the League prepared to oppose the succession of a heretic to the throne. They now for the first time made an alliance with Spain, the principal conditions of which were the transfer of the succession from Navarre to his uncle the Cardinal Bourbon, and the cession, whenever possible, of all Navarre's territories beyond the frontiers of France to Philip. At the head of the League was Henry, Duke of Guise, surnamed, like his father, *Balafré*, from a scar on his cheek. His brilliant valour, generosity, forgetfulness of self, and thoughtfulness for others, captivated men of all ranks, and well fitted him to be a party leader. His religious zeal was founded on deep faith, and in fighting for the Church, he carried out his principles with perfect disinterestedness and consistency.* The King did not regard him as a rival of his dignity so much as of his power; and he assented when it was once said to him, that "while he himself was the king in name, the Duke of Guise was the king of hearts." He had some scruples about taking up arms against his sovereign, fearing to appear as a rebel, and asked the Pope's opinion. Gregory XIII. refused to countenance the deposition of the King by violence, but said, that "if the object was of a religious nature alone, he gave it his blessing."† In the middle of April, 1585, the League published its manifesto, and the King suddenly found himself in the midst of a formidable warlike movement within his own kingdom. Catherine was called on by both parties to negotiate; and in July an edict appeared, approving of the armed rising, and commanding all to forsake the new religion or quit the kingdom. Pope Sixtus V. at the same time excommunicated Navarre, Condé, and their heirs, and declared them incapable of the succession.

Had the King now cordially co-operated with Guise, Calvinism must have been speedily suppressed. But his infamous life and long habits of dissimulation and falsehood, rendered him incapable of any noble effort. Notwithstanding his alliance with the League, he would not acknowledge that Navarre had forfeited his right of succession; and Guise gave friendly warning to Catherine, that in case of any agreement

* Sismondi, "*Hist. des Français*," part 7, c. 26.

† "*Civil Wars*," l. 5, c. 21.

between the two kings, his party had renewed at Orcamp a former resolution, that their religious duty relieved them from all the obligations of subjects.

War now broke out. In 1587 Navarre won at Coutras the first battle in which victory declared for the Huguenots. On the other hand, Guise cut to pieces a body of Germans and Swiss, who had entered France, and had been induced by Henry to retire, on discovering that they had been engaged to fight against him, instead of, as they supposed, in his defence. Henry took to himself the credit of this affair, and was much disgusted to find on their return to Paris, that Guise, who was the idol of the Parisians, was received with enthusiastic admiration, while he himself was regarded with contempt.

In the early part of this year, the warlike preparations in Germany had caused great alarm. Paris had formed itself into a civic union to support the Catholic princes; a guard of thirty thousand men had been levied; and thus an organized opposition to the King's government had been established. In this serious state of affairs nothing could be more despicable than Henry's conduct. Immersed in trivialities and alternations of sensuality and devotion, he asserted his own dignity only by petty spite against Guise, or puerile assumptions of authority. When Guise asked for the vacant government of Normandy for himself, Henry gave it to Epernon, the most hated of his favourites. When Guise requested Picardy for his cousin Aumâle, it was given to Nevers. The preachers thundered against Henry, denouncing in plain terms "the hypocritical devotees, who, after parading the streets barefoot, arrayed in sackcloth, and displaying ostentatiously their austere asceticism, were accustomed to pass the night in riotous feasting and gross debauchery."* The Duchess of Montpensier, Guise's sister, walked about the streets with a pair of golden scissors at her waist, intended, "as she said," to perform the tonsure on Henry whenever he should exchange his throne for the cloister. The Sorbonne passed a resolution, that "it was lawful to take away the government from an ill-conducted and incompetent prince, just as a guardiam who has proved himself unworthy of confidence, might be deprived of his office."† Henry scolded the Sorbonne; sent the Duchess an order to quit Paris, which she contemptuously ignored; gave money to one of the preachers "to buy sugar and honey to sweeten his bitter words;"‡ but took no vigorous steps to punish or repress the insults offered him. So incredible was his supine-

* Jervis, vol. i. p. 182.

† Ibid. p. 182.

‡ Ibid. vol. i. p. 182.

ness, that it gave rise to a wild rumour, that he was awaiting the arrival of the Huguenots to deliver up the city to them.

In this critical state of public feeling, he had the imprudence to order into the city a small body of about six thousand Swiss, who were quartered in the suburbs. As they marched through the gates with fifes and drums, the citizens rose *en masse*, barricades were thrown up, an attack was ordered; whereupon the Swiss, cowed by the overwhelming numbers, held up their rosaries in token that they too were Catholics, and cried for mercy. The terrified King sent for Guise, who was in his own house; and before mid-day Guise and the Archbishop of Lyons were seen walking through the streets in the midst of a double line formed by the mob, who greeted them with acclamations of joy and devotion. The King was advised to show himself to the populace in company with Guise; but his spirit failed him, and in the course of the night he made his escape to Chartres.

On the 19th of July, Henry renewed his acceptance of the League, and engaged to suppress heresy, and exclude it from the throne. On the 11th of August he appointed Guise Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. In September and the following months he met the States-General at Blois, and apparently fell in with all their demands. But, according to the testimony of his physician, Miron, this apparently cordial reconciliation with the League was only continuous hypocrisy, designed to put Guise off his guard. Ever since the day of the Barricades, Henry had cherished a purpose of revenge, and some hasty words dropped by Guise in conversation, determined him to strike while the Duke was a guest under his roof. Guise was warned, but he thought the King too great a coward, and said, "Should he attempt it, I will act with more vigour than at Paris. Let him beware of me." On the 23rd of December he was summoned from the council-chamber to the King's cabinet. As he drew aside the curtain at the door to enter, the private body-guard fell upon him, and he had only time to exclaim, "Traitor! I am dying! My God have mercy on me! Forgive me my sins!" At the same time, his son, his brother, Cardinal Guise, Cardinal Bourbon, the Archbishop of Lyons, and several other influential persons, were arrested. The next day Cardinal Guise was sent for by the King. He understood what was coming, and confessed to the Archbishop of Lyons; and as he passed through the door he was cut down by the assassins. The bodies of the two Guises were burnt by the King's order, and their ashes were thrown into the Loire. Catherine had anticipated some collision, and tried to restrain her son's violence. After it was all over, she

rose from her death-bed, and went to see Cardinal Bourbon in prison. He upbraided her for all that had occurred, and told her that she could not rest till she had brought them all to the shambles. She was deeply affected, and soon after her return home, breathed her last.

As the news of the murders spread through France, the rage and hatred of the people broke out with uncontrollable fury. The Sorbonne and the Parliament of Paris threw off their allegiance, and declared that all Henry's subjects were bound to take up arms against him; and the Parliaments and chief towns throughout France followed their example. Deserted by all, his power restricted within Blois, his Catholic subjects in open warfare against him, Henry threw himself into the arms of Navarre. Pope Sixtus, fearing to drive him to this step, which he had long threatened, had hitherto treated him with great forbearance. But now he issued a bull declaring him excommunicated, unless within two months he made the most absolute submission. But before the expiration of that time he had been summoned before a higher tribunal.

The Catholic nobles who were more attached to royalty than religion, joined Henry in the camp of Navarre, and he soon found himself at the head of forty thousand men, with more independent power than he had ever enjoyed in his life. He marched at once upon Paris, breathing revenge. On his way he treated with the greatest cruelty every place that offered the least resistance. As he looked upon Paris from S. Cloud he exclaimed, "There is the heart of the League. We must strike at the heart. In a few days there will be neither walls nor houses, but only the ruins of Paris." The 2nd of August was fixed for the assault, but on the preceding day he was assassinated by Jacques Clément, a fanatical Dominican.

The lawfulness of revolt against kings, and tyrannicide, was a subject of discussion among both Catholics and Protestants in this century. In the 12th century John of Salisbury had said, "To slay a tyrant is not only lawful but right and just . . . Against such a one, therefore, who subverts the law, right justly arms itself, and public authority wars against him who strives to reduce it to naught."* S. Thomas, also, says, "Tyrannical rule is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private benefit of the ruler. Therefore, the disturbance of a rule of this kind is not of the nature of sedition; unless, perchance, when the government of the

* Polycraticus, c. 15. The following remarks are drawn from a paper in the *Month* for last March and April, to which we must refer our readers for a full discussion of the subject.

tyrant is so inopportunately disturbed, that his subjects suffer more from the consequences of such disturbance than from the rule of the tyrant itself." The French doctors of the 15th century supported the same doctrine, and Gerson especially, in a sermon preached before Charles VI., A.D. 1405, warned Christian princes against falling into errors contrary to faith, as in such cases the laws both civil and ecclesiastical, authorized their subjects to pursue them with fire and sword.* But the Church has never sanctioned the execution of this judgment by the populace or by private individuals; and the Council of Constance condemned in decided terms the proposition of Wickliff, that "the common people may at their own will and pleasure condemn their lords who are guilty."†

The Protestants, on the contrary, held, as George Buchanan says, that if the king breaks the compact between him and the people, "it is lawful not only for the whole people, but for any single person to kill him." Knox also said, "that the nobles and people of England ought not only to have resisted Mary Tudor, but to have put her, her priests and all who assisted her, to death." Poynt, Bishop of Winchester under Edward VI., declared that "the deposing of kings and killing of tyrants" is "most true, just, and consonant to God's judgment." Milton's views on regicide are well known, and in his "Tenure of Kings and Magistrates" he quotes passages in confirmation of his opinions from Luther, Zwingle, Calvin, Bucer, Peter Martyr, Gilby, and Goodman.

There is a wide-spread impression that the Jesuits were, if not the originators, yet the principal disseminators of this doctrine of the lawfulness of tyrannicide. The fact, however, is the contrary. A very numerous class of Jesuit writers on government has not touched on the doctrine at all. Another large class teaches that no reason, however specious, can justify subjects in taking up arms against their prince. While a third class declares, that though it is lawful to resist and depose a tyrant, it cannot be left to the judgment of private persons, but demands a public judgment. The only Jesuit writer who has gone further, is Mariana; and of him Hallam remarks, "This language, whatever indignation it might excite against Mariana and his Order, is merely what we have seen in Buchanan."‡ But scarcely had Mariana's book appeared when Acquaviva the General ordered him to correct it, and no uncorrected copy would have remained if the Protestants had not reprinted it. Eleven years later he decreed, that no Jesuit should "presume

* Opera Gerson, t. 4.

† Von der Hardt., t. iii. p. 252.

‡ "Literature of Europe," vol. ii. c. 4.

to affirm that it is lawful for any person, under any pretext of tyranny whatever, to slay kings or princes, or to conspire against their lives." Father Gerard's history of the Gunpowder Plot, lately published by Father John Morris, shows how strictly the Jesuits in England obeyed this order.

The assassination of Henry caused great rejoicing throughout France. Cardinal Bourbon, though a prisoner, was proclaimed king, by the title of Charles X. ; and the Duke of Mayenne, Guise's brother, was nominated Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. On the other hand, Navarre took the title of Henry IV., claiming the crown by the novel doctrine of Divine right, or, more properly, natural right of blood, which he was the first to introduce, and on which was afterwards based the despotism of the Bourbons and the Stewarts. Some of the Royalist Catholics withdrew from both parties, while a few others joined the League, and others again offered their allegiance to Henry IV. if he would return to the Church, which he had already hinted that he would do whenever he should be better instructed.

The war dragged on from year to year, for neither party was strong enough to conquer the other. Guise's death had broken the aggressive power of the League ; for Mayenne had neither the military talents nor the popularity of his family, and moreover he was self-interested. On Cardinal Bourbon's death in May, 1590, he secretly made an offer to cede to Philip Burgundy, Provence, Dauphiné, and Brittany, as the price of his elevation to the throne.* But Philip himself aspired to the sovereignty, if not as king, yet at least as Protector over a confederation of independent provinces, which was to be formed by the dismemberment of France. This project was favoured by the Sorbonne and the most zealous Catholics, and also by a few of the great nobles, who hoped to be appointed governors of the provinces. But the nation at large could not brook submission to a foreign prince ; though it was not averse to accept for its sovereign the Infanta Isabella, grand-daughter of Henry II. and Catherine, who, it was proposed, should marry the young Duke of Guise. But Mayenne's selfishness upset this plan. He said that he should like to see Philip sovereign of France ; but as to his nephew, though he loved him as much as he did himself and wished him as great fortune as his own, he did not love him more than himself nor wish to see him his superior.

Meanwhile a far nobler struggle was being carried on in Rome by Pope Sixtus V. against Olivares, the Spanish ambas-

* "Life and Times of Sixtus V.," by Hübner, vol. ii. part 7, c. 7.

sador. Olivares' sole object was the interests of Philip, with which he took it for granted that those of the Catholic faith must be identical, and thus his line of policy was clear and definite. Sixtus also had a single object, which was the interests of the Catholic Church. But his line of action was not clearly visible to him, because with wide-penetrating view he saw both sides of every question, and foresaw every possible contingency. Perceiving the weakness of the League and that Henry could command the support of Elizabeth and the German Protestants, he foresaw his eventual success. Philip's invasion of France in great force alone could prevent it. But it was probable that such a step would arouse the national spirit and throw all France into the arms of Navarre, whose triumph as a heretic would result in the loss to the Church of "that noble kingdom" from which she "had always derived great advantages," and to which he "was much attached."* On the other hand, were Philip to conquer France, he would be able to realize his dream of an universal Catholic monarchy; but with the extinction of France the independence of the Church would be gone, and the Papal Chair would henceforth be the first benefice in the King of Spain's gift. Even this, however, would be preferable to the triumph of heresy and schism. The only possible solution of all the difficulties would be the conversion of Navarre and his elevation to the throne of France. Sixtus seems to have had a supernatural intuition that this would eventually come about; but at this moment he could do nothing to forward it. His policy, therefore, was to avoid whatever might hereafter hinder it, and meanwhile to follow patiently, with faith and hope, but without interior irresolution, the providential guidance of ever-changing events. He gave the support of his moral influence to Philip and the League. But Olivares could not induce him to levy troops or advance large sums of money, or take any violent steps, such as refusing to receive Henry's ambassador, or excommunicating all the Catholics in his camp. After many a stormy interview Olivares, irritated at finding that he had not gained a single inch, would upbraid him with being irresolute, versatile, a liar—nay, a heretic—and would even so far forget his Spanish dignity and courtesy as to incur the anger of his own king.

There are few passages in history more interesting than the details, as given by Baron Hübner from contemporary documents, of the struggle between the high-minded, resolute Pontiff, physically exhausted by intermittent fever, and sinking

* "Life and Times of Sixtus V.," vol ii. part 7, c. 3.

into his grave, and "that terrible Spaniard, who disregarded orders, and entered the old man's closet whenever it suited him, who poisoned his life, and humbled him in his own eyes, since he frightened a man who had never before known what fear was;"* and whose words, moreover, were backed by Philip's fleets and armies, and by the memory of the sack and twice-repeated capture of Rome within the Pope's lifetime. But "Sixtus V. came out victorious. His mind was made up. Everybody understood it. The Papacy was not to be the instrument of political ambition. . . . It would serve the cause of religion. . . . France was to be Catholic, and not to disappear from the map of Europe."† On the 28th July, 1590, he declared in the Congregation of France his final resolution to send Monsignor Serafino and Monsignor Borghese to the princes, prelates, nobles, and towns in France, and invite them to meet and elect a Catholic king. "The king thus elected might depend upon the support of the Holy See, the Pope being resolved to help him by every temporal and spiritual means in his power."‡ On the 27th August Sixtus expired.

The time was not yet ripe, but after two years and a half the Pontiff's prescience was verified. On the 28th April, 1593, the day after the formal opening of the States-General in Paris, the Catholics of Henry's party met the chiefs of the League in conference at Surène, with the view of negotiating the defection of the former from Henry, and the election to the throne of one of the Catholic Bourbons, who should marry the Infanta of Spain. Henry now perceived that his most dangerous enemies were those of his own family, and that he must no longer delay in making his long-promised abjuration. He met a number of theologians at Mantes, on the 22nd July. After being instructed on the chief controverted points, he signed a confession of faith, the Archbishop of Bourges gave him provisional absolution, and on the 25th he made his public abjuration in the Church of S. Denis. On the 27th February, 1594, he was crowned at Chartres, and in the following month he entered Paris. The only remaining point was to obtain absolution from Rome. The reigning Pope, Clement VIII., was strongly prejudiced against him, and believing him to be insincere, long hesitated to take the unusual step of absolving a lapsed heretic. But at length, chiefly through the influence of Cardinal Baronius, his confessor, and S. Philip Neri, whose disciple he had formerly been, his scruples were

* "Life and Times of Sixtus V.," vol. ii. part 7, c. 7.

† Ibid. vol. ii. part 7, c. 8.

‡ Ibid. vol. ii. part 8, c. 2.

overcome, and on the 16th September, 1695, he absolved Henry publicly with the usual ceremonies. There was now no further ground for the maintenance of the League, and on the 24th January, 1596, the Duke of Mayenne and the other leaders made their submission to Henry. With all its faults "the League was a fight for real principles, and, as such, had attractions for earnest and superior minds."* It had formed a nucleus for the deep Catholic feeling of the mass of the nation, to which, rather than to its leaders or the fortuitous incidents of war or diplomacy, the preservation of the faith was due. It had also renewed the close union with the Holy See, without which the Church, whether in its exterior relations to States, or in its interior spirituality, cannot perfectly perform God's appointed work.

Henry's change of religion, and his subsequent policy, have naturally given rise to much discussion. Mr. Jervis views them with so much clearness and fairness, that we cannot do better than quote his words :—

It were hard measure to charge him with deliberate hypocrisy ; to suppose that he knelt at the altar of S. Denis with a lie in his mouth, and double-dealing in his heart. The truth was probably this : Henry could not help sympathizing to a great extent with the Huguenot *cause* ; he was bound to it by early education, by the memory of many a gallantly contested field of battle, and by close ties of personal friendship. But Protestantism as a system of doctrine was, to say the least, indifferent to him. In renouncing it, therefore, he cannot be said, religiously speaking, to have violated the law of conscience. On the contrary, it would seem that his religious instincts attracted him strongly towards Catholicism. Palma-Cayet tells us that he remarked to one of his domestic chaplains, before his abjuration : "I cannot see either order or devotion in this religion (the reformed). It consists in nothing but a preachment (*un presche*), and this only means a tongue which can speak good French. Now, I have a notion that we ought to believe that the body of our Saviour is actually present in the Sacrament ; otherwise all that one does in religion is no better than a bare ceremony."†

Sully, himself a Protestant, says that—

"While Henry was doubtless influenced at first by political considerations, he became persuaded in the end that the Catholic religion was the surer way of salvation. He adds that, from the natural ingenuousness of the king's character, he would ill have supported, had the case been otherwise, such a disguise of his true sentiments for the rest of his life."‡

With the Huguenots Henry had great difficulties. They were sullen, jealous, factious, and unreasonable ; agitated for

* Jervis, vol. i. p. 189.

† Ibid. p. 199.

‡ Ibid. p. 200.

a renewal of the civil war; chose his moments of embarrassment for advancing fresh demands and exorbitant pretensions; and even intrigued with Elizabeth and the Prince of Orange to defeat his negotiations for peace with the King of Spain. But at length he was enabled, by the publication of the Edict of Nantes, in April, 1598, to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with them.* By the secret articles of this treaty, Rochelle and several other places of considerable strength and importance, were left in their hands. But it was evident that this arrangement could be only temporary, and that the permanent continuance of a rival and hostile power within the kingdom, always ready to foment civil dissensions and aid foreign foes, was impossible. It was rendered the more so by the factious and turbulent spirit of the Calvinists. They broke into open revolt in 1621, and when they were reduced to submission in the following year, they lost all their cautionary towns except Rochelle and Montauban; and though their purely religious privileges were continued, they were forbidden to hold meetings for political purposes under penalties of high treason. They rebelled again in 1625 and 1629, and on the conclusion of peace they lost Rochelle and Montauban, and the last vestiges of political independence, and were reduced to the position of a tolerated sect.†

Henry's liberal conduct to the Huguenots naturally exposed him to suspicion in the eyes of the Holy Father, and he therefore wrote in March, 1598:—

“If I am compelled to make greater concessions to the Huguenots, let His Holiness be assured that I do it solely for the purpose of avoiding a more serious evil, and with a view to protect and strengthen the Catholic Church to a corresponding extent; that I do it to appease and satisfy the so-called Reformers, and by that means to defeat the more easily the designs of the ambitious and factious among them, who are doing their utmost to make the rest despair of my protection, and to stir them up against the Catholics, who still live in great numbers in the towns which they occupy.”

Some months later he wrote to the Pope himself:—

“I shall take care so to manage the edict which I have published for the tranquillity of my kingdom that its most important and most solid results shall be in favour of the Catholic religion; and this, indeed, is already beginning to appear.” These anticipations were remarkably fulfilled. Within a year after the appearance of the edict, we find Henry congratulating him-

* Jervis, p. 204.

† Ibid. pp. 299–316.

self on having recovered the confidence of the Sovereign Pontiff, with regard to his designs "for the glory of God, and the restoration of His Church."*

The conciliatory spirit and patriotic example of Henry IV. won by degrees a wide-spread sympathy throughout the nation. His clemency rebuked the fierceness of religious partizanship; his long experience, his remarkable success, the sincerity of his character, were appreciated even by those who had opposed him the most bitterly, and influenced public opinion in a thousand ways.†

During the gloomy period from the sojourn of the Popes at Avignon to the Concordat, spirituality in France had fallen very low. The outbreak of Calvinism, followed by the civil wars, had still further lowered the religious tone and corrupted the morals of society, so that, on the accession of Henry IV., it seemed to be almost a question whether Christianity itself was not dying out. All over France, England, Scotland, Germany, Poland, Lorraine, Lithuania, there existed secret societies, in many cases the avowed offspring of Calvinism, the members of which professed themselves Calvinists, Lutherans, or Catholics, as might be most convenient, and were recognized only by each other. Thus the poison was disseminated the more widely, and no community or family, whether religious or secular, royal, noble, or plebeian, was secure from its baleful influence. In Paris alone there were at least fifty thousand atheists, and often in a single house no less than twelve were to be found.‡ The triumph of infidelity, which took place two centuries later, seemed even now to be imminent.

The havoc that the Huguenots made in ecclesiastical buildings has already been mentioned. The spiritual destitution was correspondingly great. Six or seven archbishoprics, from thirty to forty bishoprics, and three-quarters of the parochial churches, were without occupants; and a hundred and twenty convents out of only twenty-five of the hundred dioceses of France, were without qualified superiors. Many of the bishoprics were regarded almost as the appendages of certain noble families, and others had been filled uncanonically. "Many even of the bishops thought of nothing beyond the luxurious enjoyment of their revenues, and were quite negligent of their pastoral duties." Many of the abbey had been "sold for hard cash, bestowed as a marriage portion, bartered for worldly goods,"§ and their rule and religious spirit were totally lost. The priesthood had sunk into such

* Jervis, p. 208.

† Ibid. p. 211.

‡ "Supplement au Dictionnaire de Bayle," art. Mersenne.

§ Jervis, vol. i. p. 212.

general contempt that it was considered a degradation to take Holy Orders, except for the sake of some valuable benefice. "In the rural districts the people were like scattered sheep, without spiritual pasture, without Sacraments, and with scarcely any external aids to their salvation." "Of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation they had no apprehension whatever; nor were they at all better instructed as to the Holy Sacraments and the dispositions with which they ought to be approached."*

A distinguishing characteristic of Christianity is its vitality. The old Paganism died out as completely as if it had never existed. But whatever may be the retrograde progress yet in store for Europe, Christianity can never be thus extinguished. This was shown strikingly in the sixteenth century. At its opening, Christianity seemed to be expiring, crushed down under classical Paganism, general corruption of manners, worldliness in the upper and ignorance in the lower classes, and loss of discipline among the clergy, all culminating in the outbreak of heresy. But at its close the Church stood forth renewed in strength and beauty, her mediæval garments exchanged for the resplendent robe of charity, and entering joyously on the "second spring" that was opening before her. The Middle Ages of Faith had given place to the modern period, in which, once more, as in the days of the martyrs, she was to work through supernatural personal love.

The Catholic revival in Italy and Spain was carried by the force of unity across the Alps and Pyrenees. The Jesuits entered France in 1562. They found patrons in the Cardinal of Lorraine, Henry of Guise, and the more zealous Catholics, and soon possessed many establishments. Their missionaries spread all over France, in opposition to the Huguenot preachers. The most successful was Augier, who published a catechism, of which in eight years 38,000 copies were sold in Paris alone.† Their attachment to Rome early excited the hatred of the Parliament of Paris, who took advantage of the attempt of Jean Châtel, in 1594, to assassinate Henry, to banish them from Paris on the pretended plea of their being his accomplices. But the sentence was executed only in the district under its jurisdiction, and in 1603 they were recalled by Henry. His speech on this occasion is so remarkable for its discrimination and breadth of view, that want of space alone compels us to omit it.

A few Capuchins accompanied the Cardinal of Lorraine

* Jervis, pp. 250-252.

† Ranke, "Hist. Popes," book 5, sec. 5.

from the Council of Trent, and in 1574 Catherine founded a monastery for them in Paris, whence they spread to several other places. They made many striking conversions, among which was that of Henri de Joyeuse, one of the first men of his day, who entered their order; and Jean de la Barrière, who, having at the age of nineteen been given the Cistercian Abbey of Feuillans, near Toulouse, had himself consecrated abbot, and established the rule of Cîteaux. He traversed France with sixty-two companions, their austerities exciting reverence and the desire for imitation.

The improved spirit of the episcopate was evinced in their persevering demands for the promulgation of the Council of Trent. Their estimate of Gallican liberties was expressed in 1588 by the Archbishop of Lyons, who, Mr. Jervis tells us, reviled them "as a mere human invention, a transparent device for subverting the authority of the Apostolic See, a specious veil for people of suspected opinions in religion, eager to conceal their errors by professing extraordinary zeal for the interests of the State."*

After Henry's accession the revival received a great impulse. For his private life we would not offer a word of excuse. But as a sovereign, S. Francis de Sales said of him with truth, "In making himself a child of the Church he made himself the father of France; in becoming a sheep of the Good Shepherd, he became the shepherd of a densely peopled kingdom."† He took great interest in the conversion of heretics, and especially encouraged the controversial talents of Du Perron, whose influence had contributed greatly to his own conversion. Du Perron, born and educated as a Calvinist, made his abjuration when he was about twenty; and devoting his great learning and talents to controversy, became one of the most successful instruments in that line. Paul V. used to say of him, "Let us all pray God to inspire Cardinal Du Perron, for he will make us believe whatever he pleases." His public discussion with Du Plessis-Mornay, in which he convicted him of the same error which has been laid to the charge of Dr. Pusey, of mistaking the heretical question for its Catholic answer, is too well known and too long to be here repeated. Notwithstanding his great success, he never lost his humility, and was wont to say, "To convince is but a small thing; to convert is the grand difficulty. I may be able to silence heretics, but the man to convert them is Francis de Sales."‡

S. Francis de Sales, Bishop of Geneva, though a Savoyard and not a Frenchman, has left through his personal influence,

* Jervis, vol. i. p. 185.

† Ibid. p. 258.

‡ Ibid. p. 223.

his writings, and the Order of the Visitation, a strong impression of his spirit on the French religious character. He had scarcely been ordained priest when he offered himself as a missionary to the province of Chablais, which, having joined Geneva in its revolt from Savoy, had now fallen again into the Duke's hands. After encountering extraordinary difficulties, his supernatural patience and sweetness of spirit softened the heretics, and his eloquence gathered them into the fold in a wonderful way. Nine hundred persons are said to have been converted by a single sermon; three whole parishes came in procession to abjure their heresy; and within four years the whole population, estimated at 72,000, was converted. In the year 1602 he was sent by the Duke of Savoy on diplomatic business to Paris. He acquired great influence over the king, who used to say, "I love Monseigneur de Genève because he has never flattered me." He preached at the Louvre the Lent sermons, which were followed by a number of conversions among the upper classes. Applications for spiritual direction came from all quarters. His advice was asked about every new undertaking. Nothing was talked of but "his gentleness, his tenderness, his disinterestedness, his never-failing serenity, and his equanimity of temper;"* and his success in Paris in leading Catholics to a more fervent spiritual life, was not less than it had been in the conversion of the Calvinists of the Chablais.

Closely linked with the name of S. Francis de Sales is that of S. Jane Frances, Baroness de Chantal. Very happily married, and early left a widow, in the first hours of her bereavement she gave her whole heart to God, and devoted herself to a life of prayer, active charity, mortification, and the practice of saintly virtues in the petty trials of domestic life; as for instance, in her intercourse with her father-in-law, an ill-tempered old man, who was ruled by a housekeeper to whose domineering temper she bowed with the greatest humility. She and S. Francis, while still strangers, beheld each other in visions; and when at length, in 1604, they met at Dijon, where he had gone to preach a retreat, she placed herself unreservedly under his direction. He guided her for several years in the contemplative life, and at length led her to found the Order of the Visitation, which he used to call his joy and his crown. This Order being intended for persons advanced in age or feeble in health, interior mortification, calculated to produce great purity of heart and fervent love of God, was substituted for corporal austerities. S. Jane Frances

* Jervis, vol i. p. 240.

founded seventy-five convents in France and Savoy, and before the end of the century their number exceeded a hundred.

In 1603 Madame d'Acarie brought the Carmelites from Spain, and established them in Paris in the Rue S. Jacques. Her three daughters and several ladies of the highest rank were among the first novices; and she herself when she became a widow entered the Order, in which she died. She was beatified by Pope Pius VI. by her name in religion, Marie de l'Incarnation. Within the first twenty-six years forty convents of the Order were established in France, the superioresses of almost every one of which are candidates for canonization; and before the end of the century they had increased to sixty-three. The Carmelites of the present day boast that religion was saved in France by their prayers, their penances, and their acts of reparation to Divine Love for the outrages committed against it; and no doubt this is true, though not in an exclusive sense.

Madame d'Acarie also established the first house in France of Ursulines, whose object is the education of women. Through her repeated solicitations and those of Père Coton, the King's Jesuit confessor, Cardinal de Bérulle was induced to found the Oratory of Jesus, a congregation of secular priests, on a plan somewhat similar to that of S. Philip Neri in Rome. He wished its work to be exclusively that of seminaries, but the Pope insisted on including in the bull of confirmation the general instruction of youth.* After the Cardinal's death the Oratories became only ordinary colleges, and the priests laboured as missionaries. This was a providential circumstance, because the Fathers fell into Jansenism, and had they been engaged in the education of priests, their heretical influence would have been much greater than it actually was. Cardinal de Bérulle was so full of the love of God that he was called a "burning bush, a prodigy of charity";† and many saintly priests studied under him. Among these were S. Vincent de Paul, Father Eudes, the Apostle of Normandy, and founder of the Eudistes; and M. Bourdoise, founder of the community of S. Nicolas-du-Chardonnet, intended for a seminary. M. Bourdoise's peculiar work was the revival of Church ceremonies, which had been long neglected, and of the clerical dress, which had been generally discarded. One day, going into the church of the Abbey of S. Denis, he saw a man booted and spurred, and in the showy worldly dress of the times, hearing the confession of a priest in alb and stole.

* "Vie de M. Olier" Paris, Poussielgue Rusand, 1853, part i. book 4, note 5.

† Ibid. part i. l. 4.

He immediately sent for the prior and said to him, "Come, Father, come, and see a soldier confessing a priest." The keen satire took effect, and the irregularity was not repeated.

The successor of Cardinal de Bérulle was M. de Condren, a man of such sanctity that the numerous saints of the day regarded him with veneration. His intimate knowledge of the various ways in which God leads souls to the highest perfection, fitted him specially to be the spiritual guide of saints. Though M. de Condren originated no new work, he took an active part in the revival of religion, through his influence on all around him.

But the great spiritual centre of the age was S. Vincent de Paul, the son of a poor peasant in Gascony, and at one time a captive slave in Barbary. His life had but one aim and one idea. He saw his Lord in all with whom he came in contact; he worshipped the Man of Sorrows in the poor, the sick, and the afflicted; and he loved the sinners for whom Jesus had shed His blood on Calvary. We need not speak of the Sisters of Charity, who began their work in the poorest and wildest districts of France, but are now scattered in all lands where Catholics are to be found; nor of his innumerable confraternities and foundations for the sick, for prisoners, for idiots, for foundlings, for penitents, for every kind of woe to which human nature is subject. So limitless was his charity, that, going *incognito* to visit the galleys at Marseilles, he took the place of a convict more unfortunate than criminal, and for several weeks, till recognized, wore the fetters and endured the hardships of a galley slave.* To meet the spiritual necessities of the time, he founded, in 1624, the Congregation of the Priests of the Mission, who went forth to all parts of France to combat the almost heathenish state of vice and ignorance into which the population had sunk during the civil wars. He opened his house in the Rue S. Lazare to all the clergy, both bishops and priests, who desired to be more perfectly trained to the duties of their office; and retreats were frequently given to candidates for ordination, and those whose pastoral work limited their stay. After a time retreats were given to the laity; and on these occasions the refectory would present a curious scene—nobles, mechanics, beggars, ecclesiastics of high rank, poor monks, the wise and the ignorant, the rich and the poor, all drawn to S. Vincent by a common spiritual need, and sharing the same simple fare at a common table. In 1638 Urban VIII. invited him to found a house in Rome; and in the next twenty-two years his priests gave two

* "Life of S. Vincent de Paul," by Henry Bedford, c. 16.

hundred missions in the city and the Roman States. Thence, in 1642, his missionaries crossed to Barbary. About 1645 he sent nine of them to Ireland, then suffering the most cruel of its many cruel persecutions under Charles I. and Cromwell; and now they are spread all over the world.

S. Vincent was regarded with veneration by Henry IV. Marie de Medicis and Richelieu constantly consulted him as to the appointment of bishops. Louis XIII. died in his arms. He was one of the four councillors appointed by Anne of Austria, during her regency, to examine all matters of religion and the disposal of ecclesiastical dignities, which she refused to fill without his sanction. In this position he did good service against Jansenism, and also in opposing the wily Mazarin, who had recourse to every stratagem to convert the wealth and honours of the Church into instruments of his ambition.

The Catholic revival was also carried on with great zeal in the provinces. In Languedoc, the Vivarais, Velay, and Cevennes, S. Francis Regis, a Jesuit, by his preaching, his miracles, and his saintly example, converted thousands of heretics and sinners with a degree of success, which can be compared only to that of S. Francis Xavier in India and Japan.

Michael le Nobletz and Julian Maunoir, a Jesuit, laboured in Brittany, which had fallen into a state of great ignorance and immorality, chiefly because curés had been appointed who could not speak the Breton language. He obtained a reform of this abuse from Benedict XIV.; he composed, in Breton, canticles on the articles of the faith, which the rude villagers and fishermen delighted in singing; he painted a series of allegorical pictures as books for his unlettered flock; and thus he soon familiarized them with the great truths of salvation. Maunoir, in conjunction with Father Huby, established frequent retreats for men and women of all classes, and a congregation of nuns in connection with them. At the present time, during several months of the year, successive retreats for ladies, for peasants, for servants, and for children, are still given in the Convent of the Dames de S. Louis at Auray, at some of which no less than eight hundred persons attend.

In Lorraine, three men who had formed a warm friendship at college, laboured for the revival of religion. Layruels reformed the Norbertine abbey of S. Marie-aux-Bois, near Pont-à-Mousson, whence the reform spread into France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria. Lacour brought the discipline in the Benedictine abbey of S. Vannes, at Verdun, to a degree of perfection which recalled the days of S. Benedict. Several abbeys in France adopted his rule; and after some

time they formed themselves into a separate congregation, under the name of the Benedictines of S. Maur. In the course of ten years forty abbeys joined them, and before the Revolution their number rose to one hundred and eighty. Blessed Peter Fourier established the Congregation of Our Lady for the education of women, and reformed the Congregation of Canons Regular. But he was always spoken of only as the good Curé de Mattaincourt, a little village in Lorraine, which he never quitted except under obedience to visit his abbeys, or to preach missions in the poorest districts of the Vosges.

Still, the most important work of founding seminaries had not yet been accomplished. It had been attempted by the Cardinal of Lorraine in obedience to the Council of Trent; and later by S. Vincent de Paul, Cardinal de Bérulle, M. Bourdoise, and several bishops. But all the establishments had failed, sometimes utterly, sometimes degenerating into colleges for youth, and at others, transformed by the urgent wants of the time into communities of parish or mission priests. S. Francis de Sales said, that, after having laboured for seventeen years to form three priests fitted to reform the rest, he had succeeded only with one and a half. In twenty years the Seminary of Rouen produced only six priests, and that of Limoges not even one. At length the work was undertaken by M. Olier, who seemed to have been prepared for it by God almost from his birth. Soon after his ordination he went about the streets of Paris teaching the poor; and later, under the guidance of S. Vincent de Paul and M. de Condren, he travelled through the provinces as a missionary. After making an abortive attempt to establish a seminary at Chartres, he settled, in 1642, with two companions, at Vaugirard, and within a few months his community rose to twenty. In the course of the same year the Curé of S. Sulpice resigned to him his parish, which at that time included the whole Faubourg S. Germain, and thither he removed his seminary.

The ecclesiastical position of the parish was peculiar; for, happily, it was not under the jurisdiction of Gondi, Archbishop of Paris, who afterwards was imbued with Jansenism, nor of his nephew, coadjutor and successor, the celebrated Cardinal de Retz. M. Olier's immediate superior was Henri de Bourbon, a natural son of Henry IV., who, although not even a priest, was Bishop of Metz, Abbot of S. Germain-des-Prés, and nine other abbeys, and at last married in the year 1678. But this great pluralist was only the deputy of the Pope, and M. Olier has left it on record, that he regarded it as a peculiar favour of God to have been placed in a parish held immediately under the Holy Father, so that those who

were appointed by him to serve it were his members and substitutes ; and that the seminary destined for the service of the Church Universal should be fixed in a place which was dependent only on the Holy See, to the honour of which it was exclusively consecrated.* Under no other jurisdiction would it have been possible to reform the Faubourg S. Germain ; for it was the notorious resort of heretics, atheists, sorcerers, and libertines, most of them belonging to the highest noble families, or patronized by them.

M. Olier's first care was his community, which was the foundation of the seminary. Instead of attempting to educate boys for the priesthood, as his predecessors had done, he admitted to his seminary only young men whose vocation was certain, candidates for ordination, and bishops and priests, who came for a longer or shorter period to profit by his wise direction. He adopted the rule of S. Charles Borromeo, and used the parish and its churches as his training-school. He divided the parish into eight districts, to each of which he appointed an experienced priest, with ten or twelve assistants, who drew up a register of the spiritual state and habits of all the inhabitants, imilar to the book, "*De Statu Animarum*," which Paul V., in his ritual, recommends to all parish priests. They were to hold frequent catechism classes, one of the priests going through the street ringing a bell to summon the children, of whom above four thousand of all ranks were thus brought under instruction ; and also a general class in the churches, besides private classes for men-servants, old people, and beggars.

In the church the chanting of the Divine Office, the celebration of Mass, and all other sacred rites and ceremonies, were correctly performed according to the Roman ritual, which was then in use in the parish. There was frequent Benediction, and after a short time Perpetual Adoration ; and in the year 1655, Anne of Austria, by M. Olier's advice, established the Benedictines of the Blessed Sacrament in the parish. The Sacraments had hitherto been very rarely frequented. But even during the first Lent, confessions were so numerous that M. Olier was obliged to request the doctors of the Sorbonne, and two priests from each religious community in Paris, to come to his assistance ; and before long the communions in the parish church alone were two hundred thousand in the course of the year, exclusive of those in thirteen other churches in the parish.

M. Olier introduced the Sisters of Charity, and, at a later

* "*Vie de M. Olier*," part i. book 9.

period, the Sisters of Mercy, into the parish, and induced noble and wealthy ladies to form various confraternities for instructing and relieving the poor. He established a Confraternity of the Passion, for men of all ranks, who wished to lead a life of perfection in the world; and also an association to prevent duelling, which was then so frequent that seventeen men fell in duels in one week in the faubourg alone. At the head of the latter were the Marquis de Fénelon and Marechal Favert, once distinguished duellists; and its members, who must be well known for military prowess, were admitted publicly by a solemn vow at the altar of S. Sulpice.

Within two years after M. Olier's removal to S. Sulpice, seventeen bishops sent him priests to be trained. Before his death, A.D. 1657, he established seminaries in several dioceses, and subsequently they spread all over France. Thus was effected the long-desired reform, through which the French priesthood was built up on a solid basis, and fitted to withstand the tremendous trials which yet awaited it, and on emerging from them to constitute the finest clerical body within the Church.

Besides the few great leaders of the religious movement here mentioned, there were numberless other saintly labourers of all classes, too numerous to name. There was Claude Bernard, known as the Poor Priest, whose diocese and parish were the prisons and hospitals of Paris, which he visited daily—waiting on the inmates, dressing their wounds, kissing their feet, instructing and consoling them. His successor in the work was Thomas Le Gauffre, formerly an eminent lawyer, who gave up his profession to enter the priesthood, and died in 1646, when he was on the eve of going as Bishop of Montreal to the new mission in Canada. There was also the Baron de Renty, who, without leaving his position in the world, attained to the highest union with God, and took a leading part as the coadjutor of S. Vincent de Paul, M. Olier, Father Eudes, and the Jesuits, in all their charitable and spiritual works. The Princess de Condé, the Duchess d'Aiguillon, Marechal Rantzau and his wife, the family of Fénelon, a crowd of other men and women of high rank, co-operated, according to their several capacities, with Clement, a cutler, Beaumais, a mercer, Brother John of the Cross and Brother Claude, servants of the Poor Priest Bernard and M. Le Gauffre. But the person who was regarded with the greatest veneration by all, was Marie Gournay, widow of David Rousseau, who kept a cabaret in Paris. Her advice was sought by the most spiritual persons of all ranks. Missionaries went to her for instruction: no

good work was commenced without her approbation ; and her prayers excited and upheld the zeal of all who were labouring in Our Lord's vineyard. She had a principal part in bringing M. Olier to S. Sulpice, and the missions in Canada and the Levant were undertaken at her bidding.

In the Ages of Faith, when all nations of Europe were united in a spiritual monarchy under Christ, their Invisible King, the religious movement naturally proceeded from the heads of society, as His representatives. But in the sixteenth century this Christian idea had been discarded for the modern principle of the absolute subordination of religion to national interests. The States of Europe could no longer with truth be called Christian, and our Lord, driven out of His kingdom, could find a home only in the hearts of individuals. In this later period a wonderful effusion of the Holy Ghost has been vouchsafed, as if to reward His faithful children, and the fire of love has been diffused abroad in a degree not seen since the days of the early martyrs. A more fervent spirit has found expression in tender devotion to our Lord's Person, to His Infancy, to His Sacred Heart, to His Precious Blood, to His Passion, to the supreme act of His love in the Blessed Sacrament, to His Virgin Mother, and to the glorified members of His mystical Body. Each loving heart has been a focus of heat and light ; and hence the religious movement has been ubiquitous, circulating through all ranks of society, from Princess Louise, the Carmelite, daughter of Louis XV., and her niece, the Venerable Marie Clotilde, Queen of Sardinia, down to the Venerable Benedict Joseph Labre, the beggar.

Mr. Jervis appreciates this remarkable religious revival in France, though he cannot be expected to do it full justice. Our limited space has compelled us to omit all notice of his interesting account of Jansenism ; but we hope we may be able, at some future time, to give it the attention which it deserves.

ART. V.—THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER ON THE SACRED HEART.

The Divine Glory of the Sacred Heart. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. London : Burns & Oates.

Dr. Nicholson's Accusation of the Archbishop of Westminster. By CATHOLICUS. London : Burns & Oates.

THERE is hardly any fact of our time which to us seems so hopeful and cheering, as the recent fresh burst of devotion to the Sacred Heart, which has shown itself in this as in other European countries. A new era has opened in ecclesiastical history ; and Catholics are about to be confronted with perils, both in the intellectual and the political order, such as the Church has perhaps never before had to encounter. And what will be the Catholic's securest defence in such a crisis ? Love and loyalty to the Person of Jesus Christ. This has ever been the Church's centre of life and strength, as F. Newman for one has often profoundly and eloquently set forth ; nor can we strike a better key-note to our present article, than by placing before our readers some of his noble language on this theme. How did Christianity first conquer the world ? By the preaching of Christ.

A Deliverer of the human race through the Jewish nation had been promised from time immemorial. The day came when He was to appear, and He was eagerly expected ; moreover, One actually did make His appearance at that date in Palestine, and claimed to be He. He left the earth without apparently doing much for the object of His coming. But when He was gone, His disciples took upon themselves to go forth to preach to all parts of the earth with the object of preaching *Him*, and collecting converts *in His name*. After a little while they are found wonderfully to have succeeded. Large bodies of men in various places are to be seen, professing to be His disciples, owning Him as their King, and continually swelling in number and penetrating into the populations of the Roman Empire ; at length they convert the Empire itself. All this is historical fact. Now, we want to know the farther historical fact, viz. the cause of their conversion. In other words, what were the topics of that preaching which was so effective ? If we believe what is told us by the preachers and their converts, the answer is plain. They "preached Christ" ; they called on men to believe, hope, and place their affections in that Deliverer who had come and gone ; and the moral instrument by which they persuaded them to do so, was a description of the life, character, mission and power of that Deliverer, a promise of His invisible Presence and Protection here, and of the Vision and Fruition of Him hereafter. From first to last to Christians,

as to Abraham, He himself is the centre and fulness of the dispensation. They, as Abraham, "see His day, and are glad."

A temporal sovereign makes himself felt by means of his subordinate administrators, who bring his power and will to bear upon every individual of his subjects; the universal Deliverer, long expected, when He came, instead of wielding a temporal sway, nay, instead of making and securing subjects by a visible graciousness or majesty, departs;—*but* is found, through His preachers, to have imprinted the Image or Idea of Himself in the minds of His subjects individually; and that Image, cherished and worshipped in individual minds, becomes a principle of association, and a real bond of those subjects one with another, who are thus united to the body by being united to that Image; and moreover that Image, which is their moral life when they are actually converted, is also the original instrument of their conversion. It is the Image of Him who fulfils the one great need of human nature, the Healer of its wounds, the Physician of the soul, this Image it is which both creates faith, and then rewards it.

When we recognize this central Image as the vivifying idea both of the Christian body and of individuals in it, then, certainly, we are able to take into account two, at least, of Gibbon's causes, as having, in connection with that idea, some influence both in making converts and in strengthening them to persevere. It was the Thought of Christ, not a corporate body or a doctrine, which inspired that zeal which the historian so poorly comprehends; and it was the Thought of Christ which gave a life to the promise of that eternity, which without Him would be, in any soul, nothing short of an intolerable burden.

Now all this, perhaps, will be called cloudy, mystical, unintelligible; that is, in other words, miraculous. I think it is so. How, without the Hand of God, could a new idea, one and the same, enter at once into myriads of men, women, and children of all ranks, especially the lower, and have power to wean them from their indulgences and sins, and to nerve them against the most cruel tortures, and to last in vigour as a sustaining influence for seven or eight generations, till it founded an extended polity, broke the obstinacy of the strongest and wisest government which the world has ever seen, and forced its way from its first caves and catacombs to the fulness of imperial power? ("Grammar of Assent," pp. 457-9.)

And what was the strength of Christianity at its outset, continues to be its strength now.

As human nature itself is still in life and action as much as ever it was, so He too lives, to our imaginations, by His visible symbols, as if He were on earth, with a practical efficacy which even unbelievers cannot deny to be the corrective of that nature, and its strength day by day; and this power of perpetuating His Image, being altogether singular and special, and the prerogative of Him and Him alone, is a grand evidence how well He fulfils to this day that Sovereign Mission which, from the first beginning of the world's history, has been in prophecy assigned to Him (ib. p. 482).

And conversely, to overthrow this Image of Jesus Christ, is in

effect to overthrow Christianity from its foundation. Hear the Archbishop's words in the admirable Sermon which we have named at the head of our article :—

S. John, in his first epistle, writes thus : " Every spirit that dissolveth Jesus is not of God, and this is Antichrist of whom you have heard that he cometh, and he is already in the world." The meaning of the words " who dissolveth Jesus " is this ;—whosoever denies that the Son of God is come in the flesh, that is, the truth of His Incarnation, or in any way destroys the distinction of His two natures, or the unity of His Divine Person, or denies that He is the Incarnate God, or refuses to Him divine worship and the honour which is due to God alone—whosoever in these, or in any other way, destroys or denies the truth of the Incarnation, " dissolveth Jesus," and, whether he know it or not, is a disciple of Antichrist.

The Person of our Divine Lord has been from the beginning the centre of all the chief heresies that have tormented the Christian world. Like, as in warfare, the hottest conflict is always around the person of the king, so, in the whole history of the Christian Church, the keenest assaults of heresy and the most concentrated enmity of heretics have been directed against the Incarnation of the Son of God.

But if loyalty and love to Jesus Christ be the Catholic's one strong and sure weapon, whether of offence or defence ;—it is devotion to the Sacred Heart, which will most effectively secure to him the true possession of that weapon. There is no devotion which appeals with such depth and tenderness to " the little ones of Christ " ; whether they be " poor in this world " while " rich in faith," or whether they be endowed with all intellectual gifts and attainments. And while on the one hand this devotion thus appeals to the heart, it no less certainly leads men to sound doctrine. The more we reflect on the matter, the more profoundly true we shall find the Archbishop's remark, that " as the doctrine of the Incarnation is the true test of the disciples of Jesus Christ, so the divine glory of the Sacred Heart is the true test of the doctrine of the Incarnation." Let any Catholic accept humbly those practical lessons on the Sacred Heart which the Church places before him, he will be led securely to the full dogma on Jesus Christ, as defined by the Church against Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians ; and on the other hand let any one be unconsciously unsound on the Incarnation, he will inevitably stumble at the Catholic devotion to the Sacred Heart. We have given two reasons then why this devotion is so singularly precious in the Catholic's estimation. It secures that that central and vital Catholic Image—the Image of God Incarnate—shall at once be theologically faithful to its Original (and where it is *not* faithful there is no real Christianity), and shall also appeal with far greater sweetness, shall come home with far more intimate persuasiveness, to the heart and affections.

There is a third remark also concerning it, which is by no means to be lightly esteemed. It was F. Faber's opinion—and we heartily concur in it—that Saints' lives stand quite on a ground by themselves, and above every other kind of spiritual reading. There is no other spiritual reading, he thought, which, in the way of supernaturalizing the mind and imbuing it with the full Catholic spirit, can be even compared with those Saints' lives, which are written on what we have more than once called the "hagiological" method. By this term we mean to express a method which, avoiding all secular purpose and literary adornment, commemorates, so far as that can be made possible, *exclusively* (1) the Saint's communion with God; and (2) those external acts of his, which prominently exhibit the results of such communion. Now, the Life of B. Mary Margaret Alacoque refuses (as one may say) to be written in any other method; it *has* no secular or historical aspect. And it is no small benefit resulting from devotion to the Sacred Heart, that so very large a number of Catholics are led to study her life and revelations, her prayers, mortifications and terrible probations, who might otherwise be comparatively strangers to this style of reading. With very many this may be the auspicious beginning of a higher spiritual life.

And the same kind of service which is done by this devotion towards the spiritual advancement of Catholics, is done by it also towards the conversion of externs. As F. Newman pointed out in the passage we quoted at starting, the Image of Christ has been the means of converting those without, no less than of attracting those within: nor (speaking generally) will any other exhibition of Catholic piety be so persuasive as this, with those "*homines bonæ voluntatis*," who as yet have failed to recognize the true mother of their souls.

Whence has it come, that quite of late there has been throughout Europe this fresh and intense outburst of devotion to the Sacred Heart, which we now witness? Perhaps the Holy Ghost has infused it into faithful souls, without using any human means as His occasion and instrument. The Archbishop at least says he "knows not whence it comes.*" But here in England there are two visible events, which have been manifestly used by God for the purpose. The first of these is the ever-memorable Pilgrimage to Paray-le-Monial, on which we published an article in our last number, and of which we may truly say that it has left behind it ineffaceable results. The Catholics of England (thank God!) are peculiarly ready to seize every occasion of joining in heart and

* "I believe that this restoration of the light of the Sacred Heart, come from whence it may, and I know not whence it came, has been ordered to revive with an intense fervour and with a sevenfold ardour our devotion to the Person, the Name, the Passion of our Divine Redeemer" (p. 31).

spirit with their coreligionists of other lands, and of breaking down whatever national barriers may be seen still to remain: and they joyously availed themselves of the opportunity, for uniting themselves heart and soul with the great religious movement of their day. Many were the seeds then sown in secret, which hereafter will germinate into visible and precious fruit.

But there is a second event of a very different kind, which has had its place in pressing on the attention of Englishmen, not the devotion only, but still more its doctrinal basis; viz. the circumstance which is both cause and theme of our present article. It so happened that the Archbishop of Westminster—among whose many great services to the Church not the least has been his persevering encouragement of this devotion—in preaching on the Pilgrimage, had used a phrase which caused some commotion among Anglicans. He had said that “the Sacred Heart of our Lord, being united with the Divinity, is deified, and is therefore an Object of divine worship.” This word “deified” (as we shall presently point out) is a word frequently used, both by the Fathers and by later theologians, to express the Catholic doctrine. At the same time, some might have doubted the expediency of using the word before a mixed audience, because in popular English its sense is different. But the result has shown, that the course actually taken by the Archbishop was the wiser. No one is more uniformly careful than his Grace to speak with fullest forbearance, charity, affection, of those without: but nevertheless he uniformly refuses to hold back any particle, we do not only say of Catholic doctrine, but even (where occasion presents itself) of Catholic terminology. And he has signally promoted the interests of truth, by so acting on the present occasion. For this word “deify” took so violent a hold on the nerves of a certain Dr. Nicholson who happened to be present, that he would not be satisfied without bringing the matter before what is called “the tribunal of public opinion.” And thus it has happened, that the Catholic doctrine and devotion on the Sacred Heart, and also the vital dogmata with which these are so intimately connected, have not only been brought home with greatly increased vividness to the mind of Catholics, but have been pressed on the notice of hundreds of educated Protestants, whose thoughts might never otherwise have been turned to the subject.

Dr. Nicholson began his campaign, by writing to the Archbishop. The latter however referred the matter to one of his secretaries, Rev. Mr. Guiron; and various letters passed between the latter and Dr. Nicholson. Nothing could be better than the doctrine, the tone, and the temper of Mr. Guiron’s letters; and if he failed to understand his opponent’s meaning, this is the less wonderful, because we will confidently affirm that Dr. Nicholson did not understand his own. This gentleman in fact exhibited through-

out an union of puzzle-headedness with self-confidence, which we have nowhere seen approached except in the writings of poor Mr. Ffoulkes ; while to these he added a violent scolding vituperation, quite alien to the spirit of the unhappy gentleman with whom we have just compared him. Pleased with his own performance, Dr. Nicholson sent the whole correspondence when completed to the "Guardian"; which published it in extenso, adding comments of its own. A series of five articles thereupon appeared in the "Tablet"; which have since been collected by their writer, who signs himself "Catholicus," into the pamphlet named by us at the head of our article. These were succeeded by the Archbishop's Sermon, also there named ; which does not of course mention the controversy, but which throughout contains a tacit reference thereto. This Sermon will be pronounced by every one to be among the writer's most vigorous and successful compositions ; while as to the pamphlet of "Catholicus," we may truly say that in all our experience of controversy (which is by no means inconsiderable) we have never met with so absolutely crushing a rejoinder. It is one great benefit to the Church (as we have said) that the theme on which this discussion turns has been brought home so vividly to Catholics, and forced so urgently on the attention of Protestants. And it is a second great benefit, that the writings on both sides are such, both in substance and tone, as violently to prepossess every reader against the Protestant and in favour of the Catholic.

Before going further, we must say a few words on the doctrine concerned : viz. the adoration due to our Blessed Lord's Sacred Humanity in general, and His Sacred Heart in particular. In this we will not for the moment appeal to ecclesiastical and patristic authority : we will but consider the inference legitimately deducible, from that fundamental dogma which all the parties involved profess to accept. All the parties involved profess to hold, that Jesus Christ is God the Son, clothed in human nature, possessed of a human body and soul. The question controverted between them is on the adoration due to that Sacred Humanity and to its constituent parts.

Let us begin by betaking ourselves to the thought of her, who is given to the Church as the pattern and exemplar of piety towards Jesus : we mean of course His Most Holy Mother. Let us unite ourselves with her in spirit, as she kneels before her Infant lying in His cradle, while she knows, with immeasurably greater clearness and fulness than any Christian has since known, the revealed dogma concerning His Person and Nature. She adores Him as God : * this we assume as our foundation, which will be denied by

* To avoid unnecessary repetition, throughout this article, we will use the word "adore" to express the adoration of *latria*.

neither of our antagonists. But what is implied in this? It is implied, we maintain, that she adores the Sacred Humanity *directly*,* as being the Humanity of God the Son. She adores directly God the Son: and she also adores directly the Sacred Humanity; the Sacred Body which she sees before her, and the Sacred Soul which animates that Body. This will be made manifest, if we consider the various alternatives which can be suggested by any one who rejects our statement.

Will it be said e.g. that when she is adoring her Infant Son, she is only adoring God the Son in His Divine Nature? No one will maintain this. On such a supposition she would not be directing her adoration in any sense to the Infant Jesus.

There is but one other way (as far as we see) which can be suggested of holding what our opponents maintain; of holding that she adores indeed Jesus directly, but does *not* adore His Sacred Humanity directly. At one moment I adore God as being Merciful; at another time as being Just; at another time as being Faithful to His promises. In either case I expressly think of one only among His Attributes; I adore Him *in respect of His being* Merciful, or Just, or Faithful to His promises: though of course I implicitly bear in mind, that He is Infinite in all excellences. In like manner—so it may be suggested—when Mary adores the Infant Jesus, she adores God the Son *in respect of His being* clothed in human nature; she *expressly thinks of Him* only in that one particular; and the presence before her of the Sacred Humanity makes that thought indefinitely more vivid. But this suggestion will not bear a moment's investigation. If such were the case, she would be adoring God the Son *in respect of His being* Jesus, but she would *not* be adoring Jesus as God the Son: and neither of our opponents (as we before observed) would venture to concur in such denial. But let us dwell on this suggestion a little more at length. Let us suppose e.g. that she leaves the apartment in which the Infant lies. In that case—according to the hypothesis before us—she would not in any sense be leaving the visible presence of the Object of her adoration,† but would only for the moment be less vividly reminded of His Incarnation. To say this, as we observed just now, is in fact to deny that she adores the Infant Jesus when she is in His visible presence. The Infant whom she adores—God clothed in human nature—is here and not there; in this apartment and not in that: and to leave the apart-

* "Illud substantialiter unitum est Objectum, *directum* quidem, sed *partial*e. &c. &c."—Franzelin de Deo Incarnato, p. 457.

† For on this hypothesis the Object of her adoration has never *been* visibly present.

ment where He lies, is to leave the visible presence of the Object of her adoration.

We are brought then inevitably to the Catholic doctrine, that she adores directly the Body which she sees lying before her, and the Soul which she knows to animate that Body. She adores them however—not for their own sake, as e. g. for the singular gifts with which that Soul is endowed—but absolutely and entirely for a different reason. She adores them, precisely because they are the Body and Soul of God the Son. She addresses her adoration directly to the Sacred Humanity, but she also addresses her adoration directly at the same moment to God the Son.

We now proceed a little further. As she kneels before Him, her rapturous contemplations assume a thousand different shapes. Perhaps at one moment she thinks expressly—not of the Sacred Humanity in general,—but of the Holy Countenance in particular. She gazes, with unspeakable awe and yet unspeakable love, on His Face; and tries to discover therein indications of His Attributes, Whose Face she knows it to be. She adores the Sacred Face however—not at all *for the reason* of it so vividly setting forth the Divine attributes—but precisely and exclusively as being the Face of God the Son. If she adores the Sacred Humanity generally, she may equally adore the Sacred Face in particular. It would be unmeaning and trifling with a serious subject, to attempt any such distinction, between the Sacred Humanity in general and its respective constituent parts.

At another time perhaps her thoughts wander to His Heart. The heart is the recognized symbol of human love; and the Heart of Jesus therefore symbolizes the love felt for mankind by the God-Man. If she thinks of that Heart, of course she adores It. She adores It however—not at all because It is the symbol of Jesus's love—but precisely and exclusively because it is the Heart of God the Son. The reason why she specially *thinks* of the Heart—rather e. g. than the Hands or the Feet—is because the Heart (and not the Hands or the Feet) symbolizes love: but whether she adores Heart, or Hands, or Feet, she adores them for no other reason, than that they are the Heart, the Hands, the Feet of Almighty God. Nay doubtless very often she does specially adore the Hands and the Feet; vividly remembering that these are the very Hands and Feet, which shall be pierced for the redemption of the world.

We have said enough (we hope) to show the character and bearing of that devotion, which our Blessed Lord, in His colloquies with B. Margaret Mary, pressed on the faithful. That they should worship his Sacred Heart in particular, as distinct from other portions of his Sacred Humanity, has been in these last centuries earnestly commended to Catholics; because the thought of His Heart speaks with such singular tenderness to *their* heart,

and comes home to them with such singular vividness and persuasiveness. But it is involved in the Church's teaching from the first, that if the Sacred Heart be singled out for worship *at all*, it must be worshipped with the adoration of latria.

Such then as we have now set forth is the doctrine, which has been scientifically expressed and defined by Popes, Councils, theologians: in earlier times as regards the Sacred Humanity in general, in later times as regards the Sacred Heart in particular. On the former subject we would refer to "Catholicus's" third chapter, as containing a perfect storehouse of patristic and scholastic dicta on the matter. Two samples here may suffice, considering how readily accessible is the pamphlet itself. S. Athanasius shall come first: "Neither do we adore His Body" says that Father "*divided and apart* from the Word": implying of course, that the Catholics of his time did adore It, as being what he had just called "the Body of God" (p. 31). In like manner S. Thomas lays down expressly, that "the Humanity of Christ is to be adored with latria" (p. 35). On those *later* definitions which concern the Sacred Heart, we need say nothing; because every Anglican will readily admit, that they express the doctrine above set forth. See especially Pius VI.'s "Auctorem Fidei," propos. 61, 62, 63.

The particular controversy however with which we are directly engaged, necessitates our laying stress on one particular theological expression. The term "deification" has been used from the first to express that august fact, "the assumption of manhood into God"; "the making of humanity to be God's Humanity." (Catholicus, pp. 39, 40.) The whole of "Catholicus's" fourth chapter is occupied with collecting a few pregnant examples of this constant usage. And as he presents of course but a small specimen of those which might have been given, so we in turn can present but a small part of those which he gives. The Sixth Ecumenical Council declares (p. 47) that "His most holy spotless animate Flesh was not destroyed, by being *deified*"; and that so also "His Human Will, being *deified*, was not destroyed." S. Gregory of Nyssa: "that which *deifies* and that which is *deified* is one God" (p. 41). S. John Damascene commemorates "the deification of the Humanity" (ib.). S. Athanasius: "He *deified* that which He put on" (p. 42). S. Thomas: "the Human Nature is not called essentially God, but *deified*" (p. 44). Without recounting then the many other quotations which "Catholicus" has accumulated, we may confidently say that no safer theological proposition was ever put forth than the Archbishop's. Well might he affirm that "the Sacred Heart of our Lord, being united with the Divinity, is deified, and is therefore an Object of divine worship."

Having now sufficiently laid our theological foundation, we are in a position to deal with the two remarkable critics whom we have to criticise. Before proceeding however to this necessary work, we will advert to an opinion which has been expressed in the "Spectator" by a writer, who is ever to be mentioned by children of the Church with respect and consideration, because of his earnest desire to deal fairly with her cause. He thinks that, whatever plausible theological defence may be theoretically laid down, unlettered Catholics constantly content themselves with adoring the Sacred Heart, while failing to remember whose Heart it is. This is one of the instances, by no means unfrequent, in which this excellent writer stumbles, from want of practical acquaintance with Catholic habits; for there is not the most superficial appearance of such a phenomenon as he supposes. But in real truth, if he would but consider, he would see that his charge is a direct contradiction in terms; unless indeed he ascribes to illiterate Catholics (as we are sure he will not) the notion, that an organ of the human body is the Supreme God. How is it so much as metaphysically possible that they can pay divine worship to an organ of the human body, unless either they believe that that organ is the Deity, or else expressly think of it as hypostatically united with God?

We now proceed to the writer in the "Guardian" and to Dr. Nicholson. These two assailants by no means take up the same ground; far otherwise. The "Guardian" indeed at first acquiesced in that preposterous interpretation of the Archbishop's word "deified," which Dr. Nicholson originated; but in its very next article on the subject it frankly admitted, that that particular question was merely one of "language." In other respects the position of those two Anglicans is mutually contradictory. The "Guardian" avowedly attacked the doctrine inculcated on all Roman Catholics concerning the Sacred Heart; and dealt with the Archbishop's Sermon, as with the genuine indubitable utterance of that doctrine. But it was Dr. Nicholson's direct purpose to allege, that the Archbishop is in flagrant opposition to the theology of his own Church. We will consider separately then the two Anglican combatants.

The "Guardian" writer opposes the adoration of the Sacred Heart, on the ground that Christians are not at liberty to "place the Human Nature of our Lord before their minds" for the purpose of adoration, as "distinct in idea from His Deity"; even though only accounting it "adorable on account of its connection with Him."* The writer, it will be seen, does not even allege,

* We have mislaid our copy of the "Guardian" of September 17th, and on applying for another have found that it is out of print. The following however are the words with which the subject is closed on October 1st.

"This subject is one which, though it may be originated, can scarcely be pur-

that Catholics adore the Sacred Humanity (or again the Sacred Heart) without at the same moment thinking of its union with God the Son as the very motive of their adoration. Indeed, as we said just now in answering the "Spectator," such an allegation would be nothing less than a contradiction in terms, unless he *further* alleged (which on the contrary he disavows) that Roman Catholics actually believe the Sacred Humanity or the Sacred Heart to be the Supreme God. But he says that Christians may not lawfully adore the Sacred Humanity, as distinct *in idea* from the Deity. Why, if we took his words as they stand, we should be obliged to bring against him the very charge of which he acquits Roman Catholics; we should be obliged to charge him with utter ignorance of God. What kind of Deity can it be which he worships, from which he is unable to separate *even in idea* a certain human body and soul? Of course we know that such words are no true expression of his thoughts. But they do show an otherwise incredible confusion of mind on the whole subject; they do show at once a dense ignorance, and a profound unconsciousness of that ignorance, as to what is *meant* by those who speak of adoring Jesus as God. Verily—as "Catholicus" observes (p. 9), "the subject of the Sacred Heart seems to have been providentially

sued in a newspaper. However, we feel it due to the authority of our correspondent, signing himself 'A Roman Catholic,' to insert his letter. We also think it fair to print a letter addressed by the Archbishop to the *Spectator*, and printed by that paper—as well as a letter addressed by Dr. Nicholson to the *Tablet*, and not printed. They seem to us to leave matters much where they were. The question respecting the word 'deify' has become one of language. The real question at issue we apprehend to be this:—

"A Catholic Council followed by Catholic Doctors pronounces an anathema on those who, instead of adoring one Being at once Human and Divine, give a separate adoration to the Man or Human Nature, and a separate adoration to the Deity or Divine Nature. Nothing is said to except from this anathema a separate adoration of the human nature on account of its connection with the Divine; nothing to suggest a distinction between adoration *in se* and adoration *propter se*. In letter, the condemnation is unqualified.

"This being the Catholic announcement, the question is whether it does not condemn those who place before their minds as an object of Divine worship, distinct in idea from the Deity, though of course only adorable on account of its connection with Him, either the Human Nature of our Lord, or, still more, and far more, a particular organ of his Human body.

"The Council appears to say that the Human Nature of our Lord, though beyond doubt indissolubly united with the Divine—is *not* on that or any other account a proper object of separate Divine worship.

"Archbishop Manning and our Correspondent plainly say that the Heart of our Lord, being indissolubly connected with the Divine nature, *is* on that account a proper object of such Divine worship as Roman Catholics are encouraged to offer it.

"Whether these two positions are not inconsistent appears to us to be the principal question which arises out of this correspondence, and which we now hand over to theologians."

used at this time, that 'the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.'" Here is a writer, fancying himself to believe the Incarnation, stimulated to vehement protest by that adoration of the Sacred Heart which Catholics practise: and behold, when he comes to explain himself, no other intelligible sense can be given his words, except either (1) that the Deity is not separable in idea from a certain human body and soul; or else (2) that Jesus Christ may not be worshipped as God.

It is natural enough, that one thus bewildered should seek some plausible ground for assailing the doctrine which he dislikes: and the writer before us has caught from Dr. Nicholson the happy notion, that such ground can be discovered in a canon of an Ecumenical Council. The canon to which he refers (the ninth of the Fifth Council) runs as follows in the Latin text:—

"Si quis adorari in duabus naturis dicit Christum, ex quo duæ adorationes introducuntur semotim Deo Verbo et semotim Homini; aut si quis ad peremptum carnis aut in confusionem Deitatis et Humanitatis unam naturam sive essentiam convenientium portentose dicens sic adorat Christum; sed non unâ adoratione Deum Verbum Incarnatum cum Ejus Carne adorat, juxta quod Sanctæ Dei Ecclesiæ ab initio traditum est; talis anathema sit."

Here, says the "Guardian," those are expressly anathematized, who do what Catholics do; viz. "worship Christ in two Natures." We do not remember anywhere to have seen a more reckless interpretation. If the writer had taken the pains to read the last clause (as well as the first) of this canon, he would have seen that Catholics are therein exhorted to "worship with one adoration God the Incarnate Word together with His Flesh"; or in other words to adore Christ in His two Natures. Now it is not very probable, the writer will admit, that one and the same canon of an Ecumenical Council shall *end* by *inculcating* that practice, which it has *begun* by *anathematizing*: and it is not very unreasonable surely to express our regret, that the writer should not have taken the pains of studying the canon as a whole. Had he done so, he would have found that it may be divided into three clauses. The last of these clauses sets forth the Catholic doctrine, "as it has been delivered to the Catholic Church from the beginning"; the second clause condemns the Eutychian perversion of that doctrine; and the first clause condemns the Nestorian perversion thereof. Now, what is the Nestorian tenet? When Nestorians say that Christ is rightly worshipped in His two Natures, they mean in His two Natures *severally*; in His Divine Nature as Divine, and in His Human Nature as Human. And that this tenet is precisely the one here condemned, is manifest, not only (as we have just shown) by the very necessity of the case, but even demonstratively by the words

which next follow. "From which" mode of speech, proceeds the canon, "two worships are brought in": addressed "separately to God the Word, and separately to the Man." Such a conclusion indubitably follows from the Nestorian tenet, that Christ is rightly adored in His two Natures severally; but it has not the faintest appearance of following from the Catholic dogma, that His Human Nature is rightly adored with latria because of its union with the Divine.

We proceed to Dr. Nicholson; though as regards him, there is very little that can be added to "Catholicus's" castigation. For ourselves, we could not attach any meaning whatever to by far the largest portion of his utterances. We saw plainly enough that, with almost incredible absurdity, he ascribed to the Archbishop the doctrine, that our Blessed Lord's Heart possesses the attributes of Infinity, Eternity, Omnipresence: an absurdity indeed in which the "Guardian" at first supported him. "It may seem wonderful" indeed, well says "Catholicus" (Preface, p. ii.), "that Dr. Nicholson should have thought this proposition to be a possible error in a human mind, even of a Romanist." Even as to the word "deify," taken by itself—it is most intelligible indeed that an unlearned person might misunderstand it: but Dr. Nicholson wrote as one well acquainted with councils and theologians, as one to whom the loftiest summits of theology are familiar; and it is most discreditable to him therefore, that he should be in complacent and self-satisfied ignorance of a phrase, which has been so commonly used in every age of the Church. At the same time, as regards this particular assault on the Archbishop, we were at all events able to understand Dr. Nicholson's meaning. We also understood that he was citing against the Archbishop that canon of the Fifth Council, of which we have been speaking in detail; and we understood thirdly that he was writing in a tone of bitter invective, varnished over by affected commiseration and condescension. But as for all the rest—not only we could not understand what doctrine it was which *he himself* maintained—we could not even understand what doctrine he *charged the Archbishop* with maintaining. On the former of these particulars, "Catholicus" seems as much in the dark as ourselves; but on the latter he has managed, by a perseverance which we cannot sufficiently admire, to make out what the Archbishop is accused of.

So far as his letters are comprehensible, the charge ranges over the following heads:

1. That the Archbishop had declared the Sacred Humanity to be deified; *i. e.* changed into God; or made "God."
2. That he had separated it from the Divinity and set it up as a deified object of separate worship: a "quasi God," as Dr. Nicholson calls it.
3. That he had thereby taught at one and the same time two heresies,

namely, Nestorianism, which makes two Persons in Christ, and that thereby he fell under the anathema of the Fifth General Council, and Eutychianism, which taught that the human nature was so absorbed into the Divine, that there were no longer *two* natures but *one* only in Christ. (Preface, pp. i. ii.)

"Catholicus's" general summing up of Dr. Nicholson's controversial demeanour precisely tallies with the impression which we ourselves received on first reading his letters.

In reading these utterances of lofty wisdom and compassionate authority, we have been at times inclined to believe that the whole of the correspondence was an elaborate hoax. Its pompous absurdity and exquisite nonsense reminded us of Swift's prophecy and condolence with Mr. Isaac Bickerstaff, on the mournful event of his own death. But one thing in it seemed to us to be real : namely, the intense desire to wither up the Archbishop with scornful commiseration, and patronize him with condescending enlightenment (pp. 78-9).

Certainly this exquisitely puzzle-headed and pretentious gentleman may fairly be included among those opponents of devotion to the Sacred Heart, whom F. Franzelin (quoted by the Archbishop) designates as "*furiosè stupidos*."

After all this we are naturally led to inquire, how far Anglicans in general are compromised by such exhibitions of theological unsoundness as we have been considering. "Catholicus" has some remarks on this head.

We have been hitherto altogether unconscious, and could not have believed, that so much formal Nestorianism and Semi-Arianism could lie hid in the Anglican Church. And when we remember that the "Guardian" is, by privilege, the paper of the Anglican clergy, and to be found in a large number of their homes, we feel a profound disappointment. We had hoped better things. We have no pleasure in the errors even of our antagonists. Hitherto we have believed that in the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation at least, the Anglican clergy were faithful and well instructed. We are much shaken in this hope by these revelations (p. 9).

The Archbishop speaks, not inconsistently with this, but perhaps in a somewhat more hopeful spirit :

A century ago a number of clergymen, who were at heart Unitarians, tried hard to get rid of the Athanasian Creed. In these days this effort has been renewed. Those who have authority have resisted the attempt, and I thank God for it. It is one more barrier in the way of the descent of religion—it is one more bond to hold the Christianity of England from hastening down the rapids which have wrecked the faith of Germany and Switzerland. I speak, therefore, of the Establishee Church of England so far with hope, and I bear a true affection to multitudes of those who are in it. I believe them to be in good faith. If they knew the light of the truth, they would give their lives for it. They would not for the world speak a

syllable to derogate from the glory of the Incarnation. Therefore let nothing I am about to say be understood as reflecting on those whom I honour and love, though they be in error and in separation from the Catholic Church (p. 7).

For ourselves—as we have often enough expressed in preceding numbers—we have never shared what we must regard as the past illusion of “Catholicus”; we have never seen any reason for “hoping better things,” than have been manifested by this controversy. It would have always greatly surprised us to find that so much as one out of five hundred—even among those Anglicans who are most zealous for retaining the Athanasian Creed—have any apprehension whatever of the dogmata of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation,—we will not say as set forth by Suarez or Lugo or Franzelin,—but as expressed in ordinary text-books like Jungmann’s or Ex-Charmes’. And the circumstances of the controversy before us must have brought round to our way of thinking many Catholics, who had previously been more hopeful than ourselves.

Yet these very Anglicans may be zealous for the doctrine of the Incarnation, according to their own conception of it; nay it may be even true, as the Archbishop thinks, that “they would not for the world speak a syllable to derogate from its glory.” At all events we do not ourselves hold, that belief in the Trinity and Incarnation are necessary to salvation “*necessitate medii*.” And our own bias is to hope heartily, with the Archbishop, that “multitudes” both of Anglicans and other Protestants are invincibly ignorant of those verities which they do not know, and that, through their faith in “*Deus Unus et Remunerator*,” they are on their road to heaven.

At the same time the spirit of hostility to Catholicity which the High Church Anglicans have shown on this occasion, is much greater than we should have expected. Considering all the solemn admonitions they have been good enough to address to Catholics on the idolatrous tendency of their worship of the most Holy Virgin,—we should have expected some little recognition of the fact, that the devotion we have defended is at all events cherished by Catholics as a means of expressing intense gratitude for their Redeemer’s love. But the “*Guardian*” at least—and there is no more representative paper—has in no degree been softened by the thoughts. The facts of this case bear thinking of again and again. Those who criticise so severely the Church’s Marian devotions as interfering with the primitive loyalty to Jesus,—are found traitors against that very dogma, concerning the adoration due to Jesus, which was elaborated by the Councils and theologians of primitive times.

We should also have thought that some sympathy towards Catholics might have been elicited, by the circumstance of both parties having now to contend against the prevalent irreligion of

our time. Even Lord Shaftesbury on a recent occasion "confessed that" in the matter of denominational education "he sympathized even with the Roman Catholics. Although widely differing from them in religious conviction, he could not but admire the men who declared that their children should not be sent to schools where their great dogmas and doctrines were never heard, and where the Church to which they belonged was looked upon as corrupt and hateful." It is reported too that "cheers" from his friends were elicited by this declaration.* We do not in general meet with such sympathy, even from the more advanced Anglicans. Observe e. g. the bitter and violent language of the recent "Church Defence tracts," which came out with the expressed sanction of Canon Liddon. Dr. Pusey indeed—we are desirous of bearing testimony to the fact—has in his latest writings entirely abandoned his habit of anti-Roman declamation; but even Dr. Pusey on this occasion seems to have failed in a plain duty. He must have known perfectly well that, as a mere matter of primitive Catholic doctrine, the Archbishop was in the right, and his assailants ludicrously in the wrong. We cannot understand why he did not publicly protest in favour of primitive orthodoxy; and indeed even the more, because its assailants were High-Church Anglicans and its defender a Catholic Archbishop. However opposition is at times the greatest service which can be rendered. And we do not see how two such thinkers as the "Guardian" writer and Dr. Nicholson, could in any other way have effected nearly so much towards promoting the great Catholic devotion of modern times, as they have done by writing from their own peculiar stand-point with a view to its disparagement.

* At a meeting in the St. James's Hall, reported by the "Guardian" of Nov. 12th.

ART. VI.—THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF WOMEN.

1. *The Religious Education of Women.* By RICHARD F. LITLEDALE, LL.D., D.C.L. London : Henry S. King & Co.
2. *Manuel de la Mère Chrétienne.* Par le R. P. THÉODORE RATISBONNE, Supérieur de la Congrégation de N. D. de Sion, Directeur de l'Archiconfrérie des Mères Chrétiennes. Paris. 1859.
3. *Promenades autour de mon Jardin : Conférences aux Dames du Monde.* Par Mgr. LANDRIOT, Archevêque de Reims. Deuxième éd. Paris. 1868.
4. *Madame Swetchine, sa Vie et ses Œuvres,* publiées par le Cte DE FALLOUX, de l'Académie Française. 8me éd. 2 t. Paris. 1867.

GO with your age, and it will support you ; fall behind your age, and it will drag you ; oppose your age, and it will crush you. This maxim is attributed to one, who, had he died but a few years before his imagined star had set for ever in a cloud of tears and blood, might have been deemed the most fortunate and far-seeing statesman of his age—to Napoleon III. That he stated his formula in the terms of that false philosophy which sets the ever-changing voice of opinion in the place of faith, does not destroy the truth which it disguises. There is a sense in which our age supports us, drags us, or crushes us, according as we perceive or not, the lesson it teaches or the duties which it involves. Nations, like individuals, nay, yet larger collective parts of the human race, civilized or uncivilized man, have different needs at different periods of their development, and it is in recognizing the moments when these needs announce themselves, and in satisfying them, that both theorist and ruler show the mighty differences on which the happiness or misery of whole generations are ordained to turn. Little observation is required to discern the fact that such a demand in the present day is public education, and education in each of its many aspects—the education of the poor, middle-class education, university education, that completely new field of education created by the competitive system ; and the difficulties arising out of each of them are doubled, or soon will be, by their complication with the whole question of female education. It is to the latter, and principally with reference to its religious aspect, that we propose to devote the present paper, taking for comment, in the first instance, an article of Dr. Littledale's on this subject, which has been reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*.

Dr. Littledale complains that in works on the "Woman's

Rights Question," especially as treating of mental training, the religious side of that question scarcely enters at all. A minority of such cases of omission he refers to the notion that religion is too vague a thing to be of much importance in the conduct of life; but the majority of them he ascribes to satisfaction with the existing view, which he states, as he says "tersely," but to our thinking rather flabbily, as follows:—

That view tersely stated, is that religion (and for my present purposes it does not matter to the argument what its special form, from Christianity to Theism or Pantheism, may be) is designed to supply a safety-valve for the emotional and affective side of women, to deepen their natural tendency to patient self-sacrifice, to encourage in them a passive receptivity, and above all to make them so domestic in habits and wishes as to limit their entire horizon by the boundaries of home, and make them glad and proud to be the dependants and humble assistants of men. With a little intensifying of phrases here and there, and the addition of a few technicalities, this definition will do not merely for the schemes of life as propounded for women living as members of secular families, but also for those who have found their ties in the Common Life of religious organizations (p. 5).

The logical reader will admire this "definition" which will "do" so admirably for the conception which Dr. Littledale places before him. We should like to have seen it in its more perfectly developed state, with the phrases intensified, and a few technicalities added. However, we must take what we can get. He finds religion, as taught to females, based on the principle of deepening their affections and rendering them more subservient to men. Now, to say boldly that such is the object of the religious training of women in convents, or, as he calls it, "the Common Life of religious organizations," is extraordinary. Religious women are wholly withdrawn from the common life, in which marriage is an object, and domestic happiness the reward of a disposition only disparagingly named feminine docility.

If, as writers like Dr. Littledale would contend, the minds of religious women are trained to intellectual obedience, it is on a principle which none but very unfair or inconsequential reasoners could ever identify with that of the deference due from the weaker sex to the stronger. The coolness with which he reiterates this assertion deserves to be still more strongly brought out. He tells us, very truly:—

If religion is to come in as an adjunct to music and dancing, in order to tempt men into an investment because the article can be warranted docile and domesticated as well as accomplished, one hardly sees why it should be valued higher than such pursuits (p. 6).

Certainly not, but then the hypothesis is merely a puppet of Dr. Littledale's own imagination. In the true spirit of a sophist

he goes on, without offering any proof, to "claim" (as the Americans would say), that "this is the sentiment which meets us, more or less frankly, in most of the so-called religious works which undertake to consider this problem," including in this majority "English non-conformists like Mr. Landels, foreign Protestants like M. Monod and Count Agénor de Gasparin, the authors of most of the modern books of spiritual reading designed for the inmates of Roman Catholic convents, and the whole army of sage and kindly writers who produce the Anglican religious novelette of the day." He excepts Mgr. Dupanloup from this charge, on the strength of his essay "*Femmes savantes et Femmes studieuses*," and admits also that the late F. Faber, in his "*Growth of Holiness*," delivers some wholesome truths on this tendency of many pious women to desire over-direction. Such authorities can only be on Dr. Littledale's side on such a question to the exact extent in which they are misunderstood. He refers the supposed passive type of female education to an assumption of the inherent inferiority of women's souls to those of men's—an assumption which is the direct contrary to what Catholic doctrine has always proclaimed; the elevation of the female sex to an equality with men in moral dignity, having been one of the greatest historical glories which attach to the Church.

It then suggests itself to Dr. Littledale, that, after all, the French clergy preach the passive virtues of obedience and self-abnegation quite as forcibly to men as to women, and practise the same virtues themselves, so that they cannot be guilty of making the invidious distinction against which he is fighting. If that is the case, he has got into a muddle, for it seems that if all alike, including the teachers themselves, are urged to cultivate their passive virtues, then the religious education of women can have nothing peculiar or special in it. However, after admitting that the French clergy are consistent, he, as it were, mentally shakes himself, and proceeds *de novo*, as follows:—

The objection to all such teaching lies far deeper, and is based on primary philosophical and theological verities.

This theme promises some deep thinking, but we cannot say that the promise is realized. He goes on to tell us:

I mean that the aim of the repressive, or at best merely emotional, scheme of religion is as far as possible to neutralize the operation of free-will, and to dethrone human personality, making men all but unconscious of it. Now the mischief of this, apart from any direct moral enfeeblement, is that it tends to abolish the only sure barrier against either a materialistic or Pantheistic conception of the universe (p. 8).

This passage swarms with sophisms. In the first place, the word "repressive" already assumes that the Catholic religion

(which is included in his censure) is repressive in the bad sense of the word. No doubt, it is repressive of evil passions, repressive, not of *free-will*, but of *self-will*, repressive of that impatience of law which the human mind is ever tending to display and which, if indulged without limit, would degrade it into the state of childishness and barbarism. Correcting himself, he says, "at best merely emotional." So far from that, it is even made a reproach against Catholicism by its enemies, that it is too hard, too geometrical, relies too much upon mere logic, apart from feeling and sentiment, which ought also to influence the proceedings of a composite being like man. Consult all spiritual writers of our religion, and you will find that they particularly guard their readers against judging of their moral state by feeling, by either dryness or exaltation, but exhort them to hold fast to those practices which they are taught by the faith, which are only apprehended by a rightly informed reason, and a will acting in accordance with it. So far from "neutralizing the operation of free-will," it is exactly what true religion intensifies, because that homage of the will which it demands is the highest exercise of freedom, and were it for a moment to become mechanical, it would at once have all its value taken from it. That men are made all but unconscious of their personality, is putting the same charge in a different form, though the words, in one sense, would be a very high praise of what the Catholic faith does for the human mind. Moralists of all schools, from Marcus Aurelius down to Carlyle, would agree that the perfection and bloom of virtuous action is unconsciousness of self. If we could act, forgetting ourselves completely, putting forth deed after deed by the energy of fully-formed habit, needing not to anticipate what we shall say or do, thinking no more of ourselves when duty is achieved, than the grape-laden vine in autumn thinks of its purple clusters, then, and then only, should we be doing things of which the lives of the saints give us example. Instead of "direct moral enfeeblement," such a state exhibits the very highest moral health and strength. The contrary to it is mental poverty and weakness; the incessant introduction of our own personality spoiling actions of all their grace. *Le moi est haïssable*, is a remark of Pascal's, with which the common sense of mankind will agree. The forgetfulness of personality only returns the same to us with added lustre.

If, then, true religion by no means cancels personality, it cannot abolish any barrier afforded by it against either a materialistic or Pantheistic conception of the universe. Before, however, further examining our author's reasoning on this head, we must express our wonder that the obvious relations of the Catholic Church to modes of thought expressed by these words did not check him in such rash and idle conclusions. If Catholic doctrine tended to

abolish this barrier, of course Catholic theologians would, more or less, incline towards either a materialistic or Pantheistic conception of the universe. They most certainly do not so incline, but are the chief opposers of both when their united streams threaten to submerge European thought with a deluge. It is sufficient to state this fact, which the most superficial glance at Catholic theology and metaphysics would establish; we will, however, look into Dr. Littledale's argument, which he advances with considerable parade.

For my own personality is the only fact which I certainly know. Everything else is matter of appearance and inference. I am practically obliged, no doubt, to act on the hypothesis of the real existence of the visible creation, comprising all the objects of sense :—but considering that they are just as vividly present to my sight, hearing, smelling, taste, and touch, when I am asleep and dreaming as when I am awake, it follows that I have no warrant for asserting, without possibility of contradiction, that they are truly present to my waking faculties, and no mere phantasms. What I can be sure of is that the something which takes cognizance of all the objects of sense is myself, and nothing else. Hence I can establish the insufficiency of the sense-philosophy to account for the phenomena of mind, and I can further argue for the personality of the Power which gave being to my own personality (p. 9).

He proceeds to argue that as ten million generations of blind men could never have invented a telescope, nor ten million generations of deaf men, a violin [an ear-trumpet would have better corresponded to the telescope], so “no conceivable impersonal force immanent in nature could have produced the countless myriads of separate personalities which make up the aggregate of humanity. It is simply unthinkable.” Dr. Littledale's argument does not establish the difference he contends for. The waking faculties add to the impressions they have in common with the same faculties in dreaming, the consciousness of being awake, and the consequent certainty of reality. That we cannot explain the difference between the two states (for a difference there does appear in kind as well as degree) is no proof that a difference does not exist, which every waking man in his senses distinctly feels. Otherwise it is in vain to discuss the external world, of which lunatics and dreamers may be better cognizant than we. The fact of perception, it is true, does not prove an external world, but it proves the reality of our perceiving, which is as certain as our personality. Then, as to the impossibility of an impersonal force producing a personality, we are not at all prepared to say that it is “unthinkable,” for in point of fact, it has been thought of, wherever a process of development from the less perfect to the more perfect has been substituted for the idea of creation. It is as easy to conceive personality

emerging from the impersonal as life from the lifeless, as being from not-being, as order out of chaos. But, be this as it may, the author's next argument is as illogical and confused as any other part of his essay: he tells us:—

Now though the stages between a practical effort to suppress the individuality of one man, on the plea of spiritual advance, and the denial of a Personal God, are almost indefinitely numerous, yet they follow in an inexorable sequence, and work out into a theory of religion not intellectually discernible from the higher Buddhism of the East and the neo-Spinozism of the West (p. 10).

Reasoning is always to be suspected when it falls back into "the indefinitely numerous." If there are so many links, it would have been desirable to have pointed out some of them. And this would have been all the easier if the sequence is so inexorable. It would be more like truth to say that the denial of a Personal God leads to the suppression of individuality, with or without the plea of spiritual advance, than to say that the suppression of individuality leads to the denial of a Personal God. If it were true that we are but "parts of one stupendous whole," the more the mind can pass out of itself and plunge into the boundless expanse of Nature, the more it can become "a portion of the tempest" or of the calm, forgetting self, and imitating a child who has not yet learned to distinguish his own being from that of those who surround him, the more would the mind be acting, or rather be in process of being acted on, in harmony with Nature. That would be the "Nirwana" of the Buddhist, if turned in a religious direction; the poetic exaltation of a Shelley or a Byron, if it took the form of poetic imagination. But that habit of mind is not taught by the Catholic system, nor by any other religious systems calling themselves Christian, in whatever degree they still retain portions of Catholic truth. When S. Paul said, "With Christ I am nailed to the cross. And I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 19, 20), did he lose his individuality or personality? Did he cease to believe, or tend to cease believing, in a Personal God? Not one whit, but retained his individuality, or rather regained it, by the very act of giving it up, in a form infinitely more intense than that in which those have it who think only of themselves. When the abnegation of self-will is expressed by the Ignatian image of a man's regarding himself but as a stick wielded by a superior, is individuality then abolished? Not at all; for this reason, that the only value of such obedience would consist in the fact that it is rendered by the will of the subject, which perpetually operates every moment of self-surrender. This obedience is not the obedience of the slave, who, instead of remaining a person is degraded into a thing, so far as human nature can be so degraded, but it is the spontaneous devotion of the reason exhibited to the

will of God, no mere impersonal abstraction, but reigning in the heavens, such will being interpreted to the subject by the superior whom God has set over him.

On the other hand, the assertion of individuality in the Protestant sense does tend towards losing it in reality. Whoever, refusing to obey those set over him by God, acts by self-will, is mastered by his passions, and is in the way of being blindly urged by them hither and thither, as material things and the lower creation are swayed by the forces of nature. And such action does lead towards the denial of a Personal God, because we are always apt to deny the right of an authority of which we become impatient. We first disobey, then ignore, then formally abolish it in our own minds. Dr. Littledale's whole essay, then, being founded on an assumption he fails to prove, and the exact contrary to which is the fact, it may appear that there is little use in further examining his argument. However, as he advances many other hasty or erroneous notions in the rest of his pamphlet, we shall proceed with our criticism. He tells us that "the repressive system of education," of which he draws a picture in so false a light, brings about its own frustration "in the generation of a selfishness wider, deeper, more penetrating and absorbing than anything else can produce." These are, indeed, very strong words—*than anything else*. Unlimited self-indulgence, for instance, debasing the whole moral character; the education of an Oriental prince by the vilest of mankind will be included in *anything else*, which must cover all the agencies capable of producing what Dr. Littledale calls "selfism," and opposes to "*altruism*." By way of instance,—that is, proof of this statement—he produces "detachment," as he represents it to be taught in convents, checking personal preference between any two members of the same community, and a liking for any "little personal belonging, a picture, a crucifix, even a memory" (meaning, perhaps, a souvenir). The result, according to Dr. Littledale (who must have had such great opportunities of judging), is that everything is taken away but the fact of personality, which is irremovable (although all along he seemed to contend that it could be nearly stifled), and that then the patient "is detached from everything else, to *concentrate his entire thought and affection on himself*, and the securing the salvation of his own single soul"; and he contrasts the question of the gaoler at Philippi, "Sirs, what must *I* do to be saved?" with S. Paul's saying, many years later, "I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh." We never understood that the gaoler's question was a wrong one, or otherwise than an example to all in the like circumstances, or that S. Paul's was intended as anything but a hyperbolical expression of fervent charity. The concentra-

tion of a religious person's entire thought and affection on himself is exactly what the whole drift and meaning of the religious life condemns in its very alphabet; and whoever knows anything about those institutions is aware that religious persons apply prayers and penances far more for those without than for themselves, and that requests are incessantly sent to convents by relatives of the inmates to obtain prayers for "intentions," as Catholics call them, that is, for purposes such seculars may have at heart, subject to the will of God, but in which the religious can take little or no interest in themselves. They are faithfully prayed for, and this charitable office is carried on to an extent that probably Dr. Littledale has never for one moment had the opportunity of placing before his mind, or he would not talk so idly on the subject. "Convents are our praying machines," was a *mot* of the late Mr. Henry Wilberforce's which had much truth in it. There is, indeed, an exalted spiritual selfishness, if Dr. Littledale likes to call it so, which is inculcated in the whole teaching of our Blessed Lord and of all the saints that ever lived—the selfishness of the merchant who sold all he had to buy the one precious pearl. Of this selfishness certainly none can have too much; but whoever has it most will be least likely to forget the claims of others upon his charity; and if all had it in its completeness, the world would be full of saints. All, indeed, are not called to heroic detachment, but still there are those to whom the call is given, "Go and sell *all* thou hast." We should like to hear how Dr. Littledale reconciles that call with his view of "selfism."

The author gives the instance of conventual detachment in "an extreme example of repression," but proceeds to remark that the view which would merge the individuality of women in that of men, as enunciated in the line of Milton,

He for God only, she for God in him,

is "of the same kind, and quite as immoral." We have already pointed out the absurdity of the parallel thus indicated; indeed, Dr. Littledale here omits to show, as he ought to have done if he were a close reasoner, that if the one ends in selfishness, whilst people attempt above all things to avoid it, so will the other. He has some argument about religion not admitting "any such intermediate standard of right and wrong, any such vicegerent of Deity," and contends that woman, as well as man, being made in God's image, it is conformity to that image, and not to the defaced impression of it on man's battered soul, that should be her ideal. Now do any religions teach that women are to copy the image of God reflected in man? So presented to them, their ideal would be a masculine one; and all that Dr. Littledale says about female education, as generally understood, would be full of inconsistencies. That women should look up to their husbands does not

imply that they are to obtain from them a model for their totally different duties in life. On the other hand, that they are to look up to them is set forth in the whole revealed doctrine as to the position of women in the world, from Moses down to S. Paul, and there is no escaping from it, unless you reject revelation. How the rule is to be understood and applied is another question. A system of which some of the greatest ideals are of the female sex, certainly does not treat it as an inferior type, possessing only a borrowed lustre. The Christian husband would not address his wife in the haughty tone Corneille has given to the heathen Horatius :—

Si l'absolu pouvoir d'une pudique flamme
Ne nous laisse à tous deux qu'un penser et qu'une ame,
C'est à toi d'élever tes sentimens aux miens,
Non à moi de descendre à la honte des tiens.

* * * * *

Sois plus femme que sœur, et te réglant sur moi,
Fais-toi de mon exemple une immuable loi.

CORNEILLE, *Horace*, act iv. sc. vii.

It has happened in the monastic system that joint communities of monks and nuns have been placed under the general control of an abbess; and the social order that admits of the sovereign being a female cannot necessarily imply that there should arise any enslavement of women. The case of the marital relation applies only to each married pair severally, not to the general relations of the male and female sex. As marriage implies the family, and the family necessitates government, and government command,—it is clear one or other must rule. Now, though the Christian system, agreeing in this respect with almost all social arrangements, does give authority to the male, this by no means brings with it to the female the consequence of moral inferiority any more than any other relation—that of officers and soldiers, for instance—involves a lower moral dignity in the commanded, as compared with the commanding side. Where obedience is a duty, it is no less noble than the command to which it is rendered, nor does it ever introduce the subjugation of the conscience, which faculty indeed alone authorizes obedience. Would the Catholic Church listen for a moment to the excuse of a wife's not accepting the faith, because her husband took a different view of her obligations?

Dr. Littledale, continuing to argue against this view of religion he sets up in order to demolish, comments on the prevalent notion that women are more pious than men. He tries to account for this notion by the fact that "in a complex life, such as Christianity, the affections count for more than the intellect," and women are more affectionate than men, and, consequently, find greater

scope in religion than men do. In the very next sentence he finds the common-place erroneous, because dependent on the idea that this "emotionalism" is the highest expression of religion; whereas he says, "The practical scope of Christianity is much wider, being no other than the making men and women Godlike." He had just assumed that in the complex life of Christianity the affections count for more than the intellect. Then, of course, they count for more in its practical scope; so his detection of the error in the commonplace involves him in absurdity. It is worth noticing that he goes on to say that "Our aim in training Christian women must be not merely that they should be pure, gentle, and affectionate . . . but that they should be strong, true, liberal, wise, and just—no mere foolish virgins with amiable intentions and expiring lamps." We always thought the foolish virgins represented sloth, with or without amiability; and certainly that discipline of the will, into which the affections so largely enter, and of which the Catholic spiritual system makes so cardinal a point, will not be satisfied without moral strength, truth, and justice. We have no objections to make to his assertion that it is possible to stimulate the emotional side of our nature while leaving the other uncultivated, and that "a great deal of popular religionism has no ethical nor tonic value whatever." Only even here we cannot help remarking how wonderfully limp his logic is, opposing "ethical" to "tonic"—a word of known scientific meaning, to one which is a metaphorical expression as regards the subject before him.

The essayist now proceeds to condemn prevalent religious teaching as to blame for compelling women to stand on a lower religious level than men, and thus giving rise to a total estrangement between the two sexes in the matter of religion, especially in France, but to some extent also in England. He presents this estrangement in several particulars, contending,—

(1.) That women cannot give a reason for the faith that is in them, and that the teachers are chiefly in fault for this. He quotes Mgr. Dupanloup in illustration, who complains of the deficiency of educated women in religious knowledge required to answer common objections and calumnies, and give them influence over their male relatives who may need to be brought back to religious practice. (2.) That women almost always exercise their influence against conscience, when their husbands or other male relatives are called upon by duty to brave public opinion; and that this evil arises from their moral training being merely negative, and also from their being taught to look to the approval of men as their standard and reward. (3.) That women are deficient in impartial justice and generosity, and delight in trampling to the last upon a fallen enemy, which would not be if strength and

justice were part of their normal religious education. (4.) That women have a lower standard of truthfulness than men, and are liable to inaccuracy and exaggeration. (5.) That women are gossiping, another fault which would be corrected by wisely-chosen pursuits forming a habit of accurate thought and statement. (6.) That women are apt to show a want of liberality in money matters, whereby they often "jar against the sensitive nerves of men" (strange inversion of one's usual ideas about their relations). He qualifies this censure by a compliment to the wise economy exercised by many mistresses of households, but directs it against the determination women often show to have a thing without giving a fair price for it, their inactive bias perhaps rendering them incapable of understanding the value of labour and time, though, as he says, a single dressmaker's bill ought to teach them the difference between charges for material and for manual industry. But he ascribes it chiefly to the imperfect sense of justice amongst women, and for this blames religious teachers, who take no pains whatever to recommend or inculcate justice. "I look in vain for any instruction," exclaims Dr. Littledale, "in the pulpit, or in most books of spiritual reading, which deal with such feminine defects as those which I have been discussing."

Now most, or all of these faults will be found in the character of women, whatever be their religious education, because they arise from the feminine constitution; and we may be sure that nature will always show itself in the great mass of the world, and of both sexes. It is in vain that the modern revolutionists in the matter of feminine rights ignore the essential differences, moral and intellectual, between the two. Aristotle has a deep observation which may help us to explain the tendency of women to the faults enumerated. He says, "Nature has made the one sex stronger and the other weaker; that the one may, through fear, be more apt to *preserve*; and the other, through courage, more apt to repel attacks; and that the one may provide means from without, and the other may *keep* them within; and, as regards work, Nature has made the one fit to be sedentary, but weak for out-of-door pursuits; and the one even worse adapted for quiet occupations, but finding health in active exertions; and, as to children, . . . the office of the one sex is to rear them, of the other, to educate them." (Arist. *Æcon.*, I. iii.) It is idle to blame education, religious or secular, for defects incident to natural constitution, though it is the business of education to bring out the virtues of which even defects, when exhibited in action, are the distorted images. A character of its own belongs to youth, to middle life, to old age, to rank, to riches, to poverty, and will show itself always, but with its good side in those who live conscientiously, with its bad side in the careless and vicious. So also for the feminine type. Physical weakness,

in females no more a disease, or even, properly speaking, a defect, than it is in children, will always create a comparative timidity; and this tends to a disposition to preserve, to keep, to dislike losing things. Observe how this falls in with almost every one of the particulars for which Dr. Littledale blames female education. First, he finds fault with women for inability to give a reason for the faith that is in them. Well, it may indeed often happen with women as with men who have strong faith, that this supposed inability is real unwillingness to carry on a discussion that ought not to be indulged. It must be remembered that objections are very frequently not the causes, but only the symptoms of an unbelieving mind. There are persons who constitutionally like arguing, who have no intellectual difficulties and anxieties, but who enjoy a little fencing, and especially on the subject of religion, on which every man, however un-intelligent, thinks he can say something. People of this description are neither to be convinced nor silenced by answering their objections, any more than those whose bad habits lead them to advance propositions (in company where they dare) against the moral law. In either case, a rebuff, or an exceedingly chilling reception is often the best reply that can be given. Where, however, there is a sincere desire to learn the truth, the thoughtful study of the catechism itself will much oftener than is supposed by the many grown persons who do not condescend to read it, supply the required solution, and if women have not been properly trained in this, then their instructors deserve all the censure Dr. Littledale is inclined to give them. Still, as compared with men, women will be indisposed to set arguments in array to defend what they believe with intensity. Their disposition will be to *keep* it, and keep it, not by the sword of argument, but by the lock and key of even a timid and jealous anxiety. Do women exercise their influence against conscience? Milton, as hostile to the female sex, as Euripides is said to have been of old, has expressed this accusation in very striking language:—

Whate'er it be, to wisest men and best
Seeming at first all heav'nly under virgin-veil,
Soft, modest, meek, demure,
Once joined, the contrary she proves, a thorn
Intestine, far within defensive arms
A cleaving mischief, in his way to virtue
Adverse and turbulent.

Samson Agonistes, 1034.

It may be anticipated that a temper constitutionally conservative, rather than so formed by the reason, apt to fear anything that takes it out of routine, and shy of trusting itself and those it holds dear, to an unknown future, will always tend to oppose the claims

made by the importunate conscience of another. Moreover, of all passions, fear is that which is least willing to hear reason, and it is liable to pass off, when external authority seeks to control it, into violent, inconsiderate action. But to account for this, with Dr. Littledale, by women's being accustomed to look to the approval of men as their standard and reward, is surely to take a hasty view of the matter. Women will incline to dislike even conscientious change, not because the opinion of men favours that which is established, for there are men on all sides of every question, but because their temperament leads them to be passive rather than active. The same cause makes the feminine conscience, as an instrument of truth, suffer more from being tampered with than that of men. A man, on the whole, is governed by reason in its *explicit*, a woman by reason in its *implicit* manifestations. The former survives to some considerable extent, even in the depraved, and they may fall back upon what has once approved itself to the intellect. But a woman who has acted against the true and right (though un-analyzed) dictates of her mind, will not so easily be restored, because those dictates do not reappear when they are called, as the conclusions of explicit reason can and do. Not, of course, that women are un-reasoning, any more than children, who reason very accurately within their range, but that, in both, the implicit, almost immediate exercise of the reasoning faculty rather predominates in the composite structure of their mind. This subtler and finer use of the reason, properly preserved, will always be a quicker, often a truer test between right and wrong than the slow process of deduction which belongs principally to the masculine intellect. What we have said applies only to the manner in which women will be apt to judge the conflict between the safe and the conscientious course in another's mind. They will be less likely than men to encourage and advise a person to act according to his sense of right; but will, in their own case, act according to their conviction of duty, even more resolutely than men. The tendency to trample on the fallen, and to purchase as cheaply as they can, without duly considering the claims of labour, is also what we should expect in proportion to the timidity of a feminine mind, to the power which impressions have over it, to its unwillingness to part with what it has got. Women are often wonderfully forgiving and wonderfully generous, in both senses of the word, nobility of soul and liberality, but it is still rather from right and pure immediate perception of truth than from a view of the case as developed explicitly by the reason. This implicit conviction, right or wrong, is in them so decisive that it will not be qualified by reflection, and hurries them into greater cruelties than men ordinarily commit. "I could eat his heart in the market-place!" says the impetuous but high-minded Beatrice in the

play, when she thinks of the wrong her cousin has sustained at the hands of her mean-spirited slanderer. The Welsh women, to take another example from the same profound source of observation, go forth to mangle the corpses of their nation's enemies after the battle of Shrewsbury. Men would generally forbear such extreme vengeance over the insensible and the fallen, forbear dishonouring in their rage (as Homer says) the deaf and silent clod, not because they are constitutionally better than women, but because reason in them is more apt to make itself heard above the storm of passion. Once more, to ascribe this broad and deep distinction to mere education, shows as much hastiness of thought as the persistent attempt made some years ago to trace the modern revolutionary spirit to the simple circumstance that the classics formed the basis of study in modern schools, as in point of fact they did in the ancient as well. The difference is antecedent to all education. Even the love of gossiping, at first sight not very closely connected with other natural defects of the feminine character, and apparently even contrary to the love of keeping what they have, still springs from the promptitude of the implicit reason, which is always apt to pass off into passion. A flow of ideas, words, and imagery always attends passion even in men, so that the more passionate the character the more voluble it will be. It is of course understood that the passion need not be that of anger or others of the gloomy kind. Curiosity, the love of amusement, the love of display, are all passions, and all tend to expatiate in verbal expression, far more than the reason. If then the natural temperament is full of passion in this lower sense, it will be addicted also to the lavish use of words, to the interchange of ideas, often abundant in proportion to their littleness.

Dr. Littledale admits, or rather records—for he takes no trouble to meet the difficulty—"two great and universal facts that meet us at the outset"—the inferiority of women in physical strength, and the domesticity enforced upon them as mothers—conditions certainly which no amount of fine words and showy thought will get over. He also discusses, with some refinement of observation, the difference that will always be found in the intellectual methods of boys and girls of equal capacity, educated together in the same subjects, after they reach the age of adolescence, but flies off into exclamations at "the besotted folly of crushing this wonderfully varied creature into a mere mass of limp affectionateness or hysteric sentimentalism," or of "treating religion as an agency for turning women into devout simpletons." A long and, like the rest of the essay, rather conversational discussion follows, on the feasibility of remedying the defects in the existing female character, without great social disturbance, by a deeper religious education.

He contends that "the aim of all education—and especially of religious education—should be the general development of all the faculties in due proportion, so that any one, or any set of them, may be fitted to receive subsequent special training, according to the particular work that has to be done." This cannot, as it appears to us, be said to be the aim of religious education, although a sound religious education does tend in the highest degree to the harmonious development of the faculties. In teaching *religion*, as such, is it the aim a thoughtful and right-principled teacher sets before him, by this lesson to train the memory, by that to improve the taste, by another to cultivate the imagination, by another to strengthen the reasoning powers?

Religious education aims at what is far higher than all this—at that to which all this is only ancillary—to teach both boys and girls what they are to believe and what to do in order to save their souls, and to train them in habits accordingly. Dr. Littledale seems to regard religion as a kind of philosophy that will expand the intellect, and add dignity to the character, as the study of Aristotle or Plato might be expected to do, without at all imparting the Christian type to the soul. He justifies his ideas, of which presently in greater detail, by arguing that they coincide with the original theories of Christianity and the actual practice which meets us throughout the course of ecclesiastical history. He tells us that "lawyers, not divines, Justinian, not S. Paul, are answerable for the rehabilitation under the Gospel of the old Roman maxim, that a woman never comes to years of discretion, but must always have a guardian, with the almost inevitable corollary that docility towards that guardian is the chief virtue she is bound to practise." This is an exaggerated view of the application of the maxim, which, socially, did not involve this Oriental subjugation. The political influence of Livia even over such an emperor as Tiberius is enough to show that the Romans did not relegate the female sex into social nonentity, whatever their civil and legal position. There were learned ladies too in Pagan Rome—Cærellia, for instance, the correspondent of Cicero, and Sulpicia, an authoress of whom we still possess a satirical composition. Dr. Littledale passes very glibly over S. Paul, whose rule, "If they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home" (1 Cor. xiv. 35), rather militates against the view which pervades his whole essay. He gives a long list of women in early Christianity, in the Middle Ages, and in the age of Louis XIII. and XIV. who were remarkable for their literary attainments or general culture—for example, S. Paula and S. Eustochium, S. Gertrude the Great, S. Lioba, Jacqueline Pascal, S. Jane Frances de Chantal, &c. &c. We must remark that those of the epochs named first and third form large groups belong-

ing to an isolated and brief period, the others are scattered instances. Further on, complaining of the lack of scientific instruction in modern female education, he remarks that "only two women—both of them saints of the Roman Kalendar—have permanently enlarged the domain of religious thought; to wit, Catharine of Genoa and Teresa of Avila, an Italian and a Spaniard." As to S. Teresa however, though she must have had the education that was usual among Spanish ladies of her date—superior perhaps to those of the present day—it cannot have been anything very extraordinary. Alban Butler, whose life of her is unusually elaborate, after remarking that in her doctrine "the most abstruse maxims which experience alone can teach, but no words utter, are explained with greater perspicuity than the subject seemed capable of bearing," adds, "this was done by an illiterate woman who wrote alone without the assistance of books, without study, or acquired abilities; who entered upon the recital of the Divine favours with sentiments of humility and reluctance, submitting everything without reserve to the judgment of her confessor, and much more to that of the Church, and complaining that by this task she was hindered from spinning." (*Lives of the Saints*, Oct. 15.) If Dr. Littledale were better acquainted with the state of Catholic society of our own times than he appears to be he would know that instances are far from wanting in it of that breadth of character in religious women which he so much desiderates. Among modern foundresses of orders, or women in a similar position, the name of Mother Margaret Hallahan holds a rank that belongs quite to the class of persons like S. Teresa (without presuming to place her on the same level with the saint). Mrs. Seton, Mrs. Ball, Madame Barat, are other instances that at once present themselves to the Catholic reader, of whom we dare say Dr. Littledale never so much as heard, but to whom certainly "pious imbecility" would be the very last epithet that could attach. These were all religious. The correspondence brought together for France in the "*Récit d'une Sœur*;" for Italy in the life of Rosa Ferrucci, given to English readers by a lady (Miss Bowles) herself a brilliant example of female cultivation of the highest order in England—afford proofs of intellectual habits that cannot be exceptional among Catholic ladies living in the world. And many names could be added to the English list with little trouble: Lady Georgina Fullerton for example, Miss Adelaide Proctor, Lady Herbert of Lea, the Princess Marie Lichtenstein, &c. We wish, however, to be understood. We do not attempt to disguise the fact that from various causes education, in certain aspects and at certain times, has been and is inferior in Catholic as compared with Protestant society, whilst Dr. Littledale (certain concessions excepted) seems to throw them both into the same

category. We wish only here to point out the slipshod reasoning and unfounded assumptions of a good-natured but extremely careless writer. He complains that the real or supposed cramped nature of the religious training imparted to women (within his own experience) has reacted on preachers themselves, and that when men go to church they hear chiefly sermons "written" from the feminine point of view, and practically addressed to women only, setting forth a negative and unprogressive faith. "One does long," he remarks in winding up a paragraph, "for the mighty bass of a masculine theology—an Augustine, a Vieyra, a Du Bosc, a Saurin, a Brydaine, a South, a Lacordaire, to give weight and massiveness to the thin and reedy utterances which High Church, Broad Church, and Low Church conspire to emit." A curious example on the one hand of discontent with every form of his own communion, and on the other of a deficiency in clearness of mind, which one might have expected would have made him sit very easy under the uncertain voices of which he complains. Saurin, South, and Lacordaire all knew what they meant to say, but whoever admires strength wherever he finds it, for that reason only, has assuredly no grasp of truth sufficient to make himself strong as a teacher. However it is something to find the essayist speaking with such respect of the commanding character of a theology which, like Him from whom it comes, speaks as one having authority. Want of candour is what cannot be charged against Dr. Littledale, however vague and superficial may be his reasoning; but candour is one of the virtues which are easiest to those who have no fixed rule of belief. Recurring, however, to the special subject of our discussion, he argues for the advantage of intellectual training for women on the ground that it seldom happens that women of the humbler class assimilate the conventual system (he speaks of Anglican sisterhoods), because "it needs a certain degree of cultivation to exercise full self-control, to develop a high standard of conscientiousness, to practise the salutary habit of meditation, to exhibit any steady fervour of devotion." He adds, "This is not the case to so great an extent amongst Roman Catholics, because the conventual ideal is so thoroughly familiar to all their women from their childhood; but with them, as with us, ladies make the best sisters." It is only with considerable reserve we can admit the doctrine here laid down. It is certainly true that a large proportion of the saints appear to have been well-born, and it may easily happen that this circumstance assists a vocation to the religious life, although there are numerous instances—like that of Mother Margaret already mentioned—where humble birth seems to have left no trace in the grandeur of the character that was developed. But may it not rather be that the sacrifice made by a person of condition becoming a religious, being so much greater

than that of subjects in humble life, is rewarded by greater grace ? This explanation seems more in keeping with the great principle of humility (of which we see small notice in Dr. Littledale's essay) than that which would refer the fact—if it be a fact—to superior advantages of education.

Dr. Littledale is strong on the necessity of obtaining what he calls "facultized" women (borrowing an American barbarism for "highly educated") in the active orders, and he complains bitterly of the helplessness of the average inmate of a "Sisterhood" when placed under a new set of circumstances, in consequence of their having no idea of independent action. In this view he includes also Catholic nuns of English birth, for he tells us that he had heard the Catholic authorities have found it necessary to import German, French, and Belgian sisters to take charge of several charitable institutions in London, "because the English members of the communities were simply 'feckless,' and had no idea of organization or economy, though they left nothing to be desired in good-will and kindliness." Whilst Frenchwomen are perhaps cleverer at managing than English, we greatly doubt the authenticity of this rumour, which we are inclined to attribute to the simple fact that several religious orders, for example the "Little Sisters of the Poor" and the "Sisters of Charity," originated in France, and have their head-quarters there, so that it constantly happens in the ordinary working of institutions, that sisters are sent over from that country to England. Anyhow, if Dr. Littledale's notion of the matter were correct, it would rather militate against the idea he quotes from Mgr. Dupanloup, that the defect of the French system is that it fails to teach women the sacredness and dignity of work, and makes them frivolous. There cannot be successful management if frivolity is a prevailing characteristic. Again, the defect alleged against the English feminine type would seem to arise from race rather than from anything peculiar in the method of education. Want of exactness, want of plan and preconceived order, is what we find in almost all English action, from the conduct of a campaign to the very structure of our language, or that of an essay like Dr. Littledale's, and it would be strange if the female character missed exhibiting this feature, which is not due either to any religious habits of thought or to the absence of them. Dr. Littledale however quarrels with ladies' boarding-schools in no measured terms. He asserts that the chief leisure employment of girls in these institutions is "idle chatter about sweethearts and love-letters, about marriages and establishments," and that this need not surprise us when we reflect that "with the rarest exceptions, the instruction given in these boarding-schools is but the thinnest veneer of accomplishments, a little ungrammatical jabber of two or three languages, with no

idea of their literature ; a little bad strumming on two or three instruments, with no counterpoint, a little scratching and daubing, with no theory of perspective or colour ; and all this with the nearly avowed design of fitting the pupils for the marriage-market." If this is a just account of English female education in the higher classes, the only wonder is that half the principle and good order exists in society that appears. The essayist concludes his disquisition by some practical remedies for the lamentable shortcomings he has criticised in the female religious life. He need hardly have premised that "the order is merely arbitrary and does not imply regular sequence." We slightly condense the suggestions. He proposes then, (1) that woman should be taught her direct personal responsibility. (2) The methodization of time as a religious duty. (3) Concentration of religious aim upon definite work, making belief not a mere safety-valve for emotion. (4) Thorough instruction in the creed, "whatever it may be," not merely its statements, but the reasons for those statements, and the function of each statement as affecting spiritual or practical religion. (5) The doctrine of Rights and Duties, that is, of justice and its correlative. (6) The necessity of variety and progress in religion, that is, the adjustment of articles of belief in their application to individual wants and needs ; and the effort of believers to attain a higher spirituality than they feel themselves to have reached at any given time. (7) Two important maxims, that doubt does not necessarily indicate strength or impartiality, nor vehement assertion certainty or principle. (8) "The need of the combination of the Divine and Human in every perfect work on earth, or, *in the language of Christian theology*, the union of grace and free-will in holiness." In the last paragraph the clause as here italicised is *male sonans*, and seems to regard Christianity as merely a form of expression, a vehicle for great truths, which might be set forth equally well or better by other media. The evil of such a doctrine is not removed by the writer's individual opinion that "the highest results are attainable only in the atmosphere of a purified Catholicism," a statement which is itself the sign of an unhumbled intellect, passing in review the supreme authority, as if among the loose, changeable notions that succeed each other on the surface of the human mind. The sixth suggestion is doubtless to be understood in this sense, and it is one quite inconsistent with any act of faith. Once let it be understood that the teacher regards dogma as having no substance in itself, but as one out of many forms in which religious truths may be exhibited, and the multitude will justly draw the conclusion that nothing practically is known about religious truth, or that one religion is pretty nearly as good as another. This manner of talking is the homage paid to infidelity by minds who dare not close with it altogether, but are still yielding to its power,

at this moment threatening to seize universal dominion. For the rest, it would perhaps not be quite fair to call Dr. Littledale's suggestions generally mere truisms, not of female, but of all religious education. Would not every one of the more sober schools, even outside of the Church, declare that the souls of women, equally with those of men, are directly and personally responsible? that time should be conscientiously economized? that feeling goes for little or nothing compared with practice? that grown people as well as children ought to learn their catechism, and that not like parrots? that the soul ought to correspond with grace? No doubt, however, a truism only becomes such because it has been quoted again and again, without being acted upon, till the words come almost to convey no meaning; and the simplest maxims of prudence and faith may require putting again in a light powerful enough to fetch back their lost colours on the forgetful mind.

Passing on to consider the actual state of female religious education in English Catholic society, with reference to the real or pretended defects Dr. Littledale alleges against it, in common, be it observed, with all other religious communions, we may remark that, quite independently of the view that may be taken of the position of the feminine intellect and character, there are two methods of religious training, both adopted by very good persons, both admissible in their way, but still strongly contrasted. The one makes much of the grave, serious exercise of good sense and discretion; it prefers approved books that have been in use for centuries, the "Imitation," the "Introduction to a Devout Life," De Ponte's "Journal of Meditations;" it encourages attendance on the Divine Office; it draws largely in devotion from the great and primitive fountains of the Psalms and the Gospels. The other seeks to interest the youthful affections more than the intellect, it brings into play a variety of observances that are continually springing up in the minds of those whom the world calls "devotees," it makes a perpetual novena of the year as it goes round, it evermore talks of conversions, of confraternities, of the movements of this or that religious order or popular preacher; in meditations and the daily habits of a life endeavouring after holiness, it assists itself by the innumerable little books that the Catholic press daily pours forth, which stand related to those of the old, established school, as the much-abused lace pictures imported from France do, we will not say to the severer types of Düsseldorf and Munich (for these in their way are quite as full of mannerism), but to the simplicity and breadth of the noblest pictures of Raphael, or still more to that of early German and Flemish religious art. Compare a meditation of S. Alphonsus Liguori with one based on the Spiritual Exercises of S. Ignatius, or even one formed on the plan of those of S. Francis de Sales, and the whole difference comes out with the utmost

vividness. The one is full of feeling, as both are full of resolution and will (without which, all sound teaching will tell us that meditation is naught); the other is pervaded with reflection, measured thought, reason inflamed by divine love. Again, even the office of imagination differs in the two methods. In the former, it seems not so much to embody any picture to the mind, as to excite vivid emotions; in the other, studiously to bring reason to aid the imaginative faculty in devising a framework within which the soul, "ever apt to rove, and of the roving to make no end," may rest herself and quietly contemplate, and into which she may retire, as a bird within its cage, where the fancy tempts her to useless flight amid the regions of the air. Of these two methods, the "corruption" of the one (to use an Aristotelean phrase) is dryness, of the other, frivolity; that is, if the one have not the incentive of fervour, it will degenerate into a stiff, unprogressive habitude of mind, with a tendency to Gallicanism; the other, if without the solid foundation of faith informing the reason, will swarm with conceit, rashness, stilted and wordy imbecility, empty gossip deceiving itself. Both these corruptions are fatal to religion, and are not to be avoided without much discretion. Many well-meaning persons would view the latter with such disgust as at once to reject whatever, even misunderstood and misapplied, could be supposed to end in anything so contemptible. Still, it seems to matter little whether religion is killed by a frost or a miasma. We speak in both cases of the abuse of that which in itself is excellent, and which must not lead us hastily to scorn the use. It appears to us that the tendency of devout people is towards the latter of the two methods, less inviting as it is to human reason; and the cause of this tendency is the fact that the latter gives a religious teacher the quickest and the readiest hold of the common run of minds, and silences temptation against faith, which the other method might in some cases tend to encourage. This being so, and, moreover, the latter possessing more natural affinity to the feminine type of mind, it need not surprise us if it has rather prevailed in female education among us, and to an extent which in after-life shows itself by a distressing want of prudence. It is quite possible to have the head full of a certain kind of devotion, and of the doings of Father this or Father that, with very little sense of duty, principle, the necessity of avoiding slander, the plain common-sense distinctions between right and wrong. Protection against this great danger is to be looked for, not certainly by elaborately introducing young ladies either to the apologetic or *evidential* literature of Christianity, ancient or modern; nor again to the treatises of purely professional theology, any more than to civil or canon law, but to the grave, earnest, and thoughtful explanation of their catechism. Has Dr. Little-dale ever been present on a Sunday afternoon at the instruction

on the catechism in a Catholic church? If not, we think it could give him some lights in which at present he is deficient. Whilst Catholic preaching may often disappoint the listener who comes from a totally different school, and with different ideas of the rhetoric of sermons, we venture to say he will rarely be disappointed with the plain, homely, and detailed exposition of the commandments, which most certainly will often enter, we do not say into dressmakers' bills, but at all events into cases which ought to lead a naturally thoughtful mind to test its own conduct by the highest standard. It is exactly this, which those in charge of all education will find an abundant reward in the ever-increasing encouragement which they may give to it. Nor, much as might be done for the development of Catholic educational literature, are there wanting books to assist the teachers in so profitable a task; among which may particularly be instanced Hay's works (of which we are glad to observe a beautiful new edition has lately appeared), the "Manual of Instructions in Christian Doctrine," Gaume's "Catéchisme Spirituel," the "Année Liturgique," "S. Thomas médité," &c. These are all books that would be equally available for the education either of male or female youth. Only this must be observed as to all education, both religious and secular, that the book, although indispensable as a reference, an authority, and a basis both for teaching and learning, can never satisfactorily supersede the living voice of the teacher. Natural indolence will always cause a tendency to attempt this substitution, which is only one out of many forms in which the mechanical is made to do duty for the natural, merely to save trouble. Thus in drawing, children are made to copy from the works of their instructors, instead of the realities that surround them; in arithmetic, to do sums instead of understanding the reason and principle of the rule they apply; nay, we have heard it said that in a certain ladies' school, where "Euclid" was on the programme, instead of getting up the demonstrations, the poor things were merely taught to draw the figures! And in general, memory is cultivated and thought left untilled, so that nothing really fructifies; and thus, after the golden season of youth is over, and parents have expended much money, high hopes and great anxieties, the net result is disappointment—a poor, conceited, superficial, and dissipated mind, left to learn what it can from the stern discipline of life. These remarks apply to the education of males as well as of females. It will never succeed without a constant battle kept up by teachers against their own idleness as well as that of the pupils; and there may be idleness to a most dangerous extent where there is the greatest apparent diligence. A very small effort of the will can occupy the hour in the tasks of memory. Only minds of a higher order and sound intellectual habits can force themselves to think, and without thinking there is no real educa-

tion, and a child is never interested in its work. What is taken into a reluctant understanding and learned mechanically never assimilates with the mind, and is never called up by it spontaneously. The learner makes no independent effort, and the lesson is therefore as transient as if it were written on water. We have been carried rather beyond the subject to which we have limited ourselves, *religious* education of women, but we have wished to show that its effectiveness depends on the same principle that should pervade all education, of both sexes, and in all departments. In the midst of all Dr. Littledale's loose and talkative reasoning, it would be unfair not to admit that there is some truth which all engaged in education would do well to place before themselves. Perhaps it may be the case that the inclination to save trouble may have injured female education more than it has male, because of the greater original passivity of the female subject.

In recommending thought as the great element of efficiency in all education, it must not be forgotten that this element will operate differently in the training of males and of females. It appears to us that this has been overlooked by all such reasoners as the late Mr. Mill, who seemed to think that education could do away with all the defect inherent in the distinction between the two characters of mind. Male and female teachers may alike conscientiously put thought as well as heart into their work, but then both can, ought, and will, be of a different type. With those who place man and woman in the same mould we do not argue. *Sensus morisque repugnant*. It is self-evident that the two have different intellectual and moral functions, even as they are differently organized *ab initio*. Dr. Johnson, in quoting Hesiod's saying,—

* *Ἔργα νεῶν, βουλαὶ τε μέσων, εὐχαὶ τε γερόντων*,*

remarked: "That is a very noble line: not that young men should not pray, or old men not give counsel, but that every season of life has its proper duties." And so, either sex,—not that woman should not reason, or man should not feel, but that in each their character should take a decisive colouring from that which is predominant. Those men who are most deeply convinced of this truth will be least likely to treat women with disrespect, or afford confirmation to the sharp saying of Madame Swetchine (whose memoirs, by the bye, we commend to Dr. Littledale's consideration, in addition to several names already mentioned):—

* Let youth in deeds, in counsel man engage ;

Prayer is the proper duty of old age.

(Boswell's *Tour to the Hebrides*, Aug. 19.) The passage, however, should not be forced to a philosophical meaning beyond the compass of Hesiod. He meant simply that middle-aged men should advise what the strong hands of youth can execute, whilst old men, whose physical strength has departed, should aid the work by their vows and prayers.

Woman has something divine, said the ancient German ; woman, says the follower of Mahomet, is an amiable creature that only needs a cage ; she is a being, says the European, almost like us by her intelligence, and perhaps above us by her fidelity. With every reservation made of our dignity, is not that the history of the dog ?—in one country a god, in many others imprisoned or muzzled, and sometimes his master's best friend. (Madame Swetchine, "*Sa Vie et ses Œuvres*," par M. le Comte de Falloux, t. ii. p. 36.)

When, in the worst days of the recent agony of France, the women thronged to the sanctuaries of Paris to pray for their husbands and brothers and sons in the trenches or on the battlefield, were they simply acting on the impulse of feeling, or rather was not the faith which prompted them, reason in its highest exercise, the most vivid perception of truth, and the knowledge that what they did was their duty under the circumstances ? And were they not better so engaged than fighting like so many Amazons ? It is in vain to sneer at "limp affectionateness," when reason coincides with and encourages the dictates of the heart. By the inevitable laws of nature, the place of women, during most of their lives, is at home, and it is their office to make that home a happy one, which is not effected by passion nor yet by feeling, which comes and goes, and can never be depended on, but by thought, by deep reflection on what duty requires. One of the works we have named at the head of this article, the Abbé Theodore Ratisbonne's "*Manuel de la Mère Chrétienne*," thus presents the office of a mother in education :—

Education is the work of the whole of life. Man will carry to his last day the impressions of his first age. It is then from infancy that the young soul must be formed. If the tender plant is neglected, it bends down, it trails on the ground, and will never carry its head, covered with fruits, towards the sky. Let Christian mothers apply themselves to modify, as far as they possibly can, the vices of education ; it is for them to prepare the ways in which their sons and their daughters should walk, by placing those ways in harmony with the sublime ends of men. They will strengthen in the young souls the basis of moral education if they inspire into them the fear of God, which is the beginning of wisdom (p. 188).

The spirit of this extract is thoroughly French. In that unhappy country, the office of the mother may be said to have become doubly maternal, since for more than a century society has been penetrated by influences which are ever threatening to destroy religion altogether. It is not too much to say, that but for the counter-influence of the female sex, it would long since have perished altogether. What wonder therefore if such writers as the Abbé Ratisbonne seem to take for granted woman's chief duty is to contend by prayers and the vigilance of affection against a tide of infidelity that at any instant may overwhelm all before it ?

And yet, once more, this maternal office is no affair of "limp affectionateness." Granted that it acts by the feelings, yet those feelings are the instruments of the reason, the means by which reason acts. The Machabæan mother, the very last person to come under the class of "women weak, that wring the hand," she whom Holy Scripture describes in these noble words, *femineæ cogitationi masculinum animum inserens* (2 Macc. vii. 21), entreats her son "to have pity upon her," but she at the same time encourages him to martyrdom by pointing heaven and earth to his gaze, with the thought that lies at the foundation of faith, that God made them, and mankind also, out of nothing. This quotation occurs in a very interesting book of Mgr. Landriot's, Archbishop of Rheims, which we have placed in the list at the head of this article. Except to a few Catholic readers, we imagine it is quite unknown in this country, and yet well deserves to be studied, as a series of discourses on the spiritual life addressed to ladies living in the world. We may characterize it as a very curious as well as a very thoughtful work, a kind of parable throughout, drawing spiritual applications from the science of horticulture, in which the good archbishop is evidently as deeply versed as he is in that of meditation. An audience to which lectures of that kind can be addressed in a religious retreat cannot be made up of those unreflecting beings of which Dr. Littledale seems to think devout female society both in France and England consists. The ingenuity with which Mgr. Landriot has worked out the symbolism of his subject in its various aspects, for example, the office of roots in vegetation, the cradication and combustion of weeds, the working of the soil, the utility and beauty of dew, artificial irrigation of different kinds, and many other obvious topics, shows the way of turning one out of the many by-works or mere amusements of a reasonable being, into a source of most fruitful and ennobling thought. We will conclude the present article with an extract that may give some idea of the manner in which Mgr. Landriot deals with his materials.

Gardeners say that one may always sow at least some kinds of plants until the hard frosts have come. In the same way, in the culture of souls, new seed-plots may always be formed, until the icy hand of death arrests the pulsation of life. At all ages, where there is good will, weeds and barren trees may be rooted up and new plantations made; the good seed never fails, and the soil of the soul may, under the action of grace, make a fresh start and regain the power of an ever-youthful fertility. I do not at all think I am deceiving myself when I affirm that the soul can, in the moral order, and within a certain limit, re-ascend the river of life, resume the simplicity of childhood, the verdure of early years, the strength of ripe age, as it can, in its early years, have in a certain measure the maturity of manhood and the experience of old age. Oh! how lovely it is to see men who have the candour of infancy, the generous spontaneity of youth, the gravity of man's estate,

and the wisdom of the aged ! It is the type of perfect humanity ; we can and we ought to labour every day to realize it in us, *in virum perfectum, in mensuram ætatis plenitudinis Christi* (Eph. iv. 13).*

ART. VII.—CATHOLIC HIGHER STUDIES IN ENGLAND.

Circular on College of Higher Studies, signed by HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster.

IT is an interesting fact, that in Ireland and England at the same moment there has appeared among Catholics an increased development and organization of higher studies. The Irish Bishops, finding their just demands set at defiance by Parliament, have resolved to lose no further time. They have accordingly applied themselves to the work of so strengthening and consolidating Catholic education in their country, that the whole shall form one system, having the University as its centre and principle of cohesion. The scheme has not yet arrived at sufficient maturity to admit of comment in our present number, though we hope without fail to place before our readers a full account of it in our next issue. But the programme of the English Bishops is so remarkable an era in English Catholicity, that a few remarks are imperatively called for on the prospect thus opening. We will begin by reprinting the Archbishop's Circular.

1. In the Synodal Letter addressed to the Clergy and the Faithful from the Fourth Provincial Council of Westminster we have already made known, that the growth of the middle and upper classes of our Laity, and the opening of the career of professional and public service, render it necessary to lay at least the foundations of a system of Higher Studies, such as are required by our youth from 18 or 19 to 21 or 22 years of age. The development of such a system will, we trust, under God, be gradually made hereafter, as the growing needs of our Catholic Laity demand.

2. We have been both directed and encouraged to take this step by the authority of the Holy See, and by the assurance that the powers necessary for its guidance and accomplishment will be granted.

3. The Bishops therefore have resolved to form an Academical Council or Senate, composed of Clergy and Laity selected from the whole of England, as representing the experience and needs of the Catholics of the higher classes, and also to afford counsel derived from practical acquaintance with

* Mgr. Landriot, "Promenades autour de mon Jardin," &c., 15e Conf. p. 355.

Literature, Science, and Art. The Lay Members of this body will be in the proportion of two-thirds to the Clerical members.

4. To this Senate will be committed the office of deliberating and recommending, on all subjects relating to study, examinations, rewards by prizes, burses or otherwise, the selection of lists of names to be proposed as Professors, and generally on all matters involving the welfare and progress of Higher Studies.

5. Inasmuch as the most pressing need felt at this moment is the want of some college, in which those who are destined for our public service at home or abroad, for the army, for the duties of public life which locally attach to our higher classes, and for various professions, may obtain, under the securities and guarantees of Catholic Professors and Catholic guidance, a more advanced study of Modern Languages, Modern History, Constitutional Law, Physical Science in application to certain professional employments, and, above all, a sound course of Mental Science and of the Philosophy of Religion, with a more complete and scientific treatment of the Faith, the Bishops have determined at once to proceed to the formation of one such College, with houses of residence, under the care of Tutors, attached to it: the first, as they hope, of many which, with the growth of our needs and means, may be founded hereafter in other parts of England, under the oversight of the Hierarchy, aided by the same Academical Senate, which has been for that purpose composed of Clergy and Laity selected from all parts of the country.

6. For various reasons, such as the greater number of Students already on the spot and requiring such a College, and the greater facility of obtaining a staff of good Professors and Lecturers, as well as the actual possession of a locality well adapted for such a beginning, the Bishops have decided to open a College at Kensington. They will be able by this commencement to test by experience the advantages of such a position as compared with the country.

7. The Bishops have invited the Right Rev. Monsignor Capel to undertake the formation of such a College. Monsignor Capel has expressed his willingness to do so, and to employ for the purpose the locality and the provision he has hitherto been preparing for the purposes of education.

8. The course of studies will be so ordered as to enable the Students to present themselves for the Civil Service and other Examinations, and especially to obtain such degrees of the London University as confer advantages in the practice of certain professions.

If we may for a moment allude to ourselves, we need hardly say how great a matter of encouragement and gratulation to us this announcement has been. In the very first number of our new series, an article (not contributed, however, by the present writer) described the question of Catholic higher education as one "of the highest importance, a solution of which must promptly be made, or it will solve itself by drifting beyond all control" (p. 150). Then, after considering in detail (pp. 150-158) the pros and cons of Catholic connection with Oxford and Cambridge, the writer

concluded strongly against any such connection, and earnestly suggested an English Catholic University.* At a somewhat later period—when the project of a Catholic college at Oxford was first publicly proposed, and before the Episcopate and the Holy See had pronounced thereon a judgment—we earnestly submitted to ecclesiastical superiors (October, 1864) that the proposal involved grievous peril to the Church's highest interests; and that no plan would satisfactorily supply the need which we admitted to exist, except a Catholic University, or higher College. So far as regarded the evils of Oxford and Cambridge, the Holy See and the Episcopate promptly decided in favour of the view which we had maintained.† From that day to this we have availed ourselves of every possible opportunity, for pressing the same view on the attention of our readers; insomuch that it is almost impossible to say anything on the present occasion, which is not in some sense a repetition of what has been urged by us before. Still, though the remarks are old, they will appear in something of a new shape, because the circumstances are new.

Now firstly,—apart from all consideration of the particular scheme proposed,—it is a matter for extreme congratulation, that a scheme has actually been drawn out and placed in course of realization. By the confession of all who have considered the subject, the Church in England has never had a more arduous problem before her, than the means of providing unexceptionable higher education for her children. It was urgently needed then, that from the earliest possible moment all Catholics who feel the vital importance of the undertaking should have combined their efforts, for the purpose of facilitating the path of authority and accumulating materials to assist the Bishops' judgment. Unfortunately, nine precious years have been almost wasted as regards this accumulation of materials. By some reasoning which we have never been quite able to understand, a large number of excellent Catholics have persuaded themselves, that the Holy See had not definitively pronounced against all connection with Oxford; and a twofold misfortune has thus ensued. In the first place, those persons themselves, whose assistance and co-operation would have been most valuable to authority, expended all their energies in quite the opposite direction: in forwarding, directly or indirectly, a scheme, which, in our own opinion, would have been inexpressibly calamitous; and which, at all events, was necessarily impracticable, were

* This was the very first public expression in England as to the need experienced: a fact which we commend to the attention of persons disposed to think, that those Catholics, who have so keenly dreaded all connection with Oxford and Cambridge, have been blind to the vital importance of the end itself, a provision for Catholic higher education.

† In our last number, pp. 405-6, we have quoted from the series of ecclesiastical judgments on the matter.

it only because the Church had condemned it. But moreover, in the second place, even those who were otherwise minded, were obliged to aim, not so much at positive co-operation and respectful suggestion, as at the purely defensive task of answering arguments, which tended to prejudice Catholic minds against the decision of the Holy See. All this, thank God! is now at an end; the vessel is launched; and all good Catholics, whatever may have been their previous bias, will unite in straining every nerve, that her course may be smooth and her voyage prosperous.

Then there is a second reason, for greatly rejoicing that a start has been made. Those priests who were most heartily loyal to the Church in the matter,—when warning parents of the deference due to the Pope's judgment, and of the spiritual ruin which threatened their sons at Oxford,—encountered serious difficulty, from being unable to suggest any alternative which would be felt as really satisfactory. This will now be otherwise.

Before entering on the actual details of the scheme unfolded in the Archbishop's Circular, it will conduce to their due appreciation, if we first recapitulate (what we have urged on other occasions at greater length) the various purposes which such a scheme may fairly be expected to promote. And this recapitulation itself will be serviceably preceded, by a general statement of the intellectual position now largely taken up by cultured non-Catholics. We have often enough adverted to this in one or other detail; and we will on the present occasion not use our own language at all, but cite a writer whom no one will account an alarmist:—the eminent Unitarian physiologist, Dr. Carpenter. He expresses himself as follows, in the "Contemporary Review" of December:—

The progress of Thought has been likened, by an able writer of our time, to a succession of waves which sweep over the minds of men at distant intervals:—

"There are periods of comparative calm and stagnation, and then times of gradual swelling and upheaving of the deep, till some great billow slowly rears its crest above the surface, higher and still higher, to the last; when, with a mighty convulsion, amid foam and spray, and 'noise of many waters,' it topples over and bursts in thunder up the beach, bearing the flood-line higher than before."

"In the eyes of those who have watched intelligently the signs of the times," continued Miss Cobbe,

"It seems that some such wave as this is even now gathering beneath us, a deeper and broader wave than has ever yet arisen. No partial and temporary rippling of the surface is it now, but a whole mass of living thought seems steadily and slowly upheaved, and the ocean is moved to its depths."

The experience of the last ten years has so fully justified this grave warning, that it clearly becomes all who duly care for their own and their children's welfare, to look well to the foundations of their Beliefs, which are likely soon

to be tested by such a wave as has never before tried their solidity. New methods of research, new bodies of facts, new modes of interpretation, new orders of ideas, are concurring to drive onwards a flood, which will bear with unprecedented force against our whole fabric of Doctrine ; and no edifice is safe against its undermining power, that is not firmly bedded on the solid rock of Truth (pp. 123-4).

In fact we believe that, at this moment, among the more highly-cultivated non-Catholics, belief in a Personal God is the exception and not the rule ; nor can any young Catholic who has acquired intellectual tastes mix in the society of those who resemble him in that respect, without finding the very idea of religion treated by several of them—we will not say with disapproval—but rather with contempt and contumely, as a dream and superstition of the past : while the large majority, even of those more soundly-minded, occupy no definite standpoint of opposition, nor hold with undoubting firmness any religious dogma whatever.* A month or two ago F. Newman was reported in the Catholic newspapers to have said in a sermon, that the Church's opponents are now immeasurably more formidable than at any former time ; that were S. Athanasius or S. Augustine to revisit earth, such champions of the Church would be not less than appalled by the intellectual phenomena with which they would have to cope. If Father Newman said this, it is a very remarkable testimony, because of his singular freedom from all exaggeration of view ; and for ourselves at least, we cannot consider the statement ascribed to him as one whit stronger than circumstances fully justify. The prospect is not less than fearful. It is proverbial, that speculative opinion filters downward from the summits to the lower strata ; that what is held by the more advanced thinkers to-day, becomes to-morrow the tenet of all educated men, and the next day is taken for granted by the whole nation. And let the mass of Englishmen come to think that there is no cognisable Personal God nor any intrinsic difference between right and wrong, the collapse of all morality would be far beyond the power of imagination to picture. This however is a danger of the future : but the desolating unbelief already so widely prevalent—so extensively poisoning the social atmosphere—this is a tremendous danger of the present ;

* "We all make believe as hard as we possibly can ; we go to Church with the most praiseworthy punctuality ; . . . and some of us go home to lunch and treat the whole story as *Socrates treated the polytheism of his time*. No one who has any knowledge of the kind of language held by *intelligent men*, when not arrayed in surplices or cassocks, will doubt that such sentiments are *exceedingly common*. It is only a few who have the iconoclastic temperament and desire to break down the convenient old creeds because they may be rotten at the core ; but a large minority, or *possibly a large majority*, believe that they are rotten." (Leslie Stephen "On Free Thinking and Plain Speaking," p. 10.)

and one which the Church's rulers have carefully to bear in mind, throughout their whole dealing with educational and similar problems.

Now it is a plain fact, that, by giving Catholic youths a higher education, you open a new and very large avenue, by which the godless spirit of the time may gain admittance. And unless they be furnished with fully sufficient moral and intellectual protection, you expose them to imminent danger—not merely of holding the Faith with less simplicity and heartiness (though this would be bad enough)—but of wilfully admitting a fully deliberate doubt as to its truth ; or (in other words) of actual apostasy. It is this which makes the whole subject so anxious ; and which makes one a little impatient with common-places, about marching with the times, and aiming at progress, and growing in largeness of thought. We are very far from meaning that ignorance is the Catholic youth's *best* preservative against intellectual danger ; but it is a very powerful one nevertheless, and those who deny this are but inventing a theory in the very teeth of manifest facts. A Catholic destitute of intellectual tastes, whether in a higher or lower rank, may probably enough be tempted to idleness, frivolity, gambling, sensuality : but in none but the very rarest cases will he be tempted to that which (in the Catholic view) is an immeasurably greater calamity than any of these or all put together ; viz. deliberate doubt on the truth of his religion. It is simply undeniable, we say, that the absence of higher education is a powerful preservative against apostasy ; and those who watch over souls will reasonably refuse to bear part in withdrawing that preservative, until they are certain that some other very sufficient substitute is provided. In the present case then, it was their bounden duty to pause and deliberate, and make sure that the higher education offered be really Catholic. It is the work of higher education as such to cultivate and enlarge the mind ; but it is the work of *Catholic* higher education as such, so to cultivate and enlarge the mind, as to guard against the danger that such cultivation do immeasurably more harm than good. Now the Church's interest is not in higher education as such, but in *Catholic* higher education.

Yet, so much having been said on one side, we heartily admit on the other, or rather maintain, that the higher education of Catholic youths, when duly safe-guarded and directed, tends not only to confer great benefit on its individual recipients, but also and far more to render inestimable service to the whole Catholic body, nay and to the whole English nation. Let us consider briefly, then, in what this service consists.

I. We need hardly mention the advantage which may be derived from such a scheme, by those who seek their temporal advancement in some course of life for which higher educa-

tion is indispensable. "Twenty years ago," says the "Tablet" (Nov. 29, 1873), this want was not so much felt. It is not so much that the Catholic Church in England has increased in numbers—though it has increased in numbers—as that a social change has come over it. During the last quarter of a century the higher and upper middle classes of Catholics have received a notable and important reinforcement; and while many more are seeking to prepare themselves for the various employments open to them in common with their Protestant fellow-countrymen, the great development of the system of examination for every branch of the public service has at the same time rendered a course of higher studies a still more indispensable necessity."

II. But those of the higher classes who do not need to seek temporal advancement—or whose energies, at all events, will be by no means entirely expended on such pursuit—these will derive no less advantage, though of a somewhat different kind. A youth feels it to be a very disadvantageous and distressing position if, from absence of sufficient education, he is signally inferior in intellectual power and information to those with whom he mixes in society; and he is tempted, moreover, by such inferiority to unworthy and vicious company. A young man indeed who has much leisure time on his hands, will in many ways derive great spiritual benefit from vigorous intellectual education, if he be but provided with due protection to his faith and due spiritual training. We need not say a word more to illustrate so very obvious a proposition; nor can we wonder that Catholic parents have felt keenly the need of such an Institution as is now inaugurated.

The evil to the Church however, resulting from the absence of Catholic higher education, has been very far greater than even to the individual. It is precisely on youths of this class, when they grow up, that she will have to depend as on her principal lay champions and supporters. Now it is the special work of higher education "to open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know and to digest, master, rule and use its own knowledge; to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression."* It is a heavy calamity to the Church, so far as, at any given period, her opponents largely possess these gifts, while her supporters are without them. It would, no doubt, be a still greater calamity to her (as we have often urged) if her children purchased such gifts by sacrificing one iota of their loyalty to her, of their full sympathy with her spirit, of their submission to her rulers, of their zeal for her Creed. What she so sorely needs is, that they possess *both*

* See this and other similar passages quoted from F. Newman in our last number, pp. 412-414.

classes of excellence ; that they unite a spirit sensitively Catholic with an intellect cultured to its highest perfection. It is a complete and satisfactory system of Catholic higher education, to which alone she can look for the supply of this need. Youths therein trained—so far at least as regards their highest specimens—will come into the arena of life thoroughly well-trained combatants ; animated by one spirit of abhorrence for the prevalent anti-Catholic speculations, and of intelligent zeal for the great verities thereto opposed ; in the political order, struggling unflinchingly, and at the same time temperately, for her full spiritual freedom ; in the intellectual order, labouring successfully towards her absolute supremacy ; possessed with a holy anger against the prevalent denial of Christ and of God ; contending against the evils of the time in the spirit of veritable crusaders.

III. A third result, not yielding in importance to either of the former, will inevitably follow a thoroughly satisfactory scheme of Catholic higher education ; viz., the bringing together into mutual co-operation a number of Catholic thinkers, who make it their direct task to study the irreligious and anti-Catholic theories which now abound, and to elaborate the available Catholic replies. As far as we know, there are no existing Catholic books by any means sufficient of themselves to protect a youth against the circumambient pestilence. Those, to which attention would naturally be turned, were written by persons, who had neither experienced nor even imagined the particular anti-religious exhibition now so common. They will need therefore to be very largely supplemented ; and until in due course such necessary supplements are published, the need will have to be supplied by the oral exposition of professors. It will be found then absolutely necessary by degrees to bring together such professors from every part of England ; and thus, by the scheme's spontaneous and inevitable working, such a body of Catholic thinkers as we have named will be brought into mutual co-operation.

IV. And this leads us to a still wider consideration. Second indeed, but only second, to the Church's zeal in protecting the faith of her own children, is her zeal for rescuing those external to her pale from the miseries of heresy and infidelity. And even in regard to the extremest irreligion,—as it is the Church, and she alone, whom God has intrusted with the office of opposing it,—so under present circumstances it is she only who has any chance of success in the combat. In the first place, non-Catholic Theists—be they Deists, Unitarians, Protestants, or Anglican High Churchmen—are all in a position so self-contradictory, that their stones will be at once thrown back in retaliation on their own glass houses ; nor, indeed, can the stanchness of their resistance be at

all relied on.* And, secondly, for reasons which it would carry us too far here to enumerate, infidelity is never in fact overcome, except by an exhibition of the full truth. It is Catholics then who are specially called to the work—it is they alone who can successfully accomplish it—of confronting, withstanding and turning back that stream of irreligion, which has assumed so menacing an aspect. It is of extreme moment therefore, that those fitted to take part in so noble and pressingly urgent a work, shall be brought into mutual contact; and shall, so far as possible, harmoniously organize their plan of defence and of aggression. Now an Institution for Catholic higher studies will supply that centre and nucleus of organization which is so needed.†

We have said that Catholics alone bring with them into the field a full augury of success, in the conflict against infidelity. By this however we by no means imply, that the Catholic combatant should not make large use of what Protestants have written, or may write, in the same direction. On the contrary, it is very important that he should do so to the full extent of his opportunities. There are two points in particular, on which Protestants have done signal service against the godless movement. They have (1) maintained powerfully and successfully both the necessary character of moral truth, and also man's possession of free will—on the argument for God's Existence we think they have been less successful—and (2) they have conclusively refuted that theory on the mythical origin of the Gospels, which is the favourite resource of antitheists when confronted with the facts of Christianity.‡ In their direct historical argument for Christianity,

* The "Guardian" of Dec. 17th begins a review of a volume of Professor Huxley's, by saying "that to read a book of Professor Huxley's is always a keen enjoyment." The Reviewer proceeds to say: "We differ as widely as possible from some of the conclusions at which he arrives"; but adds that "he is a strong and daring athlete, whose feats must often be witnessed with a thrill of pleasure." So this writer experiences "keen enjoyment" and a "thrill of pleasure" in reading a very able and vigorous assault on Theism, though undoubtedly "differing as widely as possible" from the conclusion aimed at. He derives especial pleasure also, he says, from the Professor's "keen sarcasm" and "bitter irony"; though, as all the world knows, the said sarcasm and irony are directed against no one object more frequently, than against belief in religion. What trust can be reposed in a writer like *this*, for defending the great verities assailed?

† Since this article went to press, the January number of the "Month" has appeared, and contains much in corroboration of what we have said in the text. In philosophy, says our contemporary (p. 5), in modern history, in physical science, "a Catholic English literature has to be created, in order to enable our young men to be educated highly without danger of being educated anti-Christianly."

‡ We entirely agree with a Protestant philosopher of great learning and power, Mr. Joseph John Murphy, that Mr. Rowe's work, "The Jesus of the

indeed, they are grievously hampered by ignoring the Catholic Church ; but in their war against the mythical theory, they have done (as we say) service of very great value indeed. Let the Catholic upholder of the Faith by all means make the utmost use of such materials. All we mean to say is, that he should regard non-Catholics as his instruments rather than simply his allies ; that the Church's sons must keep their own controversy in their own hands, and never let themselves be supposed to stand on the same platform with those external to her pale.

We now pass from those *a priori* anticipations, to the particular proposal which has been started by the Episcopate. And we begin with one protestation. It is of course abundantly possible that some scheme, approved by the Bishops and sanctioned by the Holy See, should contain this or that provision which, according to our preconceived ideas, we should have thought pernicious or dangerous. If such were ever the case, we should at once take for granted that those preconceived ideas had been mistaken. We do not, of course, mean that such a decision of the Holy See would fall within the sphere of Papal infallibility ; but we have often urged how far beyond the strict sphere of infallibility extends the loyal Catholic's interior submission. We quoted in our last number (p. 404) F. Newman's words to this effect, in regard to the Irish Bishops and *their* University. The Church's decision, he says, "not only demands our submission, but *has a claim on our trust*. It not only acts as a prohibition of any measure, but *as an ipso facto confutation of all reasonings* opposed to it." And he urges Catholics "to trust the Church of God implicitly, even when their natural judgment would take a different course from hers, and would induce them to question her prudence or her correctness."

In the present instance, however, we ourselves are offered no such occasion of merit. Had we seen such a proposal before it had been approved by a single bishop, we should have thought it an arrangement very accurately suited to Catholic needs. On the one hand, an important step is taken at once ; viz. the formation of a Catholic higher College under Mgr. Capel. So far it was absolutely necessary to act at once : because the need of such a College is urgent and pressing ; and moreover because the delay which has already inevitably taken place since the question was first raised, has in more than one way (as we said at starting) been productive of much mischief. In Mgr. Capel too (if we may be permitted to speak of him), the Bishops have found a Rector full of energy and spirit, able and large-minded, whose chief interest has long

Evangelists," has received far less attention than it deserves. We have been long wishing to place its argument before our readers. (See Murphy's "Scientific Bases of Faith," p. 375, note.)

been in matters connected with education, and who is more familiar than most priests with "the exigences and needs of the Catholics of the higher classes," to which the Archbishop's Circular refers. But whereas it is one great excellence of the scheme that at once it does so much, another great excellence is that at first it does no more. Every detail is left open, to be considered freely by Mgr. Capel and the Senate, and to be determined in last resort by the Bishops. The Institution is not as yet called a university. The wisdom of this forbearance seems to us very great. Progress has to be made along a fresh and untrodden path; with perils threatening on the right and the left, nay, with pitfalls lying in the very path itself. Little by little, by gradual efforts, by experiments, some of which will succeed but some must fail, the course will be made clear before us. Even as regards so comparatively small matter as the locality, the Bishops announce that by beginning in the environs of London "they will be able to test by experience the advantage of such a position as compared with the country."

Then, further, the Bishops have no wish to exclude the laity from the large share which on such a matter is legitimately theirs, in submitting proposals to the Episcopate; for only one-third of the Senate is clerical. "Of the laymen," who are its members, says the "*Spectator*" (Dec. 6), "nine are members of the aristocracy, eight country gentlemen, six commercial men, and seven members of the learned professions;" so that every different interest can make its voice heard.

There is one expression, with which we have been particularly impressed. The lay students are to be instructed, not only in "the philosophy of religion," but also in "a more complete and scientific treatment of the Faith." Some Catholics are more or less under an impression, that any "more complete and scientific treatment of the Faith" should be reserved for the education of clerics. But we have ourselves humbly submitted from the first, that "a certain not inconsiderable portion of direct doctrinal teaching is absolutely indispensable, if students are to be retained as loyal Catholics": "some real and careful study of the great Catholic verities, in their relation to each other, to the dicta of reason, and the facts of experience" (January, 1869, pp. 101, 103). In the same direction we quoted Dr. Murray's eloquent words. Educated Catholic laymen, he thinks, should be imbued with a "perception intimate and sound, not only of isolated dogmas, but of the leading principles of Catholic doctrines, and of the spirit that pervades them and combines them into one perfect whole: so that one adequately appreciates their truth and grandeur, and connection with each other, and adaptation to the spiritual wants of man; and still more sees in their clear light the utter absurd-

ity of all that contradicts them, and the utter deformity of all that caricatures them." In the sermon ascribed to F. Newman, which we mentioned a few pages back, he is reported to have said that the exhibition of Catholic dogmata in their mutual bearing and scientific analysis is more available than direct controversy, towards the conversion of externs. We have always felt this; and if this course is the one more available for conversion of externs, in still greater degree it is the one more available for confirmation of Catholics in the Faith. Moreover this is a motive of credibility, which acts in the healthiest possible manner; because it does not presuppose any express examination whatever of Christian Evidence as such.

We argued a few pages back, that it is involved in the very notion of establishing under present circumstances a satisfactory scheme of Catholic higher education, that the most competent available teachers shall be brought together in its service from all parts of England. The whole tone of the Archbishop's Circular encourages the expectation that such will be the case. The new Institution is not spoken of as one of minor importance, taking a comparatively subordinate place; but on the contrary as one expressly "directed and encouraged by the authority of the Holy See," with an "assurance that the power necessary for its guidance and accomplishment will be granted."

There is one matter on which we should more particularly speak; viz., the proposed relation with London University. We have ourselves before now expressed great misgivings, as to the possibility of serious evil resulting from any such connection; and it may fairly enough be expected that we openly state our impression on the matter.

The actual text of the Circular indeed does not mention any connection, which at any time would have caused misgiving. Certain students are destined for certain professions, in which they will derive important temporal advantage from London University degrees; and the course of studies will be so ordered as to obtain for them this advantage. There is no mention, even of those who go to London University, taking *honours* there; and most certainly youths may be prepared by a good Catholic tutor for a mere London *pass*, without danger to their faith. We may add also that those who desire a London degree merely for some temporal advantage, are much less likely than any others, to be drawn away into an anti-Catholic train of thought. Nor again is it implied in the least, that *all* the studies of the Catholic College are to proceed on a model adapted for the London Examinations. Nothing could be more easily managed, than that one batch of students shall be prepared for London, while the studies of another

class shall be directed on any method which the authorities may consider in itself preferable.

But no doubt the whole question of connection with London is one of the first which will occupy the Senate's attention, and on which that body will submit some scheme to the Bishops. Their decision, whatever it may be, will carry with it indefinitely more weight than the mere speculations of an individual: but we may perhaps without impropriety submit to their Lordships a few of such pros and cons as have occurred to us. And so much indeed is at once evident, that in proportion as the new College shall be more effectively organized on its specially Catholic side,—in proportion as its teachers are on the one hand imbued with the full Catholic spirit, while on the other hand they are more able, more learned, more endued with the gift of inspiring a student with keen interest in what he learns—in that proportion will the danger of the London connection be lessened.

Now there are two great advantages which would obviously result from this connection, at all events during the infancy of the Institution. In the first place, there would be greater security for a high standard of classical and other secular studies. Until the College have firmly established its habits and traditions,—for want of such external check and control, the most able and vigilant Rector may unconsciously allow the standard to sink below its due level; whereas comparative failure in the London degree lists would be a warning both to him and his teachers. Then secondly a youth stamped with the credit of London honours would enter life with much greater prestige, than could be obtained from any merely Catholic distinction. In the long run no doubt the name of any Catholic educating body will rather be esteemed according to the power and cultivation displayed by its alumni, than according to their success either at the London or any other examination: but this can only be so, after the College has had an opportunity of displaying its alumni to the world. Here then are two important advantages; and there is a third also which occurs to us, but which we shall be able more conveniently to set forth a few pages on.

We will next consider the various objections which may be raised against this connection: reserving to the end that particular one, which is both itself of greater moment, and has also been more earnestly pressed, than any other.

I. One objection to the London Examinations, which is felt very strongly by some Catholics, is the immense variety of studies peremptorily required: no less (as has been said) than all the *ologies*. This is regarded by many as very injurious to the highest type of intellectual training; while with some students it acts as

an almost insurmountable barrier against success. On the other side it may be said, that though the method of study necessitated by London University requirements be not the very best and highest kind of intellectual training, it is a very solid training nevertheless. This is certainly our own opinion; and our opinion is grounded on some little practical experience of the London system. But something more may here be said. Should it ever happen that Catholics take their M.A. degrees at London in much greater numbers than is now the case, they will be able to gain important power by becoming members of the Senate: and the particular evil which we are here considering is one for which a remedy may very easily be devised—such e. g. as alternative examination-papers—and a remedy which is not likely to meet with determined resistance in any quarter.

II. The second objection which may be adduced, carries with it (to our mind) far greater weight than many Catholics assign to it. F. Newman observes with great truth, that “nothing will be found to occupy and impress the mind of students, but such matters as they have to present to their examiners.” And in like manner, we may add, nothing which is prepared for a purely domestic (as it were) and family examination will impress and occupy the mind even commensurably with those studies, proficiency in which will be displayed before an university examining body, stamped with university approval, and rewarded by university renown. There is very real and imminent danger therefore, lest the zeal and interest of students be almost wholly concentrated on those secular studies, which will obtain for them honour and distinction at London; and lest they apply themselves no more than perfunctorily and with half a heart to that Catholic instruction, which should be the very salt and seasoning of the whole. Of course in the last resort, and if all other expedients were found to fail, this danger could be completely met, by forbidding them to go in for *honours* at London, and requiring them to be contented with a mere pass. But this in fact would be abandoning the London connection altogether, except in the case of those who need for their temporal advancement a legally recognized degree. For our own parts we cannot but hope that the evil may be averted by some less extreme measures; by encouraging a strong “*esprit de corps*,” which would lead youths to regard their College distinctions more highly than any other; by surrounding the College solemnities with every circumstance of publicity and impressiveness; and by carefully reserving the highest honours for proficiency in purely Catholic subjects.

III. We now come to what has all along been felt as far the most serious difficulty: the London philosophical Examinations.

Now it is quite certain that no youth could read the books

necessary to prepare him for these Examinations, otherwise than under vigilant and most competent Catholic instruction, without most grievous peril to his faith. On the other hand it is admitted by all who have acquaintance with London University, that the philosophical Examinations are there conducted with perfect fairness; and that where thought and knowledge are exhibited, the most Catholic complexion of opinions would not injure the candidate with the Examiners. Then, since we last expressed an opinion on this subject, there has been privately printed a collection of all the philosophical questions which have been given since the present system was first started; and on carefully reading them, we entirely think that a Catholic youth might be prepared by competent Catholic teachers to answer them in a way which would satisfy the Examiners, without incurring any peril whatever to his faith. Indeed we believe this is actually done at some Catholic colleges; as particularly at S. Cuthbert's, Ushaw. So far as it goes, this circumstance is reassuring.

But we would earnestly submit, that this is very far from being enough. It is not enough surely, nor nearly enough, that the philosophical teaching of a Catholic college be not *perilous* to faith; it must tend vigorously and effectively to *confirm* faith: and it is precisely those philosophical truths and reasonings most requisite for this purpose, which would make no show whatever in the London examinations. Nor again is it at all sufficient, even that all these truths and reasonings be *contained* in the philosophical course: they must be inculcated with due *prominence*; and the whole must be studied according to that particular arrangement and relation of parts, which is suitable to the exigencies of Catholic philosophy and theology. Here is the chief anxiety concerning the London connection. Firstly, can professors be found able to solve this complicated problem? Secondly, will they have the power of influencing students to move with them in harmony?

There is one circumstance however in the London Examinations, which makes it indefinitely easier than it otherwise would have been, to answer this question in the affirmative. Of the four Examinations which culminate in the M.A. degree, there is but one in which any philosophical matter is *compulsory*; viz. the second for B.A. A bachelor of Arts can take his M.A. degree by standing his examination in classics or mathematics, without having anything to say on philosophy at all. Now the youths at the new College are intended to be in age between 18 or 19 and 21 or 22; and if the connection with London is pretty intimate, they would be expected before leaving to take their M.A. degree. Nothing then would be easier of arrangement, than that their B.A. should be taken at the end of their first year, and that their whole philosophical connection with London should be brought to a close at

that point. There would then remain two years for a purely Catholic philosophical course.

In fact we really think—though at first sight our statement will appear paradoxical—that there is one very great philosophical advantage, which will be more effectually secured by connection with London, than it could be in any other way: we refer to the necessary supplementing of existent Catholic philosophical treatises. And as this is, in our view, a matter of extreme moment, we hope we shall be excused if in conclusion we devote a page or two to its consideration. We begin with a remark, of which the relevancy will not be at once apparent, but which has a very real connection nevertheless with what we would urge.

Catholic philosophy differs from non-Catholic, in one essential and fundamental particular. The Catholic holds, not only (of course) that reason is the gift of God, but also that every single adult (putting aside idiots and the like) is led by his reason (except for his own grave sin), whether explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, to the sure and certain knowledge of various truths, which are of vital moment to his well-being here and hereafter.* As to these fundamental verities therefore, it is not ordinarily the work of philosophy to indoctrinate the student with new truths; but rather to analyze with greater or less completeness that process of reason, which has long ago landed him in sure and certain knowledge of them. From a very early period he has known those verities on sufficient grounds: the study of philosophy does but enable him to contemplate and exhibit to others what he already possesses.

Some given philosophical treatise then may be really valuable and adequate for certain students, which is by no means adequate for certain others. There may be many youths, who have no time or no ability to study a *complete* and *profound* analysis of what their reason has implicitly declared; who nevertheless will be greatly benefited by an analysis, which is true *as far as it goes*, without being either complete or profound. Take e. g. one who is being trained for the priesthood, but whose vocation manifestly lies in the direction of active work among the poor and uneducated. A certain study of scientific theology is nevertheless essential to him; and a certain course of philosophy is absolutely indispensable for such a study of theology. His philosophical studies then are of great value: but they will be of quite a different character from what is needed for those, whose life is to be more or less occupied in philosophical speculation, and who will be brought practically into contact with the irreligious philosophy of the day. It does not at all follow therefore, because some given philosophical treatise is admirably suited to *his* needs, that it will on that account be at all adequate for such as those last mentioned.

* See *Liberatore*, Dmowski, &c., "de sensu naturæ communi."

Moreover there is a strong *à priori* probability, that any given Catholic philosophical work will be seriously inadequate for the present needs of higher lay education, unless its writer have either (1) been brought practically across modern irreligious philosophy, or else (2) have laboured with sustained effort fully to apprehend the standpoint of that philosophy, in its apparent strength no less than in its real weakness. His treatise may not improbably be defective in two different respects. In the first place—even as regards the most fundamental truths—the very fact that he himself knows them on reasonable grounds which are far deeper than argument, has a distinct tendency to make him less discriminating and also less exhaustive, in the *analysis* which he exhibits of these grounds. His arguments may not improbably need to be elucidated, so as to make their full force more apparent; and also to be supplemented by others, which will possibly be more effective, “*ad homines*,” against the propagators of philosophical falsehood. Secondly, he may probably have treated either not at all, or far too perfunctorily, questions which, in our time and in this or that country, require to be most carefully and searchingly examined. Theological science is beyond question more simply divine, and more immutable, than philosophical; and yet, even in theological science, Catholics have always considered it their duty to educe fresh developments, whenever any important heresy freshly emerges, for the purpose of directly encountering that heresy. Much more than must this be their appropriate course in the case of philosophy. But a writer who has not studied closely and with laborious candour the philosophical falsehoods prevalent in some given country, will of course not treat with due emphasis and due explicitness their antagonistic truths. Such a treatise as is here supposed would become a source of positive, nay of very great, danger, to the student whom we are considering. There is perhaps no one thing which so powerfully tends to scepticism, as the seeing some vitally important truth defended on grounds manifestly inadequate; and still more if there seem any attempt to make up for inadequacy of argument by confidence of tone. A very serious responsibility is incurred, by proposing some painfully insufficient argument as “*invictissimè demonstrans*” some fundamental verity.

Our own humble opinion is that, as regards Great Britain at least, the circumstance, thus *à priori* probable, really exists; that the existing Catholic philosophical treatises need very large supplementation at the professor's hand, if they are to be really serviceable, nay if they are not to do serious mischief. We may be asked indeed whether we would include such a work as F. Kleutgen's in this statement; but a reference to that great and admirable work will enable us to explain still more clearly what we mean. We can imagine F. Kleutgen to have written it, because the then existent

Catholic treatises did not sufficiently provide for the appreciation and refutation of those false philosophies which prevail in Germany; the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Hermes, Günther. If then the false philosophies now prevalent in England were substantially identical with those of Kant, Hegel, Hermes, Günther,—F. Kleutgen's work would be almost fully adequate to our needs; but it is notorious that, on the contrary, those most influential and pernicious are in the very opposite pole of error to the German. Nor indeed can one better describe the philosophical need on which we speak, than by saying that we desiderate some work, which shall do for England what F. Kleutgen has done for Germany.

Reverting then to our general argument—here is one signal advantage, which will be gained by a philosophical connection with London University. The Catholic teacher will necessarily have to face the phenomena of non-Catholic English philosophy; and to adopt a lengthened course of oral instruction, in supplement of what can be found in Catholic treatises. And as one professor after another performs this work, such supplementary teaching will by degrees assume a consistent shape, and recognized text-books may be the ultimate result.

These are our humble words of welcome and gratulation, on occasion of the new era in English Catholicity inaugurated by the Archbishop's Circular. Similar topics will doubtless long occupy us from time to time; for there are few predictions which we can make with more confidence, than that the Institution now rising into existence has a lengthened and momentous Future before it.

ART. VIII.—THE SITUATION IN FRANCE.

Lettre de M. le Comte de Chambord à M. de Chesnelong, 29 Oct., 1873.

THE sanguine hope which we had entertained that the French National Assembly would, on its meeting in November, be enabled to proceed at once with the restoration of the Legitimate Monarchy on a constitutional basis, proved to be premature. The negotiations which had been commenced between certain leaders of the Majority and the Comte de Chambord were brought to a summary end by the publication of the letter of his Royal Highness to M. de Chesnelong. The effect produced by that publication was instantaneous and unmistakable. From that moment it became clear that, in the words of the late Duc de Broglie, which we quoted in October, it was the policy and indeed the necessity of all men who cared to avoid the horrible calamity of civil war in France "to give time to time." In such circumstances as had

arisen, the old statesman, who had seen Republic, Empire, and Kingdom succeed each other again and again, with a calm prescience advised the exact policy which it had become, by a strange dispensation, the duty of his son to carry into effect. "It will then," he said, "be a wise necessity to be resigned; but it will be wise at the same time only to consider the republican régime as a *pis aller*, as a state of transition, and not to sacrifice to the republican spirit, its jealousy, its turbulence, especially not to sacrifice to the maintenance, to the perpetuity of the Republic, any of the guarantees of order at home, any of the conditions of security or greatness abroad." It was hardly possible—if it had been possible it would certainly not have been politic—to have presented its king to France at that moment. In the absence of its king, it was well that the course of Providence and the consent of all men of good will pointed to a man who, under the title of "President of the Republic," was qualified to discharge the duties of the more ancient and illustrious office of Constable of France.

We shall not affect to deny that we read the letter of the Comte de Chambord with a feeling of poignant regret, but at the same time with the sense that it contained a profound and most useful moral lesson for the French nation, and in its every line the proof that the writer was by his nature, if he had not already been by his birth, the man of all men worthiest to bear the title of the Very Christian King. He stood apparently within a step of the throne. Notwithstanding all its catastrophes and revolutions, the throne of France has still every temptation of splendour and power that can be conceived. For more than forty years those who have occupied that seat of supreme authority have not hesitated to concede to popular passion, to conspire, to be forsworn, to resort to sudden and unlawful violence in order to attain or to retain power. There was nothing, as we took some pains to show, in the many declarations of the Comte de Chambord's political principles which he had permitted to be published, to prevent his agreeing with the National Assembly to establish a moderate Monarchical Constitution. "The maxims which France has so much at heart, and which you have defended in the tribune," he wrote to M. Berryer more than twenty years ago,—“equality before the law, liberty of conscience, free access for all talents to all employments, to all honours, to all social advantages—all these great principles of an enlightened and Christian society are as dear and sacred to me as to you—as to all Frenchmen. To give to these principles all the guarantees which are necessary by institutions in conformity with the wishes of the nation, and to found in accord with the nation a regular and stable government, placed upon the basis of the hereditary monarchy and under the guardianship of public liberties at once firmly regulated and loyally respected, such shall be the

one object of my ambition." At last the moment so ardently desired, so long contemplated, had apparently come. There was a National Assembly possessed of supreme legislative and constituent powers sitting at Versailles, in which ever since the reunion of the Royal Family, the monarchical principle had been steadily asserting its ascendancy. The charge of the actual Government of France was in the hands of an illustrious soldier, equally trusted and respected by the nation and by the Prince. Never since the Revolution of July had a Restoration in accord with the nation seemed so feasible and natural a solution of the state of France. Without hesitation, the prospect was sacrificed to a scruple of honour. In the communications that had passed between his Royal Highness and the deputies who had undertaken to negotiate with him on behalf of the majority of the Assembly, the question of the future flag of France had been evidently discussed with a degree of detail and solemnity wholly incommensurate, according to our conception, with its actual importance. The Comte de Chambord considered that he was bound by the most sacred obligation of honour to declare beforehand that he could not return to France as king, if he were to be expected to renounce the ancient flag of his House. It would certainly have been more politic, it might even have been wiser, to have waited until, on behalf of the National Assembly, acting publicly in the plenitude of its authority, this question had been raised. But no circumstance could be better calculated to reveal the chivalrous sense of honour, the sublime disinterestedness, the blameless and candid soul of the Prince. If loyalty be, as it is in many lands, a dead virtue nowadays, it is because princes have too often ceased to represent principles and have deigned to seek for the inspiration of their conduct rather in the gutter than in the sky. The French nation and the House of Bourbon have known each other for nearly nine hundred years, as sovereign and subject; and we believe that there was not a true Frenchman who, when he read the Comte de Chambord's letter, did not feel in his inmost heart that in its every sentence breathed the spirit of that race which has always counted nothing lost, though all was lost save honour.

Yet it may be confessed that the surgical operation which Sydney Smith declared was necessary to get a joke into a Scotchman's head, is almost required to enable an inhabitant of these islands to comprehend all the importance attached to this question of the Flag. If the Monarchy had been restored in connection with a complete recognition of the hereditary principle, with the liberties to which the Comte de Chambord referred in his letter to M. Berryer embodied in fundamental clauses of a Constitutional Act, with such institutions of government as he at the same time described solidly established, with Marshal MacMahon at the head of the

army, and the present Ministry in charge of affairs, what possible effect on the conduct of public business and the maintenance of order could the colour of the Flag have? After all, politics are not arranged by rubrics, nor is there anything sacramental in the colour of a banner. The Communists of 1848, the Communists of 1871 were as well and duly shot under the Tricolor as they could have been under the White Flag. Under the White Flag the Constable de Bourbon attempted the sack of Rome. Under the Tricolor Pius the Ninth was restored in 1849, and has lived during the greater part of his Pontificate. In a country like France, divided against itself, agitated by the most desperate struggles of the revolutionary spirit, full, like other countries, of reasonable and unreasonable men, but in which at present the reasonable appear to be very slightly in excess of the unreasonable, in such a country, we say, when Providence offers the opportunity of founding a good government, surely it is rather too much to hope that men and things will arrange themselves altogether according to an abstract ideal of political perfection. Provided the essentials of power are conceded, much must be risked, much trusted to the wise inspirations and good luck, the courage, energy, and skill of those who conduct and control affairs. Something must be conceded to public spirit, even to popular passion, which, though sometimes warped to wrong, is a force that no statesman can afford to contemn, and which, when it is controlled by a good and a strong government, is, next to its religion, the most fruitful source of a nation's greatness. In his letter to M. de Chesnelong, the Comte de Chambord doubts whether his illustrious ancestor, Henry the Fourth, would have accepted the crown of France coupled with the condition of a change in the colour of the Flag. Henry the Fourth was a very valiant and sagacious prince, but in matters of sentiment and religion we have not deduced from his history the conclusion that he suffered from a too severe scrupulosity of conscience. It was said, not by perhaps, but in effect for him, that Paris was worth a Mass; we have little doubt he would have thought France worth a Flag with all the colours of the rainbow in it. With the Crown, with the Sceptre, with the Sword, with Ministers nominated by him, the army under his command, laws enacted, justice administered, office and honours conferred in his name and by his authority, Henry the Fourth would, we believe, have become curiously colour-blind as to the bunting that happened to be popular in Paris. But in truth it was not necessary to have sacrificed even a sentiment. Why, as we have already said, should not the King of France use the White Flag as the Royal Standard, and allow the Tricolor to be carried as the Service Flag? The Royal Standard and the Union Jack are equally honoured in England; nor is England the only kingdom in which the arms of

the reigning family are carried on a different ensign from that which is used for general public purposes.

It did not need any very profound political sense to recognize the fact, that from the moment the letter to M. de Chesnelong was published, a Restoration to be effected by means of a sufficient majority of the National Assembly was out of the question. If the existing Government had used its utmost influence in favour of such a proposal, it is very doubtful whether it would have had even a very small majority. It is possible, and even not improbable, that a majority of a few votes might have stood on the other side. A Restoration so effected would not have consorted either with the peace of France or the dignity of the Prince. He has again and again declared that he only wished to return to France when France claimed his services and summoned him from his retreat. "My reign," he wrote to M. Berryer, "must be neither the resource nor the result of an intrigue, nor the exclusive domination of a party." He has also spoken repeatedly and most explicitly of his desire to concert the constitutional bases of his authority with a National Assembly. The present National Assembly is by no means a model legislature, but, in so far as we can judge by the result of recent elections, it is not likely that, if it were dissolved, the next one would be more Royalist. There is no foreign army now to make the Restoration at once inevitable and welcome, as the Allies did in 1814; nor is Marshal MacMahon the man to effect it by a military *coup d'état*, and indeed we believe that the use of force for such a purpose would be absolutely abhorrent to his Royal Highness. When such are the difficulties that oppose the success of a great cause, the first duty of its partisans is patience. The Restoration being for a time, and even for a considerable time, plainly impracticable, we believe the course proposed by the Ministry and adopted by the majority, was the wisest and best possible under the circumstances. The vesting in Marshal MacMahon of supreme power for a period of seven years was the most effectual way of "giving time to time," of deferring the definitive adoption of the Republic, of establishing an authority that would command respect abroad and insure peace at home,—in fine, of placing the sovereignty of the Assembly itself out of the struggles of its factions.

The debate which ensued in the Assembly was not so much remarkable for the eloquence of its speeches as for the far greater eloquence of its silence. It was a supreme moment in human, at least in French history. For seven long years the power of France was about to be sheathed in the scabbard of an Irish soldier. Was the toga to yield to the sword without even a word of protest? When we regard the by no means reticent character of M. Thiers, and the impetuous volubility of M. Gambetta, it seems to us that their silence was

simply ignominious. It is no secret, we believe, that they were silent from fear of the effect of their eloquence. It was openly stated, that if M. Gambetta had spoken, the Government would have had a majority of 100. Their majority was only sixty-eight. The power which the Republican party possess of working on the credulity of the British journalist was never more absurdly illustrated than on this occasion. The London press almost unanimously anticipated the downfall of the French Government. Even the *Times* indignantly protested against the establishment of a military despotism by a majority which could not at most exceed eight or ten, in the same page which announced the result.

From the moment that the prolongation of the Marshal's powers became inevitable, there ought, we think, to have been no doubt as to what was the duty of all loyal Frenchmen towards his Government. While that Government directs its policy to combat the revolutionary spirit and party, they are entitled to the stanch support of the majority which placed them in power, not so much with a view to a Monarchical restoration as to prevent Radical anarchy from making further way. After all, the Government of the Marshal is a Conservative Government; his ministers, the principal agents of authority at home and abroad, are Monarchists; his policy, the policy promulgated in a famous report of a Parliamentary Commission last May. Before proceeding to weaken the authority of such a Government, members of the Assembly and gentlemen of the press were, we submit, bound to consider with great care what government it is possible to set up in its place. It is not an easy task in France nowadays to make and to maintain a Government capable of conducting public affairs with adequate capacity, energy, and authority. The first condition of the very existence of such a Government is the steady support of the party which has raised it to power, so long as it is pursuing the policy for the sake of which it was placed in power. The best Government in the world being, after all, only a combination of men, will no doubt commit some blunders, and not a few mistakes. But so long as it pursues the great objects for which it was chosen, it is entitled to steady support, good-will, and favourable consideration. Parliamentary Government becomes otherwise impossible; and there are no Frenchmen so interested in the maintenance of the dignity and authority of Parliamentary Government as the Royalists of France, for it is the form of government with which the Comte de Chambord has always indissolubly united the question of his Restoration. Nevertheless we have read in journals from which more forbearance might have been expected, a continuous series of acrimonious attacks upon the Ministers; and we have observed with still graver anxiety in several recent divisions the desertion of the administration by a

varying but always considerable number of its ordinary supporters. If those gentlemen were opposed on principle to the certainly very strong measure of local administration which the Duc de Broglie demanded, it was their duty to say so from their seats in the Assembly. There is no medium about such a measure. It is either necessary for the public safety; or it is the commencement of arbitrary government. In either case it is not consistent with the dignity, which ought to attach to the legislation of a great State, to abandon the Government to the mercy of the Opposition. Either restore the Opposition to power or sustain the Government in power. The tactics of the Fronde are not permissible in a Parliamentary system, especially against a French Government, which in these days, without an ally abroad, with inimical States on its frontiers, with a destructive democracy continually seeking to subvert it, must soon give way to a despot or to the Commune, if it be not loyally sustained by men of order and religion.

As we are going to press, we learn with deep regret that the French Government has suspended the *Univers* for a period of two months. We are not ignorant of the persistent and certainly very provoking attacks which the *Univers* has directed against the French Government, and especially against the Duc de Broglie for several months past; but we cannot help regarding such a measure of retaliation as undignified and impolitic. We fear it is an act which will be regarded throughout Europe as indicating a change of policy on the part of Marshal MacMahon's Government towards Rome, directly caused by menaces from Berlin. We cannot permit ourselves to treat such a construction as well-founded; but it is one which the French Government will find it by no means easy to dissipate. It is, in our opinion, a very grave blunder, and one which we should have thought the Duc de Broglie would be the last man in France to commit.

ART. IX.—CHURCH ARCHITECTURE.

By M. J. F.

(COMMUNICATED.)

AN exceedingly interesting "communicated" article by H. W. B., which appeared in the April number of this *REVIEW* for 1872, has been replied to by another "communicated" article which appeared in the January number of the succeeding year. The first article advocated the employ-

ment of the "Gothic" style in our church architecture. The second article gave the preference very decidedly to the "Italian." Each of these articles is written in that temperate and conciliatory manner best calculated to gain the ear of candid and dispassionate opponents. Each advances weighty arguments in favour of the view it advocates. Both articles are calculated to produce conviction; and yet, while adhering to most of the positions respectively maintained by each, I none the less venture to dissent from the conclusions arrived at by either. It is my conviction, at the end of a quarter of a century's reflection on the matter, that there is yet a third course open to us; and I venture to believe it possible that the church architecture of the future may possess all the advantages for which either of the disputants here referred to contends, without being subject to any of the defects or disadvantages against which either of them protests.

Before proceeding to develop my views, and to state the facts on which they are based, and the arguments by which they may be supported, it may be well shortly to restate the positions assumed by the two disputants referred to.

H. W. B. advances* the following arguments in favour of the employment of "Gothic" in our churches:—1. It was reintroduced here by the great and good Bishop Milner. 2. It is the only architecture which has originated under Christian influences. 3. It is the style at present popular for ecclesiastical buildings. 4. It is capable of adaptation to all needs. 5. Its use is now widely diffused over both hemispheres. 6. It is cheap.

The writer further controverts the allegations of such anti-Goths as maintain,—1. That Gothic is anti-Roman; 2. That it causes the obstruction of church interiors by too many columns; 3. that Gothic churches are dark; 4. that they are cold; 5. that their constructive peculiarities cause the altar to be hidden from a large part of the congregation. In opposition to these five assertions, H. W. B. contends,—(1) that, far from being anti-Roman, Gothic is adopted by the zealous and uncompromising Ultramontanes of Germany and Holland; (2) that many columns and narrow naves are by no means necessary features of Gothic (instancing the cathedrals of Alby and Angers, 70 feet wide, that of Angoulême without columns, and that of Terragona, in Spain, 80 feet wide); (3) that Gothic is the style which is *par excellence* capable of admitting light, some of its structures being almost all window, while churches in the Italian style

* DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1872, Art. IX., p. 441

are often so dark, like S. Paul's, which alone of English cathedrals, is incapable of being photographed internally; (4) that Gothic churches can just as easily be made warm as Italian ones; and (5) that the altar can as easily be made visible to the congregation in Gothic as in any other style of architecture. This writer, on the other hand, fully admits that a real and complete Italian church is a fine and noble thing, but contends that those generally built (or likely to be built by us in England now) resemble mere unsightly rooms. Expense alone, he asserts, would prevent the erection of really fine Italian churches in England, an elaborate stucco ceiling (such e.g., that of S. Peter in Montorio in Rome) being likely to cost more than would a stone vault, even if that stone were marble.

The other writer, the advocate of "Italian" church architecture, opposes H. W. B., and replies to the following effect. He begins by conceding* that there is no force in those five objections to Gothic just noticed, namely, that it is anti-Roman, over-columned, dark, cold, or hiding the altar. These concessions are, however, followed by the following hostile assertions. He says,—(1) that Gothic churches are ill adapted to the existing exigencies of Catholic worship; (2) that they are unsuited to the use of paintings; (3) that they are also unfavourable to the use of sacred images, which latter were, he asserts, in Gothic architecture too much subordinated to architectural features. His chief contention, however, is (4) that a majestic "unity" finds expression in almost every Italian church, while in Gothic ones unity is lost in multiplicity of detail and complexity of design. He asserts again and again that a church should be the material expression of a divine religious unity which can be apprehended "at one glance,"—that it should be well adapted to the most recent developments of ritual, and especially harmonious with the modern religious developments of the pictorial and plastic arts. He also maintains that an Italian church need not cost more than a similarly sized Gothic one; and to the affirmation that a common structure of the former style is a mere "room," he rejoins by stigmatizing an inferior Gothic one as a mere "barn."

Now it is not probable that the first of these writers would deny the needfulness of the positive characters for which the second writer contends, nor that the second would repudiate the advantages desiderated by H. W. B. I will therefore venture to *combine* their requirements as to the style of architecture really suited for a Christian church. They will be as

* DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1873, Art. V., p. 105.

follows:—1. That it should be connected with saintly memories of the past. 2. That it should have originated or have been greatly modified through Christian influences. 3. That it should be widely acceptable. 4. That it should be capable of adaptation to varied circumstances. 5. That it should not be anti-Roman. 6. That it should be exactly fitted to our existing modes of worship. 7. That it should not necessitate too many columns. 8. That it should not exclude a due amount of light. 9. That it should not render heating exceptionally difficult. 10. That it should manifest one predominant idea and exhibit an impressive unity. 11. That it should afford good spaces for the effective exhibition of paintings. 12. That it should harmonize with the use of sacred images according to existing modes. 13. That it should not be extraordinarily expensive. To these requirements I would venture to add: 14. That it should be eminently rational as well as beautiful, so as to be a fitting shrine for our “reasonable service.”

By the word “Gothic” I understand the successive styles of architecture which prevailed from the very earliest “Early English”—or its Continental equivalent—down to the latest “Perpendicular” or “Flamboyant.” But these styles are in many respects so diverse that it is difficult to find for them any common character other than that of the employment of the pointed arch which runs through them all even in the smallest ornamental details as well as in the main constructive features, and profoundly modified and dominated the whole. Thus the phrase “the pointed style,” so commonly adopted to denote what many call “Gothic,” is one admirably chosen for its purpose, the pointed arch being the one governing character of all forms of “Gothic.” By the word “Italian,” as here used, I understand that style which has prevailed generally, but especially in Italy, from the full development of the transitional *Renaissance* down to the revival of pointed architecture. As notable examples may be taken S. Peter’s, S. Andrea della Valle, and the Gesu, of Rome; S. Paul’s, of London; the Pantheon and S. Sulpice, of Paris. For the church architecture of this post-mediæval period it is perhaps more difficult to find any positive common character than for Gothic architecture. Perhaps it may best be shortly described as “round-arched,” with ornamental details copied exclusively from or directly suggested by pre-Christian Roman and Greek authorities, with a tendency to the use of the dome.

The lovers or advocates of the “pointed” style may well contend that as to the first two of the fourteen requirements above enumerated, it is unrivalled. Centuries must indeed elapse before any later style can boast as many *saintly asso-*

ciations as can that one which ranged from the birth of S. Bernard to that of S. Ignatius. These associations, moreover, have especial force in England, owing to the apostasy which synchronized with the abandonment of that style. Again, it is evident that no other style is so emphatically and exclusively *Christian in its origin*.

It may also be fairly maintained that Gothic is now *widely acceptable*; but it should not be forgotten there is also a widespread hostility to its use, and that with the very congregation with which the recent spread of Catholicism in England is so signally connected—the Oratorian, it does not appear to have found favour. Far be it from me to be faint in acknowledging the deference due to the judgment of our immortal Bishop Milner, but there is another authority equally great on the opposite side—that of Dr. Newman. The fourth character, *adaptability to varied circumstances*, is one in which “Gothic” has indeed the advantage over “Italian.” The very essence of Gothic is the subordination of means to ends; irregularity and asymmetry, instead of being blemishes, add to the very attractiveness and picturesqueness of the “pointed” structures which display them. Not so with “Italian” architecture—rigid as to its requirements in these respects, all buildings erected in that style must subordinate all details of arrangement to the general design adopted.

The next requirement is one of extreme importance and of deep significance—that, namely, of essential *harmony with Rome*. The arguments brought forward by H. W. B. are forcible enough. It is most true that thoroughgoing Ultramontanes in France, Germany, and Holland have built in the pointed style, and I may add, even the Society of Jesus itself has of late, habitually, as we all well know, made use of it in England and elsewhere. Nevertheless, there is a mode of favouring Gothic which is not only anti-Roman but essentially anti-Christian, and a danger attends an extreme advocacy of the pointed style which in no way attends the most zealous support of “Italian” architecture.

A strong assertion of the claim of Gothic to be the “Christian” style, to the exclusion of all others, is almost tantamount to a reproach on the Church for having consented to its abandonment in favour of a revived “Pagan” style. It harmonizes with the view (so strongly put forward by Michelet in this connection) that Christianity culminated at the period of Innocent III. and S. Louis—at the time of the purest and most perfect pointed architecture, that of the S. Chapelle—and that since then Christianity has been progressively decaying and disintegrating.

But the Christian Church went forth from the "upper chamber" of Jerusalem conquering and to conquer, and though always "militant" and never yet "triumphant," her course, in spite of apparent superficial reverses, has been in fact one uninterrupted progress from victory to victory. Far from failing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, her Catholicity became even more manifest, more explicitly developed, and more consciously maintained on the part of her spiritual children.

Any position, then, which leads us to view with want of sympathy the *post-mediæval* path of the Church is essentially heretical in its tendency, and such a view seems latent in that exclusive and passionate advocacy of the pointed style which has occasionally found expression. It seems to indicate the presence of an aspiration towards the Church as she was at an earlier period, instead of a loyal and undeviating fidelity to the Spouse of Christ as she exhibits herself to us at this day; and it is where the Gothic spirit is strongest out of England, namely in Germany and Holland, that that miserable abortion of heresy, the synagogue of Reinkens, has found its birthplace and blasphemous anointing.

I do not of course contend that "Gothic" is essentially anti-Roman; but I do contend that it is *accidentally* so, as will again appear in connection with the next requirement, namely, *fitness for the existing ritual*. Nothing could have been more admirably adapted for the worship to be carried on within them than were the Gothic churches at the time of their erection. Now however the assistance of the laity at "office" has all but ceased; nor have we, nor are we likely to have, troops of canons, regular and secular, to fill the deep stalled chancels and vast inclosed choirs of our Mediæval edifices. Almost daily Benedictions, frequent expositions, and prayers recited at the altar's foot, to be heard and responded to by the people (as in our devotions to the Sacred Heart), find in general a more suitable and congruous home in an "Italian" church than in a *real* "Gothic" structure, which is thus again, to a certain extent, unavoidably anti-Roman. As to the requirement that the interior should not be greatly *obstructed by columns*, it has been demonstrated by H. W. B., and admitted by his opponent, that "Gothic" by no means necessitates its infringement.

The eighth requirement, that of an adequate supply of light, can equally be met by either style. But the mode of meeting it is different in both, and seems to me in both objectionable. As H. W. B. most justly observes, a Gothic church may be "all window," as is the case with the noble

pointed choir added to the old Dom of Aachen, and indeed, the pointed style in its fullest development, such as the choir of Beauvais, with large lower windows and with double, glazed triforia as well as clerestory, becomes one enormous lantern. Moreover, these "pointed" windows, with their graceful tracery, are beautiful objects in themselves, apart from the glorious colours which should fill them. Nevertheless it cannot but be unreasonable and contradictory to provide immense windows for the admission of light and then exclude that very light by the treatment of the material with which such windows are glazed; this appears to me a serious objection, in addition to others which will shortly be noticed in relation to painted windows. Italian architecture is free from this irrationality, but then it is at the expense of presenting ugly gaps for the admission of light, instead of the graceful fenestration of Gothic architecture. This objectionable Italian feature is also likely to be much more offensive and obtrusive in our dull climate (where we need large windows) than it is in Italy, where the exclusion of sunlight is a boon to be desired.

In connection with "light" naturally comes "heat"; but it is difficult to see how any one style can necessarily have any advantage over another with regard to affording facilities for the admission of manufactured warmth.

The tenth requirement proposed was that a church "should manifest one predominant idea and exhibit an impressive unity." I think it must be conceded that the advocate of the "Italian" style is right when he says, that on entering an Italian church (say S. Peter's or the Gesu), as opposed to a Gothic one (say the Cathedral of Canterbury or the Abbey of Westminster), one *does* receive an impression of majestic unity rather than of awe-inspiring complexity—that all is, as he says, "taken in at a glance," instead of offering for investigation a series of successive revelations of beauty and mystery. But to very many, and I confess I am among that number, the absence of this element is one fatal defect in churches of the "Italian" style. How many varied combinations, each as full of interest as of beauty, are presented to us by a magnificent old Gothic church, the original complexity of which has been increased by the irregular additions of succeeding centuries! At the same time, though I think it would be a grievous loss to give up this rich element of surprise and mystery, I do not shrink from admitting that "Gothic" does leave something to be desired as to unity, and does often, as in Canterbury, more or less impoverish the general effect of a building as a whole by excess of subdivision. Most lovers of architecture would surely admit that a

combination would be desirable in which, while a majestic unity should be the prevailing characteristic, a subordinate complexity, presenting unexpected mysterious features and varied combinations, should by no means be excluded.

The next desirable feature of a modern church is that perhaps in which "Gothic" appears at the greatest disadvantage compared with "Italian"—namely, in the space it affords for the effective exhibition of paintings. In addition to the relatively small unbroken surface of wall (between the many windows and architectural irregularities of surface) the effect of paintings must ever be ruined by the brilliant hues of the material with which every window of a perfect Gothic church should be glazed. Thus, in spite of the beauty of stained glass, it has in addition to its intrinsic irrationality the grievous disadvantage of marring, or rather destroying the effect of perhaps the most important of the arts which minister to religion.*

But not painting alone, sculpture also (as now used for purposes of devotion) finds a place more readily and harmoniously in an "Italian" than in a "Gothic" church. In the former Holy Images can attain both a larger and more independent development than in the latter, where each, closely buried in its niche, assumes a quasi-architectural character. In this I quite agree with the second writer referred to, but I cannot do so when he goes on to add that in the Gothic style "the images of our Lord and the Saints are not representations of our Lord who came in the flesh, or of the Saints who were men of like passions with ourselves. They are as if 'clothed in white samite, mystic, wonderful.'" Now to assert that mediæval sculpture was necessarily defective, from the imperfect anatomical knowledge of the period would be reasonable enough, but to object to images which are to suggest to us divine and sanctified beings as they now are *in glory*, because they are "mystic" and "wonderful," seems to me a mistake. Surely such are the very characters which such images should present!

Passing by the requirement as to moderation in expense, which appears to be about equally capable of fulfilment by either "Gothic" or "Italian," I may pass to the last requirement, that, namely, which I have ventured to add as to the reasonableness which should pervade the most desirable style of architecture and should manifest itself in the constructions it inspires. In this matter it must, I think, be allowed that "Gothic" has a most decisive advantage over "Italian."

* The Church of S. Apollinaris at Remagen is a good example of the incongruity of Gothic with extensive wall paintings.

Mediæval architecture has developed with admirable skill the art of forming the largest and most durable constructions with the least expenditure of material. It may be called emphatically the most rationalistic and truthful system of stone construction which the world has yet witnessed. That canon for which Mr. Ruskin has had so much credit, but which was, years before, enunciated by Augustus Welby Pugin: "that nothing should be constructed for ornament, but that all construction should be useful first, and secondarily made the vehicle for ornament," is thoroughly embodied in "pointed" architecture alone.

No doubt this rule was occasionally transgressed by Mediæval architects, as e.g. by the designer of the west front of Wells Cathedral; but in Italian architecture it is persistently ignored. Thus the erection of flying buttresses is almost a necessity where a massive stone roof is suspended at a great altitude over a spacious interior; but while such buttresses become, in the pointed style, objects of beauty no less than of utility, in the architecture of Italy they have no avowed place, and may be, as in S. Paul's Cathedral, concealed by an elaborate screen of stone which is *doubly* mendacious, since it denies the existence of constructions which it exists only to hide, and at the same time tends to delude the observer as to the real height of walls, the altitude of which it falsifies by exaggeration. In Gothic architecture, wherever a door or a window is really wanted there it is placed. It is not denied or disguised, but made manifest and at the same time ornamental. In S. Peter's, on the other hand, the canons pass to and from their choir by a door the existence of which is as far as possible disguised, and simulated mouldings traversing it, falsely represent it to be but a part of the solid and unbroken wall.

It would be easy to adduce a multitude of examples, but these are sufficient to illustrate the principle here maintained, namely, that a temple of the God who has given us our reason, and who is truth itself, should be both eminently "rational" and thoroughly "true."

Recapitulating, then, our short examination of the fitness for church architecture of the two styles, "Gothic" and "Italian," it seems that neither one nor the other can be deemed free from very serious objections.

But is there no alternative? Are we eternally to oscillate from Gothic to Italian, and from Italian to Gothic? Has the Church come to the end of her architectural powers of expression after passing from the catacombs through the Basilica to the pointed minster, and back to the classical revival of Italy? Believing, as I most confidently do, that the Church's

splendour in the thirteenth century was but a faint adumbration of the august future reserved for her even in this world, and while still only the Church militant, I am persuaded that architecturally, no less than in other respects, what is yet to be, will be far more glorious than anything which yet has been.

My readers may well ask whether I have any grounds for this prediction,—whether, ignoring the principle of Continuity, I expect the sudden invention of a new style, or have even myself the presumption to think I may invent it? I am fully aware that no style was ever formed, nor, I am persuaded, will one ever be formed, otherwise than by gradual growth; and it is because I think I see the possibility of such future growth that I venture to make this communication. A zealous “Italian” may say to me, You have objected to extreme Gothicism as opposing a church of the past to the church of to-day, and as blaming its action in the post-mediæval period; but you yourself implicitly blame that period when you abuse the mendacity and other failings of the architecture which during that period it formed. This criticism of my words would, however, be very erroneous. I do not blame the course pursued in adopting and developing the Renaissance; on the contrary, I believe it to have been the only wise and proper action then possible. But it is one thing to say that an action was, under given circumstances, the relatively best, and quite another to say that such action would be, under all circumstances, the absolutely best.

If what I am about to advocate should find favour, it would none the less have been impossible at the period referred to. The Renaissance and subsequent architecture was a necessary transitional step; the return to Pagan models was, I believe, the only mode possible for progress, even if that progress should hereafter take the course I suggest. “*Reculer pour mieux sauter*” will then be found to have been the real signification of the retrogression, although, of course, the actual enthusiasts for classical revivals were not conscious of the future which they were, as I believe, but beginning to prepare.

I would urge then, that while full of veneration for every manifestation of the Church, while reverencing its outward expression from the first to the nineteenth century, we should carefully keep ourselves clear from all exclusive attachment to any one of those passing modes—whether Basilican, Gothic, Italian, or what not—in which its holy spirit found material expression. In the words of H. W. B.,* we should be careful not “to adore the works themselves instead of the God who

* *Loc. cit.*, p. 449.

inspired them," or "to worship the mere garments in which the Church has decked herself." The view taken by fanatical admirers of "Christian" (*i. e.* pointed) architecture is very different from that taken by the mediæval builders themselves, who actually fancied that *they* were continuing true classical architecture, just as the German Kaisers were, in their eyes, real successors of Cæsar and the Antonines.

It is time now to explain exactly how and where I look for the development of a new style of architecture combining the advantages, and avoiding the defects, of both the "Italian" and the "Gothic" styles.

As I said at starting, the "pointed arch" is the one dominant feature of Gothic architecture, and it is so with good reason, if, as I believe, the whole mode of architectural development in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries was due to the introduction of the pointed arch in the twelfth. I believe that that element, once introduced, gave, so to speak, a certain twist to architecture, which, once having got as it were into the "pointed" groove, ran its natural course and worked itself thoroughly out. Having reached its last stage, no richness of detail in panelled wall or fan-traceried vault, could compensate for the weariness produced by that endless mechanical repetition it resulted in, where the same ornamental features were reproduced on all sides, so as to suggest their being carried down even to microscopic dimensions. Great indeed must have been the feeling of relief afforded by the change to the revived classicism. We may speculate as to the possibilities of architectural development had no classical *Renaissance* taken place, and there are facts enough to make us rejoice over that *Renaissance*, as at least a relative blessing, compared with what might otherwise have been in store for us.

When we consider the wonderful pulpits of Belgium—with their apes and parrots—and certain late churches, where the pillars expanded above into a realistic reproductions of palm-trees, the possibility suggests itself that, but for the classical revival, our churches might have assumed such a realistic botanical and zoological development as to have become like immense structures of Dresden china transformed into stone, its pillars stone trees, its windows, or groining, a collection of petrified creepers (as partly in Prague Cathedral), its niches grottos, and its altars rocks!

If, however, nothing further is to be hoped from "Gothic," and if we can nevertheless only hope for something new by a more or less continuous development from something old, what is to be our starting-point? As has been said, "Gothic"

architecture is essentially "pointed," and its *raison d'être* is the pointed arch. To obtain a new starting-point, continuous with preceding structures, we must then revert to architecture as it existed before, or independently of, the introduction of the pointed arch. Now, of such architecture we fortunately have abundant examples in Germany, where the pointed arch appeared late, and was for a long time sparingly adopted, the pre-existing round-arched or Romanesque style persisting.

We have in the cathedral of Speyer a magnificent example of this style in its earlier condition, that of excessive strength and stability; but from this early Romanesque a lighter round-arched style became developed, embodying the true principles of construction and much of the picturesqueness of Gothic, while free from the special peculiarity of "pointed" arches and details. I feel strongly persuaded that if the pointed arch had not made its appearance in Germany at all, a style would have been ultimately developed at least as perfect as the true "Gothic" subsequently became. But this development was nipped in the bud by the introduction, first of the pointed arch, and then of true *French Gothic*, as in Cologne Cathedral.

It is then, I believe, to the Romanesque we must return, not for adoption and imitation, but as a starting-point, whence to develop an architecture at once rational and beautiful, embodying all the truest and best principles of construction and ornamentation, and profiting and learning both from pointed architecture and from all that was admirable in the Renaissance of Italy. I do not mean that we are to become architectural eclectics, and cull a feature here from the Gothic, there from the Renaissance—a window from Lincoln, an arch from Durham, &c. I mean that the architect should endeavour to improve upon the Romanesque by a mind imbued with all that is best, both in the spirit of true Gothic and of the Renaissance. In this way I believe it will be quite possible to evolve a style of church-building which shall satisfy all the requirements drawn out in the earlier part of this article. This I will endeavour shortly to show; but first it may be useful to notice some of the old more or less perfectly Romanesque churches, which may serve, not as models, but as objects of study, full of fruitful suggestions.

Foremost amongst these may perhaps be cited S. Cunibert's, at Cologne, which, although finished in the same year in which the Cathedral was begun, nevertheless exhibits the pointed arch only here and there. It consists of a nave and aisles with clerestory, an apsidal choir having on each side a tower. At the west end is a lofty transept, somewhat as in our old college chapels, *e. g.* Merton and Magdalen, Oxford.

Again, the Apostles' Church, with its three apses, and that of S. Martin's, with its short sanctuary, so suitable for modern worship, as well as the grand old church of Andernach and the Abbey of Maria Laach, should be carefully studied. The lovely fragment still left of the Abbey church of Heisterbach may be referred to as an example of the lightness and elegance attained to in the transition period, as the Cathedral of Mainz, and that, before referred to, of Speyer, may be quoted as examples of the majestic solidity of the earlier Romanesque.

S. Gereon's Church at Cologne shows how fine an effect might be produced by the addition of the dome to Romanesque architecture; while the peculiar semicircular windows of S. Cunibert's, as also of the nave of the minster at Bonn, suggest the employment of windows at once ornamental and light-giving, yet not absorbing too much space.

The Cathedral of Durham and the city of Shrewsbury show us how light and beautiful a development the round arch sometimes attained even in England; but it is in Germany that by far the richest collection will be found of round-arched buildings calculated to suggest treatment and features suitable for modern round-arched buildings constructed on the *principles*, though not in the *configuration*, of mediæval architecture.*

It is much to be regretted that our Catholic architects have been so tied down and cramped by the narrow taste of their public for "middle-pointed" architecture with abundant floral ornamentation. I know more than one who groans over the apparent impossibility of introducing a taste for grand and solid buildings of real majesty, instead of the "pretty" and petty beauties so generally in vogue. I would suggest to any of my readers interested in some parish church about to be built, to make a pilgrimage to S. Columba's, Shoreditch, and imagine the excellent effect of similar buildings, the designer being invited to discard in them the pointed arch except where solidity of construction might require it.

Let us now review the style of church architecture here suggested as regards the fourteen requirements enumerated in the earlier part of this communication. In the first place, as it adopts its principles of construction and ornamentation mainly from

* Many of these German churches have an apse at each end. It appears to me that this feature might be very usefully adopted with a slight modification, the western apse serving as a baptistery. As we are "buried with Christ in baptism," a representation of the entombment might be appropriately placed in a small crypt beneath such western apse and font.

mediæval architecture, it can claim a share in the holy memories connected with the latter, while, in its repudiation of the narrowness of Gothic, it is in harmony with the spirit of S. Philip and the saintly men of the post-Tridentine period.

The same considerations show that it fulfils the second requirement, that, namely, of having been "originated through Christian influences." The third requirement, "that it should be widely acceptable," is one which it is already well on the way to fulfil. In France, in Belgium, in Germany, and even in England, symptoms of a spontaneous and apparently unconscious development in this direction are already to be met with.

The next requirement, "that it should be capable of adaptation to all needs," is of the very essence of its *principles*, which are those of mediæval architecture, it not being in the least tied down to the formality and symmetry of the Italian style.

"That it should not be anti-Roman" is also of its essence, since it will arise in part from an objection to Gothic as being to a certain degree open to this reproach, and since it will freely adopt all the best features of the Italian style.

"That it should be exactly fitted to our existing modes of worship" will also necessarily follow, since it will be developed with the express purpose of providing in the best manner possible to harmonize with and subserve the ritual of the period of its birth. The seventh requirement, "that there should not be too many columns," also follows, since it is free to adopt in this respect whatever features in whatever preceding style may be deemed most desirable. The eighth requirement, that respecting the due admission of "light," is one in which it will present numerous important advantages over every preceding style.

In the first place, the absence of any rigid rule of symmetry will allow the admission of light just wherever it may be required. Secondly, the windows may be of any shape found the most convenient,—square, elongated and narrow windows, rose-windows or semicircular windows, as in the nave of Bonn Minster. They may also be made ornamental by mullions, while tracery need not by any means be confined to the upper part of each window, since each window may be all tracery, the stonework being of such thickness as may combine strength and security with a copious admission of light. The absence of that beautiful but self-contradictory feature, stained glass, will allow an ample supply of light without too great a sacrifice of wall-space, and without any impairment of stability. Not that the glazing should not be ornamental and artistic; the pieces of glass might be so designed that their

lead framework may form elegant patterns,* while the glass itself, of delicate greys and half-tints, will afford a wide scope for the skilful designer. The nature and arrangement of the windows will especially facilitate the eleventh requirement—that as to paintings,—since the neutral-tinted glass will be highly favourable to them, while the non-obstruction offered by it to the entrance of light will, by rendering less numerous or less large windows necessary, increase the amount of available wall-space.

The preceding, or tenth, requirement that each church should “manifest one predominant idea, and exhibit an impressive unity,” can as well be met by the developed Romanesque as by Italian architecture. That noble and especially unity-giving structure “the dome” will find its place therein; and there is no good feature of the Italian style that may not be freely adopted in the style I venture to advocate. At the same time, the absence of any rigid canons as to symmetry will allow the free development of all such subordinate features or later added additions in each building as original or subsequent needs may require, and thus an element of complexity, surprise, and mystery may be annexed, in a secondary manner, to the predominant and primary unity of the whole.

It is hardly necessary to add that the modern use of holy images will here meet with facilities fully as great as in Italian architecture, and a different degree of prominence, importance, or majesty, can readily be given to each separate image.

Finally, that requirement as to church architecture which I have ventured to add to those of H. W. B. and his opponent, namely, rationality of construction, will find itself pre-eminently met in the architecture here advocated. It will be so met because the adaptation of all the true principles of mediæval architecture is one of the primary conditions supposed and laid down for its development, while whatever is noble and striking in post-mediæval architecture may be freely adopted; nevertheless, its various objectionable features will be as studiously eschewed.

Thus I venture to think a concordat may be established between those rival parties the “Goths” and the “Italians,” and we cease to be “cabined, cribbed, confined” within the narrow limits of the last six centuries.

If I am right in believing that the Church will even in this

* A precedent for this is to be found in the abbey of Pointigny. This abbey was built in the early days of the Cistercian reform, and the luxury of stained glass being forbidden, an ornamental arrangement of colourless glass by means of the leading became the only adornment.

world attain a majesty and glory such as was but poorly shadowed forth by its mediæval beauty, it is surely reasonable also to believe that the artistic expression of its spirit has as yet by no means fully blossomed forth, and I deprecate an undue exaltation of the post-mediæval art of Italy as strongly as I do the exaggerated claims made by some for the style which preceded it.

H. W. B.'s opponent speaks* of S. Peter's at Rome as "that mighty and glorious temple—the mightiest and most glorious, surely, which the world has ever seen," and he appeals to a spectator of the Vatican Council as to the fitness of that temple for the purposes it then served. I had the happiness of being present at that august assembly, which so gloriously added another stone to the spiritual temple of Holy Church. Nevertheless, the sentiment attributed to the spectator was *not* mine, nor that of others known to me who were there also present.

I am far, indeed, from denying that S. Peter's is "mighty and glorious," but I am no less far from regarding it as the culmination of religious art. Should it one day, by God's permission, whether by war, by natural convulsion, or the violence of demagogic passion be demolished, I doubt not that afterwards another S. Peter's would arise as much excelling in majesty and beauty the S. Peter's we see to-day as the S. Peter's of to-day excels the ancient and venerable Basilica of Constantine which preceded it.

H. W. B.'s opponent himself makes† the following remark: "That different ideas of the human mind are expressed by different styles of architecture will hardly, I suppose, be denied by any who have thought upon the subject. If this be granted, then it is difficult to see how any one style of architecture can be upheld to the exclusion of all others." This seems to me to be in one sense true, and in another sense false. That any one style of architecture is suitable for all times and all places is manifestly absurd; but, nevertheless, I venture to maintain that only one style can be really suitable for a definite purpose at any special locality at any given period.

If it is true, as the writer just quoted says, that "different ideas" are expressed by "different styles." I hold it to be also true that one definite and clear idea can have but one distinct and articulate architectural expression. I also believe that every church built should be the expression and embodiment of its religious object as conceived at the period of its erection in the locality in which it is placed.

* *Loc. cit.*, p. 107.

† *Loc. cit.*, p. 104.

While this rule is by no means a narrow one, but freely allows that various and very diverse buildings (e.g. Amiens or the Certosa of Pavia, or the Gesu) may correctly embody the diverse ideas of their designers, it is decisive against the fitness of either "Gothic" or "Italian" for the religious architecture of the future in England. That which correctly embodied conceptions of the thirteenth century or of the Italian climate, *cannot* also be the correct embodiment of an English devotional idea of the nineteenth century, except such idea is that of *the essential identity of the church of to-day with that of the Middle Ages*. As such an idea of continuity has largely occupied the minds of English Catholics since Catholic emancipation, it has been naturally and fittingly expressed by the architecture we have in the main hitherto adopted. What could be more satisfying to the mind of an English Catholic at the end of three centuries of persecution than to see rising on every side church and chapel, convent and cloister, the very same in style and plan, in arch and window with those of which their forefathers had been so brutally deprived! What a poem can be read in the stones of S. Augustine at Ramsgate! How complete is the resuscitation presented to us by the Black Friars of Woodchester! For some time to come "Gothic" architecture may still be fitly used by us, and surely it is desirable that the metropolitan church of Westminster should visibly and tangibly declare the spiritual authority ruling in it to be the legitimate successor and representative of the extinct primacy of the abolished province of Canterbury.

That providential action which favoured the classical Renaissance, and which did away with the narrowness of "Pointed" architecture, has no less presided over the great mediæval revival which has spread so widely over the earth with such happy results. But in the nature of things such an architectural protest cannot be perpetual. The continuity and unity of the Church of the nineteenth century with that of the thirteenth having been by the recent happy revival once for all architecturally demonstrated, the devotional idea will surely cease to be occupied therewith, and will address itself to the direct object of the buildings it erects without an eternal retrospect on any particular period. Such ideas will, I venture to think, find their architectural embodiments in some such development as that I have here ventured to advocate. Therein and thereby all wants and aspirations will, I am convinced, find their satisfaction; and while the actions of the Church in this matter in different preceding epochs will all alike be justified, we shall none the less be encouraged to look forward to other deve-

lopments and greater glories of religious art than any revealed to us in the course of the centuries which are gone. *Nullum tempus occurrit ecclesie!* the ever fruitful mother of beauty and of truth, of holy aspirations and of good works, has not come to the end of her evolution even in the world of art, and I have ventured to offer for the consideration of Catholics one more mode in which that evolution may, it seems to me, be advantageously worked out.

LAUS DEO.



Notices of Books.

Cæsarism and Ultramontanism. A Lecture delivered by the ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER. With a Preface. London : Burns & Oates.

THIS pamphlet appears too late in the quarter, for notice in the present number. But the subject is so practically momentous in the present state of European society, that we hope to give an article thereon in April, reviewing perhaps, Mr. Fitz James Stephen's volume in connection with the Archbishop's most timely and powerful Essay.

Examen Philosophico-theologicum de Ontologismo. Auctore P. F. ALBERTO LEPIDI, O.S.D. Lovanii.

THIS work has been sent to us for notice ; and we cannot speak too warmly in its praise, or recommend it too unreservedly to theological and philosophical students. The author is at once dogmatic professor and prefect of studies at Louvain ; and it is especially suitable that from the University of Ubaghs should come the refutation of Ubaghs.

A controversialist who writes against one particular error, is often tempted to express himself as if no other error were equally dangerous. It is among the many illustrations of F. Lepidi's dispassionateness and equability of balance, that he is entirely proof against any such temptation. He assails ontologism of course as a grave error ; as demonstrably false on grounds of reason, and as in many ways injurious to revealed truth. But he reserves what may be called his *invectives* for those modern philosophies — materialism, positivism, idealism, pantheism — which he calls (p. 152) "the tenets not of philosophers but of madmen." As to ontologism, he frankly confesses (p. 322) that it contains a certain amount of truth ; as asserting, namely, that God is "the objective ultimate fundamental Reality" of all necessary verities : in other words (as we understand him) that these are founded on Him ; that they are what they are, because He is what He is. And he adds that this important doctrine has been more clearly discerned by Catholics, in consequence of the ontologicist controversy.

As far as we happen to know, there is no ontologism at all among

English thinkers. Some five years ago no doubt there was a vivacious controversy, in which one party inscribed the name of ontologism on its flag: but the doctrine which these writers so earnestly upheld, was only the existence of various eternal immutable and necessary verities. They understood the opponents of ontologism as denying the cognisableness of such verities; and again as accounting all knowledge to be derived from the senses. We took our own humble part in the controversy, by maintaining that this was a complete mistake as to the matter of fact; and F. Lepidi is most express in confirming our statement. In a note (under pp. 47—49) he affirms that, according to the scholastics, knowledge cannot possibly be produced (*effici*) by sensible things; but that it is produced by the light of reason, which God has implanted in the human mind. Nor is he less express, but rather much more so, in disavowing the other principal error, which has been ascribed to the opponents of ontologism. He begins by laying down (pp. 1, 2), as common ground between the ontologists and himself, that there are three classes of known truths: viz. (1) the Existence of God; (2) other “necessary absolute undying” truths; and (3) experienced facts. He refers almost in every page to eternal immutable and necessary truths. He defines ontologism (p. 9) as “the system in which it is asserted, that God is immediately and in Himself present to the created intellect; and gives Himself to it (*objicere*) as the intelligible light and ‘*ratio idealis*,’ in which the mind naturally beholds [both] God Himself and [also] all those necessary immutable eternal and absolute verities which it sees.”

Nothing can exceed the completeness with which F. Lepidi does his work. In his first chapter, he defends his definition of ontologism, by adducing citations from leading ontologists. In his next twelve chapters, he examines ontologism on grounds of reason; stating his opponents’ arguments with very remarkable intelligibleness and fairness, and answering them uniformly with complete success. He next advances to theological ground; and shows in successive chapters, that the error which he opposes is contrary to Scripture, to the Fathers in general, to S. Augustine in particular (on whose testimonies the ontologists lay singular stress), to S. Anselm, to S. Bonaventure. He concludes by pointing out the intolerable theological heresies and errors, which would follow by logical consequence from the acceptance of ontologism.

If ontologism prevailed to any extent in England, we should have devoted not a notice, but a long article, to this truly admirable and complete work. We will only add in conclusion that, even if ontologism had never existed, the various truths, which F. Lepidi so clearly exhibits and arranges, would have been of great value both to the theologian and the philosopher.

Macmillan's Magazine, Dec. 1873. Art. I. "Galileo and Papal Infallibility."
Signed "SEDLEY TAYLOR." London: Macmillan & Co.

SINCE Mr. Taylor writes his article avowedly as an answer to one of ours, we suppose we ought to notice his statements: though so singular are his controversial tactics, that we hardly know what to say.

He begins by announcing (p. 89) that "the view taken by infallibilists of the relation of Galileo's case to the central dogma of their system has been deliberately expounded in an article of the DUBLIN REVIEW" for Oct. 1865. He adds (p. 90) that in the said article we "defined the position which infallibilists are bound to take up with respect to the doctrinal decrees of Pontifical Congregations." Will it be believed, that we did not even express a confident acceptance on *our own* part of the "position" to which Mr. Taylor refers? "Zaccaria's doctrine," we said (p. 388),—which is identical with this position—is at least very plausible"; but "whether or no this can be maintained," we added, a certain other opinion "is most indubitably true." As for our saying that "believers in papal infallibility are bound to take up" Zaccaria's doctrine, Mr. Taylor might as reasonably have cited us as declaring, that believers in papal infallibility are bound to dye their hair black. We expressly affirmed (p. 388) that "it is of no very great practical moment" whether the doctrine be true or no.

Further, if Mr. Taylor had taken the trouble to read our article with any kind of attention, he would have seen that the facts he adduces have no more tendency to refute Zaccaria's doctrine (which we did and do think the more probable one), than to refute the multiplication table.

Mr. Taylor's main point against us is, that certain facts concerning Galileo have been "for the first time unearthed by M. de l'Épinois," since our article was written; and that these facts show that, according to Zaccaria's doctrine, the Pope's condemnation of Galileo was *ex cathedra*. But long after M. de l'Épinois had "unearthed" these facts, we reverted to the case of Galileo in two further articles; and Mr. Taylor is aware of the circumstance, for he cites them in a note (p. 89). Yet he has not taken the trouble to read them, nor apparently even to look at them.

We shall not condescend to argue further against a criticism like this. We have not a dream who Mr. Taylor is; but no respectable writer would venture on such tactics as his, unless he were assailing an "Ultramontane"; who is of course a controversial outlaw. Let Mr. Taylor carefully read our three articles, master the view therein set forth, and point out expressly the facts which seem to him inconsistent therewith. Let him do this, and we will give our careful attention to the result of his labours.

Acta et Decreta variorum Conciliorum recentiorum Collectio Lacensis.
Tomus quartus.

WE are happy to see that Bismarck's persecution has not reduced the German Jesuits to silence. Banished from the sunny banks of the Rhine into the fogs of Holland, Father Schneeman still continues his valuable collection of modern Councils. Few documents are more instructive and precious to the historian who would ascertain the state of the Church, than the Acts of Councils. Perfectly outspoken, the Fathers by their decrees expose, we would almost say recklessly, the wounds of the Church, and even the vices of the clergy where they exist. Hence the enemies of the Church have only to turn over the index of a collection of ancient Councils in order to find matter for telling books about ecclesiastical disorders in rude and violent times. With facile erudition and doubtful logic they cite canons respecting scandals, and thence argue that the disease there denounced was common. By a parity of reasoning they ought to argue, from the total absence of such canons, that the state of the modern clergy, as is indeed the case, is immensely improved and thoroughly edifying. In another respect this collection is valuable. All these assemblies met before the Vatican Council. One and all are held in France, the very home of Gallicanism, yet many of them use the same language with respect to the authority of the Pope as that assembly which declared the Sovereign Pontiff infallible. For instance, the Bishops of the province of Rheims declare that the decrees of the Pope on matters of faith and morals are "irreformable." Over and over again the Holy See is declared indefectible in its doctrinal decisions. Again it is observable how universally the use of the scholastic philosophy is made obligatory in seminaries, yet we notice that the Provincial Synod of Rheims takes care to inculcate on the students the necessity of accustoming themselves to use arguments out of the regular syllogistic form. It also insists on the special cultivation of the vernacular tongue by the young clerics, "for it would be most lamentable if men, destined to instruct the people daily, should not be masters of their mother tongue, and should be altogether unable to speak it correctly and fluently." This is repeated by the Council of Auch. Now that we are turning our attention to the formation of a University, these decrees are most noticeable. There are valuable appendices to this volume; one on the famous passage of S. Irenæus on the authority of the Holy See, and an especially interesting account of Napoleon's pseudo-council of Paris. F. Schneemann especially corrects an error into which a reader of d'Haussonville's interesting and valuable book might be led. That well-known work fails to give a sufficient reason for Napoleon's suppression of the supposed approbation of that assembly's decree on the subject of the institution of Bishops. The real fact is that Pius VII. did not approve that decree. Father Schneemann has pointed out that the Pope only allowed the Metropolitan to grant institutions in his name, "the effect of which would be,

that he could not act at all against the will of the Sovereign Pontiff." This, as appears from d'Haussonville himself (vol. v. 106), the Emperor and his council were sharp enough to see.

Altogether the volume does great credit to the industry and learning of the editor, and is indispensable to all ecclesiastical and historical libraries.

Miscellanies from the Oxford Sermons and other Writings of John Henry Newman, D.D. Strahan. 1873.

"IT is hoped," says the Anglican editor or putter-forth of this volume, "that the passages chosen will, in some degree, contribute to make still better known one of the deepest thinkers and most eloquent writers of the present time." F. Newman's influence, in fact, over the course of English thought begins to be appreciated in its fulness, only as life draws towards its natural term; and while we watch its main current widening as well as deepening its flow, we become aware of the variety of divergent streams spreading among regions unsuspected and unknown. The strength and sustenance of these waters are in fact so abundant and so distinctly recognized, that they are drawn upon by all classes of readers and writers. In fact—however the circumstance may be accounted for—whereas other eminent converts to the faith are cut off, or barred out, or in some way branded with discredit, by the community of letters they have left behind them, there is a determined resolve to hold a lien upon F. Newman as a kind of universal property. The editor, however, following so much of Aristotle's dictum as lays down that "the office of courage consists in moderating the impulse of rash boldness," has carefully eliminated theological discussion, controversy, and the "Apologia" from the collection, and has confined the extracts to "Historical Studies," "Moral," "Practical," and "Doctrinal," or what we should call spiritual passages, and has thus "adapted" the volume in the approved way to Anglican readers. "Give, and it shall be given," has always been one master principle with F. Newman; but in this instance we rejoice to know that a fuller volume of "Miscellanies" is to be brought out under his own eye, containing passages from the whole circle of his writings. The selection before us, however, gives a very interesting series of extracts full of suggestive teaching, as well as furnishing admirable examples of F. Newman's thoughtful, pregnant style. In the opening pages, in "The World's Benefactors," one such occurs, when, after saying that the most useful men are not those who make the most noise in the world, and asking who first cultivated corn, tamed the food-animals, and distinguished the medicinal herbs, he goes on:

"It is notorious that those who first suggest the most happy inventions, and open a way to the secret stores of nature; those who weary themselves in the search after truth; strike out momentous principles of action; pain-

fully force upon their contemporaries the adoption of beneficial measures ; or again, are the original source of the chief events in national history ; are commonly supplanted, as regards celebrity and reward, by inferior men. Their works are not called after them, nor the arts and systems which they have given the world. Their schools are usurped by strangers, and their maxims of wisdom circulate among the children of their people, forming perhaps a nation's character, but not embalming in their own immortality the names of their original authors. Andrew followed John the Baptist while Simon remained at his nets. Andrew first recognized the Messiah among the inhabitants of despised Nazareth, and he brought his brother to Him. Yet to Andrew, Christ spoke no word of commendation, which has been allowed to continue on record ; whereas to Simon, even on his first coming, He gave the honourable name by which he is now designated, and afterwards put him forward as the typical foundation of His Church." (pp. 4-5.)

Still more striking is the analysis of Balaam's character and conduct, which in certain points, always full of awe to the thoughtful student of Scripture, recall to us many public characters—take, for instance, the Emperor Napoleon III.—who have been largely used by God for His Church and people, as instruments for a time, but not to the end.

"God has a store of favours in His treasure house, and of various kinds—some for a time, some for ever ; some implying His approbation, others not. He showers favours even on the bad. He makes His sun to rise on the unjust as well as the just. . . . How He separates, in His own divine thought, kindness from approbation, time from eternity, what He does from what He foresees, we know not, and need not inquire. At present He is loving to all men, as if He did not foresee that some are to be saints, others reprobates, to all eternity. . . . Balaam, I say, was in His favour ; not indeed for his holiness' sake, not for ever ; but in a certain sense, according to His inscrutable purpose who chooses whom He will choose, and exalts whom He will exalt, without destroying man's secret responsibilities, or His own governance, and the triumph of truth and holiness, and His own strict impartiality in the end—not only had he the grant of inspiration, and the knowledge of God's will, an insight into the truths of morality, clear and enlarged, such as we Christians even cannot surpass, but he was even admitted to conscious intercourse with God, such as Christians have not." (pp. 12-13.)

"A man divinely favoured, visited, influenced, guided, protected, eminently honoured, illuminated, a man possessed of an enlightened sense of duty, and of moral and religious acquirements ; educated, high-minded, conscientious, honourable, firm, and yet on the side of God's enemies, personally under God's displeasure, and in the end (if we go to that) the direct instrument of Satan, and having his portion with the unbelievers." (p. 18.)

May we not, while reading these words, recur with trembling to ourselves, recognizing many instances of the same want of *whole-heartedness* which underlay and made a wreck of all these gifts and favours in Balaam ?

"Balaam obeyed God from a sense of its being *right* to do so, but not from a *desire to please Him*, from *fear* and *love*. He had other ends, aims, wishes of his own, distinct from God's will and purpose, and he would have effected these if he could. His endeavour was, not to please God but to please self without displeasing God ; and to pursue his own ends

as far as was consistent with duty . . . He obeyed him as a man may obey human law, or observe the usages of society or his country, as something external to himself, because he knows he ought to do so." (p. 20.)

In the same thorough, searching, far-seeing spirit of interpretation, the nature of Balaam's insistence with God is handled, and the awfulness of the consequences set out. Balaam first asked and was refused leave to go to Balak. Again he asked, and leave was given. If, so to speak, we use a rude insistence with God, He will give us our heart's desire, and along with it all the evils of the actual disobedience to His known wishes.

"God told him (Balaam) distinctly not to go to Balak. He was rash enough to ask a second time, and God as a punishment gave him leave to ally himself to His enemies, and to take part against His people. With this presumptuousness and love of self in his innermost heart, his prudence, wisdom, illumination, and general conscientiousness availed him nothing." (p. 23.)

"There *is* a right and wrong in matters of conduct, in spite of the world; but it is the world's aim and Satan's aim to take our minds off from the indelible distinctions of things, and to fix our thoughts upon man; to make us dependent on his opinion, his patronage, his honour, his smiles, and his frowns . . . It is plain that the most conscientious, religious, high-principled, honourable men (I use the words in their ordinary, not in their scriptural sense) may be on the side of evil, may be Satan's instruments in cursing, if that were possible, or at least in seducing and enfeebling the people of God." (p. 24.)

"When we have begun an evil course we cannot retrace our steps. Balaam was forced to go with the men; he offered to draw back—he was not allowed—yet God's wrath followed him . . . Men get entangled, and are bound hand and foot in dangerous courses. They make imprudent marriages or connections; they place themselves in dangerous situations; they engage in unprofitable or shameless undertakings . . . God seems to say—'Go with the men.' They are in bondage, and they must make the best of it; being the slave of the creature, without ceasing to be the responsible servants of God; under His displeasure, yet bound to act as if they could please Him. All this is very fearful." (pp. 25-26.)

This is most truly the exposition of Scripture in its full sense, every word of which sinks into the heart, while moulding the character and enlightening the mind. It is said of some one of the monks of the Anglo-Saxon Church that he ground the ripe wheat of God's Word and kneaded it into sweet bread for the food of the people; and it is sad to think how far we have fallen from this continual, free, thorough, and untechnical study of the Scriptures; bringing out of them the kneaded bread of Scriptural knowledge, Scriptural application, and a Scriptural tone of mind and speech. Under this feeling we greeted with a special warmth of welcome Mr. Garside's "*Prophet of Mount Carmel*," and earnestly trust that it is only the pledge of a further series of Scriptural sketches, which shall throw the light of study and a cultivated mind upon the great characters of the old Scriptures. Abraham, Joseph, Moses, and David, to mention no others, would afford opportunity for abundant thoughtful commentary, full of spiritual teaching. In the present volume of *Miscellanies*, the

sketch of David—too entire to be extracted from—is one of the most complete and exquisite F. Newman has ever drawn.

We have dwelt so long upon this one most instructive exposition of Balaam on account of its depth and thoroughness of application, that we cannot do justice to the remaining portions of the volume. As an instance of a subject intellectually set out, we should instance "The Individuality of the Soul" (p. 149), which is also a study in concentrated, luminous writing charged with thought.

"When this one dies and that one dies, we forget that it is the passage of separate, immortal beings into an unseen state, that the whole which appears is but appearance, and that the component parts are the realities. No, we think nothing of this; but though fresh and fresh men die, and fresh and fresh men are born, so that the whole is ever shifting, yet we forget all that drop away, and are insensible to all that are added; and we still think that this whole, which we call the nation, is one and the same, and that the individuals which come and go exist only in it and for it, and are but as the grains of a husk or the leaves of a tree." (p. 151.)

And again to take up a greater theme, in the extract from that perhaps grandest of his sermons—"Warfare the Condition of Victory," F. Newman could scarcely now add one word to what he then preached. The winding-up of the whole subject, while accumulated to the utmost pitch of eloquence, and spirit-stirring as the trumpet to battle, is as natural, and simple, and unstrained in its majestic flow, as any ordinary daily conversation which falls from his lips.

"So down to this very time, when faith has well-nigh failed, first one and then another have been called out to exhibit before the Great King. It is as though all of us were allowed to stand around His Throne at once, and He called on first this man and then that, to take up the chant by himself, each in his turn having to repeat the melody which his brethren have before gone through; or as if He held a solemn dance to His honour in the Courts of Heaven, and each had by himself to perform some one and the same solemn and graceful movement at a signal given; or as if it were some trial of strength or of agility, and while the ring of bystanders beheld and applauded, we, in succession, one by one, were actors in the pageant. Such is our state. Angels are looking on. Christ has gone before. Christ has given us an example, that we may follow His steps. He went through far more, infinitely more than we can be called to suffer . . . Now it is our turn, and all ministering spirits keep silence and look on. Oh, let not your foot slip, or your eye be false, or your ear dull, or your attention flagging! Be not dispirited; be not afraid; keep a good heart; be bold; draw not back; you will be carried through. Whatever troubles come on you of mind, body, or estate; from within or from without; from chance or from intent; from friends or foes; whatever your trouble be; though you be lonely, O children of a Heavenly Father, be not afraid! Quit you like men in your day; and when it is over, Christ will receive you to Himself, and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you."

The Life of the Most Rev. M. J. Spalding, D.D., Archbishop of Baltimore.
By J. L. SPALDING, S.T.L. Catholic Publication Society. New
York, 1873. London: Burns & Oates.

FATHER HECKER—to whom the papers of the late Archbishop Spalding were intrusted at his death—seems not to have been able to carry out his wishes, and the life before us has been written by one of the Spalding family. It is too wordy and diffuse, but is full of interest, not only such as is excited by the noble, energetic prelate himself, but also by its account of the seeds sown and fostered to growth by him, and by what it reveals of the Catholic story of Kentucky. To begin with,

“The ancestors of Martin John Spalding belonged to the band of Catholic Pilgrims who, fleeing from religious persecution in England, founded the Maryland colony in 1634, fourteen years after the landing of the Puritans at Plymouth.”

We hear a good deal about the Puritan “Pilgrim Fathers,” who have been alternately the theme of history, poetry, and painting; but very interesting records could also be given of the Catholic emigrants, who were in truth the “fathers” of the exuberant religious settlements in the other half of the globe. The Spaldings originated in Lincolnshire, where the town of Spalding and remains of the great abbey of the name—spared by some lingering remorse or favour even by Henry VIII., but dissolved by his son—are well known. The Spaldings (mentioned as early as 1267, in the reign of Henry III.) were related to another old English Catholic family—the Fenwicks of Fenwick Tower, in Northumberland—members of which also went out with Lord Baltimore to Maryland. Dr. Spalding had an Irish great-grandmother named O'Brian, so that he claimed, and probably benefited by, at least three nationalities. His grandfather, Benedict Spalding, took out a Catholic colony to Kentucky in 1790, settling in the “Dark and Bloody Ground” in the midst of Indian dangers. Bardstown became the centre of the colonists, and for many years maintained its position as the nucleus of the faith in Kentucky. The first spiritual growth in these colonies sprang, as usual, from those marvellous and apparently exhaustless sources of charity—the French missions and the Jesuits. Fathers Badin and Fournier went out into the forests and built themselves log huts, and for many years encouraged and sustained the practice of religion among the Kentucky colonists. Life in Kentucky was by no means play at that time. The whole country was nearly covered with forests, so thick with undergrowth of canes, pea vines, and creepers, that men could only make their way through them by following the buffalo tracks. The colonists were clad in deerskins and homespun woollen, and the clay-floored cabins possessed only a few wooden stools and a table and bed of rough-hewn boards as furniture. Even Dr. Spalding could remember the time when he rode six or eight miles to mass behind his grandmother, Alethia Spalding, a woman of remarkable courage, strength, and beauty, whom even Protestants recognized

as "a saint." Martin Spalding went to school, also in a log cabin, at eight years old, where he distinguished himself by learning the whole of the multiplication table in one day. The first Catholic College in Kentucky was St. Joseph's, at Bardstown, built in 1820, and Martin Spalding was educated in the second foundation, St. Mary's, which was opened near Lebanon in the following year. The account of this single undertaking of St. Mary's College is a story in itself. Father Byrne bought a farm, on which stood an old distillery; and to make this available for a college he was obliged to collect corn, pigs, and skins from the Catholics of the neighbourhood, and convert the produce into money with the most painful labour and difficulty. Having obtained a certain sum, he began the opus magnum of transforming the distillery, and worked either as a mason, carpenter, or common labourer himself throughout the operation. When the class-rooms and schools were ready, he gave out that he would teach any boys who came in exchange for wheat, bacon, or other such goods. The college was opened in 1821, and the very first pupils were the three young Spaldings, Martin and his two brothers. When everything had been finished, added to, and paid for, Father Byrne went on business to Louisville, and during his absence the college was burnt to the ground. He rode back, and looked at the smouldering ruins with a sorrowful face, which struck grief into the hearts of his pupils. But in a few months this brave man had again raised funds and means, and St. Mary's College was rebuilt on a much improved scale. This erection was also burnt down; and it was only the third building which lasted, and became the means of usefully educating a crowd of Kentucky Catholics.

Martin Spalding was soon distinguished by Father Byrne, and continued the singular story of St. Mary's, by becoming professor of mathematics at fourteen. Well-known men of science, surveyors, and professors of other colleges, visited St. Mary's to see this wonderful fact, and to puzzle the boy-professor with elaborate mathematical difficulties. But Martin, with his sweet, modest look and simple manner, asked only for a little time, and soon brought back his answers invariably correct. But, although at twenty no one in Kentucky could equal him in mathematics, he was not the least puffed up or spoilt. At that time, the diocese of Kentucky was filled by that true apostle of Western America, Bishop Flaget, another offshoot of the French missions, and a bishop thoroughly of the type of the great ecclesiastics of the seventeenth century in France. A man of the firmest faith and most unshaken principles, yet with more than a woman's tenderness and patience with his flock. Wherever there was a lowly place to be taken, or humbling work to be done, there was Bishop Flaget to be found, the lowliest and most cheerfully self-denying among all. His coadjutor, Bishop David, a learned man and great disciplinarian, lived with him in the seminary at Bardstown. Both bishops ate with the seminarists, and followed all the external rules. Bishop Kenrick was also a student in the Bardstown seminary, and other eminent men who afterwards well served the Church in America.

In 1830, Martin Spalding, then twenty years old, was sent to the Propa-

ganda College at Rome to finish his studies, and before he sailed, saw, at Baltimore, Charles Carroll, the last surviving hero of the War of Independence. Though then ninety-three, he was able to ride six or seven miles a day without being much tired.

It is worth noting how travellers to Rome fared in those days. Martin Spalding sailed first to Cadiz, where he waited a fortnight for a vessel to Marseilles, and as the wind fell, the vessel was becalmed for nearly a month off the Spanish coast. He was on the Mediterranean between Marseilles and Leghorn for a whole week, and from thence made his way through Florence and Sienna to Rome, a journey of just four months. It is characteristic of young Spalding that as the vacations had begun, and the Propagandists were *villeggiaturing* at Tivoli, he set himself to learn Italian there with such zeal, that by the end of the holidays he could speak it with some ease. He returned in November to the normal Propaganda life in Rome, and immediately took the full benefit of his opportunities. The studies, the professors, the society of so many known scholars of all nations, and the privilege of pleading or attacking in the public halls before the first Catholic judges in the world, were all fully appreciated by the Kentucky boy, now rapidly springing up to full growth of experience and the grace of real culture. His course was interrupted by a violent attack of cholera, which brought him to the edge of the grave ; but either the prayers and tears of Bishop Flaget or some other intercession, and his own perfect and joyful submission to the stroke, pleaded for him, and he was restored to health. He resumed his studies vigorously, and was presented with the gold medal. Young Spalding was certainly studying at Rome then under favourable conditions. Cardinal Reisach was rector of the Propaganda College, his Scripture professor was Cardinal Cullen, and he was so fortunate as to obtain the help of Fr. Pallotti as his own director, a man whose singular sweetness and tenderness of character gave a peculiar warmth and fragrance to his holy life. The two cardinals Mezzofanti and Mai were frequent visitors at the college, and Angelo Mai, who had not at that time the hat, presided several times at the public disputations in theology. Those who visited Rome under the pontificate of Gregory XVI. will easily recall those never-to-be-forgotten golden hours which shed

"The tender grace of a day that's dead"

over life in Rome before the coming of the storm. Martin there made his first acquaintance with the Jesuits, for whom he conceived a great veneration ; with Father Perrone, Theiner, Palma, and Dr. Wiseman, and treasured up for after use the precious things gleaned in his four Roman years. He returned to America in 1834, and at New York met Archbishop McCloskey, then a young man just starting for Rome, and at Philadelphia visited Dr. Kenrick, his life-long friend. Bishop Flaget was just setting out for Europe, and appointed Dr. Spalding (he had taken his doctor's degree) to the cathedral at Louisville, but in 1838 he removed as President of St. Joseph's College. At his request for a return to parish work, however, Bishop Flaget again removed him at the

end of two years, and gave him a church at Lexington. In 1841, the bishopric was removed from Bardstown to Louisville, and Dr. Spalding was placed at Bardstown as a kind of compensation to the people. His next office was that of Vicar-General, when nearly all the business of the diocese fell upon him, and in 1848 he became coadjutor to Bishop Flaget *cum jure successionis*. The account of the last joyful and peaceful death of that holy man soon afterwards is well worth reading, and, like his life, is a speaking commentary on the text, "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted"; for Bishop Flaget's one unflinching cry was, "*ma nullité, ma nullité!*" (my good-for-nothingness). Bishop David, at the age of eighty, had also preceded him to his rest, and Kentucky had thus lost its two great Fathers, who had been in truth pilgrims and strangers on earth while toiling as if it were to be their lasting home. Martin Spalding now became Bishop of Kentucky (Louisville), and nearly his first act was to put the Jesuits in possession of St. Joseph's College. He also established a house of Cistercian monks, another of nuns of the Good Shepherd, and opened missions to the wilder parts of his diocese. "For nearly a century and a half," says the narrator, "from the arrival of Lord Baltimore in 1634, down to the War of Independence, the faith was preserved among the Catholics of Maryland by the Jesuits . . . noble and disinterested men, whose praise is still in the Church, and whose memory will never be forgotten by the descendants of those to whom they secured the most priceless of all gifts." After the War of Independence the aspect of things necessarily changed, and as the hierarchy asserted itself more and more, the missionary condition of the country was exchanged for the ordinary, of the settled secular clergy and their flocks. In 1852, the new cathedral at Louisville was built and consecrated in the presence of two archbishops and eight bishops, with more than forty priests; and on the following day, what may without straining be called the relics of Bishop Flaget, were transferred to the crypt under the high altar.

In 1852, also, the first Plenary Council of Baltimore was held, and the Pope (Pius IX.) at its prayer created a new diocese, of Covington, in Kentucky, of which a Jesuit father (Carrell) was the first missionary Apostolic Bishop. At the close of the same year Bishop Spalding went to Europe, where he succeeded in obtaining some Xaverian Brothers for his schools, and laid the foundation of the American College at Louvain.

The usual consequences of unexampled religious development and prosperity soon made themselves visible, and the year 1855 was disgraced by the great Louisville riots and "Bloody Monday," when more than a hundred poor Catholics were murdered in the streets, or burnt in their own houses. The Civil War also dealt a great blow to the rising institutions in Kentucky, and in 1861 St. Joseph's College was closed for students, and turned into a hospital. Great part of the diocese, in fact, was covered with the Federal troops, and for a time was quite a seat of war. The Sisters of Charity nobly did their duty in nursing the wounded, and the well-known Superior, Mother Catherine Spalding, the Bishop's aunt, died while nursing the soldiers of the fever. The whole diocese was darkened by the conflict between the two armies, but the Bishop was everywhere to be found en-

couraging and helping his flock. He was grieved to leave it, when, on Archbishop Kenrick's death, in 1864, he was raised to the Archbishopric of Baltimore, the highest ecclesiastical dignity in the United States. Dr. Spalding took possession on the Feast of S. Ignatius Loyola, which he commented upon as a happy coincidence, S. Ignatius being the father of the Maryland missions. Nearly his first act was to found a house of Good Shepherd nuns at Baltimore, and he then entered upon the full visitation of every part of his diocese. That same winter the Pope put the diocese of Charleston, containing the two Carolinas, under his charge, as the war and fever had nearly destroyed the clergy, and the Bishop (Lynch), who had been in Europe, was blockaded out of his diocese. Dr. Spalding encountered and overcame innumerable difficulties in discharging his heavy duties to the Charleston diocese, and he was glad to be released from its weight to attend to his own. His next great act was to found the Baltimore Protectory, or Industrial Establishment for boys, which was opened in 1868. At the second Plenary Council of Baltimore, Dr. Spalding raised the question whether an American University should not be begun; but after deliberation, as a very large sum of money was required, it was decided that the time for such an undertaking was not come. At this Council it was also decided to petition the Pope for fifteen new dioceses and vicariates apostolic in the States, which fact speaks eloquently of the growth of the seed corn since the tangled Kentucky forests and log huts of Martin Spalding's childhood.

It is impossible to give any detailed account of his last labours and closing days; his going to Rome for the Jubilee in 1867, and his crossing the Atlantic again for the Vatican Council in 1869. The position which he was at first disposed to assume on the definition of infallibility, deserves far more attention than we have hitherto had an opportunity of giving it; but the present is certainly not such an opportunity. His noble letter to the Bishop of Orleans was nearly his last work, and he sank, fuller of labours than of days, in 1871. All Baltimore, without the slightest distinction of faith or colour, pressed round the catafalque on which the body lay, sincerely mourning for the Archbishop's death, and thousands of people followed him to the grave, where fourteen bishops and two hundred priests took part in laying Martin Spalding beside his friend, Archbishop Kenrick, in the crypt of the cathedral.

The Revival of Priestly Life in the 17th Century in France. By the Author of "A Dominican Artist." Rivingtons. 1873.

THIS book is by an Anglican lady, and professes to describe the revival of priestly life in France by De Berulle, De Coudren, Olier, and S. Vincent de Paul, at a time when the French Church was in "the most seemingly hopeless" state. We regret extremely that we cannot

recommend it to our readers, because it is full of historical and personal errors. These saintly men lived when the Church in France, far from being in a hopeless state, was animated by a spirit of extraordinary fervour; and the revival of priestly life had begun before they were born. Ranke dates it from the year 1562, when the Jesuits entered France. A few years later they were reinforced by the Capuchins and Cistercians. Missionaries preached wherever they could find hearers; Jesuit colleges were established; and the great men of the rising generation—including De Berulle, Olier, and, if we mistake not, De Coudren—studied in them. The secular clergy also, Ranke tells us, were “inspired by a new zeal,” and applied themselves to the care of souls; while the bishops urgently demanded the promulgation of the decrees of the Council of Trent. Again, our author tells us that De Berulle made “the first attempt at a—strictly speaking—theological college”; whereas the first seminary had been founded by the Cardinal of Lorraine about 1564, and several bishops had followed his example. She omits to mention that De Berulle’s seminaries failed, in common with all the others, and degenerated even in the lifetime of the founder into ordinary colleges, in which, and in mission and parochial work, his congregation laboured. Again, she tells us that the Oratorians were “a very bulwark of the faith”; whereas, even in the time of De Condren, they furnished Jansenism with several of its leaders. Quesnel, the successor of Arnould, sprang from their ranks; and the whole body was so infected that it was the subject of universal suspicion. Again, she mentions Malebranche among the worthy descendants of S. Philip Neri: ignoring the facts, that his spirit was purely Cartesian and rationalistic, and that his system of grace was censured at Rome, refuted by Fénelon, and condemned by Bossuet, who wrote across his “Treatise on Nature and Grace,” “*Pulchra, nova, falsa*” (beautiful, new, false). But her greatest blunder is in connection with S. Philip, whom she insists pertinaciously in connecting with the French Oratory; which did not even bear his name, but was called the Oratory of Jesus—a fact which she omits. All the Oratories of S. Philip Neri differ from the Oratories of Jesus in their work, which is confined to preaching and the administration of the Sacraments within their own churches, and to certain spiritual exercises which are kept up daily by the brotherhood of clergy and laity known by the name of “The Little Oratory.” Their spirit is so directly opposed to the highly intellectual picture which the writer gives us at page 39, that S. Philip forbade his sons to touch, when preaching, on questions of theology, and would not permit even Baronius to be engrossed by the great intellectual task which he had set him. Though we have not detected any positive misstatements in the biographies which she has undertaken to write, yet she completely omits the characteristics which give individuality to each. Who could recognize in her portraiture of De Berulle, him who said that Rome is “the place from which light comes to us”; who was so devoted to our Lady, that he was said to have taken, so to say, a new life in the Oratory; whose infused knowledge from his childhood was a marvel to all who conversed with him; and who was favoured with such mystic union with our Lord, that Pope Urban VIII. styled him

"the Apostle of the Incarnate Word." The extracts from De Condren's letters are interesting, but they are not so selected and supplemented as to give an adequate notion of him of whom M. Olier said that "what was seen of him was only an appearance and a shell, his interior being truly Jesus Christ and His hidden life; so that he was rather Jesus Christ living in F. de Condren than F. de Condren living in himself. He was like the Host on our altars; without one sees the accidents and appearance of bread, but within is Jesus Christ." Her description of M. Olier and his seminary is equally defective. She does not tell us that he dedicated his seminary to our Lady as its Queen, that he enjoined the students to feed their souls with the interior of Jesus in Mary, and to offer masses for her intentions. To omit such details is like offering to the public a lifeless skeleton from which the soul has been withdrawn; and it would be more fair, both to them and to saintly memories, if she were to devote her talents to the biography of members of her own communion, whom she can depict truthfully without shocking the religious susceptibilities of her readers.

Letters to and from Rome, in the years A.D. 61, 62, and 63. Selected and translated by C. V. S. London: Williams & Norgate.

THESE letters, as the author tells us, speak for themselves. They are meant to illustrate the way in which the character of our Lord and that of the early Christian Church were regarded by persons who only saw them from the outside. We have been greatly pleased with this little work, and think it likely to do a great deal of good. But we have one or two faults to find.

For instance (p. 37 and p. 57) S. Paul is represented as being in a state of persistent hostility with the leaders of the "Christian Society"; and it is said that he brought forward charges against S. James of persecuting him, and treating him unfairly. We cannot conceive how any pagan could have formed such an estimate of the relations between the two Apostles, any more than we can understand how any one writing, as Flavius, of the household of Lucius Postumius, is supposed to write to Rufinus of Corinth, could say that "the nominal leadership" of the Christians, after remaining for a time with Simon and John, passed into the hands of James. No one living at Jerusalem and witnessing those stirring scenes which are recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, could possibly form any other conclusion than that S. Peter was the head of the new-born Church. S. James would, we should have thought, have been looked upon simply as exercising that local ecclesiastical authority which he undoubtedly possessed; but Simon, who was called Peter, because he was the rock on which rested, as on a most sure foundation, all the Church's ecclesiastical system, must have been regarded as the only head.

So again, that Lucius Postumius at Rome should write to Septimius Varo at Cæsarea, to the effect that the God of the Jews was simply a local

god—like the gods of heathendom, we do not believe. L. Rubilius, he tells us, had brought him from Egypt one of the sacred books of the Jews. But we should have thought that, had he really read them, he would have found out that the God of the Jews had revealed Himself as gradually preparing *all* the nations of the earth to be taken into His arms. What was the promise made to Abraham, but a promise that he would make him, the faithful one, the father of many nations, and that in his faithful seed, in due time, all the nations should be blessed? Nor can we possibly conceive how any intelligent pagan who had read the sacred rolls of the Jews could think that their God was deaf to the voice of pity. Surely he could never have read the words—"O the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, patient and of much compassion, and true—who keepest mercy unto thousands,"—these words occurring in the Pentateuch. Of course we do not suppose that Septimius Varo had read the Psalms or the Prophets, otherwise he might have read there other words. "To Thee is the poor man left Thou art a helper to the orphan—He shall feed His flock like a shepherd, He shall gather together the lambs with His arm, He shall take them up into His bosom, and He Himself shall carry them that are with young." We say that we do not suppose Varo had read the Psalms or the Prophets, because he speaks of the sacred rolls, by which we understand the Law; but he might have done like the eunuch whom S. Philip instructed, when reading the prophet Isaias. But even the Pentateuch is full of hints of the tender loving-kindness of the God of the Jews in the midst of the terrible judgments necessary for a stiff-necked people.

We should also have thought that in any description of the crucifixion some mention ought to have been made of the darkness which covered the earth for three hours, when its Creator died. There is no fact better authenticated, and it must, as we know it did do in certain cases, have profoundly impressed a Pagan mind.

With these few adverse criticisms we cordially thank the author for his work.

Jesuits in Conflict. London: Burns & Oates. 1873.

THIS is the first of a series of publications illustrating the history of the Jesuits in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It contains the lives of Thomas Pounce and George Gilbert, gentlemen of property, who became lay-brothers in the Society, and of Father Darbyshire, nephew to Bonner and Dean of S. Paul's in Mary's reign. Pounce spent thirty years in ten or eleven different prisons. Gilbert was the founder of the Association, solemnly blessed by Gregory XIII. in April, 1580, and composed of laymen, who devoted themselves to receive and conceal priests, lead them in disguise through the country, supply all their wants, and help them in every possible way in their work. After Elizabeth's accession Father Darbyshire was sent to the Council of Trent by the English Catholics to inquire whether, under the most severe

compulsion, they might attend Protestant services; and he brought back the decision of the Fathers that it would be a very grave sin to do so. In 1563 he was received into the Society, and as the Jesuit missions to England did not begin till 1580, when he was above sixty, his labours as a Jesuit were confined to teaching in various colleges abroad. This volume contains interesting letters from Fathers Campion and Parsons, and Dr. Allen, founder of the colleges of Douay and Rheims. It also exhibits in a striking manner the supernatural fervour and indomitable courage which animated the martyrs and confessors, to whom Catholics are indebted for the preservation of their faith in England.

Regesta Pontificum Romanorum. Edidit AUGUSTUS POTTHAST. Opus ab Academia Litterarum Berolinensi Duplici Premio ornatum, ejusque subsidiis liberalissime concessis editum. Fasciculus I. Berolini: prostat in ædibus Rudolphi de Decker, Prototypographi Regii ab intimis. Londini: D. Nutt.

THIS is a most valuable collection of the Acts of the Roman Pontiffs from the year 1198 to the year 1304. The present number embraces the Pontificate of Innocent III., and contains a brief account of even the minutest acts of that most active of the supreme rulers of the Church of God. No ecclesiastical library should be without it.

History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany, viewed according to its fundamental movement, and in connection with the Religious, Moral, and Intellectual Life. By DR. J. A. DORNER, Oberconsistorialrath, and Professor of Theology at Berlin. Translated by the Rev. George Robson, M.A., Inverness, and Sophia Taylor. With a Preface to the Translation by the Author. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38, George Street. 1871. [In two volumes.]

IN these two handsome volumes an enterprising firm, already well and honourably known by its efforts to promote the study of anti-rationalistic Theological literature, presents the British Theology-reading public with a philosophical history of German Protestant Theology by one who is perhaps the most eminent of German Protestant divines. Dr. Dorner's History of Protestant Theology is obviously a work of immense research. The reader will find in it an amount of condensed and detailed information, which he will in vain seek in other quarters, respecting both earlier and more recent theological movements among the German Protestants, and especially among the Lutheran party. The author writes from an orthodox Lutheran standpoint. Of German Catholic Theology scarcely anything is said, probably because the Historical Commission of the Academy of Sciences at Munich, which intrusted to Dr. Dorner the composition of the

"History of Protestant Theology," intrusted to a Dr. Werner the composition of a companion or rival "History of Catholic Theology."

Dr. Dorner does not aim at writing a mere historical introduction to German Protestant Theological literature. He aspires to construct a philosophical history of Protestant Theology,—not merely to describe the events which have taken place, but also to analyze the forces that have produced them. He sets out by protesting that Protestantism is not, in mathematical language, a mere function of Catholicism, but that it has a distinct *raison d'être*; that it is not a hybrid, but a species with a life of its own. He therefore attempts, from the very history of Protestant Theology itself, to show in these volumes that Protestantism is not a chaos, but a homogeneous formation, and that the natural tendency of the *ensemble* of Protestant religious thought is towards, not the destruction, but the preservation, of Protestantism as a distinct form of religion.

This being Dr. Dorner's theory, it is easy to see what is the task which it imposes on him. In the first place he has to determine what the inner principle is, in which the (hidden) unity of Protestantism consists, in which also the key to its history and the reconciliation of its divisions are to be found. In the second place he has to justify the historical appearance of Protestantism, by showing that at the time of the Reformation a religion built round this inner principle was just what was required to set matters right. In the third place, he has to show that the subsequent history of Protestantism is not the history of a mere commotion and confusion—for that would indicate that it has no inner principle whatever—but the history of a *progress* having for its term not any system external to Protestantism, but a Protestantism determined by this fundamental principle of Protestantism. That which of these three objects is the primary and fundamental one, is to get hold of the fundamental principle of Protestantism, since by its use the other two objects are to be attained.

This supposes, in the first place, a typical Protestantism. It supposes further that this typical Protestantism is an organism of beliefs. It again supposes that its organic unity is dependent on some principle or principles which bind together the articles of the typical Protestant creed. If there is but one such principle, this is what we are seeking. If there is a plurality of principles, they must by the supposition be connected together, and the principle connecting them is the fundamental principle of Protestantism; for if they were not connected together, the organism of beliefs would not really be an organism, since one part of it could continue to exist healthily apart from the rest.

The train of thought which guided Dr. Dorner to his fundamental principle is easily to be accounted for. The mother-dogma of the Lutheran system of theology is the doctrine of justification by faith—the doctrine that a man is justified by an inward and divinely produced assurance that he is justified, and that Christ, whom Lutherans as such do not believe to have died for all, died at any rate for *him*. Luther therefore originated, and Schleiermacher has more recently revived, the view that "Holy Scripture is accredited to Evangelical Christians, not by rational proofs and historical evidences, but by a real experience of the act of redemption

through Christ.”* It is in this order of ideas that Dr. Dorner believes himself to have found the fundamental principle of Protestantism. He calls it the Evangelical Principle, and distinguishes in it a material side,—justification by faith, and a formal side,—Holy Scripture. As it would be too much of a *tour de force* to suppose that Protestantism has always been in the densest ignorance as to what its own fundamental principle is, he seeks to justify his speculation by appeal to the writings of Luther. Probably no living man better knows the mind of Luther than Dr. Dorner. In his theory of the Evangelical Principle others, moreover, have gone before him, so that it has more than a merely personal significance.

Luther's position is thus represented† by Dorner :—

Although the historical evidences of themselves give a certain probability to Holy Scripture, or at least to certain parts of it, its authority cannot be really sure to one not yet justified. Again, although Holy Scripture is not identical with the Word of God, it *de facto* contains it ; it is the star that leads to Christ, the swaddling-clothes in which He is wrapped, the historical record of His work and person. It is therefore the instrument by which God commences the work of justification. When the sinner, pondering on the picture drawn in Holy Scripture of Christ, comes thereby to a knowledge of the outward and historical Christ, God bestows on him saving or justifying faith. He now knows that Christ is *his* Redeemer personally, and that He died for him in particular ; and of this he is as certain as mankind at large are of intuitive truths. The eye perceives the forms and colours of a landscape, but it is for the mind, prepared and disciplined, to recognize its beauty ; so in like manner the natural man can study the Gospels, but the eye of faith alone can penetrate to the riches of Christ treasured up in them. Whoever is justified knows the kingdom of God and Christ as Redeemer, no longer merely from hearsay, or from the testimony of Scripture, or on the authority of others, but from his own personal experience : he confesses that He is indeed the Saviour of the world because he knows it of his own proper knowledge, having felt in himself the power of His redemption. Now, therefore, after he has been justified, and Christ has been subjectively revealed in him, he perceives from this personal and internal experience of his the truthfulness of the representation of Christ given in Holy Scripture. “Now only does there take place the proper attestation of the Holy Scriptures, of their SUBJECT MATTER, to our hearts, a divine assurance of the truth of that matter, kindled by God, through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and infinitely higher than a faith in the Scriptures which is only the acceptance of the ecclesiastical canon, and confidence in the decisions of the Church regarding the Scriptures.‡” It is thus the peculiar property of saving faith that it puts the believer into immediate relation with God, without any intermediary, whether Church, Scripture, or anything else. “I must have *God's* Word,” said Luther, “I will hear what *God* says.” According to him, consequently, the Catholic system errs by interposing the authority of the Church between the believer and Christ. *But it is equally an error to inter-*

* ii. 387.

† i. 230–254.

‡ i. 230.

pose the authority of Scripture between the believer and Christ. "The standpoint of the Waldensians, which believes in Christ on account of the Holy Scriptures, and in which faith, cut off by the Scriptures from immediate communion with Christ, would be delivered over to the legal standpoint,"* is consequently akin to Catholicism, and a falling away from the Reformation principle. Faith, in short, is not founded on Scripture. It on the contrary attests Scripture. For the essential subject-matter of Holy Scripture is Christ. And faith instinctively knows Christ, can alone find Him where He is, and detect that He is not where He is falsely pretended to be: faith, therefore, judges what is Scripture and what is not. The principle on which it judges whether a book is or is not really Scripture is, whether and how it is occupied with Christ. If it is not occupied with Christ, it ought to be excluded from the canon. If it is occupied with Christ, its worth is greater or less according as its representation of Christ corresponds more or less closely with the subjective view of Christ as Redeemer, which, according to the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith, is immediately infused into the soul by God. In this way faith traces out what is spoken by the Spirit, and, seeing in Scripture the reflection of herself, imputes inspiration to the holy men who composed it, and employs it for instruction and edification. When, therefore, our faith has judged what is truly inspired Scripture, Scripture becomes a rule by which we are guided. This judgment once passed, faith and Scripture by their internal correspondence furnish each a confirmation of the other. Faith points to Scripture, which is its objective counterpart. Scripture tells of faith, and causes the reader to perceive that it is necessary. Faith gains through Scripture a standing in the external world, without which it would remain merely subjective. Scripture is clear and perspicuous to faith, and awaits faith to unfold its meaning. Faith and Scripture together constitute the Evangelical Principle, of which faith is the material and Scripture the formal side.

The first observation we shall make on all this is that this new principle might be expected to work a revolution in the attitude assumed toward Holy Scripture. And it did so:—

"He [Luther] denied the canonicity of the Epistle of James, without, however, regarding it as spurious, and to this view he adhered. He occupied at least a similar position [with regard] to the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse, although he afterwards passed a more favourable judgment on the latter. He even says of a proof led [held] by the Apostle Paul in Galatians, that it is too weak to hold. It gives him no trouble to allow, that in external matters not only Stephen, but even the sacred authors, contain certain inaccuracies. So far as the Old Testament is concerned, its authority does not appear to him invalidated by the admission that several of these writings have passed through revising hands; what would it matter, he asks, in reference to the Pentateuch, if Moses did not himself write it? And in reference to the prophets he says, they studied Moses and one another; thus were their books originated, inasmuch as they wrote out their thoughts inspired by the Holy Spirit. If therefore these good and faithful teachers and searchers of the Scriptures sometimes

* i. 234.

built much hay, stubble, and wood along with the rest, and not pure gold, silver, and precious stones, still the foundation abides, the fire of the day shall consume the former; for in this way do we treat the writings of Augustine, &c. In the Old Testament he gives a particularly high place to Genesis; it is the fountain from which, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, all the later prophets flowed; amongst the historical books the books of Kings are far more to be believed than the books of Chronicles; Ecclesiastes is forged, and does not come from Solomon; is slipshod, &c. Even the book Esther he does not regard as canonical; he would that the books of Maccabees did not exist, for they are too Jewish and have much heathen rudeness.

"The canon has been formed by the Church; it may have erred in the adoption of a book Therefore the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, although the Church received them as canonical, are rejected from the canon. And even in reference to the New Testament, the series of writings received by him is determined by his critical judgment, and no small portion of them receives a secondary, deuterocanonical, position.

"This testing by means of faith may also lead to the result, that the one Scripture obtains a greater value than the other and exhibits a higher degree of inspiration For the above shows that he acknowledges in the Scriptures not only what is divine, but also what is human, and even what is wholly human. *There is thus most indubitably admitted by the German Reformer a difference between the Word of God and the Holy Scriptures, not merely in reference to the form, but also in reference to the subject matter.*" In the New Testament he calls the Gospel of John the alone and tender chief Gospel, far to be preferred to the other three, whilst the Epistles of Paul and Peter also stand far above these. In short, the Gospel and the First Epistle of John, the Epistles of Paul, and especially the Epistles to the Romans, Ephesians, and Galatians, and the First Epistle of Peter, these are the books which exhibit Christ and teach all that is necessary and saving for thee to know." (i. pp. 243, 244.)

One very important effect of the Evangelical Principle therefore is to unsettle the canon of Scripture. Secondly, it is implied in it that from a book being inspired as a whole it will not follow that each part of it is inspired. It may contain historical and other inaccuracies, like the works of "Augustine." As to the first conclusion, there has always been among continental Protestants a traditional uncertainty about the books of which Luther denied the canonicity. His denials paved the way for subsequent larger denials. As to the second conclusion, the theory of partial inspiration, deriving its principal support from difficulties of detail in harmonizing statements contained in Holy Scripture with each other or with real or supposed information gained from other sources—from historical records, or from physical science—is gaining ground, and will in all probability continue to gain ground, in proportion as these difficulties of detail gradually become—as they inevitably must become—more generally known among those whose religious system is otherwise too weak to withstand the shock thus given. We need not therefore be surprised that it should have found favour with many British non-Catholics who have devoted themselves to the special study of Holy Scripture. We have here to note that it arose out of the "Reformation," and was not a merely

* The Italics are Dr. Dorner's.

accidental phenomenon. That Luther played fast and loose with Holy Scripture,—that he boldly denied what was not to his taste, that he declared the history of Jonah to be monstrous and incredible, the Epistle to the Hebrews to contain a mixture of wood, straw, and hay, the Epistle of S. James to be an Epistle of straw, and the Epistle of S. Jude to allege “stories” which have no place in Scripture,—all this is too well known to need any comment. His flippant and superficial criticisms, and the attitude of superiority which he assumed toward the Sacred writings, have, through the influence which his name has always possessed with his fellow-countrymen, been a source and a protection of the destructive biblical criticism which has made Germany notorious as the principal seat of the war against Jesus Christ. But this might have been merely an accident in the Reformation movement, attributable to the principal Reformer’s well-known violence and impatience of temper. What is specially to be remarked in Dorner’s representation is, therefore, the close connection which he points out between Luther’s attitude toward Holy Scripture and his doctrine of justification by faith alone. For this connection shows that the disease was not functional merely, but organic. And the *status* of the doctrine of justification by faith in the Lutheran system is, according to its founder, such that the disease could be cured only by killing the patient. “*De hoc articulo cedere, aut aliquid contra illum largiri, nemo piorum potest, etiamsi celum et terra et omnia corruant. Nam in hoc articulo sita sunt omnia, quæ contra diabolum et mundum universum in tota vita nostra testamur et agimus.*”*

The second observation that we have to make is, that this same doctrine of justification by faith lies at the root of the extreme importance ascribed by Luther to his own utterances and to the utterances of those who agreed with him. For it is “faith” that, according to him, accredits Holy Scripture; and when any one is listening to declarations coming from a man who has “faith,” and coming from the “faith” which he has, he is listening to the pure Word of God, which he can find only mixed and adulterated in Holy Scripture. “We must stand,” he says, speaking of preaching, “in such certainty of God’s working and speaking in us, that our faith can say, What I have spoken and done, that God has done and spoken.” “Faith delivers from being in tutelage under teachers, for believers should have themselves judicial power; faith is master, judge, and rule, of all doctrine and prophecy.”† This is the *spiritus privatus* of Luther, which is a very different thing from private judgment, as the term is now used. That he held or fought for the doctrine of private judgment is an entire misconception; that doctrine, moreover, is contrary to the spirit of his whole system, which supposes that human reason is powerless as to divine things.

Our third observation regards Dr. Dorner’s section‡ on “the essential independence of the Holy Scriptures in respect of faith and the Church.” As to this it is to be noted that if, according to Luther, Scripture and faith correspond, this so only because faith (in his peculiar sense of the word faith) has previously excluded all that does not correspond with itself.

* i. 263.

† i. 241.

‡ i. 245–249.

Under these circumstances "Scripture" becomes a word of double meaning. In the first place, it may signify the entire contents of the Bible from Genesis to the Apocalypse, and in this sense it is not all inspired, but contains errors, fables, &c. In the second place, it may mean certain portions and aspects of Holy Scripture, judiciously selected from the rest by the principle of faith; and it is in this sense that he declares Holy Scripture to be inspired, authoritative, and self-consistent. He could therefore on the one hand lay it down that "it is impossible that the Scriptures should contradict themselves." On the other hand, either from forgetfulness, or playing on this verbal ambiguity, he could counsel his disciples that any of them who might be pressed from Scripture by a Catholic ought to say, "Thou art almost a bully with the Scriptures," "Thou bringest out of them what is not altogether the best portion." "Boast away of the servant (Holy Scripture); I, however, glory in Christ." "I care not the slightest jot for all the expressions of Holy Scripture, to set up the righteousness of works and to lay down the righteousness of faith."*

Here a further observation naturally occurs. If Holy Scripture, we have seen, should venture to contradict Martin Luther,—then so much the worse for Holy Scripture. He will turn round on it straight, and abuse it like a pickpocket. From Holy Scripture we are referred back to the principle of faith. To the principle of faith in the last resort we always come. And appeal to the Lutheran principle of justifying faith is essentially an appeal to internal evidence. On internal evidence, therefore, according to this account of the genesis of belief in Christianity, the Lutheran system is essentially grounded, so that if the value of internal evidence be lowered, that system must of necessity fall into confusion. Into confusion, then, it must fall. Not only is it an appeal to internal evidence but it is an appeal to internal evidence of a very peculiar character, possessed only by certain persons, incapable of being imparted by them to others, and equally incapable of being evaluated by any application of psychological science which it is possible for mankind at large or for sceptics in particular to make or judge of. In an age in which the strength of the religious ideas was as yet comparatively immense, religion might be made to rest on subjective feelings and assurances, without unbelief being the immediate result. But to give it such a foundation in a time like the present is to exhibit it as hanging in the air, deprived of any visible and tangible support. And if an appeal to internal evidence should fail Lutheranism, whither can it turn for assistance? For we find the external evidences in the hands of Lutheran orthodoxy incompetent to support the inspiration of even the four Gospels in the sense ordinarily given to the word inspiration. If it be said that a religion must rest on internal evidences, it may justly be replied that such evidences are secondary and auxiliary; and are, moreover, of a character more verifiable than those which the Lutheran system would, if it were true, supply.

The "Evangelical Principle" is inadequate to perform the functions of a fundamental principle of Protestantism; it is not true; and no consist-

ent universal system can be built up from a false principle. Nor does actual Protestantism even tend toward its adoption ; the stream is flowing in quite another direction. The complexus of Protestant doctrines cannot be naturally arranged with the doctrine of justification by faith as their logical centre.

Dr. Dorner's narrative, as is often the case with German writers, is deeply coloured by his own subjectivity. His account of the progress of Rationalism is not so full as might have been desired. And while we have no reason for believing that with regard to the history of Protestant Theology in Germany his readers will find him other than a fairly trustworthy guide, they will find him a very untrustworthy one with regard to Scholasticism, of which he treats in the First Book of his History, designing to show that his so-called Evangelical Principle was needed at the time of the Reformation.

First Principles. By HERBERT SPENCER. Third Edition. London : Williams & Norgate, 14, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden. 1870.

HERBERT SPENCER is now engaged in publishing a series of works which when complete are to form a "System of Philosophy." "Philosophy" he defines to mean unified knowledge,—knowledge of the highest degree of generality ; knowledge, not belonging to any one science exclusively, but, directly or indirectly, obtained by fusing together the contributions received from all the special sciences. Each science, working within its own sphere, by successive generalizations, of which the first are drawn from individual facts, reaches at last largest generalizations, beyond which *it*—that particular science—cannot go ; and therefore at last presents us with facts and laws which are *to it* ultimate, inasmuch as *it* cannot account for them. The assemblage of special sciences, consequently, presents us with an assemblage of laws and facts which are ultimate to the sciences to which they respectively belong ; and it is the business of Philosophy properly so called to generalize among the ultimate facts themselves, and so to discover those which are ultimate, not merely to this or that special science, but to all human knowledge. A complete system of Philosophy would consist of their exposition (General Philosophy) and their application to the special sciences (Special Philosophy).*

This volume, which derives its title from the ultimates or *First Principles* which it is intended to indicate, is the first of the series, and contains Mr. Spencer's "General Philosophy." Of the "Special Philosophy," "The Principles of Biology" and "The Principles of Psychology" are already published. The publication of "The Principles of Sociology" and "The Principles of Morality" will complete the series so far as Mr. Spencer intends himself to complete it : for he proposes to pass over the application of the First Principles to the sciences of inorganic nature, because their admission would have

* *First Principles*, "Philosophy Defined," pp. 127-134.

made the plan too extensive, and because the application to the sciences of organic nature is of more immediate importance.*

There are then, according to Mr. Spencer, certain ultimate principles of things, and consequently of our knowledge of them. His views about these he unfolds in the *second* part † of the present volume,—for before he comes to them, he has a previous question to determine. What lies beneath these first principles themselves? From what region do they emerge? What is the unseen foundation on which the superstructure of knowledge rests? He replies that it is the unknowable. By the unknowable, moreover, he means a real being. He does not mean to assert the mere truism that our knowledge is limited, and that what we cannot know is unknowable. The first part of “First Principles,” entitled “The Unknowable,” ‡ treats of this real being, the *nature* of which we cannot know, on the *existence* and *incomprehensibility* of which it is the business of *religion* to insist.

For he does not hold that religion is an invention of priests, and could very well be dispensed with. On the contrary, since in every error there is a soul of truth, in the religions which exist or have existed,

“Some essential verity must be looked for. To suppose that these multi-form conceptions should be one and all *absolutely* groundless, discredits too profoundly that average human intelligence from which all our individual intelligences are inherited.

“This most general reason we shall find enforced by other more special ones. To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the same class have some common foundation in fact, must in this case be added a further presumption derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs. Religious ideas of one kind or other are almost if not quite universal. Even should it be true, as alleged, that there exist tribes of men who have nothing approaching to a theory of creation—even should it be true that only when a certain phase of intelligence is reached do such ideas make their appearance; the implication is practically the same. Grant that among all races who have passed a certain stage of intellectual development, there are found vague notions concerning the origin and hidden nature of surrounding things; and there arises the inference that such notions are necessary products of progressing intelligence. Their endless variety serves but to strengthen the conclusion; showing as it does a more or less independent genesis; showing how, in different places and times, like conditions have led to similar trains of thought, ending in analogous results. That these countless different, and yet allied, phenomena, presented by all religions, are accidental or factitious, is an untenable supposition. A candid examination of the evidence quite negatives the doctrine maintained by some, that creeds are priestly inventions. Even as a mere question of probabilities it cannot rationally be concluded that in

* The application to the sciences of inorganic nature might easily be filled in afterwards by other hands. And “in anticipation of the obvious consideration that the scheme [even as] here sketched out is too extensive, it may be remarked that an exhaustive treatment of each topic is not intended; but simply the establishment of *principles*, with such illustrations as are needed to make their bearings fully understood.” (Preface, p. xiv.) Hence the titles “First Principles,” “Principles of Biology,” “Principles of Psychology,” &c.

† First Principles, Part II., “The Knowable,” pp. 127–558.

‡ Pp. 1–123. Cf. DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1873, pp. 244, 245.

every society, past and present, savage and civilized, certain members of the community have combined to delude the rest, in ways so analogous. To any who may allege that some primitive fiction was devised by some primitive priesthood, before yet mankind had diverged from a common centre, a reply is furnished by philology; for philology proves the dispersion of mankind to have commenced before there existed a language sufficiently organized to express religious ideas.* Moreover, were it otherwise tenable, the hypothesis of artificial origin fails to account for the facts. It does not explain why, under all changes of form, certain elements of religious belief remain constant. It does not show us how it happens that while adverse criticism has gone on from age to age destroying particular theological dogmas, it has not destroyed the fundamental conception underlying these dogmas. It leaves us without any solution of the striking circumstance that when, from the absurdities and the corruptions accumulated around them, national creeds have fallen into general discredit, ending in indifferentism, or positive denial, there has always by-and-by arisen a re-assertion of them, if not the same in form, still the same in essence. Thus the universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to admit that if not supernaturally derived, as the majority contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organized.

"Should it be asserted that religious ideas are products of the religious sentiment, which, to satisfy itself, prompts imaginations that it afterwards projects into the external world, and by-and-by mistakes for realities; the problem is not solved, but only removed further back. Whether the wish is father to the thought, or whether sentiment and idea have a common genesis, there equally arises the question—whence comes the sentiment? That it is a constituent in man's nature is implied by the hypothesis; and cannot indeed be denied by those who prefer other hypotheses. And if the religious sentiment, displayed habitually by the majority of mankind, and occasionally aroused even in those seemingly devoid of it, must be classed among human emotions, we cannot rationally ignore it. We are bound to ask its origin and its function. Here is an attribute which, to say the least, has had an enormous influence,—which has played a conspicuous part throughout the entire past, as far back as history records, and is at present the life of numerous institutions, the stimulus to perpetual controversies, and the prompter of countless daily actions. Any theory of things which takes no account of this attribute, must, then, be extremely defective. If with no other view, still as a question in philosophy, we are called on to say what this attribute means; and we cannot decline the task without confessing our philosophy to be incompetent.

"Two suppositions only are open to us: the one that the feeling which responds to religious ideas resulted, along with all other human faculties, from an act of special creation; the other that it, in common with the rest, arose by a process of evolution. If we adopt the first of these alternatives, universally accepted by our ancestors and by the immense majority of our contemporaries, the matter is at once settled: man is directly endowed with the religious feeling by a creator; and to that creator it designedly responds.

* What amount of religious knowledge was communicated to the non-immediate descendants of Noë it is of course impossible to ascertain; but, so far as we are aware, it has not been proved that the first languages, which we know only by their *débris*, were incapable of communicating religious knowledge, which, as the visible world takes up most of the attention of the majority of mankind, is communicated by using non-religious words in secondary religious meanings.

If we adopt the second alternative, then we are met by the questions—What are the circumstances to which the genesis of the religious feeling is due? and—what is its office? We are bound to entertain these questions; and we are bound to find answers to them. Considering all faculties, as we must on this supposition, to result from accumulated modifications caused by the intercourse of the organism with its environment, we are obliged to admit that there exist in the environment certain phenomena or conditions which have determined the growth of the feeling in question; and so are obliged to admit that it is as normal as any other faculty. Add to which, that as, on the hypothesis of the development of lower forms into higher, the end to which the progressive changes directly or indirectly tend, must be adaption to the requirements of existence; we are also forced to infer that this feeling is in some way conducive to human welfare. Thus both alternatives contain the same ultimate implication. We must conclude that the religious sentiment is either directly created, or is created by the slow action of natural causes; and whichever of these conclusions we adopt, requires us to treat the religious sentiment with respect.

“One other consideration should not be overlooked—a consideration which students of science especially need to have pointed out. Occupied as such are with established truths, and accustomed to regard things not already known as things to be hereafter discovered, they are liable to forget that information, however extensive it may become, can never satisfy inquiry. Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the whole region of possible thought. At the uttermost reach of discovery there arises, and must ever arise, the question—What lies beyond? As it is impossible to think of a limit to space so as to exclude the idea of space lying outside that limit; so we cannot conceive of any explanation profound enough to exclude the question, What is the explanation of that explanation? Regarding science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may say that every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience. There must ever remain, therefore, two antithetical modes of mental action... There can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion. (“First Principles,” pp. 13-17.)

Naturam expellas furca, &c.: but if the religious sentiment is a normal sentiment, “the unknowable,” to a certainty, is not its object. It is impossible for any one who is not committed to a theory to believe that the religious sentiment, as it exists in the world, and as it is portrayed in the foregoing passage, can possibly be satisfied by Mr. Spencer’s brand new Deity; and if the unknowable cannot satisfy it, the religious sentiment is religious, not irreligious in the least, in maintaining that God is knowable. Mr. Spencer thus explains his position:—

“We are told that ‘it is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite.’ That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said... This which will seem to most an essentially irreligious position, is an essentially religious one, nay, is *the* religious one, to which, as already shown, all others are but approximations. In the estimate it implies of the ultimate cause, it does not fall short of the alternative position, but exceeds it. Those who espouse this alternative position make the erroneous assumption that the choice lies between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between personality and something higher. Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will, as these transcend mechanical motion? It is true that we are utterly unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its

existence ; it is rather the reverse . . . Is it not proved that this incompetency is the incompetency of the conditioned to grasp the unconditioned ? Does it not follow that the ultimate cause cannot in any respect be conceived by us, because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived ?* And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations but degradations ? Indeed it seems somewhat strange that men should suppose the highest worship to lie in assimilating the object of their worship to themselves . . . Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious . . . The attitude assumed can be fitly represented only by further developing a simile long current in theological controversies—the simile of the watch. If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness ; and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined like its own, by springs and escapements ; we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did not venture so to formulate it, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further." ("First Principles," pp. 108-111.)

Let us not refuse to recognize the "soul of truth" these is in this passage. Extremes lead to extremes. Writers and preachers in this country have too much accustomed themselves to represent God as—if we may use a somewhat irreverent expression for the sake of its clearness—a magnified man. Decline of properly theological study has naturally resulted in the exaggeration of the *conceptus univocus Dei*. Herbert Spencer exaggerates† the old opinion of the *conceptus equivocus Dei*,—probably without being aware that there ever was such an opinion. The intermediate opinion of the *conceptus analogicus Dei* excludes whatever is false, and includes whatever is true, in these pronouncements of his ; and alone meets, in the opinion of the present writer, the difficulties of the case.

Let us now briefly glance at the course of argument which has led Mr. Spencer to these conclusions. In creating an essentially complete system of philosophy it was obviously imperative on him to treat of the fundamental question of certainty. This he accordingly does. We cannot, he says, build up a philosophical system from a few axiomatic propositions, as most metaphysicians attempt to do : for every thought involves a whole system of thoughts. We must *provisionally* assume that those ideas without which our intelligence can no more stir than the body can move without using its limbs, are true ; leaving the assumption to be justified by the results ; justification by results being the test of valid human knowledge. For truth is agreement between the faint manifestations which we call ideas, and the vivid manifestations [things objectively existing]

* Why so ? How can it be proved that the unconditioned is higher than the conditioned, if the unconditioned is unknowable ?

† *Exaggerates* : for those who held this opinion did not stretch it so far as to say that God might very well be the soul of the world, the substance of all things, the force that works through nature, &c.

of which they are presumed to be copies.* Ideas are either real or symbolic. A real conception purports to be a copy of the *res*, the thing itself; it is a mental picture of it. A symbolic conception is an idea of some symbol of the thing, as when we fail in mentally representing a large number, and think, instead, of the figures by which it is conventionally symbolized. A real conception, therefore, is justified immediately, by its correspondence with the vivid manifestations of which it purports to be a truthful though feeble representation: but as symbolic conceptions do not immediately correspond to things, they cannot be justified in the same way. But sometimes, at least by an indirect and cumulative process of thought, they can be *developed*—using *developed* as it is used by photographers—into real conceptions. Sometimes they can be justified by the fulfilment of predictions based on them. It follows that if a symbolic conception can neither be translated into a real conception, nor be justified by fulfilment of predictions, it cannot be justified at all. Such conceptions are consequently, in Mr. Spencer's phraseology, *unthinkable*; they are altogether vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions. However attractive or apparently consistent an argument in which they are inherent may be, it must be abandoned as invalid *ab initio*, and transcending the nature of the human faculties.†

Here is our test, then; it remains to apply it. Are there any unthinkable symbolic ideas? In what regions of (so-called) thought do they lie? How is their existence to be explained? What is the bearing of the whole matter on the nature of that which can, and of that which can not be known? The answer is that there are unthinkable symbolic ideas, because ultimate religious ideas—ideas respecting the nature of God and the origin of the created universe—are unthinkable, and show themselves to be so, not only negatively, but positively, by the contradictions which emerge when we endeavour to develop them into real conceptions.‡ But let not science, hearing this, boast herself against religion: for the ultimate scientific ideas of space, time, matter, motion, and force, ideas respecting these, the ultimates of science considered in themselves, are equally unthinkable.§ The explanation of this is to be found in the principle of the relativity of knowledge;|| from this principle, and from the nature of these ultimate ideas, results the only possible theory of the knowable and the unknowable; and this is the basis of the only possible reconciliation between Religion and Science.¶

It would be impossible for us within the limits assigned to us to attempt any detailed criticism of these positions; much less would it be possible to examine one by one the metaphysical puzzles which Mr. Spencer regards as insoluble contradictions, and brings forward in proof that ultimate ideas are unthinkable. A few general observations are all that we shall offer.

The metaphysician starts with necessary beliefs; nor is it any argument

* "The Data of Philosophy," pp. 135-157.

† Pp. 25-29, "Ultimate Religious Ideas."

‡ Pp. 30-46, "Ultimate Religious Ideas."

§ Pp. 47-67, "Ultimate Scientific Ideas."

|| "The Relativity of all Knowledge," pp. 68-97.

¶ "The Reconciliation," pp. 98-123.

against him that they include a number of things which he does not profess to include. He does not exclude their implication. He merely abstracts from them, in order to fix his attention on one thing at once; and this will not prove that justification by results is the ultimate test of the validity of all human knowledge. It is *a* test; and for some knowledges.* But it is not *the* test. The deeper test is consequence from necessary beliefs. Further, the foundation of the argument by which the unthinkableness of ultimate ideas is proved is a confusion between thought and imagination. Mr. Spencer's real conceptions are simply phantasmata or imaginations. His theory on the justification of conceptions would stand, if justification by results were the ultimate test; but as it is consequence from necessary beliefs, it will not. Then, again, the alleged contradictions are mere fallacies, and, sometimes, fallacies very easy of detection. Thus we are told that a Necessary Being is unthinkable; for that infinite past time is unthinkable, and a Necessary Being is a Being who has existed through infinite past time.† It is true that we cannot form a mental picture of infinite past time. Is it like-wise nothing to the point. To one who accepts the scholastic definition of eternity, the whole argument, indeed, is beside the point. And even to one who rejects the Scholastic definition, the question is, not, can I imagine infinite past time? but, can I believe in it? In another place‡ we are told that an end of consciousness *a parte post* is unthinkable; because to form a conception of it would be to think of ourselves as contemplating the cessation of the last state of consciousness, which is absurd, implying the continuance of consciousness at its cessation. But, although we cannot *imagine* an end of consciousness, in the sense in which Mr. Spencer here requires us to do so, when people wake up after a sound sleep they have no difficulty in believing that there has for the time at least been an end of consciousness. In fact, adequate explanation of the differences between cognition, imagination, and belief would of itself be a sufficient refutation of great part of Mr. Spencer's "Philosophy."

Mr. Spencer also builds much on the Theory or Philosophy of the conditioned; a speculation of Sir William Hamilton's, which, as far as its general character is concerned, was apparently suggested by contemplation, firstly, of the so-called antinomies or contradictions which according to Kant necessarily emerge when we push speculative *a priori* reasonings beyond the limits of experience, and secondly, of the idea, the germ of which was also given by Kant, that thoughts and things move, as it were, in a sort of trichotomy or triple movement. The fundamental position of the Philosophy of the Conditioned is that "all positive thought lies between two extremes, neither of which we can conceive as possible, and yet, as mutual contradictions, one or the other we must recognize as true." The metaphysical puzzles which Sir William used as proofs of this position are largely utilized by Mr. Spencer, whose "System of Philosophy" could be adequately considered only by treating pretty fully of the "Philosophy of the Conditioned,"

* Only for such knowledges as are anticipations of nature—if anticipations of nature can be called knowledges.

† P. 31.

‡ P. 62.

and also of the "Relativity of Knowledge," and its bearings on the unknowableness of the "Absolute,"—of which also he makes much.

Of the second part of "First Principles," "The Knowable," we can of necessity give only the merest outline. It has been seen that the Knowable is divisible into faint or subjective, and vivid or objective manifestations; and of these the former are the subject matter of Subjective Psychology, while the latter are the subject matter, partly and under some aspects of Psychology, partly of the other sciences. On further analysis the vivid manifestations are redvisible into Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force-manifestations. Ulterior analysis again discloses the fact that these are all reducible to Force-manifestations,—to manifestations of a persistent Force. The faint or mental manifestations also are manifestations of the same force. And finally it is shown that the Indestructibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, the Persistence of Relations among Forces, the Transformation and Equivalence of Forces, the law that motion takes place along the line of least resistance, and the law that wherever there is motion there is a rhythm in that motion, are corollaries from "the ultimate of ultimates," the parent of the four other ultimate scientific ideas, Force, the Persistence of Force. Arguments and illustrations in support of these assertions—which we recite, without, therefore agreeing with all of them, occupy the first and analytical division of the second part of "First Principles." * Mr. Spencer, it may be observed, holds the metaphysical theory of force; and his Philosophy would therefore be regarded by a Comtist as belonging to an imperfect and transitory stage of human thought. He believes that the real force is something behind the movements; and that this something is the unknowable itself.

In the second and synthetical division † he proceeds to consider the subject of Evolution. It is the business of Science to explain, relatively, the origin and destination of the Universe; and the answer of Science is that not only the Universe as a whole, but also each part of it in detail, is subjected to the two opposed principles of Evolution and Dissolution. Evolution he defines to mean "an integration of matter with concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." The formation of the inorganic world from a nebula, the genesis of life, the advance from lower forms to higher by means of Natural Selection and other agencies, the genesis and growth of intelligence, the progress of societies, of civilization, of arts and sciences, of morals, of religion, are in the eyes of Herbert Spencer but illustrations of the more general fact of Evolution and Dissolution.—This, we need not say, is the Evolution theory formulated after a particular manner. It is open to the general arguments against Evolutionism, and to other special arguments besides; and ought, as it is propounded by Mr. Spencer, to be considered in connection with his doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge.

In a third division ‡ he proceeds to interpret the law of Evolution; and

* Pp. 135-271.

† Pp. 272-396.

‡ Pp. 397-559.

arrives at conclusions which are certainly general enough, but are not attained by the means commonly used to discover universal and ultimate laws of nature. They may therefore very well be generalizations of facts not alike in character, but depending on agencies fundamentally different. The reader, while he cannot fail to admire the command of facts and richness of illustration which make Mr. Spencer's works pre-eminently interesting, will observe the frequent occurrence in them of the old and unsatisfactory induction by simple enumeration.

Henry Fothergill Chorley. Autobiography, Memoir, and Letters, compiled by HENRY G. HEWLETT. 2 vols. London: R. Bentley & Son. 1873.

IT is very possible that three-fourths of the readers of this Review may never have heard the name of Chorley. His was a celebrity that was much confined to two, out of the many worlds which make up the universe of the reading public, namely, that of the criticism of literature and of music. People glance over articles, which, however honestly written by their authors, are hardly expected to live over the week, and they take no further interest about them. Henry Fothergill Chorley was for many years a principal contributor to the "Athenæum," especially in the department of music, and left sufficient impression on the minds of the society in which he lived to justify an unpretending, but still painstaking and rather elaborate biography of him. A good deal of it is made up from his own papers, and the whole throws some light on the literary history of the generation, now rapidly passing away, which was distinguished by names like Dickens, Talfourd, Barry Cornwall, and their contemporaries in the field of literature, and such as Mendelssohn, Moscheles, Pasta, Grisi, and many more in that of music. H. F. Chorley was born in 1808, of Quaker parents, but of an ancient stock, for many descents Catholic, at Blackley Hurst, in Lancashire, a house belonging to the Catholic family of the Gerards. The Chorleys were ruined as landed gentry by the Stuart troubles in the last century, and latterly had been engaged in business pursuits. A long account is given of the character and ways of the good folks that surrounded his early years, strongly-marked provincial people particularly remarkable, it appears, for their love of the marvellous, Henry Chorley's own early sweets and bitters, are also described, the latter chiefly consisting in the not small disadvantage of belonging to a Quaker family, which was not hearty in its adherence to Quakerism, and of his tastes being so little understood by his friends, that they placed him in a mercantile house in Liverpool, to which he looked back, all his life after with a kind of horror as a dreary slavery, however softened by some congenial intimacies. His recollections of the religious atmosphere of his childhood and youth are worth extracting:—

Over all these original, imperfectly-educated persons, the ordinances and usages of the Society of Friends hung like a pall of conformity, heavy enough to inspire them with certain characteristics, but so oppressive as to make escape and insincerity inevitable. It would be difficult to conceive a worse education for mind and heart. On the one side, a narrow, ascetic, mystical sectarianism, including the minute formalities of discipline, but

not including the rallying-points of an established creed ; on the other, worldly pursuits and pleasures partaken of by snatches, without those safeguards which good-breeding and good manners substitute for higher moral principle and precept among people of the world (vol. i. p. 18).

He appears to have been particularly disgusted with the personality that was thrown into Quaker preaching, the "accepted ministers" reproving the disaffected in unmistakable terms. An instance of such lecturing had occurred even at the funeral of his uncle, when, "a hard, harsh, ignorant man" administered a severe rebuke to Mr. Chorley and others who had left the society. In fact, it seems his family had only nominally belonged to it, and from infancy he had seen its statutes evaded, for his mother "painted flowers and practised music." This simple expression throws a flood of light on the narrowness of the system ; but, however narrow, we quite agree with Mr. Chorley that to live in habitual disobedience to any rule of life that in some way or other was acknowledged by the conscience, at least whilst they remained under it, must have been, morally and religiously, very injurious. In his case, though he grew up a rigidly honest and honourable man, we look in vain through these pages for a trace of religion, except to the limited extent of inferring he was not a sceptic. There may of course have been positively religious feelings in Mr. Chorley, and we are far from passing an adverse judgment, merely because there is a silence on the subject, still the impression is unavoidable. One reminiscence of his childhood is remarkable. There was a character whom he regarded with extreme curiosity and interest—an *ex-Catholic* priest, who had left the Jesuits' college at Douai, embraced Protestantism, escaped during the first Revolution, and used to amuse the tea-parties frequented by young Chorley with a set and oft-repeated narrative of his escape. Thus family traditions, and local associations must have combined to make the future man of letters *advert* to the great question, but everything had acted, it must be supposed, the wrong way. He early displayed a passion for art, painting at first, and afterwards music, and for some years rose habitually with daylight that he might have time for painting before he betook himself "to the abominable school, or the detestable counting-house." His family were not qualified to interpret these signs of the career he ought to have pursued, and his temperament seems to have permanently suffered in consequence. However, his residence at Liverpool threw him in the way of hearing first-rate music, and it rapidly grew into the object of his enthusiastic devotion. He joined a musical society of amateurs, and made many valuable friends. He began to contribute to annuals, and his future profession seemed to draw him towards it, as is always the case with men of marked and decided bent. There is a very interesting anecdote of his delight on reading a translation of some musical criticisms of Hoffmann. He exclaimed, "That is what *I* can do, and what *I will* do." He obtained, when about 22, an introduction to Mr. Dilke, the late well-known editor of the "Athenæum," was engaged by him as contributor and sub-editor, at but a very moderate salary at first, soon made himself useful and necessary, and regularly maintained his connection with that journal till a few years before his death. He added to this literary profession the composition of

many independent works, novels, dramas, &c., which never were very successful. What seemed rather hard to be borne by human nature was, that the "Athenæum" itself did not indulge its faithful servant with a puff, or hesitate even to administer him a little wholesome castigation, on an occasion when his literary attempts seemed to require it, for it was a principle with that journal that its own contributors were to fare just like the other slaves of the lamp. There could be no objection to a rule so obviously just, except that it would appear to have been applied with greater severity to them than to those without, which the biographer compares to the children of a conscientious, or rather a scrupulous schoolmaster getting less indulged even than the other boys. It was, however, erring on the safe side, and the extent to which the wretched system of puffing had been carried at the time the "Athenæum" became conspicuous, needed some severe remedy. At the present day the evil seems greater than ever. We have only to look at those sugary morsels of recommendation that accompany the advertisements of books, to see that about as much trust is to be reposed on the sentences of the common run of reviews as on the judgments on men's lives which we read in the records of tombstones. Of a man who resisted this temptation, and set the example of honesty in this important department, we can certainly say, so far, *Nec virit malè*. His uncompromising strictness of criticism sometimes provoked a degree of spite and rage that is almost incredible. Thus, from some disappointed author, he once got an anonymous letter, beginning, "You Worm!" and on another occasion, Mr. Robert Montgomery's "Luther" having been sharply reviewed in the "Athenæum," but not by Chorley, who had not even seen the book, he had the following agreeable note:—

Be sure your sin will find you out! One who is well acquainted with Mr. Chorley's infamous trade of defamation and envy against his betters, in the "Athenæum," commends the enclosed to his conscience. If not yet too indurated, it will suggest moral justice to a mean and malignant trader in literature!

As a musical critic, his biographer tells us that in the last twenty years of his life, his judgment seems to have been accepted by the first musicians of England as that of a thoroughly competent authority, and the letters addressed to him by such a musician as Mendelssohn amply bear out this statement. To an ear of extraordinary sensibility he added a wonderful retentiveness of musical memory, and in this department, as in literature, he was above the wretched temptation of bartering praise for gain. In both branches of his labours he made for himself a name that brought him into contact with most of the celebrities of the day, whose names glitter in brilliant profusion through these pages. Lady Blessington. Lady Morgan, Procter, Dickens, Grote, Browning, Hawthorne, in letters, and Thalberg, Ernst, Meyerbeer, Costa, Liszt, in music, are a few examples, to which many others could easily be added. It cannot be said that this distinguished man of letters led a happy life. We have noticed the rather depressing circumstances of his early years, to which it is true minds of great strength could have risen superior, but which in his sensitive nature left deep traces. More than one deep grief from bereavement, more than one aching disap-

pointment in his affections, did their work in augmenting a constitutional tendency to self-introspection and a somewhat querulous humour. In society to the last he delighted, and at an age, his sixtieth year, when to most men it begins to pall. His closing years offered a rather painful lesson, which his biographer has the good sense neither to hide nor to make unduly prominent, that insidious habit of attempting to support failing health and loneliness by the use of stimulants, a fatal error which, however, he brought under control, but never entirely shook off. He died rather suddenly, early in 1872.

Anglican Orders: a few Remarks in the form of a conversation on the recent work of Canon Estcourt. London: R. Washburne.

WE are very grateful for this little "brochure." It will, we think, express the feeling of many Catholics on Canon Estcourt's work upon Anglican Orders. With the very greatest respect for the learned Canon—and the learning shown forth in his book must have made us admire his painstaking research—but we must candidly acknowledge that it has not helped the controversy about the validity of [the orders of the Anglican clergy one step—we had almost written, it has pushed it a step backwards. It is never a prudent policy, we conceive, to admit too much,; when we ourselves are doubtful whether we are right or wrong. Now this, we take it, is just what Canon Estcourt has done. There are many doubtful points connected with the controversy, but no one surely can have read history, and thought over it—nay, even read the chronicles of our own days as set forth in our papers, without feeling a doubt that what has been asserted one day may not be contradicted another. As regards history, to use the expression of *De Maistre*, it will have to be re-written when all the proofs are found. So, too, with regard to the particular point in question, any day may throw further light upon the subject.

We may be mistaken, but we have always hesitated to form any decided judgment on the Nag's Head Plot. From the evidence, we are ourselves inclined not to give it up, for reasons which we have no time to give in this simple notice.

The Church of God has never doubted that Anglican ministers are simple laymen, and we cannot do better than sum up our opinion on the whole matter than by saying, with the Mr. Smith of this pamphlet, who asserts that "after all, Canon Estcourt's book is conclusive as to the invalidity of your Orders, even if all his admissions were worth more than they are." With Mr. Smith we would say that Canon Estcourt's work must be read with an unprejudiced mind.

Eagle and Dove, from the French of Mdlle. Fleuriot. By EMILY BOWLES. London: Washburne. 1873.

AT a time when there exists such a passion for works of fiction, and the press overflows with novels of even worse than questionable morality, a book like that which Miss Bowles has given us is a real gain. Though a translation, the language runs so freely and easily that it reads as if originally written in English. The story and the characters, however,

are distinctively French, and as a picture of French life from a French point of view, it possesses merit far above the pretty fictions got up by English writers from French books and hasty travellers' glimpses. It is not in the least sensational ; but the interest is kept up by graphic descriptions of the scenes in which the story lies, by life-like delineations of character, and by incidents which flow on in simple and natural order.

The story opens in the picturesque town of Quimperlé, the church of Notre Dame upon its proud ascent crowning the irregular line of houses, which tumble over each other down to the very bottom of the valley, where majestically is seated the Saracenic dome of Ste Croix. Then it passes on to the Whit-Monday Bird-fair in the forest of Karn-Hoet ; and amid heaps of countless osier cages, in which pretty wild wood-birds flutter, and fountains of sparkling cider under the broad chestnuts and beeches, we revel in the dazzling rays of the sun, the vivid green of the trees, the carpet of velvety and tufted moss, framing in groups of country youths with well-knit frames and honest faces, and laughing, simple, modest girls in velvet bodices and short skirts, moving in harmonious cadence in the majestic figures of the national dance. The scene changes to Paris, and we are in the din, the heat, the glare, the ever-moving groups on the Boulevard des Italiens. Or we listlessly wander to the Bois de Boulogne, loiter amid "the artificial and voluptuous scene," and marvel at "the splendid carriages flashing in and out of the shady drives," and the restless, worn-out, "scoffing, sneering pleasure-seekers, whose corruption is thinly veiled by the "airs they assume. Weary and disgusted, we gladly seek refuge in the solitude of the Rue Cuvier. From the window of the small house covered with Virginia creepers, we look out on the Jardin des Plantes, and find repose in "the vast lawns, the glorious trees, the open blue sky, and that peculiar vague murmur and scent which breathe from natural life ;" till finally we are whirled back to the barricades, the hail of shells and bullets, "the roar of human beings tumultuously surging through the Place de la Carrousel," "the Tuileries canopied by a vast dome of heavy smoke ;" and, as we "gaze, breathless, at the dreadful scene, suddenly the reddening glow springs into hideous intensity ; thick sheaves of flame pierce the dark masses of smoke, and, shooting up their fiery tongues to the very heavens, light up the city with an unspeakably horrible brilliancy," while on every side rises the cry, "Paris is on fire !"

The story is not a professedly religious one. There is neither controversy nor dogma ; and the author, with instinctive reverence, even omits devotional expressions where they might naturally occur. But the point of the book is the contrast between characters which rest on a foundation of Christian faith, and those which develop themselves on the basis of nature and passion alone. On one side is a family of Parisians, of a far too common type, Positivists and Atheists ; "realistic" men and women, who despise such "ideals as honour, conscience, patriotism ;" to whom "there is only one God, which is success, and one influence, which is money ;" while "everything else in life is fair game for scoffing, and only to be reviled and hunted down," or turned to selfish account. On the other side is a group of Bretons,—ordinary pious Catholics, but belonging unmistakably to that class whom the infidel Parisian describes,

having within them "some tough, troublesome sort of fibre" which they get he knows not where, and who, even when in times of temptation they fall through human frailty, "have revivals of scrupulosity, aspirations after what is honourable, moments of integrity, and passing frenzies for recovering themselves, and expiating what they have done" amiss. The heroine resembles one of Fra Angelico's angels, and, like them, she ever lives in the presence of God. Gentle, holy thoughts visibly follow one another on her pure white brow; her eyes, at once profound and unconscious, glance without fixing upon the objects and people she looks at; her rosy lips are closed with a significant firmness, though without the least disturbing force; and it is manifest that the slender form with its measured movements, the transparent, almost spirit-like shell, is animated by a vigorous and energetic soul." The hero, Hervé Darganec, is a young man full of mind and thought,—of impulses of independence, ambition, and love of action. He has been educated and started as a lawyer by his charming old aunt, Mdle. Collette,—a volcano covered with a thick crust of ice, who has spent a poverty-stricken life of unmitigated saving and hoarding, and yet has preserved her loving and generous nature, because her faith has shielded her from prizing money for its own sake, and her motives have been duty, self-sacrifice, and the purest family affection. Hervé wearies of the narrow, petty life at Quimperlé, and intoxicated with the promises and hopes of success which his Paris friends hold out to him, while veiling with diabolical cunning its true springs, breaks loose from the family home, and sets out for the capital. In the depth of her sorrow Mdle. Collette exclaims, "Ever since I saw the people who are taking him away, I have been in a fever of grief. I might be able to bear that Hervé should lose his means, the esteem in which he is held, his reputation, and his honourable name, but not that he should lose his religious belief. If there never has been a cowardly, dishonourable, treacherous Darganec, it is because there never has yet been a Darganec unfaithful to his God!"

It would not be fair to follow the thread of the story further, but we can strongly recommend it both to young and old as full of interest, and pure and ennobling in its tone.

The Great Condé, and the Period of the Fronde. A historical sketch. By WALTER FITZPATRICK. London: T. Cautley Newby, Publisher.

THIS historical sketch will be read with interest. Although not brilliantly written, it is not altogether devoid of those graces which for such a subject are legitimate. We confess that personally we have no great liking for that period of French history when the great Condé lived. We believe that most of the seeds of evil which afterwards sprung up in the Revolution were sown then. Mazarin and Richelieu, Turenne and Condé, have left their names to France, but what can earthly glory do for a nation? Poor France learnt how little it was worth when her Emperor, once the arbiter of European politics, laid down her sword at Sedan; where, by the way, Turenne, if we remember right, was born.

Correspondence.

F. NEWMAN ON THE SPIRITUAL ADVANTAGES OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

To the Editor of the "DUBLIN REVIEW."

SIR,—An article appeared in your last issue, which dealt with F. Newman's work on the "Idea of a University." Your reviewer pointed out with great force many of the beauties of the work ; but at the same time he felt himself called upon to dissent from what he supposed to be F. Newman's view on one important point—viz. the spiritual advantages of higher education. He considered that F. Newman ascribed to intellectual culture a far higher place than it deserves, in promoting the spiritual interest of its possessor. He quoted two paragraphs which occur at pp. 184-6 ; and concluded from them that it was F. Newman's belief that unless a man possessed high intellectual culture, he was certain (humanly speaking) to fall frequently into mortal sin, unless indeed he were exceptionally strengthened by the stern visits of sorrow, sickness, or care. "F. Newman's language, as we understand it," he writes, "implies that of those leisured persons who neither possess high intellectual culture, nor are visited with exceptional sorrow, it may almost (or quite) infallibly be predicated that this vacancy of thought leads them into frequent mortal sin."

If this is really F. Newman's meaning, your reviewer will certainly be sympathized with when he declares that he dissents from it "with some confidence." But I venture to submit, that nothing in the passage quoted can fairly bear any such interpretation. Here are F. Newman's words on which your reviewer's inference is based :—

"This then is the *primâ facie* advantage of the pursuit of knowledge : it is the drawing the mind off from things which will harm it to subjects which are worthy a rational being ; and though it does not raise it above nature, nor has any tendency to make us pleasing to our Maker, yet is it nothing to substitute what is in itself harmless for what is, to say the least, inexpressibly dangerous ? Is it a little thing to exchange a circle of ideas which are certainly sinful for others which are certainly not so ? You will say perhaps, in the words of the Apostle, 'knowledge puffeth up' ; and doubtless this mental cultivation, even when it is successful for the purpose for which I am applying it, may be from the first nothing more than the substitution of pride for sensuality. I grant it ; I think I shall have something to say on this point presently : but this is not a necessary result, it is but an incidental evil, a danger which may be realized or may be averted, whereas we may in most cases predicate guilt, and guilt of a heinous kind, where the mind is suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts without training or law of any kind ; and surely to turn away a soul from mortal sin is a good and a gain so far, whatever comes of it. And therefore, if a friend in need is twice a friend, I

conceive that intellectual employments, though they do no more than occupy the mind with objects naturally noble or innocent, have a special claim upon our consideration and gratitude."

F. Newman is here engaged in pointing out—what no educated person will deny—that intellectual culture saves a man from a multitude of spiritual dangers by lifting his mind into an atmosphere where temptations are fewer and less perilous. The senses are the gates whereby sin, for the most part, enters in; and the man who can find pleasure in intellectual pursuits is certainly further removed from danger, than one whose enjoyments are of a lower and more sensuous order. In developing these thoughts F. Newman makes one reflection, which your reviewer seems to me to have taken in a sense that was not intended. He urges the fact that a mind which is thoroughly uncultivated, "which is suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts without training or law of any kind," is in most cases certain to contract guilt, and guilt of a heinous nature. Here F. Newman is evidently describing the case, not of a man who merely lacks high intellectual culture, but of one whose mind is altogether neglected. It surely is not rash to say that a man "whose mind has been suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts without training or law of any kind," is certain to be led on into sinful actions. From this we are left to draw the inference, that if *some amount* of education is certainly necessary to fence the human mind from the inroad of moral disorder, a higher intellectual culture is a still greater safeguard from the same danger. Nothing more than this appears to be meant by F. Newman when he says, "*therefore*, if a friend in need is twice a friend, I conceive that *intellectual employments*, though they do no more than occupy the mind with objects naturally noble or innocent, have a special claim upon our consideration and gratitude."

Such, I take it, is F. Newman's meaning; and I have the less hesitation in differing from your reviewer, inasmuch as he himself candidly acknowledges that he may have misinterpreted the passage: "It is abundantly possible," he says, "that we may have misunderstood F. Newman's meaning." And on the other hand, it seems quite impossible that the illustrious writer, whose whole line of thought on the subject of education is so thoroughly religious, could even in a moment of forgetfulness have broached a doctrine so evidently out of harmony with the spirit of the Gospel.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,
L. K.

[We have great pleasure in inserting this letter, and are only too happy to believe that F. Newman did not mean what we supposed. We could not ourselves however adopt our correspondent's statement in its more obvious sense, that "intellectual culture saves a man from a multitude of spiritual dangers." It seems to us that this culture does tend indeed to save a man from *one* kind of spiritual dangers; but that on the other hand in at least an equal degree it exposes him to others, from which an uncultured man is exempt, and which we cannot account less serious. But we have more than once argued for this thesis; and this is not the place for entering again on the subject.]

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW.

APRIL, 1874.

ART. I.—PRUSSIAN AND ITALIAN DIPLOMACY
IN 1866.

Un po' più di Luce sugli Eventi Politici e Militari del' Anno 1866, pel Generale ALFONSO LA MARMORA. Quarta edizione. Firenze : G. Barbera, 1873.

Histoire de la Campagne de 1866, rédigée par la Section du Corps Royal d'Etat-Major, sous la direction de S. E. le Général de Moltke. Traduit de l'Allemand par M. FUREY RAYNAUD. Paris : Dumaine, 1868.

ONE of the most striking features of our stormy times is the feverish haste with which statesmen and diplomatists now reveal to the public the secrets of their most recent negotiations. The ink is scarcely dry on the minutes of a treaty destined to change the fate of whole nations, when those who held the pen tell us of every latent move and manœuvre, of all the dark minings and sappings they had recourse to in order to gain their object. And, singular enough, in this age of rapid progress, as our sages call it, there does not seem to be much more real improvement as to the means employed by diplomatists than in former times. We have to deal with the same underground burrowings, the same truckling spirit, the same intense wish to make the most of an opportunity at the expense of the very men you pretend to make friends of; the same lying, dishonest propensities at the very moment you are courting a close alliance with some foreign power. And all the while this selfsame statesman plays his part as if he firmly believed in his co-negotiator's sincerity and veracity, though he watches every move, and listens to every word with intense anxiety, lest he may be taken in by his crafty friend. All these are melancholy features, doubtless; yet it is quite as well that we should know them.

But what strong impulse thus forces the principal actors in these shifting scenes to bring their network before our eyes? Public opinion. Some of these men belong to constitutional

VOL. XXII.—NO. XLIV. [New Series.] U

states, wherein every act of the government is subjected to severe scrutiny. Their measures are often attacked in bitter terms—their most patriotic intentions maligned in most unguarded language, and *volens volens* they are put upon their defence. Hence so may publications of the character we are alluding to; hence the book of Jules Favre immediately after his negotiations with M. de Bismarck; hence Count Benedetti's "Mission in Prussia"; hence Baron Stoffel's military reports to Napoleon III.; hence again the work placed at the head of the present article, and published by General La Marmora, Prime Minister in Italy during the memorable year of 1866, which beheld the downfall of Austria under the combined efforts of Victor Emmanuel and the King of Prussia.

General La Marmora is an old servant of the Italian crown. We first meet with him as commander of the Italian forces in the Crimean war; he belongs to the school of Cavour and Azeglio, and reminds us that from 1849 to 1859, being himself a member of the cabinet, he was upon a footing of intimacy with those two celebrated statesmen, who, during that long and complicated period, kept but few secrets from the gallant officer. This we can fully understand; for there reigned throughout his whole public life a certain feeling of honesty and sincerity, which forms a most striking contrast with the crafty conduct of Prince de Bismarck. Such qualities often breed strong attachments in the breasts of the very men who are totally devoid of them: hence most probably the deep confidence bestowed upon La Marmora by his two eminent countrymen. "I enjoyed their intimacy to such a degree," says he, in his preface, "that they had scarcely any secret from me, and consulted me almost on every occasion. During this long, difficult—nay, dangerous ordeal of public life, I learned that if few men of genius, and more particularly those who combine firmness of character with genius, succeed in ruling, in facilitating, in developing political events, not one single man can boast of creating them, not only in the form built up by the fancy of the vulgar multitude, but even in the way imagined by men of standard worth."

Such were the views entertained by General La Marmora when in 1864 he was called upon by Victor Emmanuel to form a new cabinet, of which he was to become the head, and minister for foreign affairs. From the very first, his great object was to take hold of every opportunity to turn to advantage every political incident which might tend to the acquisition of Venetia—then considered by every true Italian as the indispensable completion of the national independence. And yet to attain such an end then seemed almost a hair-brained

scheme. We all know, however, that the scheme was realized ; by what means La Marmora himself shall tell us.

The Italians had scarcely reaped the immediate advantages of their alliance with France in the memorable war of 1860, when they turned their eyes towards Prussia, as being a power likely at some future time to form a combination with themselves against Austria. The gratitude they owed the French nation seems to have weighed heavily upon them, and they were fain to rid themselves of the incumbrance. La Marmora makes no mystery of the matter, whilst the keen eye of Cavour soon discerned a practical way of broaching the subject. In 1861 William the First ascended the throne of Prussia, little dreaming yet of the high position he was to conquer in Europe. The crafty Italian minister took advantage of the opportunity to send a solemn embassy to Berlin, by way of complimenting the new sovereign on his accession to the crown. He selected La Marmora as his agent, well knowing, says the latter, what stress I laid upon the friendship of Prussia, whose situation was then almost identical to our own, and how highly I appreciated the Prussian army, which I had studied more deeply than any other. And yet even such an embassy was a bold step of Cavour's ; for if at Berlin there were many who sympathized with Italy in her efforts to reconquer her national independence, the court, the ministers, the army, and a large proportion of the population itself, considered the peninsula as a nest of revolutionary banditti. Bismarck was not yet at the head of the Berlin Government ; we shall soon see that he was of a very different opinion.

It is really singular and curious to see how far the ruling principles of the Hohenzollerns were then in formal contradiction with those of the Turin cabinet. Cavour had sent to Berlin a memorandum laying down the leading features of his policy, based, as every one is aware, on the boasted claptrap of "Nationalism." Baron de Schleinitz, the foreign minister in those days, replies in the following pithy terms :—

According to the Sardinian memorandum, everything must give way to national aspirations, and whenever those aspirations are decidedly adopted by public opinion, every existing government is bound to obey such a manifestation.

Now, this maxim, so diametrically opposed to the rules of international law, cannot be carried into practice without endangering the welfare, no less than the political balance and peace of Europe. By supporting it, we give up reform for revolution. And yet it is by resting on the absolute right of Italian nationality that the Government of H.M. the King of Sardinia required of the Holy See to disband its non-Italian forces, and without even

waiting for a refusal, invaded the Pontifical States, which they still occupy for the greater part. On the same pretext, insurrections arising out of that invasion were fomented ; the army formed by the Supreme Pontiff merely to maintain public order was attacked and dispersed, and then far from stopping in such a path, contrary to all international law, the Sardinian Government has just ordered their army to invade the Neapolitan frontiers, with the unconcealed view of favouring an insurrection, and taking possession of the country. . . .

As we are now called upon to give our opinion of such acts and such principles, we can but deeply and sincerely deplore them, and it is under the consciousness of fulfilling a strict duty that we express our most formal and most explicit disapprobation both of the above principles and the application they have given rise to.

Such were the feelings which animated the court of Prussia towards Italy in 1860, and which La Marmora had to encounter when he undertook his mission to Berlin. In the course of a few days, however, he seems to have gained favour with the new king, and we even find out that the latter looked with a certain degree of sympathy on the struggle Italy was then maintaining for her very existence. At any rate, the wary general makes the most of his time, since he obtains for his country several commercial privileges of some importance, already detects an incipient irritation between France and Prussia, though he by no means shares the views of the French ambassador, that "*in case of a rupture between the two countries, Prussia would never be able to resist ; but, for my part, I deem there would be a good deal to say as to the results of such an eventuality*" !* And as a full justification of this startling opinion, he enters into technical details concerning the organization of the Prussian army, visits with minute attention the fortresses at Mentz, Cologne, Coblenz ; nay, the very bridges thrown across the Rhine do not escape his searching eye. At last he comes round to the two following conclusions : (1) Prussia was already strong enough to cope with the most mighty armies ; (2) she would never have dared to attack Austria in 1866, had she not been backed by an alliance with Italy. The reader will soon judge for himself as to the soundness of the latter conclusion ; 1870 is an awful confirmation of the former !

Years rolled on, the Danish difficulties and war arose, and seemed for the time being to unite the two great German powers, if rather, as some suspect, it was not a snare prepared for Austria by the astute policy of Bismarck, who had now risen to power. In the mean time, La Marmora had himself

* Pp. 18-20.

been called upon by his sovereign to form a cabinet, almost immediately after the famous September convention. He had scarcely begun to exercise his new functions, when a series of incidents attracted his attention, all tending to a future alliance with Prussia. First, Austria herself seemed disposed to acknowledge the kingdom of Italy, and to conclude a commercial treaty between the two nations, but still reserving of course the Venetian question. Then M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave General La Marmora to understand that the cabinet of Vienna might even ultimately consent to a cession of Venetia itself, if Italy would but disarm and observe a strict neutrality in the impending crisis. But was such a crisis really to be feared? No, said M. de Nigra, nothing of the kind was to be dreaded—no black cloud was looming in the distance, the political horizon was calm and serene. So Cavaliere Nigra advised the Italian Government to disarm. Such a measure General La Marmora considered as downright suicidal; for a leading feature of his policy was to maintain the Italian army on a footing adequate to any sudden emergency. But then, to take at once one's seat among the great European powers, to form a part of the political system, which then pretended to rule our continent!—what a temptation. But then, again, what a downfall if Italy after all should be duped by foreign diplomatists!

Just at this perplexing moment for the Italian minister, the Prussian agent at Florence becomes all of a sudden very assiduous in his visits to La Marmora, prolongs them designedly, refers constantly to the possibility of a rupture between Austria and Prussia, and even goes so far as to inquire what, in such a case, would be the attitude of Italy. This was in the beginning of August, 1865, at the very time when the two powers were negotiating the Gastein Convention.

Thus taken by surprise, La Marmora endeavoured to gain time for reflection, and assumed a tone of reserve suitable to the occasion. But in a second visit, M. von Usedom, the Prussian minister in Florence, became more explicit:—

He repeated that Prussia was resolved to go to war with Austria. "Well," replied I, "in that case we can take no engagement without knowing, first of all, what are the intentions of the French Emperor, and the Prussian Government ought to do the same. You are fully aware how highly important it is for us, and no less for yourselves, to ascertain whether France would be favourable or opposed to such a war.

And here General La Marmora was decidedly in the right, for he asserts from one end to the other of his book that

Napoleon III. never wavered to the last in his sympathy for Italy, and he proved it at that very time by initiating secret negotiations at Vienna for the cession of Venetia. To be sure, the Gastein Convention had just been signed, and all seemed smooth once more, though the ominous year 1866 was just beginning. Yet before we enter upon the events of that memorable year, it may be as well to lay before the reader a report sent by M. de Nigra to his Government, as it throws some light on the policy of France during the forthcoming struggle between Prussia and Austria. He wrote as follows, after an interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys :—

In regard to Italy, the imperial minister added :—"For my part, I think General La Marmora's answer to Count d'Usedom to have been most opportune and proper ; I would myself endorse three-fourths of it. The cabinet of Florence would be right in following the same path. Its position is capital, you can afford to wait."

Here I interrupted my interlocutor to say :—"But if the Italian Government could not wait, or if they thought our interests did not allow us to proceed with all this reserve, in other words, if we deemed it advisable, to enter upon a sphere of action, I suppose France would not oppose us."

"Doubtless not," replied Drouyn de Lhuys. "The Florentine cabinet is the best judge of its own interests, and has full liberty of action. But in such a case, Italy must go to war at its own risk and peril."

"Well, but if the incidents of the war were to lead Austria on to the Ticino, to the Mincio, to the Alps?"

"Such a case," retorted Drouyn de Lhuys, "is one of those touching upon France's own interests ; for it is of high import to herself that Austria shall not recover the ground she has lost in Italy. . . . And that is exactly why I recommend you to be prudent. . . . Don't hastily jeopardize your own action. Perhaps Austria herself may come to terms with you. Prince Metternich has already made to me some overtures about a commercial treaty between Austria and Italy. The object of such a treaty would simply be to regulate and facilitate the intercourse between Venetia and the Italian frontier ; but it might lead to something else."

This *something else* set all the diplomatists speculating ; yet there was a man at Berlin who knew better, and who held the wires of the puppet-show ; that man was even then signing the Gastein treaty, whilst his agent in Florence was pressing upon La Marmora that all depended upon himself, the future of Italy being in his own hands.

The Italian minister was exactly of the same opinion, though of course with different views. M. de Bismarck had courted and patted him, as it were, as long as he thought it his interest so to do ; but now his agent at Florence grew suddenly cooler, discontinued his visits, and threw the proposed commercial treaty with Prussia quite overboard. La Marmora

felt the affront keenly, said nothing, and immediately started a new plan. He sent to Vienna a confidential agent, an Italian by birth, but well known in Austrian society, in order to propose a formal cession of Venetia at the price of a pecuniary compensation. The plan did not succeed, and we are not told wherefore, but La Marmora assures us he never repented the attempt. Indeed, one might be disposed to believe that the wary Italian minister aimed at playing off Austria against Prussia, and *vice versâ*, for matters were fast hastening to a crisis between the two powers, notwithstanding the Gastein treaty. Bismarck had with some difficulty obtained several interviews with Napoleon at Biarritz, but no one could yet tell the result of those mysterious communings. On his return through Paris the Prussian Premier had another interview with Cavaliere Nigra. "He gave me to understand," wrote the latter on that occasion, "that a war with Austria was inevitable, and showed himself highly confident that France would not be hostile to Prussia." And to show how sincerely he wished for the co-operation of Italy he added, "Did she not exist already, we ought to invent her." He then pointed out the utility of a commercial treaty between both countries, a plan, by the bye, which he himself had abruptly overlooked and finally dropped the preceding year. Now he was intent upon concluding it immediately. Was not such a treaty highly favourable to Italian interests? Would it not create a sympathy for them throughout all Germany? Why, such a bond of union was an act of high policy, pre-eminently advantageous to their future welfare.

Such was Bismarck's language, and well might La Marmora be surprised at all this sudden warmth for a measure lately advocated in the very same terms by himself, though with what scant success he could remember. But of course he was not the man to let the golden opportunity slip through his hands, and the treaty was concluded after all. But Bismarck's eagle eye reached much farther; whilst the Government of Florence was alternately or simultaneously plying Austria and France as to the acquisition of Venetia; whilst Prince Metternich in Paris showed some leanings in that direction in proportion as events assumed a threatening appearance for his own country, the Prussian minister intimated that he would be glad to see a confidential and military agent sent from Florence to Berlin. There was no mistaking the hint contained in such a request. So General La Marmora immediately sought for an instrument equal to so important a mission. His choice fell upon General Govone, a name now known throughout Europe since the hot debates which took

place in January last, in the Prussian parliament. It may be as well therefore to become more intimately acquainted with that military diplomatist. In fact, the mission itself was no easy one. Prussia had more than once deceived the Florentine cabinet, and La Marmora was determined not to be deceived any longer, as he says in so many words.

"General Govone," observes his employer, who seems to have known him thoroughly, "was a man of high military talents, who rendered many a good service to his country, and who added to these talents an innate disposition for diplomacy. His mind was ever on the look-out—ever sifting and prying into dark corners for information. He delighted in subtleties and snares of every description; often went out of his way to discover unknown facts, and even now and then went beyond the limits of his official station, in order to make sure doubly sure. Did he himself fall into some unforeseen difficulty? His subtle mind, fertile in all sorts of devices and resources, soon extricated him from any serious danger." Such was the agent selected by La Marmora; and we can almost understand the rage of Prince de Bismarck at now discovering that he was sometimes outwitted and often seen through by this wily *Italian*. At any rate his confidential reports are full of interest, and deserve our attention.

On leaving Florence, Govone received instructions of a most precise character. If any new treaty was to be negotiated, General La Marmora was firmly resolved it should be no other but a compact binding each power to an offensive and defensive alliance. His reason for such a line of conduct was obvious. He was almost sure that, in case of a prolonged contest with Prussia, the court of Vienna would end by giving up Venetia to Italy for some sort of consideration. "If Prussia," said the Italian Premier, "is determined to follow up both firmly and thoroughly a policy which might secure her ascendancy in Germany; if in consequence of the hostility shown by Austria to Italy and Prussia, war becomes an eventuality really accepted by the Prussian Government; if, in fact, at Berlin, they are disposed to contract with Italy certain definite engagements to attain positive objects, we think the time come for Prussia to tell us candidly what she wishes, and we are ourselves quite ready to open a series of communications, all tending to show how seriously we are disposed." At any rate there is no equivocation, no bamboozling here.

Govone's mission was of course a secret one; and yet he was scarcely arrived in Berlin when it was bruited throughout the whole land. He complained of such an act of indiscretion; Bismarck pretended deep indignation and promised condign

punishment, but the subtle Italian saw very well that it served Prussia's purpose, by acting as a sort of threatening pressure on the court of Vienna.

However, the two negotiators set to work, and the first report sent by Govone on the occasion is so pithy, so truly interesting, that we shall lay its principal parts before our readers. The Italian agent at once told the Prussian minister what was the object of his mission, viz., to combine the efforts of his own country with those of Prussia, in case she should make war upon Austria, with the special view of recovering Venetia by sheer force of arms. But Italy could afford to wait and bide her time. Should Prussia be disposed to bind herself to serious and reciprocal engagements, the court of Florence was ready, but on no other condition, to negotiate and come to a satisfactory conclusion.

After listening with the greatest attention and a "sifting eye" (*con occhio penetrante*), Count de Bismarck replied:—

Going so far back as the Olmutz Convention, he said that such a complicated situation as the one existing in Germany towards 1850 would be favourable to his own views, since the character of the Prussian king would have at once put an end to it by war, whilst the Olmutz Convention was but a failure. As for himself, he intended to bring back Germany to a state of things sufficiently complex to realize his own plans. Those plans, he admits, are to satisfy the ambition of Prussia—an ambition extending to the supremacy over all Northern Germany, but no farther. As for raising a war out of the Danish question, that would be an easy matter for him; but to bring such a momentous war out of so trifling a cause would discontent public opinion in Europe, whilst on the contrary, Europe would consider as lawful a war tending to a decisive and national solution of the German question.

The President then went on to say that, according to his own personal views, Austria must ever deem herself an enemy to Prussia, and consequently he had seen with pleasure the attitude assumed and the results obtained by the House of Savoy; but then his opinion stood alone in Prussia. Formerly, added he, a war with Austria and an alliance with France were both considered here as absolutely sacrilegious; and public opinion personified all Italy in Garibaldi, or even in Mazzini. He had, however, succeeded in modifying this opinion, and had even brought round King William to make an experiment, viz., to induce Austria to share in the Danish war, and thus to cement an Austro-Prussian alliance. But the experiment had proved a positive failure, or rather a positive success, according to his own way of thinking; for the innate hostility and animosity of Austria had shown itself in stronger colours than ever; thus curing the king and many others of an Austrian alliance. King William has given up his notions of a purely legitimist character, and may therefore be led to follow my views.

Count Bismarck then summed up those views as follows:—"In a short time, say in three or four months, to bring forward again the question of a

German reform, peppered (*abbellita*) with that of a German parliament." Such a proposal, backed by a parliament, would soon set Prussia and Austria at daggers' ends. Prussia would then decidedly go to war, a war which Europe could not oppose, for it would arise out of a grand national question.

The reader will now see, we believe, that the above quotation contains the whole of Bismarck's policy in a nutshell: we can perceive his deep-laid plans, his bitter hatred to Austria, of which we shall find further proof; the difficulties he had to contend with, and his stern purpose to overcome them *per fas et nefas*. And at the same time we can no less fully understand the burst of rage that seized him, on finding his most secret plans thus unexpectedly brought to light by General La Marmora. The why and wherefore we shall state in another place. But the very first step to the realization of this plan was a treaty with Italy. Such a treaty would bind that country to follow Prussia, and imply, in case of war, the solution of the Venetian question.

All this looked very fine, and we can well imagine with what glee Govone heard the Prussian minister's words; but it did not prevent him from seeing that his own country could not bind itself by solemn engagements to an uncertain and somewhat distant action. Besides, was the Berlin minister sincere in all these fine professions? Did he really intend what he said? Or was he simply aiming at using Italy as a bait for some particular purpose? Such a suspicion seems even to have escaped his lips, for he attributes the following words to Count de Bismarck:—

I understand very well that Italy may be somewhat chary about us, and may have her doubts as to our trustworthiness (*timore della nostra fedeltà*). In such a case, and for your own guarantee, Prussia might even now sketch out the sundry developments of the German question according to my own plans, and then draw a determined line beyond which it would be impossible for Prussia to fall back, as being bound beforehand to a certain line of conduct. Then, and then alone, would Italy have to fear no desertion on our part; then alone would she be likewise engaged. For instance, let us suppose the German Parliament to be assembled; would not then Prussia have burnt her vessels, and would she not be obliged to march onwards? In that case, what inconvenience would there be for Italy to make her line of policy identical with our own, and to decide together both the German and Venetian questions?

The Italian negotiator did not feel satisfied with this *exposé*; he was still afraid that all this tortuous line of policy might be only an expedient to force Austria, and finally that the two German powers might come to a mutual arrangement

at the expense of the new-born Italian kingdom. In his eyes, there was yet no practical result in the proposed treaty, and a practical result he was determined to obtain. He therefore put forward, as a preliminary condition, that not one single question, not even that of the duchies, should be decided between Austria and Prussia, unless the Venetian question should likewise be solved at the same time. This was, indeed, a home-thrust, which provoked the following reply :—

We cannot bring the Danish question into a treaty ; it is far too insignificant, and we wish for the support of Italy for much higher and more various objects. First of all, we should thus mutually increase our strength ; secondly, when united to Italy, it would be easier for us to have the concurrence of France. At present, France refuses to come to any arrangement with us. In fact, the emperor consents, in regard to the duchies, to allow us full liberty, and to remain neutral. But in any other case, he would make his own conditions, which he now keeps to himself. Were we allied to Italy, it would be easier for us to come to an understanding with France. But even supposing Italy ill-disposed for a formal convention, still a treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance would be desirable, were it but to confirm King William in his actual dispositions.

Still the wary Govone was not satisfied, still he clung to his feelings of distrust ; and there he was undoubtedly right, for Bismarck himself let him see at one moment that he feared some understanding between Vienna and Florence as to the purchase of Venice, and in such a guess he was certainly not far wrong. So the Italian strictly adhered to his purpose and his instructions, and *he* likewise was right. The fact is, neither Bismarck nor his master had yet made up their minds as to their future policy ; King William had strong objections to a war with Austria—objections which his bold minister was by no means sure of overruling. At any moment the two great German powers might settle their differences in an amicable way ; but what then would have been the dangers of the Italian peninsula ? So there the matter rested for a short space of time, and Govone applied his whole faculties to the observation of passing events.

But Bismarck was not the man to give up his views so easily ; a few days afterwards he returned to the subject, stating that Napoleon would wink at a German war, as offering him an excellent opportunity, at the head of a French army, to serve his own purposes ! “ But that is the very reason,” added the Prussian Premier by way of conclusion, “ why we should make ready for war, and yet put it off as long as possible. However, to do that, we stand in need of Italy.”

At the same time, to support his words, he came forward with the draft of a treaty in three articles. This looked like something practical, but the draft aimed at binding Italy to follow the Berlin policy, whilst the latter would have preserved full liberty to act according to its own will and pleasure. Of course La Marmora could agree to no such thing; and well might he doubt Prussia's good faith, since he might have found himself forced to denounce war against Austria on a question of a purely German nature.

In the mean time matters were hastening to a crisis. The two German powers becoming daily more and more embittered, England ventured to offer her mediation, a proposal which seems to have caused Bismarck a violent fit of anger, referring the British cabinet to Austria, as the sole cause of the prevailing difficulties. Well, the assertion was a pretty cool one, if we remember the views he had stated only a few days before to Govone. And then, on the impulse of the moment, perhaps, the Prussian minister suddenly asked Govone:—

“Would Italy undertake to declare war immediately on Austria, for in that case Prussia would do the same directly afterwards?” “No,” replied the Italian agent, “for, in the present state of affairs, it is for Prussia alone to play the first part. Besides, supposing that Italy should assume the offensive, would you bind yourself by a formal treaty to assume it likewise, not immediately, but the next day?”

At this question, I clearly saw Bismarck hesitate, and he ended by telling me he would be obliged to consult the king for the last time; should the latter refuse, he would then send in his own resignation.

Such were, therefore, the apparent waverings of the Count even down to the last moment; we say apparent, because his listener seems by no means convinced of his sincerity. The Count, he observes, was highly incensed at England's interference, coupled as it was with a positive disapprobation of the Prussian policy. He therefore endeavoured to push on Italy against Austria, in the hope, somewhat uncertain, of inducing King William to follow his example. Of course this was unsafe ground for La Marmora to tread upon, and he most naturally refused to entertain for a moment any proposal of the kind; so the Prussian minister returned to his former plan of a general treaty of alliance, which was neither one thing nor another. Evidently he was trifling with his future allies. But they were determined not to be trifled with, and to watch their opportunity. To be sure time was serving them, for a few days afterwards (March 21) a telegram from Berlin informs us that Austria is arming, and the probabilities of a war thickening all around. Then, for the first time,

Count de Bismarck adopts the notion of an offensive and defensive compact to hold good for three months. Yet still there were many difficulties in the way; the negotiators themselves do not appear to have quite known their own minds. On the eve of incurring such a tremendous responsibility, a sort of instinctive tremor seems to come over them, and their telegrams, as well as their confidential reports, are anything but clear or precise. La Marmora alone stands out here as the strong man *tenax propositi*, decided upon binding Prussia to fulfil her engagements, and working away in good earnest. The most curious part of the business is, that Bismarck wanted the Italian minister at this period to send full powers for signing a treaty, the draft of which he had not yet even seen!

However, whilst both parties were perhaps playing at cross-purposes—the Italian endeavouring to gain time; the Prussian, to see his way through the maze of conflicting tendencies then thickening around him; there was another man in Europe on whom every eye was fixed—we mean the Emperor Napoleon III. If Count Benedetti's publication has thrown some light upon his shortcomings and waverings in 1865 and 1866, La Marmora's work is still more explicit on the same subject. What would be the attitude of France in the forthcoming contest; such was the universal question.

It is therefore by no means astonishing that the Italian Premier should likewise pause on his way to describe the attitude of the French sovereign at this stormy period. But before entering into details, he makes the following significant observations, in which we fully concur:—

It is evident that France could not remain indifferent to the events then preparing beyond the Rhine. Indeed, though the Emperor was still in full possession of his power, more especially in regard to foreign policy, still he could not overlook the feelings of France, no longer to be satisfied with the Crimean and Italian laurels, nor even with a material progress, which had become a source of unexampled welfare and wealth for every class. The French nation, ever restless, upbraided the monarch of their own choice, now with the Italian unity, now with the Mexican expedition, or again with the curtailment of a liberty they knew not how to use; or, finally, they taunted him with a policy not sufficiently jealous of maintaining their supremacy over other States—a supremacy which they sincerely believe to be an heirloom of their own. The accusations were more particularly brought against the Emperor by the same men who, after his fall, fiercely upbraided him with every disaster, as if he had sacrificed France to his own personal ambition. Now, most probably, his downfall arose out of the fact that he found it impossible to curb the ambition of those Frenchmen who wanted to establish the grandeur of France on the weakness of other nations. It is but

justice to affirm—and we Italians are bound to do it more boldly than any other—that Napoleon III. invariably discarded such a paltry system.

At any rate it was impossible for the heir of the first Napoleon to remain an idle spectator of the inevitable conflict between the two German powers, and they were not the last to acknowledge the truth of this remark. They consequently beset him with offers of the most tempting kind, so tempting indeed, adds La Marmora, that he was obliged to remember the proverb, which tells us we must not sell the bear's skin before the beast is slain. The bear's skin, in this case, appears to have been a good round slice of Italy itself, or still better, the whole of Belgium.

However that might be, this was the first grand opportunity for France to examine, in the Emperor's own words, *the difference existing between her actual frontiers and those of 1814*. Such a consideration, according to our author, must have alone made Napoleon averse to any attempt to prevent the war, and no less averse to any understanding between Austria and Italy, since, in that case, Prussia would not have dared to push matters to extremities. There may be some truth in this, yet might not likewise the Emperor have learned prudence by Italy's ingratitude towards him? Might he not fear that the cabinet of Florence would turn round at some favourable moment and side with his enemies? Those who remember the attitude of Italy towards France in 1869 and 1870, would not feel disposed to treat such forebodings as altogether chimerical. As matters stood in 1866, the bare proposal made by the Italian Government to the court of Vienna, after the Gastein convention, for the cession of Venetia, seems to have disconcerted the calculations of France, and La Marmora was perfectly convinced at that time that an amicable adjustment of the kind was totally opposed to the Emperor's policy.

Not indeed that he was inimical to a retrocession of Venetia, for he full well remembered his promises of 1859; but he wanted it to form a part of a more general plan, in which France was likewise to play her own game. Unfortunately Sadowa knocked on the head all these fine combinations, acting at once as a threat for France, and an omen of the future. Our neighbours felt deeply the fatal blow, the sole result of the Imperial policy being an increase of power for Italy, and a decrease of influence for its former protectors. To this very day, the French nation has not forgiven that fatal mistake of Napoleon III. They still accuse him of having sacrificed their interests to those of Italy.

At the time we are speaking of, however, things wore a

very different appearance; all bowed and listened to the very mutterings of the reticent sovereign.

"We must foresee the case," suggested Cavalier Nigra, "of an immediate war, and of Austria giving up Venetia. Consequently it is but prudent for us to keep aloof from formal engagements with any one."

"Now don't give way to such a delusion," replies the Emperor. "Austria will do no such thing unless forced by war. In former times I advised her to do it; but she retorted, in high dudgeon, that she was asked to do in time of peace what could scarcely be expected of her after a disastrous war."

There was no mistaking this language, which ultimately turned out to be true: so Italy might form an alliance with Prussia and declare war on Austria, but at her own risk and peril, should she do this alone. In all other cases France would again come to her rescue.

In the mean time, what were they doing at Berlin? Austria had just sent in an official note, discarding all aggressive intentions, whilst the Southern States of Germany, after being called upon by Prussia to make their choice between the two great powers, had declared that the Diet alone had a right to decide between the rivals. This must certainly have been the more provoking for M. de Bismarck, that he had lately offered Bavaria the acquisition of Tyrol, if she would but side with Prussia. Besides, was not his prime object to overthrow the very body to which he was now referred, and on its ruins to establish the ascendancy of his own country? This was a terrible drawback, for it seemed to deprive him of a *casus belli*. Let us see the picture drawn on the spot by Govone, a keen observer of passing events. Photography could not have done it better:—

April 2, 1866.

Count Bismarck thought perhaps for a few days that Austria would at once take upon herself the responsibility of a rupture, and if such a sudden crisis would be a serious one, at any rate it would have delighted him. But his delusion did not last long. He soon learned that the military measures adopted by Austria were of a purely defensive character. However, in the mean time, Count Bismarck made the most of the occasion, and went to work splendidly in his newspapers. We heard of nothing but war—of nothing but the Austrian provocations—of the just preparations of Prussia. . . . In reality, these preparations are trifling, and may be either a matter of caution, or a way of forcing Austria to arm seriously; thus leading to a situation out of which war may arise. . . .

Another difficulty she has to contend with is the country itself. Not only the higher class but the middle class are both averse to the war. This aversion is clearly perceptible in the popular journals. Public opinion manifests itself likewise by a feeling of rancour (*rancore*) and mistrust against France, whilst no hatred exists against Austria. Again, the contest going on

should she come to a bloody issue with Austria. The only means of gaining that end was an offensive and defensive alliance with the court of Berlin; he consequently would listen to no other proposal. In this he acted as a true statesman, as the events proved abundantly. But as long as Bismarck himself changed from day to day, as long as he suddenly veered round from one point of the compass to another, surely no one can accuse La Marmora of fickleness because he doubted the sincerity of the man he had to do with. After all, he had but to bide his time; and, in fact, he brought Prussia to his own terms. That he was both right and honest in the attitude by him assumed towards the man we may now call his bitter antagonist, is shown by the fact that all the information which Bismarck had then communicated to Benedetti had been supplied by a private agent, a former Garibaldian, whom he had long before secured at Florence, says the French ambassador, unconsciously confirming beforehand La Marmora's statements.

The treaty was signed on the 8th of April, and bound both powers for three months to a common action in case of war. But though every clause had been formally agreed to on each side, at the very moment of signing M. de Bismarck wanted to alter the character of the mutual engagement, by coming back to that general treaty of friendship and alliance which Italy had firmly rejected, as having no particular object in view. Of course, the Italian negotiators could but adhere to their purpose. In the mean time, events were fast hurrying on to the final crisis. Austria required Prussia to disarm, maintaining that she herself had no measure of the same kind to adopt, since she had never had the slightest idea of arming. However, she added, that if Prussia refused so to do, she would not long be able to stand and look on. This sort of ultimatum seems to have exasperated King William, but delighted M. de Bismarck, as it was one step further towards the development of his plans. He consequently gave out that a flat refusal would be sent by the court of Berlin to the Austrian demands, and proposed the convocation of a German parliament for the purpose of reforming the constitution. Immediately every money market in Europe was in a flutter, and the funds fell enormously. Every wind the political atmosphere blew was a rumour of war; the next day all was peace again, and the ocean looked as calm and laughing as a new-born babe in its cradle. Not so M. de Bismarck, who sent a note to Vienna stating that Prussia having simply followed Austria step by step as a matter of self-defence, she could not recede if the latter did not set the example. Austria

in the Chamber is another hotbed of antagonism to Count Bismarck, though the Chamber here enjoys no great *prestige* nor popularity. It is spoken of in Berlin with a certain degree of contempt, and as if it were but a coterie of petty intriguers. The Constitution itself is looked upon as by far too advanced for the state of public opinion in Prussia. All this amazes us, but there must be some truth in the assertion, if we consider the way in which the Minister behaves to the House.

As for the army, from all we can gather from official sources, it shows no enthusiasm for a war with Austria. Quite the contrary, its sympathies are with the Austrian army. I am well aware that, war once declared, the army would be electrified, and do its duty bravely, but still it offers no support, no stimulus for the policy which Count Bismarck wishes to follow.

So he stands, as it were, alone, or at least but weakly supported, having to contend with all the above difficulties; and one is led to suppose, that overcome at last by so many obstacles, he is about to give up the struggle. Altogether he is undoubtedly a man of high value, of great resource, and endowed with an iron will worthy of success.

Such is the picture drawn by Govone of Prince de Bismarck's character, and the reader will readily agree with us in saying that it is impossible to discern in it the slightest shadow of antipathy, far less of a disposition to underrate or calumniate him. To a certain degree the Italian general seemed even to yield to the ability of the Prime Minister, and consented to certain clauses, which La Marmora was obliged to reject. Such was the plan of a military convention, weighing heavily on the Florentine cabinet, but leaving Prussia at liberty to act as she pleased. At any rate, we cannot say that good faith is a gem in Bismarck's character, and those who have read the first Napoleon's correspondence are often reminded of his backslidings in this respect whilst reading the work now before us, and of this we shall soon see a most glaring instance. On the present occasion, La Marmora was obliged to telegraph as follows:—"As for the mobilization of our troops, the clause you propose won't do; for either Prussia acts in good faith, and then it becomes useless, or she does not, and then she will seek for some other pretext. The same holds good of the military convention." This certainly does not look much like reliance on Prussian honesty; and unfortunately facts justified La Marmora's distrust.

On the 5th of April, however, he sent full powers to draw up and sign a treaty. M. de Bismarck was elated beyond measure on learning it, and entered fully with Govone on the future march of the Prussian army through Bavaria, then onward to Lintz, *where it might join the Italian army*, winding up his confidential conversation by the following significant hint:—"But all this, you know, is in case France approves

seemed inclined to consider this demand as conciliatory, and again Bismarck looked disappointed—at least, so says Count de Barral. However, the Prussian Premier took good care not to disperse his cavalry, in order to be ready on the nonce against any comer.

In fact, he must have laughed in his sleeve, just as La Marmora confesses he himself did, at this pretended disarmament of two great powers, who, shortly before, had maintained in the face of all Europe that they had never armed at all. The farce went on for a few days, when a spark in an unexpected quarter caused the fire to break out. The Italian Government recalled from Naples to the northern provinces two regiments that had been quartered there for several years. It appears to have been simply a disciplinary measure, such as any War Office might adopt in time of peace. Yet in the heated state of men's minds this measure assumed enormous proportions. At Vienna, rumour said that these troops were to back a revolutionary insurrection in Venetia; in London, our Government received intelligence that Italy was on the eve of declaring war single-handed on Austria. Lord Russell immediately assumed a somewhat blustering tone towards Florence, yet with very little effect, one may well imagine, since La Marmora had already his Italo-Prussian treaty in his pocket; but of that the British minister had no information. This idle rumour, however, was brought forward by the Vienna cabinet as a reason for increasing her own troops in that direction; one of the greatest errors she could commit, as it incensed public opinion, and supplied Bismarck with a pretext for not continuing his pretended disarmament. He was not, certainly, the man to let the golden opportunity slip through his hands, and General La Marmora gave immediate orders for the concentration of the national army on the frontiers. He was resolved not to be taken by surprise.

But whilst the Italian minister was thus acting up to the terms of the treaty, firmly resolved, on the one hand, not to strike the first blow, which would have been an act of sheer madness, on the other, to repel any aggression on the part of Austria, he received strange news from Berlin. On the 2nd of May Govone telegraphed as follows:—

In order to ascertain what extent they give here to their engagements with us, I told Count de Bismarck that both Austria and ourselves would be ready in one month at the very latest; in which case the war might break out in Italy. I then asked him if Prussia could not calculate better as to her own armaments, and if she would be ready to declare war on Austria, in case, according to the treaty of alliance, Austria should declare it against Italy.

He replied that *the king did not give such an extensive meaning to the treaty, nor did he believe that such an obligation arose out of its literal terms.*

"Well," replied I, "could not one complete the stipulations and introduce an absolute reciprocity into a military convention?"

He told me that *the king would refuse to bind himself to declare war on Austria in case it should break out in Italy, because he did not wish to encourage us in pushing matters to extremes.*

Doubtless we have no particular sympathy for Italy's policy in general; but we cannot help observing in the present case that she had to do with a foreign enemy, and her rulers were struggling for the entire liberation of their country by means which no honest man could approve. And yet, after contracting a solemn treaty with Prussia at her own suggestion, La Marmora found himself suddenly deserted by his ally, and exposed to all the dangers of an isolated position, without even being able to rely upon the support of France. To be sure, M. de Bismarck declared that, should his own king persist in his opinion, he would himself send in his resignation; but how far could the Prussian minister be depended upon, and would not even such an occurrence be a trump-card in the hands of Austria?

The enormity of such a pretension seems, however, to have struck even Bismarck himself, by no means over-scrupulous in such matters; so he again applied to King William, who replied by promising to support Italy, should she be attacked by her adversary, but strongly advised her not to strike the first blow. This was at least a useless piece of advice, for unless General La Marmora had been downright insane, it is scarcely possible to conceive that he should have defied Austria in her stronghold of the Quadrilateral. Evidently the object of this second telegram was to attenuate the effect of the first. Nay, more, the Prussian Premier even gave Govone to understand that at the very last moment an understanding might take place between the two German powers; adding, by way of comment: "*We do not interpret the April treaty as binding Prussia to declare war on Austria, in case the latter should enter into a contest with Italy; we believe that such an obligation exists for Italy alone, and it is the literal meaning of the article relative to . . .*"

We may easily apprehend the amazement and vexation of La Marmora at finding himself thus duped by Prussia at the very last moment, for we can find no other expression for such conduct. He had, indeed, been forewarned as to the faithlessness of Prussian diplomacy, but he evidently had not believed it would be carried to such lengths. At the same time, we can fully apprehend Bismarck's rage at seeing him-

self held out to Europe as a faithless ally and breaker of treaties which he had just concluded. We must however recollect that such an incident at such a juncture was a deadly blow to the hopes which the Italian minister had conceived of recovering Venetia by force of arms, instead of owing it to France, a favour he particularly deprecated, as incurring a too heavy debt of gratitude to that country. He boldly resolved to maintain his ground, and replied immediately to his agent's despatches:—

Tell Count Bismarck that Italy entertains no intention of attacking Austria. But in the case of an aggression against Italy on the part of Austria, the offensive and defensive alliance obliges Prussia likewise to enter upon and follow up a course of hostilities. As our engagements towards Prussia and the line of policy we are obliged to follow in consequence would be the sole cause of Austria's attack upon us, I cannot see how the King of Prussia could deem himself freed from any obligation towards Italy, nor how Prussia could elude the reciprocal duties of the offensive and defensive alliance.

This was doubtless plain speaking, and meritorious at the same time; for at that very moment the Emperor Napoleon was authorized by the court of Vienna to make formal offers for the restitution of Venetia, on condition that the Italians should remain neutral in the great contest. But no; La Marmora would not accept the proposal, because, says he, "the treaty is a question of honour and honesty, obliging us not to break with Prussia." And so matters went on, and in a few days more Prussia herself set her whole army in motion, bringing at once 150,000 men to the battle-field of Bohemia, whilst another army was marched towards the frontiers of Hanover. But though Bismarck had succeeded in conquering his master's fears and vacillations, he was still in the dark—at least if we are to believe him—as to Napoleon's real intentions. In the heat of the struggle, would he not pounce upon the Prussian provinces along the Rhine, or seize upon some other compensation for German aggrandizement? And here we are startled by the following report of Count Barral, on the 6th of May:—

People here are most anxious about the very active negotiations going on, they say, between France and Austria, in the interest of Italy, and which have gone so far as to offer France the line of the Rhine. As I observed that such an offer would be dangerous for any German power to make, Bismarck replied by a shrug of the shoulders; thus clearly indicating that if necessary, he would not refuse such a means of aggrandizement.

This communication is certainly most extraordinary; but what shall we say of the following, written on the 3rd of June

by Govone, just about one month after the preceding one, and on the very eve of the war? This despatch is so important, and bears altogether throughout every line such an appearance of sterling truth, that we do not hesitate to borrow rather fully from its contents :—

Before departing for Italy, I had requested an audience of the Count de Bismarck, in order to take leave of him; so yesterday evening he received me at nine o'clock, in the garden of the Ministry of State, where we conversed till ten. "As the present events," said I, "were daily wearing a more serious aspect, I was obliged to give up the idea of filling myself the duties of a military *attaché* in the Prussian army." "Well," rejoined Count Bismarck, "who will set fire to the mine, Prussia or Italy?" I asked the President of the Council whether he knew the precise tenour of the Austrian answer to the proposal of a congress, and whether the Prussian cabinet had come to any new determination as to that answer, both in regard to such a conference, and to his own journey to Paris. Had he given up the latter idea?

The President replied :—"I believe I know exactly the Austrian answer; it objects to any treaty tending to alter the actual status (*status quo*) of the different powers. . . . On the other hand, as we expect to-morrow the official text, we shall wait till then to adopt a decision. We hope that France, whether in regard to the Austrian answer, or to the forced loan in Venetia, as also to the late conduct of Austria in the Elban duchies—a direct violation of the Gastein Convention—will acknowledge the firm resolve of Austria to reject any sort of arrangement, and will no longer prolong attempts no less useless than baneful to ourselves. Such an attitude on the part of France would be a proof of her sincerity towards us; whilst a different conduct would lead us to suspect her intentions. One thing alone would have induced me to run up to Paris. I should have wished to have an interview with the Emperor, in order to ascertain the full extent of the concessions he would require of us for France."

I inquired whether there was any part of the country beyond the Rhine where a vote of annexation to France would have any chance of success. Count de Bismarck said : "No, none—the very French agents who travelled through the country for the express purpose of probing the dispositions of the population, all reported that none but a fictitious vote could be obtained. Doubtless the people love neither their own government nor their reigning dynasties; but still they all wish to remain Germans. So we should have to indemnify France in some other way."

I replied that this would certainly be very difficult; but if a popular vote was out of the question, might there not be some other principle to start from, such as *natural boundaries*. "Of course," added I, "that does not imply the whole left bank of the Rhine, yet is there not some other geographical line that might satisfy France?"

"O yes," said the Count; "the Moselle. For my part, *I am far less of a German than of a Prussian*, and should have no difficulty in consenting to yield to France the whole country included between the Rhine and the

Moselle,—the Palatinate, Oldenburg, even a part of Prussian territory, &c. But then the king . . . would have most serious scruples about it, and would come to such a determination only in a most critical juncture, for instance, on the eve of utter defeat or signal success. At any rate, even to work upon the king's mind, and bring him to some sort of understanding with France, we must know the minimum of her pretensions. Yet if we are to yield the whole left bank of the Rhine—Mentz, Coblenz, Cologne,—it would be far better to come to an agreement with Austria, to give up the duchies, and many other things into the bargain."

"But any such understanding," retorted Govone, "would be a downright capitulation to Austria, since her most vital interests were now in question."

The Count could not deny the fact; adding, however, that public opinion in Germany would justify the king, if by so doing he did not give up one inch of German territory. Yet, after all, according to the Prussian minister's mind, this was not the greatest difficulty he had to contend with; King William had not even yet given up all thoughts of peace, and at the very moment he was speaking, underhand and secret negotiations were going on with Vienna, through the agency of the Saxon court. And then returning to his previous subject of conversation, he endeavoured to impress once more upon the Italian agent the opportuneness for his own country to strike the first blow, were it but to force at once the Prussian sovereign into war. It would probably have been woe indeed to Italy, had she listened to the conjurer's spells.

The reader has now before him the despatches which lately gave rise to such a violent outbreak of passion on the part of Prince de Bismarck in the Prussian parliament. Their contents, however, bear from one end to the other the stamp of truth upon them. What possible aim could Govone have in misrepresenting the Premier's language, when reporting it to his own Government on such a grave occasion? Or, unless he was either a dotard or a madman, how could he have invented all these complicated details and views, which chime in so well with the Prince's character and policy? Nay, more, how is it that but a few weeks before he told Govone that if France should assume a hostile attitude, all their plans must fall to the ground? How could it happen that Commendatore Nigra should also write from Paris (May 31): "Bismarck appears decided upon granting to France the territory included between the Moselle and the Rhine, as a compensation for an armed co-operation on the part of France. I had this from a confidential, but most certain, authority." In another despatch we are again told that Austria was likewise offering the same German territories to Napoleon III., provided Italy

should remain neutral throughout the ensuing conflict. Is this also apocryphal? Does it sound like a calumny; or rather have not we here the two rivals acting both as highest bidders before the French Emperor, so great was still his prestige? Could Nigra, could Barral, could Govone, could Benedetti, could all misunderstand M. de Bismarck's meaning? For, had we time and space, we could show likewise by the French ambassador's publication, that at one time the question of the Rhenish provinces was seriously discussed between them both. Of course the Prussian minister may say that he was dallying with French vanity and illusions; but can he say the same of the Italian negotiators? and how does it happen that he enters with them unnecessarily, and yet so fully, into the same subject? He must really have a more than usual belief in human credulity to make the whole pass off as apocryphal and slanderous inventions.

In plain words, not one man in his senses throughout Germany believes La Marmora's assertions to be false. Apart from his well-known integrity and truthfulness, his narrative, or rather his despatches, agree too minutely with other sources to be the offspring either of fancy or of some private aim, which an honest man would rather conceal. Indeed, one can hardly conceive what such an aim could be, since it was evidently the interest both of La Marmora and his country to stand on good terms with the Prussian Government, and the General must have had some very serious motive to disclose so many state secrets. That motive was nothing else but to vindicate his own character, which had lately been assailed in Italy, where he was accused of having sacrificed her interests to M. de Bismarck's ambition. The production of the official documents could alone dispel the delusion; and as, on the other hand, the German history of the events of 1866 seems to throw a certain slur upon the conduct of the Florence cabinet; as again the Prussian Chancellor was by no means slow in showing to other governments how much he distrusted the Italian negotiators, we deem La Marmora quite entitled to place before the world the facts as they really took place, and even to assert that, if there was bad faith on any side, the verdict could not be awarded against himself. Besides, is it not strange that Benedetti's "Mission in Prussia" should contain many statements exactly similar to those brought forward by the Italian premier? And yet at the same time when he communicated them to the French court, he could not certainly guess what was going on between Bismarck and Govone, for he himself comments in one of his despatches on the extreme reserve shown by the

latter towards the French ambassador. The reader may now draw his own conclusions.

In the mean time, La Marmora's publication went the round of the reading world. In Germany it raised an intense—nay, a sort of fierce excitement; for the great statesman, the great diplomatist, the master mind, who had gained all his ends, who had baffled and overthrown Napoleon, after bringing Austria to the brink of ruin, now appeared in the eyes of the world as a man ready to sacrifice the interests of the German nation to those of his own greedy, thievish fatherland—the land of that other Frederic, who ever trampled ruthlessly on conscience and principle, whenever he found them opposed to his own plans for robbing provinces or kingdoms. But still every good German held his breath, or merely whispered the astounding fact to his next-door neighbour, either from shame or fear; for Bismarck has a good deal of the despot in his metal, and Prussian fortresses easily open their doors to close again on political delinquents, or maligners of that arch-spirit. Yet, after all, the secret went round, re-echoed by the French press, taken up anew by the London journals, till it came back again to Berlin. Still the great man was silent, not a word escaped his lips;—what, then, were the facts brought forward by La Marmora really true? Most unlikely—otherwise the Prince would have noticed them; if not, it must be from a feeling of contempt for such trash.

There seems to be, however, in the possession of supreme power a downright fascination, bordering almost on insanity. Every one may remember those storms of violent passion which at times made Napoleon I. rave like a madman before an amazed and trembling audience. Many are the instances of that kind related by M. Thiers in his celebrated *History of the Empire*. One would think that at such heights man is incapable of brooking the slightest contradiction, that independence of character or mind is an insult to his omnipotence, an attack upon his rule. On considering somewhat closely Prince de Bismarck's character and late conduct, we are strongly reminded of the old Emperor, who rests at last under the cupola of the Invalides. We have before us the same stern purposes, the same recklessness as to means, the same contempt of right, the same worship of might, the same thirst for uncontrollable power, the same resentment against opposition, whatever form it may assume, and lastly, the same outbursts of anger. The whole world is aware how of late the Prince has undertaken to force, through persecution, German Catholics into a sort of schism against the Church, apparently because he wants to overrule the clergy just as he overrules

a Prussian parson, a Prussian magistrate, or a Prussian functionary. The Catholics form in Prussia an independent body of about thirteen millions; sound policy would seem to advise prudence and moderation in order at least to conciliate men who have fought and bled for their country in the two late wars as bravely as any other Germans between the Vistula and the Rhine, between the Baltic and Riesengebirge chains. If this be not a fit of political insanity, we really know not by what name to call it, more particularly if we remember that it will require half a century, as M. de Moltke said a short time ago, to mould into a compact body the conquests of the last six years. To be sure, there may be another secret motive for such a line of conduct; a motive we shall speak of hereafter.

At any rate, one of the very first effects of M. de Bismarck's new system, as applied to the Catholics of the German empire, has been to bring before the national Parliament La Marmora's publication, and in a manner highly disagreeable to the Prime Minister's irascible feelings. On the 16th of last January, a debate was going on relative to the votes of the schoolmasters in the late parliamentary elections, a high-pressure system being enforced by the Government on such occasions. A Catholic member of the Centre (Poles, Catholics, and Progressists) was commenting severely upon the fact, when he was followed by M. Mallinckrodt, one of the boldest defenders of the Church, who declared "that the German Catholics, or *Ultramontanes*, as they are called, are quite as sound patriots as Prince de Bismarck himself." And then suddenly assuming the offensive: "By the bye," continued he, "was any one here present at the conversation between Prince de Bismarck and General Govone, wherein they discussed the cession of the territory situated on the left bank of the Rhine? For my own part I did not attend, but I found my assertion upon good authority."

The allusion was so pointed, the attack so direct, that, after a few moments of universal stupor, the whole Assembly was in an uproar. The German Parliament is anything but like a British House of Commons. The majority consists of serried files of "national liberals," the offsprings of German rationalism, who are bound legs and arms to Prince de Bismarck, and who are ready to support his most despotic plans, on condition, however, that he will hand over the Church to their merciful dealing. One may easily imagine, therefore, the effect produced by such a daring onset coming from one of the hated members of the Centre. The Prince was soon informed of what was going on, and made his appearance just

in time to hear another Catholic leader, Baron von Schnortamer, taunt him with having used "revolutionary means" in 1866 to cause an insurrection in Hungary. The Prince's outward appearance, says an eye-witness, was dark and ominous to the utmost. He looked daggers at his opponents, turned pale or red by turns under their lashes, and seemed hardly capable of repressing the violence of his emotions.

I have just been informed, said he, that Mr. Deputy Mallinckrodt has maintained—I beg to be set right if I am in the wrong—that in certain former negotiations I prospectively offered to General Govone the cession of a Prussian district on the Moselle or on the Sarre. I don't exactly know which. I am obliged to affirm, in the strongest terms, that it is a barefaced lying invention, not indited by the honourable deputy, but indited elsewhere. However, he ought to be cautious before repeating such assertions, which deserve so harsh a refutation. The fact has been invented to serve an odious lying intention; there is not one single particle of truth in it. No—never to any one did I promise nor give reason to hope for the cession of one single village—nay, of one single field in Germany. Every rumour circulated about it is, from first to last, I say it again, a barefaced lie, got up for the express purpose of blackening my reputation.

I should wish honourable members to observe that the supreme authority instituted by God above—the authority which rules over us, even in such agents as His Majesty places at the head of the empire, is entitled, not to any personal regard, but at least to be treated decently before foreigners, and I should wish that no one should dare to malign his own Government in the presence of foreigners. . . .

M. von Schnortamer has moreover maintained—and this assertion bears the same stamp as those brought forward to-day by M. von Mallinckrodt—that in 1866 I provoked the defection of the Hungarian and Dalmatian regiments. This is an untruth. The honourable member ought to produce proofs of his assertion, relative to the events of that year. It is a fact known by the whole world that out of Hungarian prisoners of war a regiment was formed in this country; and proposals were made to us on that subject at the very beginning of the war, but I rejected them, though a minister engaged in a war with a military empire so powerful as Austria, would assume a grave responsibility by discarding an aid perfectly allowable by the rules of war. . . . Ay, at the beginning of the war I refused the Hungarian offers, and it was only after the battle of Sadowa, when the Emperor Napoleon informed us through the telegraph of his intervention, that I said to myself: 'I owe to my country not to repel any longer a means of defence and attack justifiable in the eyes of military law.' So I did not even then form, but I authorized the formation of such a legion, simply as an act of necessary self-defence.* Can any one call this a revolutionary measure? . . .

* To show the value of the above positive and somewhat imperious denial, we shall simply lay before the reader the two following facts:—In one of his

The Prince then goes on to expatiate at full length on the subject, as if he were happy to elude the debate on the more important facts stated by General La Marmora relative to the cession of German territory. But this M. von Mallinckrodt would not allow him to do. "Were these documents," he said, "exact and trustworthy in every detail? He had no reason to say so; but they were official documents; they spoke of certain negotiations then going on; and the persons reporting on these negotiations were evidently in a position to know the truth, for they stated what they had heard with their own ears. Besides, every one must be aware of the facility with which the most positive facts are officially and officiously denied, so that when the Prussian Prime Minister did not deem it advisable to repel accusations brought against him by a foreign minister in a book which had gone the round of Europe, and had been translated into German, every one was entitled to believe there might be some truth in such accusations. He, for one, had believed them, though he did not consider them as positively certain. The minister now declaring them to be false and untruthful, he had no longer any reason for maintaining his view of the matter; but as for the reproach of *lying*, he would simply refer it to its proper address—to General La Marmora."

M. von Mallinckrodt, as we said above, is one of the Catholic leaders in the German Parliament, and seems endowed with that cool presence of mind, with that sternness of purpose so useful in public assemblies, when coupled with suavity of demeanour and gentlemanly manners. Think of the all-powerful minister being thus bearded and put upon his defence in his own Parliament—for such it is called—by a M. Nobody, by a member of that odious sect of "Ultramontanes," the only independent body at present throughout Germany. If we are to believe eye-witnesses, the effect on Prince de Bismarck was crushing, and we see some traces of it in his reply, which is really amazing, coming from the lips of a ruling statesman.

First of all, he said, he had applied to the Italian Govern-

dispatches, Govone informs his Government, *before* the declaration of war, that M. de Bismarck proposes to levy a Hungarian legion, if the Florence cabinet will share half of the expenses. To this proposal La Marmora replied by refusing to join in any scheme of the kind. He knew Hungary too well, he said, to think of raising at present an insurrection in that country, and M. de Bismarck himself must be deluded by false information to entertain such an idea. Is this likewise a calumny, or what interest could Govone have in inventing it? The outlay was estimated at three millions of francs.

ment for a prosecution against La Marmora; but unfortunately there was no law applicable to the fact, since the general had simply published documents belonging to himself. And then, feeling probably the weakness of such a mode of defence, he treated La Marmora as a personal enemy, and upbraided his opponent for siding with *his enemy*. Does this look like an honest man calmly rebutting an untruthful charge against him? And so probably thought M. de Bismarck, for he suddenly burst out into the following tirade:—

The honourable member believes in M. La Marmora's assertions, because they have remained unanswered for six long months. If I were to refute everything printed against me merely by people belonging to the Centre, no press offices, no Guelf funds, would be adequate to such an object, which would require a special ministry established on purpose to read those writings. And indeed I glory in it. During my public life, entirely devoted to a resolute defence of my king and country among the sundry forms of European politics, I pride myself on having made many an enemy. Start from the Garonne in Gascony, and then run up to the Vistula, or again from the Belt to the Tiber, on the banks of the Oder and the Rhine, everywhere you will find that I am the man most hated throughout all Germany. And what would it be were I to read all that is written against me in France, Italy, and Poland! No—I have formed the habit of feeling a proud contempt for all such lucubrations, and the gentlemen of the Centre are well-nigh making me extend that contempt much farther than before.

Probably the above outburst of anger and rude contempt passed in Berlin for a model of Parliamentary eloquence; but we can fancy what would have been the attitude of the British House of Commons if any Premier, if Mr. Gladstone—nay, if Pitt himself presumed to address his opponents in such language. It does credit, however, to M. von Mallinckrodt that he did not allow himself to be browbeaten and put down by the minister's haughty bearing. He retorted in the following terms, and with them we shall bring to a conclusion these somewhat lengthy quotations:—

I am by no means in the habit of refusing battle when once it has been offered me. The Premier might certainly have shortened the debate by a categorical declaration as to the authenticity of the documents published by General La Marmora. All your poetical divagations about the Tiber and the Garonne would almost remind one of the troubadours (general laughter). At any rate, the author of the publication was then both a general and the head of the Italian cabinet, though he may not be so at present; so his position enabled him to have plenty of official documents at his disposal. It would be interesting to know how far those papers are truthful. In order to ascertain the fact, it is far less important to know what was the political station of the witnesses than how far their evidence can be trusted.

If the President of the Council believes himself to be more jealous of our national honour than myself, he is greatly mistaken. It is a statement I will not allow in this place. The national honour ought to be dear to every citizen, quite as much to one as to another. But in my opinion, the highest honour consists in an honourable policy, and if the Government commits dishonourable deeds, the National Assembly's duty is to remind them of it. It is by so doing that one may defend a country's honour—not by concealing one's own faults.

After a short and tart reply by M. de Bismarck, the incident closed; but any candid reader will admit, we believe, that the Prince got the worst of the contest. In fact, the accusation was of so glaring a character, that for several days Berlin spoke of nothing else; bystanders state the scene both in and out of Parliament to have been indescribable; and the minds of men were worked up to the highest pitch. On the other hand, General La Marmora could not thus let the matter fall to the ground; in spite of his own Government's solicitations and pliancy to Bismarck's will, he had his honour to defend, and he set about it in a business-like way, alike alien from blustering or sheepishness: he simply deposited the original documents at the office of a public notary, where every one was admitted to peruse and authenticate them. This was a way of answering the Prussian minister which he probably had not dreamt of. So little by little the matter was allowed to drop, as if he were ashamed of it, though we strongly suspect him of entertaining but few scruples as to the ways and means of attaining the objects of his grasping ambition.

And we are fairly justified in so saying, for during that hot contest about La Marmora, one thought was evidently uppermost in his own mind. He was constantly reverting to the Catholics, constantly taunting his opponents with their adherence to the Holy See, constantly upbraiding the bishops for their opposition to "the laws of their country." We could perfectly understand such language falling from the lips of a Roman proconsul in the first or second century of Christianity; for the Roman laws embodied within their enactments a large amount of heathen polytheism; but in the name of common sense, how can Prince de Bismarck aim nowadays at stamping out the religion of thirteen millions of Catholics, even though he is supported by a packed Parliament, the great majority of whose members are rationalizing Jews or Protestant free-thinkers? The very idea seems preposterous, and yet the Prussian minister is by no means the man to follow up a preposterous system. What can be his object—what his particular aim? Some time ago the "*Spectator*" endeavoured to solve the problem, and on reading its article we were par-

ticularly struck with its coincidence with our own sources of private information. The statements brought forward are of so tangible a nature that we can do no better than to quote them :—

For our own part, said that paper, we believe that Prince de Bismarck, so far from disapproving the war of 1870, was sadly put to it to get his more cautious master finally committed to it ; that he saw in that war, and in that alone, the means of a united Germany ; that he was but half satisfied even with its great results, so far as the temper of Germany was concerned ; that he has felt ever since the necessity of keeping up the war spirit in Germany, in order to avoid the internal conflicts which might result from the sense of complete security ; and that his perplexing and recently almost unintelligible desire to push things to extremes in relation to the Catholic question, has grown up in great measure from an impression of the same kind,—that a strife for national existence, whether imposed upon Germans by common-sense caution or by fancy, and whether affecting the region of physical force or only the region of ideas, is the one condition of success for the suppression of all German disunion, and for eliciting that common spirit of national enthusiasm which welds together and constitutes a nation. We can indeed hardly explain otherwise, that evident desire to encourage the German Press to take offence at the powerless French Bishops, and that constantly reiterated attempt to impress on all Europe that Germany has great cause for fear both from France and from Rome, which distinguishes the official action of the German Government. Consider, for instance, the letter which the German Emperor has been induced to write to Lord Russell :—"It is incumbent on me," he says, "to be the leader of my people in a struggle maintained through centuries past by German Emperors of earlier days, against a power the domination of which has in no country of the world been found compatible with the freedom and welfare of nations : a power which, if victorious in our days, would imperil, not in Germany alone, the blessings of the Reformation,—liberty of conscience and the authority of the law."

Now if that has always been so, how is it that Prussia not only tolerated, but was on the best possible terms with this same Church till only the other day, and that an extension of power which certainly added more non-Catholics than Catholics to the German sceptre should have changed so radically the situation ? It has been said repeatedly, and by the King himself, that the treason of Catholics caused the peace to be broken, and compelled the Government to accept the challenge. How, then, was it that not one Prussian Catholic has ever been prosecuted for treason ? How was it that the Bavarian Catholics were amongst the first to offer the Imperial Crown to King William in 1870 ? Surely these exaggerated statements can only be explained by the growing impression of Prince de Bismarck that war against an external foe, both physical and spiritual, is the policy most profitable to German unity. For our own parts, we believe that while Germany is quite right to be fully prepared for attack, whether physical or otherwise, half the fears expressed by the Government are purposely magnified for the sake of the reaction which they provoke. No doubt, in an empire which

contains some thirteen millions of Catholics, the policy of encouraging a struggle *à outrance* with the Catholic Church is more than a bold one—a very critical one. But then Prince de Bismarck is perhaps aware that the danger of war is not enough to draw Germans politically together. There must be internal and domestic questions as well for Germans to discuss freely, and on which a party of movement could support the Government, or there would be other and more dangerous questions raised, on which the Government would be compelled to break with the party of movement. The Roman Catholic question is just one of this kind. And on it, therefore, Prince de Bismarck has gradually taken the same kind of aggressive ground as, on military questions, he has taken with regard to the danger of invasion from France. We have no doubt that, to some extent, Prince de Bismarck's policy is shrewd. But it may be easily pushed too far. To our minds, looking at the matter in the coldest light of policy and without any relation to equity, he is now not only pushing the persecution of Catholics too far, but also endeavouring too openly to provoke expressions of national hostility from France. It is a game which may be easily over-played. Directly it is seen to be a game at all, its effect on Germany will rapidly diminish—indeed, the aim of the provocative policy of the Government will be discounted by the Germans themselves.

The game may be over-played ; ay, indeed, and this seems almost to have taken place already. There is not a sane man in Germany who believes in the sympathy of the German Catholics for the French nation ; there is not one sane man who does not know they all fought bravely against them during the late war, sometimes indeed with a degree of savage cruelty which reminds one of the Thirty Years' war. There is not one sane man who does not know that the bishops are no rebels, for they pay down their fines, allow their property to be seized, and march meekly into prison, without offering the slightest show of resistance. To be sure, they do repeat the old saying, "*Non possumus*," a saying as old as the Gospel itself ; a saying echoed back by thousands of faithful priests, by millions of no less faithful Catholics. But what then ? Does this look like bending to the will of a despot ? or does it not rather forebode the growing up of a sullen, deep feeling of discontent, which if allowed to develop might become a danger for the State itself ? The German race has a long-enduring patience, but patience has its limits, and may be goaded into passion, and from passion into rebellion. Prince de Bismarck boasts of being hated throughout all Europe, Marshal de Moltke sees a foe to Prussia in every nation, and yet the arch-mover seems now intent upon breeding a host of intestine foes around him ! Verily, we have here before us a strange sort of policy, the offspring of Erinnyes rather than of political wisdom. How delighted the

French people, for instance, must feel at the appearance of such signs in the yet unfledged German empire!

And as we have mentioned the French nation, let us turn our eyes for a few minutes towards the annexed provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. But two years ago Prince de Bismarck told them they would be treated with so much lenity and kindness that they would soon learn to love their old Teutonic fatherland. We were disposed to believe his words: they were so consonant with the most common prudence and self-interest. Well, what do we now see? For the first time they have returned deputies to the German parliament, and their very first act is a bold, uncompromising protest against the annexation; their second, is to lay before the House a list of their grievances, and to proclaim aloud their unconquerable attachment to France. Protestants, Catholics, Jews—and there were many of the latter in Alsace—are all unanimous on this head. The only defection in this respect, if defection it can be called, was that of the Bishop of Strasbourg, and it has called forth such a storm of protests from his whole flock, that many people believe that he will be obliged to give up his seat in the Reichstag.

Now let us see what are those grievances laid before the German Parliament:—

I ask, said the deputy Guerber, on the 3rd of March—I ask for the suppression of the tenth article of the law of 1871—in other words, the suppression of the dictatorship implied by that article, as well as of the martial law. This article places in the hands of the Upper President of Alsace-Lorraine, a power which is perhaps not wielded by any European monarch; for it empowers him to adopt any measure which he may think fit for the maintenance of public order. The French law, on which the tenth article is grounded, is a law of the Revolution, enacting that the nation has a right to establish martial law to ward off any imminent and extreme danger. Now, in the present case, we have to do, not with a public assembly, but with a single man. Well, gentlemen, is any dictator infallible? May he not consider as a danger any innocuous circumstance? May he not be deceived by the police? And yet he may in such cases sentence to imprisonment, to expulsion, nay, to death itself. Such a state of things only tends to corrupt our whole population.

And now I will endeavour to show how the man invested with such a power may abuse it, even unconsciously. Liberty of association and individual freedom are both oppressed in Alsace-Lorraine by this dictatorship. The press is likewise fettered more grievously than in any other country throughout Europe. Our vicar-general Rapp is by no means a criminal, but a venerable priest, and yet he has been expelled. There was one thing at least we liked in Germany—freedom of association. Well, M. Rapp made a most lawful use of that right, and yet he has been expelled. Our schools again have been treated with the greatest harshness; Catholic children have been forced to attend Protestant schools, and Protestant

masters appointed to govern Catholic schools. The press, in its turn, has been persecuted and gagged, above all the Catholic press ; and every Catholic paper of Germany has been prohibited in Alsace-Lorraine. Whilst your officious papers are constantly threatening us day after day, we have not one single organ wherein we can answer them as they would deserve. Now what have you gained by this mode of ruling ? Nothing, absolutely nothing. The sympathy of Alsace-Lorraine for France is stronger than three years ago. We also are fond of freedom, and we hate slavery.

Such are the grievances of the two annexed provinces, and from others sources of authentic information we know that there is not a tittle of exaggeration in them. Seventy papers have been suppressed, the Christian Brothers expelled, and their schools closed, as well as others of a higher level for the middle class ; arbitrary arrests have taken place in the dead of night, and imprisonment without trial ; in fact, no form of petty tyranny has been forgotten. And this is Prussian rule ! Is it not conciliation with a vengeance ? Is it not creating a state of things very like that of Poland, or of Ireland, such as it lasted for centuries ? With what results we all know. At any rate, the *iron-prince*, as he is now called, does not seem to care much about consequences, for he answered the above moderate statement in a tone of haughty contempt, sneering at Alsatian grievances, telling the new deputies in so many words that he wanted their good swords against Prussia's enemies—not their love, nor their willing allegiance. And then he raised laughter at their expense, for Bismarck is a wit, though after a certain fashion of his own, somewhat *grob*, as his own countrymen would put it. As for Alsatian love, it had plenty of time to grow. It had taken two hundred years to create strong attachment to France within their breasts ; well, in two other centuries they would be equally attached to Germany, their primitive fatherland. And so on.

Yet, after all, we may well ask whether this is common sense ? Is it statesmanship ? Must not France chuckle over this mode of treating her former compatriots ? Can they wish for anything more favourable to their future hopes of revenge ? On the other hand, the nucleus of able men sent up from Alsace-Lorraine will certainly increase the power and influence of the small body of opponents who maintain so manfully the rights of religious freedom within the walls of the German Parliament. Their very way of speaking—so different from the monotony of Teutonic diction—has, we are told, taken people by surprise ; but their energy and ability, which are by far more important, may ere long lead to results little suspected at present. Let us hope so, for the sake of religion, freedom, and civilization.

ART. II.—AMERICAN POETS.

Lars. A Pastoral of Norway. By BAYARD TAYLOR, author of Goethe's Faust, translated in the original metres. London : Strahan & Co. 1873.

Poems by Walt Whitman. Selected and edited by WILLIAM MICHAEL ROSSETTI. London : John Camden Hotten. 1868.

The Biglow Papers. By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. London : John Camden Hotten. 1868.

Songs of the Sierras. By JOAQUIN MILLER. London : Longman & Co. 1871.

Hans Breitmann's Ballads. (Three series.) London : Trübner & Co. 1871.

Southern Poems of the War. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. London : Trübner & Co. 1869.

The Poet at the Breakfast Table. By OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. London : Routledge & Sons. 1872.

The Pennsylvania Pilgrimage, and other poems. By JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER. Boston : Osgood & Co. London : Sampson Low & Co. 1872.

John Greenleaf Whittier's Poetical Works. Complete edition. London : Macmillan & Co. 1873.

WE have many examples in history of a national literature built up in a dialect, but America seems to stand alone in possessing a distinct literature composed in the mother tongue. The war of independence, the final separation of the two countries, the lapse of nearly a century since the latter event, the great difference between the natural scenery of the United States and England, the composite character of their population, and the ever-increasing influx of German and other foreigners, have all operated in directions wide of ours as to the forms of the expression of thought, yet have, nevertheless, left the higher literature, and particularly the romance and poetry, of the Republic, absolutely identical with our own as to language. But in spite of this identity of language, the poetry of America is strictly national. It has a flavour of its own, like an American apple. It differs as completely from English poetry as a prairie from a moor, an acacia mimosa from a sensitive plant, sassafras and maple from birch and oak, or a squatter in a log-hut from a farm labourer in a cottage. Though it is, like the poets who produced it, the offspring of

England, it has grown up under foreign skies, unlike its parent as the Mississippi is unlike the Thames and the Alleghany mountains differ from the Snowdon range. In the aboriginal Indian traditions, in particular, American poets have sources of originality so abundant that we have nothing that can be compared with it among ourselves. The Celtic and Gaelic legends, which gleam brightly through the pages of Ossian and the "Irish Melodies," are faint in comparison with the Indian traditions that blaze through the "Song of Hiawatha."

It is to scenery, principally, that poets in general are indebted for their hold on the mind of others. Important as it is that they should be melodious, should sound the depths of the human heart, and depict exactly the lights and shades of character, it is to scenery, or, in other words, to nature, that they owe their most striking images and illustrations. The American poet has a rich treasury of poetic imagery in his native land. In variety and grandeur it can hardly be equalled. It is as marked as the imagery of Hafiz, Saadi, and the Sanscrit drama, and has many more elements of strength. For distinctness and beauty it stands beside the imagery of Sicily in the Idyllia of Theocritus; of Mantua and Cremona in the Bucolics of Maro; of Castile and Navarre in the Spanish ballads translated by Lockhart; of Windsor Forest in Pope and Shelley's "Alastor"; of the Rhine and the Hartz Mountains in the songs of Goethe and the lyrics of Schiller. "The Americans," says Walt Whitman, "of all nations at any time upon the earth, have probably the fullest poetical nature. The United States themselves are essentially the greatest poem. In the history of the earth hitherto, the largest and most stirring appear tame and orderly to their ampler largeness and stir. Here at last is something in the doings of man that corresponds with the broadcast doings of the day and night. Here is not merely a nation, but a teeming nation of nations. Here is action untied from strings, necessarily blind to particulars and details, magnificently moving in vast masses."

Let us take a few pictures of American scenery drawn by master-hands. They will be found to have a *cachet* all their own. Others, perhaps, more striking may have been found, but they are the first that occur. They resemble the fruit of which Bayard Taylor speaks in "Lars":—

One afternoon, within the orchard, Ruth
Gathered the first sweet apples of the year,
That give such pleasure by their painted cheeks
And healthy odour.

Let the reader imagine himself on the edge of a huge

swamp, and in the company of William Gilmore Simms, who says :—

'Tis a wild spot, and hath a gloomy look ;
 The bird sings never merrily in the trees,
 And the young leaves seem blighted. A rank growth
 Spreads poisonously round, with power to taint
With blistering dews the thoughtless hand that dares
 To penetrate the covert. *Cypresses*
Crowd on the dank, wet earth ; and, stretched at length
The cayman—a fit dweller in such home—
Slumbers, half-buried in the sedgy grass.
 Beside *the green ooze*, where he shelters him,
 A *whooping crane* erects his *skeleton form*,
 And shrieks in flight. *Two summer ducks*, aroused
 To apprehension, as they hear his cry,
Dash up from the lagoon, with marvellous haste,
 Following his guidance. Meetly taught by these,
 And startled by our rapid, near approach,
 The *steel-jawed monster* from his grassy bed
Crawls slowly to his slimy, green abode,
 Which straight receives him. You behold him now,
His ridgy back uprising as he speeds
 In silence to the centre of the stream,
 Whence his head peers alone. A *butterfly*
That, travelling all the day, has counted climes
Only by flowers, to rest himself awhile
Lights on the monster's brow. The surly mute
 Straightway goes down so suddenly, that he,
The dandy of the summer flowers and woods,
Dips his light wings, and spoils his golden coat
With the rank water of that turbid pond.

Can anything be more graphic and picturesque? Do you not fancy yourself on the swamp's edge, eyeing eagerly the alligator and the butterfly? But perhaps you are tired of swamps, so, if you will, we shall follow the "Grey Forest Eagle" in his flight homeward, and hear what Alfred B. Street, another American poet, has to say about him :—

The dark, gloomy gorge, where down plunges the foam
 Of the fierce, rock-lashed torrent, he claims as his home ;
 There *he blends his keen shriek with the roar of the flood*,
 And the many-voiced sounds of the blast-smitten wood ;
 From the *crag-grasping fir-top*, where morn hangs its wreath,
 He views the mad waters white writhing beneath ;
 On a limb of that *moss-bearded hemlock* far down,
With bright azure mantle and gay mottled crown,
 The Kingfisher watches, where o'er him his foe,
The fierce hawk, sails circling, each moment more low :

Now poised are those pinions, and pointed that beak,
 His dread swoop is ready, when, hark ! with a shriek,
His eyeballs red-blazing, high bristling his crest,
His snake-like neck arched, talons drawn to his breast,
 With the rush of the wind-gust, the glancing of light,
 The gray forest-eagle shoots down in his flight ;
One blow of those talons, one plunge of that neck,
 The strong hawk hangs lifeless, *a blood-dripping wreck ;*
 And as dives the free kingfisher, *dart-like on high*
 With his prey soars the eagle, and *melts in the sky.*

Here, indeed, is "Nature, red in tooth and claw with ravine." Alfred Street's name does not stand very high in the list of his country's poets, yet his "Grey Forest Eagle" will match with any poem of its kind in any language. It is certainly quite equal to the "Löwenritt" of Freiligrath, which resembles it in subject and in treatment. But a softer and sweeter voice meets our ears. It is Dr. Arthur Cleveland Coxe, who asks, in the first stanza of a lovely and deeply religious poem on "Old Churches"—

Hast been where the full-blossomed bay-tree is blowing,
 With odours like Eden's around ?
 Hast seen where the broad-leaved palmetto is growing
 And wild vines are fringing the ground ?
 Hast sat in the shade of catalpas at noon,
 And ate the cool gourds of their clime ;
 Or slept where magnolias were screening the moon,
 And the mocking-bird sung her sweet rhyme ?

What a delicious climate these words conjure up to our view—a climate (for the United States comprise all climes) reminding us of Emerson's lines in the "Humble Bee":

Hot midsummer's petted crone,
 Sweet to me thy drowsy tone ;
 Tells of countless sunny hours,
 Long days, and solid banks of flowers ;
 Of gulfs of sweetness without bound,
 In Indian wildernesses found.

But the American poet is not tempted to linger too long in gulfs of sweetness, and become enervated in plantations of sugar and cotton. The wings of his fancy easily transport him to the Northern frontiers, where, according to Longfellow—

—The fierce Kabibonokka
 Had his dwelling among icebergs,
 In the everlasting snow-drifts,
 In the Kingdom of Wabasso,
 In the land of the White Rabbit.

He it was whose hand in Autumn
 Painted all the trees with scarlet,
 Stained the leaves with red and yellow ;
 He it was who sent the *snow-flakes*
Sifting, hissing through the forest,
 Froze the ponds, the lakes, the rivers,
Drove the loon and sea-gull southward,
Drove the cormorant and heron
To their nests of sedge and sea-tang
 In the realms of Shawondasee.

Shawondasee, fat and lazy, has his dwelling far southward, in the drowsy, dreamy sunshine of never-ending summer. But American poets have often found abundant pabulum in realms of snow-flakes, and have woven dulcet strains in the bitter breath of freezing air, like the *Chicadee* of Francis H. Green—

So we never know a fear
 In this season cold and drear ;
 For to us a share will fall
 Of the love that blesseth all ;
 And our *Father's smile we see*
On the snow-crest—Chicadee.

Maria Brooks, in her lines on the river St. Lawrence, speaks of love that sits throned on snow, and of "*Snows that drive warmth to shelter in the heart.*"

Now, if we were amind, we could quote from fifty poets of the Union, passages true as pictures by Teniers, Claude, or Salvator Rosa to the scenery of their country. We might cull choice specimens from "The Strawberry-Pickers," by Edmund B. Stedman ; "Life in the Autumn Woods," by Philip Pendleton Cooke ; "The Poet," by Ralph Waldo Emerson ; "The Chants Democratic," by Walt Whitman ; "The Stranger on the Sill," by Thomas Buchanan Read ; "The Bison-Track," by Bayard Taylor ; "The Sultry Summer's Noon," by Carlos Wilcox ; "The Little Beach Bird," by Richard Henry Dana ; "The Birchen Canoe" and "The Indian Lament," by Henry R. Schoolcraft ; "The Coral Grove," by James Gates Percival ; "Forest Musings," by Charles Fenno Hoffman ; "The Fringed Gentian," by William Cullen Bryant ; "The Merrimack" of John Greenleaf Whittier ; "The Forest Walk" of Alfred B. Street, and "Fifty Years Ago," by William D. Gallacher. Especially we could recall "The Songs of the Sierras," by the young Californian poet, Joaquin Miller. No writer is more intensely national. He riots in the loveliness of the Great West ; the savage grandeur of the Sierra Nevada mountains ; the mingled Indian and Spanish life of New Mexico, Nicar-

agua and San Francisco; the diggings of the gold-fields; the bird-voices; the lilies in the jungle-grass; the beautiful, terrible, lithe, long snakes, with rose-coloured eyes; the green and graceful bamboos; the monkeys in brown and blue, running like shuttles through the leaves; the "proud mustangs with banner'd mane;" and the cayman lying like a log on the water, with red, watchful eyes. We could string together on a long thread, such jewels of description as the following:—

The beech displays its *marbled bark*,
The spruce *its green tent* stretches wide,
While *scowls* the hemlock, grim and dark,
The maple's scalloped dome beside
The partridge, whose *deep-rolling drum*
Afair has sounded on my ear,
Ceasing his *beatings* as I come,
Whirrs to the sheltering branches near:
The little milk-snake glides away,
The brindled marmot dives from day.

(Alfred B. Street.)

It is a fair
And goodly sight to see the antlered stag,
With the long sweep of his swift walk repair
To join his brothers; or the plethoric bear
Lying on some high crag,
With pinky eyes half-closed, but broad head shaking,
As gadflies keep him waking.

(Philip Pendleton Cooke.)

He looks across the field, and sees
The waves that ever beyond it climb,
Whitening the rye-slope's early prime:
At times he listens listlessly
To the tree-toad singing in the tree,
Or sees *the cat-bird peck his fill*
With feathers adroop *and roguish bill.*

(*Alice of Monmouth*, by Edmund B. Stedman.)

No one, we think, will dispute that this is genuine poetry, natural and national in a high degree. The partridge *whirring* to the branches near, reminds us of a happy expression in "The Deserted Village" of Goldsmith—

And as a hare whom hounds and horns pursue,
Pants to the place from whence at first he flew.

These are poetic touches which no art can teach. But putting aside writers of inferior calibre, let us for a moment confine our attention to two poets of nature, Longfellow, by

far the chief of American poets, and Emerson, one of the most illustrious of American prose writers. Poetry, it is true, is not the latter's *forte*. It trammels his genius, though it cannot conceal it. When he writes verse, he is like Caractacus in fetters in the streets of Rome; but of this we shall speak more fully anon. One of his poems is exclusively descriptive of scenery, being a Journal in blank verse of a visit to the Adirondac Lakes, made in August, 1858, in company with nine friends and ten guides. Each man had a boat and a guide, and

By the bright morn the gay flotilla slid
Through files of flags that gleamed like bayonets,
Through gold-moth-haunted beds of pickerel flowers,
Through scented banks of lilies white and gold,
Where the deer feeds at night, the teal by day.

The charm of this poem consists in its freshness and truthfulness. The scenery through which the travellers passed was peculiar in its broad outlines and in its minute details, and Emerson seizes on all the strong points with a poet's instincts. Brilliant and precise as his descriptions are, they do not weary, because they are *shot* with philosophy like scarlet threads running through a dark ground. His verses are not unfrequently like Goethe's in their melody and reflectiveness, and the light of the student's lamp is shed over them all. Thus he observes nature from two points of view at the same moment,—from the scientific and the poetic. It is remarked of Tennyson that his allusions to science are studiously accurate, and we have read one critic who even complains of this precision. But it is common to all poets of a higher order, and may be traced in such lines as these from "The Adirondacs"—

Nor less the ambitious botanist sought plants,
Orchis and gentian, fern and long whip-scorpus,
Rosy polygonum, lake-margin's pride,
Hypnum and hydnum, mushroom, sponge and moss,
Or harebell nodding in the gorge of falls.
Above, the eagle flew, the osprey screamed,
The raven croaked, owls hooted, the woodpecker
Loud hammered, and the heron rose in the swamp. . .
Decayed millennial trunks, like moonlight flecks,
Lit with phosphoric crumbs the forest floor.

Let us, in the last place, follow Longfellow breaking into the prairies, in the track of the emigrant's wagon, and fancy ourselves in the midst of a Western solitude. He describes them, it must be remembered, in English hexameters, a metre

not very common, but used by Southey, in his "Vision of Judgment":—

Spreading between these streams are the wonderful, beautiful prairies,
 Billowy bays of grass ever rolling in shadow and sunshine—
 Bright with luxuriant clusters of roses and purple amorphas ;
 Over them wander the buffalo herds, and the elk, and the roebuck ;
 Over them wander the wolves, and herds of riderless horses ;
 Fires that blast and blight, and *winds that are weary with travel* ;
 Over them wander the scattered tribes of Ishmael's children,
 Staining the desert with blood : and above their terrible war trails
 Circles and sails aloft, on pinions majestic, the vulture,
 Like the implacable soul of a chieftain slaughtered in battle,
 By invisible stairs ascending and scaling the heavens.
 Here and there rise smokes from the camps of these savage marauders ;
 Here and there rise groves from the margin of swift-running rivers :
 And the grim, taciturn bear, the anchorite monk of the desert,
 Climbs down their dark ravines to dig for roots by the brook side ;
 And over all is the sky, the clear and crystalline heaven,
 Like the protecting hand of God inverted above them.

The first poetic efforts of American settlers consisted in hymns, and these, while they evinced deep religious feeling, were pervaded with Puritan errors. Nine years before the execution of Charles I., the Apostle Eliot, as he was called, compiled the Bay Psalm Book. But hymns in general, and especially Puritan hymns, belong to a low order of poetry, the ideas in which are equally sublime and hackneyed. Narrative and descriptive poems followed ; and there is one, dated as early as 1630, by an anonymous hand, which is preserved as the first recorded poem written in America. It gives an amusing account of the annoyances to which the first planters in the wilderness were exposed. Benjamin Franklin tried his hand at humorous verse. Descriptive poems appeared by Benjamin Thompson, Timothy Dwight, David Humphreys, John Pierpont, Samuel Woodworth, Seba Smith, and Charles Sprague. Joseph Hopkinson, Washington Alston, and Francis Scott Key had some claim to the title of lyric poets ; and John Howard Payne was the author of one of the most popular songs ever written, "Home, Sweet Home." But these were only pioneers in the band of American poets, and their chief merit consisted in clearing the way for others of more renown.

Lydia Huntley Sigourney, born at Norwich, in the United States, like William Cullen Bryant, her junior by three years, manifested in very early childhood a strong propensity to rhyme. At eight she used to astonish her parents by reciting verses of her own composition. Nor have her mature years altogether

belied the promise of her youth. During a long literary career, she has produced a great deal of respectable poetry, but has seen her fame eclipsed by many a brighter star. Her "Gossip with a Bouquet" is fresh with bloom as the nosegay she addresses, and if the flowers could speak, they would declare that they were never talked to more prettily. Speaking to the pansies, she says :

I remember well
How beautiful they were, and with what pride
I used to pluck them when my school was o'er,
And love to place them, rich with breathing sweets,
Between my Bible leaves, and find them there
Month after month, *pressing their bosoms close*
To some undying hope.

A pretty idea, truly, and neatly expressed. Mrs. Sigourney's lines on the "Falls of Niagara" are more vigorous; and those on "Maternal Piety" and the "Pilgrim Fathers" are often found in Collections. Taken on the whole, she is the poetess of decent mediocrity, and this is saying much, when so many female poets are far below mediocrity. Her "Pleasing Memories of Pleasant Lands" is just what one would expect from the title.

The names which stand highest on the list of American Poets are William Cullen Bryant; Henry Wadsworth Longfellow; Bayard Taylor; Oliver Wendell Holmes; James Russell Lowell; John Greenleaf Whittier; Edgar Allan Poe; and Ralph Waldo Emerson. These, in relation to other poets, their countrymen, may be said to occupy a place similar to that occupied in Germany by Goethe; Schiller; Uhland; Heine; Chamisso; Freiligrath; and Körner. The first of them in order of time, but in that order only, is Bryant. He was born in 1797, and at ten years old published some translations from Latin poets. At thirteen he wrote the well-known "Embargo." One of his poems, entitled "The Ages," was subsequently recited before a University Society of Harvard College, and thus an opportunity was seized of testing its merits and chances of success before publication. The practice is common in the United States, and offers several advantages. Longfellow introduced his translation of Dante into society in this manner. A select number of critical friends would always be a fair criterion of public opinion in such matters, and would spare many a reader disgust, and many a writer bitter disappointment. Bryant and Washington Irving strove together for popularity, and both obtained it. The poetry of the former has some characteristics of the latter's prose. It is free from extravagance, classic,

reflective, observant of nature. It is hard to say whether he has learned most from Wordsworth or from nature herself. Both have taught him, and he has (to use his own words in speaking of Freedom) made it his vocation,—

To tend the quiet flock and watch the stars,
And teach the reed to utter simple airs.

His highest bid for immortality was "Thanatopsis," a solemn hymn in blank verse, on a mournful theme. We seem to hear in it the true, tender, melodious wailing of chords swept by the night wind. The pensive strain is marked, as Lady Pollock has said, by a monotony of excellence, and in it, as in Bryant's other compositions, a certain poetical piety pleases even where it least satisfies. "Be it ours," he prays,—

To meditate
In these calm shades thy milder majesty,
And to the beautiful order of Thy works
Learn to conform the order of our lives.

Bryant has all the taste of Samuel Rogers, and more imagination, and with more prominent teaching also of natural religion. Here is the sum of his pious counsels :—

So live, that when thy summons comes to join
The innumerable caravan that moves
To that mysterious realm where each shall take
His chamber in the silent halls of Death,
Thou go not like the quarry-slave, at night,
Scourged to his dungeon, but, *sustained and soothed*
By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave,
Like one that draws the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams.

Alexander Smith thinks the "Disinterred Warrior" the finest of all Bryant's pieces. None of his poems are more popular than the "Inscription for an Entrance to a Wood"; the "Indian at the Grave of his Fathers"; the "Death of the Flowers"; the "Prairies"; the "Hymn of the City," and the "Battle Field." But the subject of his "Lines to a Waterfowl" is made the occasion of a moral so beautifully pointed, that we cannot do better than quote it. It is Bryant all over, and concentrates his every art :—

Whither 'midst falling dew,
While glow the heavens with the last steps of Day,
Far through their rosy depths dost thou pursue
Thy solitary way ?

Vainly the fowler's eye
Might mark thy distant flight to do thee wrong,
As darkly limned upon * the crimson sky
Thy figure floats along.

Seek'st thou the plashy brink
Of weedy lake, or marge of river wide,
Or where the rocking billows rise and sink
On the chafed ocean-side ?

There is a Power whose care
Teaches thy way along that pathless coast—
The desert and illimitable air—
Long wandering, but not lost.

All day thy wings have fanned
At that far height the cold thin atmosphere,
Yet stoop not weary to the welcome land,
Though the dark night is near.

And soon that toil shall end,
Soon shalt thou find a summer home, and rest
And scream among thy fellows ; reeds shall bend
Soon o'er thy sheltered nest.

Thou'rt gone ; the abyss of heaven
Hath swallowed up thy form ; yet on my heart
Deeply hath sunk the lesson thou hast given,
And shall not soon depart.

He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky† thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will lead my steps aright.

There are many who think that "Hiawatha" and the "Biglow Papers" are the finest and most original products of American fancy. They certainly have the merit of nationality ; the maize and the pumpkin are not more indigenous. Longfellow has always had a passion for quaint and varied metres. In adopting them he may have consulted his own taste, or the probability of their attracting attention by their novelty, or he may have been influenced by both. "Hiawatha" is an unbroken succession of lines consisting of four trochees, and the simplicity and monotony of the metre is supposed to suit well the subject, which regards savage life among a primitive race. Words among such people are few, and melody, if they have

* In some editions "painted on."

† In some editions "the uncertain sky."

any, of a sing-song kind. "Hiawatha" is the Messiah of an Indian tribe—a King Arthur of North America. His birth is miraculous, he is regarded as a demigod, and his mission is to clear rivers, forests, fishing-grounds, and to teach the arts of peace—to bring, in short, those benefits which society, among his people, seems most to need. The rough materials of Longfellow's poem are to be found in the works of Schoolcraft, Catlin, Heckewelder, Mrs. Eastman, and various scientific Reports and Transactions; but the incidents, the imagery, the colouring, are all his own. They stamp the author of this epic of the melancholy moorlands as a creator of beauty, and consequently a true poet—and all the more true because his subject, rhythm, scenery, adventures, treatment, are perfectly new and strange. His sentiments, which are almost always just and pious, find room for expression very often, even amid the fierce and ever-changing activity of Ojibway life. For example:—

Ye whose hearts are fresh and simple,
Who have faith in God and Nature,
Who believe, that in all ages
Every human heart is human,
That in even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings
For the good they comprehend not,
That the feeble hands and helpless,
Groping blindly in the darkness,
Touch God's right hand in that darkness,
And are lifted up and strengthened;—
Listen to this simple story
To this song of Hiawatha!

There is something not unlike this in the sermon which S. Paul preached at Athens. He spoke of all mankind as having the means of seeking after God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us (*εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφίσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὗροιν*). And doubtless there are among the heathen many who fall with their weight of cares upon the great altar-steps of nature "that lead from darkness up to God"—many who stretch lame hands of inchoate faith, and grope, and gather dust and chaff, and call on what they feel is the Lord,

And faintly trust the larger hope.

Ludovico di Varthema, who travelled in the East three centuries and a half ago, says, "The Guzerati are a certain race which eats nothing that has blood, and never kills any living thing. And these same people are neither Moors nor

heathens. It is my opinion that if they were baptized, they would all be saved by virtue of their works, for they never do to others what they would not that others should do unto them." Even Voltaire has said (*Correspondance avec d'Alembert, Lettre XV.*), "Jamais on n'a adoré les idoles ; jamais culte public n'a été institué pour du bois et de la pierre."

There is an enormous amount of natural history scattered over "Hiawatha," and reduced to poetry ; but the author has interspersed it in a scarcely less degree with touches of human tenderness, relieving the waste of uncivilized life. Death makes his darkness and sorrow beautiful, in these pages. The decease of the singer Chibiabos and of Hiawatha's wife, Minnehaha, give rise to some affecting poetry, of which we shall quote but a few lines in reference to each :

He is dead, the sweet Musician !
 He, the sweetest of all singers !
 He has gone from us for ever,
He has moved a little nearer
To the Master of all music,
To the Master of all singing !
 O my brother, Chibiabos !

* * * * *

In the snow a grave they made her,
 In the forest deep and darksome,
Underneath the moaning hemlocks ;
 Clothed her in her richest garments,
 Wrapped her in her robes of ermine,
 Covered her with snow, like ermine.
 Thus they buried Minnehaha.
 And at night a fire was lighted
 On her grave, four times was kindled,
 For her soul upon its journey
 To the Islands of the Blessed.
 From his doorway Hiawatha
 Saw it burning in the forest,
Lighting up the gloomy hemlocks ;
 From his sleepless bed uprising,
 From the bed of Minnehaha,
 Stood and watched it at the doorway,
 That it might not be extinguished,
 Might not leave her in the darkness.

"Evangeline" is written in a metre which can never be successful in our language, for hexameters require a preponderance of spondees for English ears, and spondees in English

are rare. Hence readable hexameters are almost impossible, and this was the opinion of a high authority on metrical questions—Edgar Allan Poe. It is well that we should have occasionally English poems in hexameters, galliambics, alcaics, and hendecasyllabics, if only to exercise the ingenuity of writers ; but they can only please us as curiosities, being foreign to the genius of our tongue. The case is the same in other modern languages. “Germany’s great poets,” says Dr. Alfred Baskerville, “have clothed sublime thoughts in hexameter verse, but they have not succeeded in rendering it popular, in the true sense of the word. What German schoolboy, when he has to learn a piece of poetry, chooses one in hexameters?” If “Evangeline” acquired a popularity, it was in spite of the metre, not because of it. The lovely images of the poem are so profuse, the style is so quaint, so scripturally tender, so Puritanically Catholic, and the painting of the old French pastoral life is so true, that most of those who read it once read it again, and many water it with their tears. The religious sentiments which pervade it are pure and undefiled, and its attempts to portray Catholic life, creed, and ritual, are not always failures. “The Tale of Love in Acadie” is fraught with Catholic associations from the beginning to the end. The Angelus sounds over the rude villages ; the heroine goes by the sweet name of the “Sunshine of S. Eulalie ;” and the pious Acadian peasants call the peaceful Autumn a “Summer of All-Saints.” The priest, Father Felician, exhorts his people in these words :—

Lo ! where the crucified Christ from his cross is gazing upon you !
See ! in those sorrowful eyes what meekness and holy compassion !
Hark ! how those lips still repeat the prayer, “O Father, forgive them !”
Let us repeat that prayer in the hour when the wicked assail us ;
Let us repeat it now, and say, “O Father, forgive them !”

The chant of the Catholic Mission is :—

Sacred heart of the Saviour ! O inexhaustible fountain !
Fill our hearts this day with strength and submission and patience !

The tents of the Jesuit mission are seen, and the Black Robe chief kneeling with his children under a towering oak.

. A crucifix, fastened
High on the trunk of the tree, and overshadowed by grape-vines,
Looked with its agonized face on the multitude kneeling beneath it.
This was their rural chapel. Aloft, through the intricate arches
Of its ærial roof, arose the chant of their vespers,
Mingling its notes with the soft susurrus and sighs of the branches.

Evangeline, having failed of finding her long-lost, deeply-loved Gabriel, is thus described :—

Patience, and abnegation of self, and devotion to others,
 This was the lesson a life of trial and sorrow had taught her ;
 So was her love diffused, but like to some odorous spices,
 Suffered no waste nor loss, though filling the air with aroma.
 Other hope had she none, nor wish in life, but to follow
 Meekly, with reverent steps, the sacred feet of her Saviour.
 Thus many years she lived as a sister of Mercy ; frequenting
 Lonely and wretched roofs in the crowded lanes of the city,
 Where distress and want concealed themselves from the sunlight,
 Where disease and sorrow in garrets languished neglected.
 Night after night when the world was asleep, as the watchman repeated
 Loud, through the gusty streets, that all was well in the city,
 High at some lonely window he saw the light of her taper.
 Day after day, in the grey of the dawn, as slow through the suburbs
 Plodded the German farmer, with flowers and fruits from the market,
 Met he the meek, pale face, returning home from its watchings.

These extracts are given to illustrate the Catholic aspects of "Evangeline." They have little poetic merit, being, indeed, remarkably common-place. But we accept as a tribute to our holy religion whatever presents, in a pleasing point of view, a picture of its rites. Longfellow is a true poet, but never a great one. Greatness has not hitherto been the attribute of any of the American poets. They have produced little that fires the mind with enthusiasm, or stands forth in the grandeur of sublime originality. Much of their verse which is extremely beautiful, falls short, nevertheless, of poetry's highest requirements. It will not endure a process of analysis and anatomy. It cannot be tried in the fire, and decomposed as in a crucible, yet come out after all renewed and reattested, perfect in all its parts, in solid and flawless unity. But is it, therefore, to be cast away as dross ? By no means. All metals have their value, though all metals are not gold without alloy. Longfellow's last poem, "Aftermath," resembles his "Tales of a Wayside Inn." It is a series of short, bright, and crisp tales told by a Spanish Jew, a theologian, a monk, a student, a poet, a musician and a gay Sicilian, who meet at an inn and tell tales by the fireside. It perpetuates but does not increase the author's reputation. When we compare it with what Longfellow produced in his youth, we recognize the justness of the title "Aftermath." It is precisely that. A second crop—not, as the poet himself says :—

Not the sweet, new grass with flowers
 Is this harvesting of ours ;

Not the upland clover bloom ;
But the rowen* mixed with weeds,
Tangled tufts from marsh and meads,
Where the poppy drops its seeds
In the silence and the gloom.

As a translator, Longfellow has earned for himself well-deserved laurels. We are indebted to him for the best English translation of the "*Divina Commedia*" of Dante. He adheres to the original with the closest exactitude, and at the same time infuses into his verse more spirit and poetry than are to be found in Cary. In minor translations, also, he has been eminently successful, particularly in the "*Children of the Lord's Supper*" from the Swedish of Tegner; "*Coplas*" from the Spanish of Manrique; "*Beware!*" from the German; the "*Castle by the Sea*," from Ludwig Uhland; and the "*Luck of Edenhall*," by the same poet. Some of these were published in Longfellow's earlier days, when the dew of his youth was yet upon him, and several of the smaller poems which he then wrote have retained a firmer hold on the public than any which have appeared since. The down of the ripe peach rests on them still. "*Excelsior*," the "*Footsteps of Angels*" and the "*Psalm of Life*," the "*Builders*" and the "*Old Clock on the Stairs*," abide in our memory, while many more elaborate efforts of later years are read, admired, and forgotten.

Longfellow is not alone among his countrymen as a successful translator. Bayard Taylor has published a version of Goethe's "*Faust*" in the various original metres; and in his poem entitled "*Lars*" we have 130 pages of blank verse without a single violation of the laws of iambs. Of all poets, Bayard Taylor, has been, perhaps, the greatest traveller, and he carries about with him an incalculable number of memories of sunny lands. In every country his eye fastens on the objects distinctively poetical, and his mind is therefore a perfect treasure-house of diversified images. He has visited India, China, Japan, Syria, Arabia, and Egypt, besides being familiar with England, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and France. He has sailed up the Nile far beyond the rapids, and penetrated into the centre of Africa, as far as the green sea called the Sea of the Gazelles. He has explored Palestine, and written a volume of Oriental poems, while in "*Lars, a Pastoral of Norway*," he exhibits an intimate acquaintance with the scenery, habits, and manners of that land of fiords and skerries. This Norwegian pastoral, published in London (Strahan & Co.,

* Rough grass.

1873), is a charming, sedate, picturesque novel in blank verse. It has features all its own; not a line in it is unmusical; nothing is forced or artificial; it is calm and mellow beauty throughout; thoughtful, tender, and pervaded with a sort of Quaker piety, which is very pleasing so far as it is orthodox. The dramatic propriety of each character is duly preserved, and in the first book the quarrel and duel of Lars and Per, ending in the death of the latter, are graphically described. The scene in the second book changes to the Isle of Tinicum, in Delaware, United States, where Lars becomes the servant of Ezra Mendenhall, and marries his daughter Ruth. The pastoral life of these pious settlers is recorded most poetically, and when Lars returns with Ruth to Norway, and is challenged (according to a Norwegian custom more honoured in the breach than the observance) by Thorsten, the brother of the slaughtered Per, he nobly refuses to fight, and braves the reproach of cowardice, without a stain on his honour or his character as a man or a Christian. Ruth and Brita, who had once been loved by Lars, and had been the occasion of the hasty duel, become dear friends; and thus ends a Puritan poem, supremely placid, and glowing, like a fertile vale at sunset, with light and colour too delicate for description. When we speak of "Lars" as a Puritan poem, we do not mean that it is aggressively so, or that it even attempts to indoctrinate the reader with any particular system of religious thought, but the prevailing *tone* of its descriptions, so far as they relate to the inner life, is of a Puritan or Quaker kind. Every intelligent Catholic reader will know how to derive good from it, as well as pleasure, and if we were not flooded in these days with what is called poetry, a pure and limpid stream, like that which flows through "Lars," would not easily be washed down into oblivion. A few of the lines describing Arendal, where Ruth was welcomed, seem typical of the poem itself:—

To Ruth, how sweetly the geraniums peeped
 With scarlet eyes across the window-sill!
 How orderly the snowy curtains shone!
 Familiar, too, the plainness and the use
 In all things; presses of the dusky oak,
 Fair linen, store of healing herbs that *smelled*
Of charity, and signs of forethought wise
That justified the plenty of the house.

But our subject being American Poets, we cannot illustrate it better than by quoting the verses addressed by one of these poets to another. "Lars" is dedicated by Bayard Taylor to John Greenleaf Whittier (a "Friend" in a double sense), in verses full of music and feeling.

Through many years my heart goes back,
 Through chequered years of loss and gain,
 To that fair landmark on its track,
 When first, beside the Merrimac,
 Upon thy cottage-roof I heard the autumn rain.
 A hand that welcomed and that cheered,
 To one unknown didst thou extend ;
 Thou gavest hope to song that feared ;
 But now, by Time and Faith endeared,
 I claim the sacred right to call the Poet—Friend !

However Life the stream may stain,
 From thy pure fountain drank my youth
 The simple creed, the faith humane
 In Good, that never can be slain,
 The prayer for inward Light, the search for outward Truth !
 Like thee, I see at last prevail
 The sleepless soul that looks above ;
 I hear, far off, the hymns that hail
 The Victor, clad in heavenly mail,
 Whose only weapons are the eyes and voice of Love !
 Take, then, these olive-leaves from me,
 To mingle with thy brighter bays !
 Some balm of peace and purity
 In them, may faintly breathe of thee ;
 And take the grateful love wherein I hide thy praise !

These are the verses on which a man may look back with satisfaction when he comes to die. Bryant's translation of the Iliad is a work which deserves to stand side by side with Longfellow's version of Dante. It is, like Lord Derby's, in unrhymed iambics, or blank verse, and is executed with great taste and exactness, as well as with true poetic feeling. Though in choosing such a task, Bryant entered the lists with Chapman and his fourteen-syllable line, with the rhymed couplets of Pope and Southey, the blank verse of Cowper, the Spenserian stanzas of Worsley, and the ballad movement in seven beats of Professor Newman, he cannot be said to have been foiled, or to have missed his crown. Besides the praises which have been bestowed on his work by the best critics in America, he has had the satisfaction of seeing his translation exert a beneficial influence on the national literature. It has promoted the study of Greek classics, and served as a protest against the hankering after glitter and novelty, and the morbid self-consciousness, which fester the growth of true poetry. Translations such as this have not yet reached their full measure of utility, because it has not yet been generally taught with suf-

ficient distinctness, that good, that is exact and spirited, translations, are the best of all means of learning a foreign language, and especially a dead one. It would not be much to say that Bryant's translation of the Iliad surpasses in excellence that of Lord Derby ; there are those who prefer it even to Cowper's, and wish that Bryant had, like Voss, executed his work in hexameters instead of iambic pentameters. "For conscientious adherence to the text," says an American critic in the "Catholic World," "his version has no rival in our tongue, and ought in justice to be compared with Voss."

Although there is no Catholic poet in the United States who has attained a recognized eminence, we find occasionally, among the contributions to the New York review just mentioned, pieces worthy of note ; and as they are purely anonymous, we take it for granted that they are of indigenous growth. We select two specimens, the first of which is from the "Catholic World" of May, 1868.

LOVE'S BURDEN.

"My burden is light."

The Disciple.

"Dear Lord, how canst Thou say
 'Tis light,
 When I behold Thee on the way
 To Calvary's height,
 Fainting and falling 'neath its heavy weight ?
 Ah, no ! For me Thy burden is too great."

The Master.

"Good child, thou dost mistake ;
 The burden I would have thee take,
 The cruel load
 That crushed Me down on Calvary's road,
 Was thine,
 Not Mine.
 What lighter burden can there be
 Than that which Love would lay on thee ?"

The Disciple.

"Kind Lord, how foolish is my speech !
 I mark the truth which thou wouldst teach
 To my cold heart.
 Love all the burden bears to others' woes,
 Beyond its might ;
 But of its own on them it would impose
 Only a part,
 And makes that light."

The last line of the following sonnet is very effective, and we can only regret the defective structure of the sonnet in the latter part, or, as it is properly called, the minor system.

S. MARY MAGDALEN.

'Mid the white spouses of the sacred Heart,
 After its Queen, the nearest, dearest, thou.
 Yet the auréola around thy brow
 Is not the Virgin's ; thine a throne apart.
 Nor yet, my Saint, does faith-illumined art
 Thy hand with palm of martyrdom endow :
 And when thy hair is all it will allow
 Of glory to thy head, we do not start.
 O more than virgin in thy penitent love !
 And more than martyr in thy passionate woe !
 How should thy sisters equal thee above,
 Who knelt not with thee on the gory sod ?
 Or where the crown our worship could bestow
 Like *that long gold which wiped the feet of God* !

The disposition of the rhymes in the major system, or first eight lines, of this sonnet is faultless, but that of the remainder is awkward, inharmonious, and unwarranted by the example of Petrarch and other correct sonneteers. The sonnet is the most difficult of all forms of poetry when its rules are faithfully observed. But its perfection and its merits depend on this observance; and those who feel its fetters galling should not put them on. They may be worn lightly, and, indeed, should be worn as if they were bracelets or flower-wreaths, but they must not be taken off whenever they chance to be inconvenient. *Un sonnet sans défaut*, says Boileau, *vaut seul un long poëme*.

Oliver Wendell Holmes is an American physician, who has devoted himself chiefly to literary occupations. He earned his reputation in the first instance by delivering a metrical essay entitled "Poetry" before the Phi-Beta-Kappa Society. In after-years he recited before the same body his "Terpsichore" and "Urania" with similar success. He has always been famous for songs and lyrics written for festive occasions, and often sung and spoken by himself. Like Thomas Moore, he possesses the happy faculty of singing his own verses with a rare amount of pathos. All who know him look back fondly on every occasion when, in their society,

Friendship loosed the jesses of his tongue.

He is a choice spirit, socially considered ; can set a table in a roar, and recommend his own compositions by the geniality

of his disposition. His cordial good-fellowship is taken in part of payment by those who seek from him literary enjoyment, and they are at the same time obliged to admit that earnestness and vigour are never wanting in his rhymes. He has the rare advantage of being a cheerful poet, and cheerfulness is refreshing when there is so much morbid melancholy among the *genus irritabile vatum*. The truly poetic temperament is almost always pensive and sorrowful. A highly organized brain and constitution must of necessity be keenly sensitive, and the poet's utterances are not inaptly attributed to a "lyre," a "harp," a "lute," or a "shell," because stringed instruments emit wailing sounds. The truest eloquence of poetry lies in its pathos, its keen sympathy with human suffering in every shape. But this pathos, so powerful and tear-exciting in the hands of a master, degenerates into whining and affectation in the verse of imitators. And as the imitators are many and the masters few, we are always glad to meet with a poet who makes no attempt at melancholy, but is cheerfully genuine. Such a singer is Oliver Wendell Holmes, and his mirth has occasional touches of sadness all the more welcome because we are not surfeited with it. Thus in one of his poems in the "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table" we have the beautiful couplet:—

Alas for those that never sing,
But die with all their music in them !

Another quality which Holmes possesses, in common with all able satirists, is that of being a moralist—not indeed a severe and indignant moralist, but a genial disseminator of wholesome maxims, who is too wise to mistake the true end of poetry, and fancy that it should always, or even generally, be didactic. He knows full well that it is of the essence of poetry to be suggestive, metaphorical, indirect—that it is a sort of Cabala—a Cabala of a high order, every line and word containing a mystery. And, in the sense here intended, the poet most inspired by genius is the most Cabalistic—he wraps up most meanings in his expressions, and condenses the largest amount of wisdom or of beauty into the smallest compass. Here is a specimen of Holmes's moralizing, and it occurs in the midst of droll verses "On lending a Punch-bowl": it would serve well as a motto for a goblet.

'Tis but the fool that loves excess ; hast thou a drunken soul ?
Thy bane is in thy shallow skull, not in my silver bowl !

Poetry speaks to us in *tesseractæ*, in parables, and its moral lessons are, for the most part, to be inferred. "The Old

Man's Dream" is a good specimen of Holmes's playful moralizing:—

Oh, for one hour of youthful joy !
Give back my twentieth spring !
I'd rather laugh a bright-haired boy
Than reign a grey-beard king !

Off with the wrinkled spoils of age !
Away with learning's crown !
Tear out life's wisdom-written page,
And dash its trophies down !

One moment let my life-blood stream
From boyhood's fount of flame !
Give me one giddy, reeling dream
Of life all love and fame ?

My listening angel heard the prayer,
And, calmly smiling, said,
" If I but touch thy silvered hair,
Thy hasty wish hath sped.

But is there nothing in thy track
To bid thee fondly stay,
While the swift seasons hurry back
To find the wished-for day ? "

" Ah, truest soul of woman kind !
Without thee, what were life ?
One bliss I cannot leave behind :
I'll take—my—precious—wife ! "

The angel took a sapphire pen
And wrote in rainbow dew,
" The man would be a boy again,
And be a husband too !

" And is there nothing yet unsaid
Before the change appears ?
Remember, all their gifts have fled
With those dissolving years ! "

" Why, yes ; for memory would recall
My fond paternal joys ;
I could not bear to leave them all,
I'll take—my—girl—and—boys !

The smiling angel dropped his pen,—
" Why, this will never do,
The man would be a boy again,
And be a father too ! "

And so I laughed,—my laughter woke
 The household with its noise,
 And wrote my dream, when morning broke,
 To please the grey-haired boys.


Oliver Wendell Holmes is the sworn enemy of shams and humbug. He delights in brushing away social cobwebs, and clearing the moral atmosphere of noxious vapours. His verse is a brisk and healthy current of good common sense. A genial nature beams forth in every line, and the spontaneity of his humour is one of its principal charms. Of such verses as his, says Alexander Smith, the basis is good sense, but it is saved from dulness by a kindly satire, a pleasant music, unexpected rhymes, and a constant flow of witty and fanciful illustrations. His verses of society are not all compact poetry, but poetry is there—like a flower in the button-hole, like perfume in the handkerchief. “Since Præd, no one, perhaps, on this side of the water, has cultivated that difficult branch of writing—in which the knowledge of the man of the world and the art of the poet are required in pretty nearly equal proportions—with more success.” “Contentment” is one of Holmes’s most quizzical pieces, and a few stanzas only will give a sufficient idea of his sly humour and piquant satire:—

Little I ask ; my wants are few ;
 I only wish a hut of stone
 (A *very plain* brown stone will do)
 That I may call my own ;—
 And close at hand is such a one,
 In yonder street that fronts the sun.

Plain food is quite enough for me ;
 Three courses are as good as ten ;—
 If nature can subsist on three,
 Thank Heaven for three. Amen !
 I always thought cold victual nice,—
 My *choice* would be vanilla-ice.

I care not much for gold or land ;—
 Give me a mortgage here and there,
 Some good bank-stock, some note of hand,
 Or trifling railroad share,—
 I only ask that Fortune send
 A *little* more than I shall spend.

And thus the *contented* man runs through some dozen stanzas, expressing, one after another, his extremely limited and moderate wishes in respect to honours, jewels, his wife’s dress, his horses, pictures, books, busts, cameos, gems, his



buhl-tables, his *one* Stradivarius, and his *two* meerschaums, winding up with the climax of self-deception :—

Thus humble let me live and die,
Nor long for Midas' golden touch ;
If Heaven more generous gifts deny,
I shall not miss them *much*,—
Too grateful for the blessing lent
Of simple tastes and mind content !

There is a sound moral in this cutting irony. Privations, and not gratifications, are the true criterion of contentment. We must not give ourselves credit for contented minds if we say, in Holmes's words ;—

That *but for this* our souls were free,
And *but for that* our lives were blest ;
That in some season yet to be
Our cares will leave us time to rest ;—

or if we suppose—

That when we sob o'er fancied woes,
The angels hovering overhead
Count every pitying drop that flows,
And *love us for the tears we shed* ;
That when we stand with tearless eye,
And turn the beggar from our door,
They still approve us when we sigh,
'Ah, *had I but one thousand more.*'

We propose returning to this subject at an early opportunity, and completing in another number our review of American Poets.



ART. III.—MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF FREEWILL.

Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL.
Fourth Edition. London: Longmans.

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL.
Eighth Edition. London: Longmans.

The Emotions and the Will. By ALEXANDER BAIN. London: J. W. Parker.

ON the present occasion our contention against Mr. Mill will be purely psychological; though connected of course with most important metaphysical questions, such as morality and again causation. On every question debated between intuitionists and phenomenists, we consider Mr. Mill by far our ablest opponent; as we have often said. But on the particular theme now before us, he is preeminently the most suitable champion we could assail; for "the theory of volition and of responsibility," says its advocate in the "Westminster Review" (Oct. 1873, p. 305), which was "first stated in this country by Hobbes," "is now associated most closely with the name of Mr. J. S. Mill." In addition however to the two works in which Mr. Mill treats this theme, we have also named at the head of our article Dr. Bain's well-known treatise, which is identical in doctrine with Mr. Mill's volumes. And in our present article we propose to join issue with Mr. Mill on a mere question of fact, in regard to experienced phenomena. He holds, "as a truth of experience," "that volitions do in fact follow determinate moral antecedents, with the same uniformity and the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes": these moral antecedents being "desires, occasions, habits and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances suitable to call those internal incentives into action" ("On Hamilton," pp. 576, 7). He maintains, that if we knew any given "person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting on him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event" ("Logic," vol. ii. p. 422). This doctrine has commonly been called "the doctrine of philosophical necessity," and we think the name a very suitable one. Mr. Mill however prefers the name "determinism"; and in this he apparently accords with the great body of his fellow-thinkers: by all means therefore so let it be.

For ourselves—as we have already implied—we shall not attempt in our present article to establish the full doctrine of Freewill: because this cannot be done, until we have treated “causation”; as we hope to do in the next article of our series.* On the present occasion we shall content ourselves with disproving (as we consider) the psychical fact, which Mr. Mill alleges. He calls his theory “determinism”; and we will call our own therefore by the name of “indeterminism.” The full doctrine of Freewill includes indeed the doctrine of indeterminism; but it includes also a certain doctrine on the causation of human acts, which we do not here profess to establish.

It is always of preeminent importance in controversy, to understand rightly the position of one's opponent; but on no other question (we think) is this so necessary as on the present. We will beg therefore our readers' most careful attention, while we draw out what we apprehend to be Mr. Mill's theory, at a length which to them may possibly appear tedious and superfluous. As we proceed, we will cite in foot-notes illustrative passages from Mr. Mill himself and from Dr. Bain. The determinist then may be supposed to express himself as follows:—

“By the term ‘motive’ I understand the desire of ‘some pleasure which may be gained, or the aversion to some pain which may be prevented, by some given course of action.† For the sake of greater compendiousness indeed, I will call the avoidance of pain a negative pleasure; and I can then omit the second part of the above definition. When a man in a boat sees the approach of a storm and rows to save his life, his *motive* is his desiring that *negative pleasure*, the escape from death.

“If any motive at any moment acted alone, it would as a matter of course be followed by action in the indicated direction. But almost always conflicting motives are at work; or (in other words) the pleasure desired is seen to be unattainable, except with some concomitant pain. Even a flower cannot be plucked, without the trouble of stooping.

* It is an inconvenience in philosophical controversy, that not unfrequently some particular theme has to be treated piecemeal, in order that nothing may be assumed without proof. It would have been indefinitely *more* inconvenient, if we had attempted to treat causation before we had dealt with determinism.

† “A motive, being a desire or an aversion, is proportional to the pleasantness as conceived by us of the thing desired, or the harmfulness of the thing shunned” (“On Hamilton,” p. 605). So Dr. Bain: “Various motives—*present or prospective pleasures and pains*—concur in urging us to act,” p. 550).

"But in many cases there are powerful conflicting motives in several different directions. If I enter on course A, I shall certainly or probably derive pleasure M; but on the other hand I shall certainly or probably endure pain N: while at the same time, by pursuing course A, I shall be prevented from pursuing course B, or pursuing it at least with equal diligence; which said course B offers special pleasures of its own, though these of course accompanied with its own pains: and so on indefinitely. Under these circumstances, an illustration of my position may be derived from mechanics. A certain physical point, possessing certain intrinsic qualities, is solicited at this moment by several attracting forces: such being the case, it moves definitely and decisively; not perhaps in the direction of any one force, but at all events in a direction resulting from the joint influence of all. The conflicting motives which act on my will are analogous to the conflicting forces which act on the physical point; and my will commonly under these circumstances moves definitely and decisively, not perhaps in the exact direction of any one motive, but at all events in the direction which results from the joint influence of them all.* From time to time, no doubt, there are pauses for deliberation; and there are cases also, in which there exists for a while much vacillation and (as one may say) vibration of the will. I will expound these cases presently. But in the enormous majority of instances—even where there are powerful motives acting on some side which does not prevail—there is no such vacillation at all, but one definite and decisive resultant. Take as an instance, the demeanour in battle of some brave soldier. He is stimulated by many impelling motives: by a certain savage pleasure in aggressiveness, which is partly natural and is partly due to past habit; by desire of his country's success; by zeal perhaps for the cause in which his country is engaged; by desire of his countrymen's and of the world's applause; by repugnance to the infamy which would follow a display

* Determinists "affirm as a truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents, with the same uniformity and with the same certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes. These moral antecedents are desires, aversions, habits and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into action. All these again are effects of causes; those of them which are mental being consequences of education and of other moral and physical influences." ("On Hamilton," pp. 576, 7.) So Dr. Bain says in effect that the will's act is in every case determined by "the operation of the motive forces of pleasurable and painful sensibility, coupled with the mental spontaneousness of the system" (p. 553).

“of cowardice: &c. &c. Yet the motives are in themselves extremely strong, which solicit him in the opposite direction. He is vividly conscious (even though implicitly) of the danger to which he is exposed; of the fearful suffering, and death itself, which may not improbably befall him; he remembers his wife and children whom he has left at home, and the doubt whether he shall ever be with them again; he has seen perhaps his dear friend shot dead by his side, and would be glad to have some brief time for the indulgence of grief; the whole scene around him is ghastly and repulsive in the extreme. Yet in the teeth of these repelling considerations, there is not one moment's faltering or hesitation: the antagonistic motives are as nothing, when conflicting with those which stir him to action. Or take a son, passionately devoted to his mother and tending her in her old age. In vain he is solicited by this that and the other antagonistic gratification: the one master passion overbears all other motives, promptly and without a struggle. And so, if you look at the lives of men in general: you will find that, during very far the greater part of their existence, they are pursuing without hesitation one very definite line of conduct; though there is many a motive simultaneously present, which by itself has a very strong tendency to divert them from their course.

“Here I can explain what I mean by the *power* of a motive: I mean its tendency to influence this or that man's conduct, at this or that particular instant, by means of the pleasure which it proposes. That assemblage of motives, which influences the heroic soldier or the passionately loving son in one direction, is indefinitely ‘more powerful,’ ‘stronger’—or in other words indefinitely more suggestive of positive or negative pleasure—than that which influences him in the other.* Here however I must make two explanations, to prevent very serious misconception of my meaning.

* “Various motives—present or prospective pleasures and pains—concur in urging me to act: the result of the conflict shows that one group is stronger than another, and that is the whole case” (Bain, p. 550). “It is only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest of two pleasures, or what appears such, sways the resulting action; for it is the resulting action that alone determines which is the greater” (ib. p. 447). Mr. Mill is express on this point: “Those who say that the will follows the strongest motive, do not mean the motive which is strongest in relation to *the will*, or in other words that the will follows what it does follow. They mean the motive which is strongest in relation to *pain and pleasure*: since a motive, being a desire or aversion, is proportional to the pleasantness as conceived by us of the thing desired, or the painfulness of the thing shunned” (“On Hamilton,” p. 605). There is another passage of Mr. Mill's, which may be cited as illus-

"Firstly. The natural difference of character among men is enormous; and this enormous difference is enormously increased by difference of education and of past life. That which may be a most powerful motive to one man, will be a very weak one to another, and an actual cause of repulsion to a third. Nay,—so moody and changeable is human nature—not only at different periods of his life, but even at different moments of the same day, the same object is desired by the same man with very varying degrees of intensity. This is partly caused indeed by the fact, that the nervous and muscular systems are so very differently affected at different instants; so that the very same object is indefinitely more attractive at one instant than at another.* Nor again is there any more common phenomenon, than that a man's desire of some immediate gratification is indefinitely stronger at the moment, than his desire of what he well knows to be far more to his permanent welfare; or in other words, that the thought of enjoying such gratification is at the moment far more suggestive to him of pleasure, than is the thought of promoting his own permanent welfare.

"Secondly. Very prominently under the head of 'pain' ranks 'difficulty': such difficulty e.g. as accompanies any attempt at breaking through a firmly established habit. Suppose e.g. I have established a very firm habit of early rising. When the proper moment comes, very strong motives on the other side are spontaneously and at once counterbalanced, by the difficulty of breaking through my habit. And similar phenomena are by no means confined to the case of habits. As one of a thousand instances—there is a very strong impulse with some men, to throw themselves down a precipice if they are standing close to its edge: an impulse which it requires powerful effort to withstand. I am not of course taking a case where the man's head becomes so dizzy, that he loses his power of remaining on the cliff. I am supposing a man with full power over his actions, but conscious of this strange and eccentric impulse. This impulse then acts as a strong motive: and yet it cannot in any obvious sense of the words be called

trating his doctrine in another point of view: "I dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion. The difference between a bad and a good man is not that the latter acts in opposition to his strongest desire: it is, that his desire to do right and his aversion to doing wrong are strong enough to overcome—and in the case of perfect virtue to silence—any other desire or aversion which may conflict with them" (ib. p. 585). What is conscience, he elsewhere asks, except a *desire*? "the desire to do right" (ib. p. 583).

* Bain, p. 442, and elsewhere.

"either a desire of pleasure or an aversion to pain. In fact however it is the latter. There is very great difficulty—i. e. 'pain'—in resisting his natural tendency to throw himself down; and strong motives on the other side are required, to counterbalance this difficulty.*

"I have hitherto considered that great majority of instances, in which conflicting motives issue in a definite and decisive resultant. But I admitted at starting that this is not always the case. Sometimes e.g. there occurs a pause for deliberation. But what more easily explicable than this on my theory? The person pauses, that he may more fully understand the full nature and consequences of proposed alternatives, before deciding which he prefers. You will say perhaps that he sometimes pauses, in order to consider whether some action to which he is attracted be consistent with morality: and I admit this. But then this very fact

* The following passage from Mr. Mill's "Logic" deserves very careful attention:—

"As we proceed in the formation of habits and become accustomed to will a particular act or a particular course of conduct because it is pleasurable, we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being pleasurable. Although, from some change in us or in our circumstances, we have ceased to find any pleasure in the action, or perhaps to anticipate any pleasure in consequence of it,—we still continue to desire the action, and consequently to do it. In this manner it is that habits of hurtful excess continue to be practised although they have ceased to be pleasurable; and in this manner also it is that the willingness to persevere in the course which he has chosen does not desert the moral hero, even when the reward, however real, which he doubtless receives from the consciousness of well-doing, is anything but an equivalent for the sufferings he may undergo or the wishes which he may have to renounce" (vol. ii. pp. 488, 9).

The last clause of this sentence, if regard be had to its *rhetoric*, is one of the numerous passages in Mr. Mill's works, which imply a theory on morals indefinitely truer and nobler than that in which he philosophically acquiesced. But its *logical* meaning is made obvious by the earlier clause. "Habits of hurtful excess continue to be practised, although they have ceased to be pleasurable," simply because their abandonment is so intensely painful. In like manner then, according to Mr. Mill, the difficulty of acting in opposition to a strongly formed virtuous habit affords a motive, which will often counterbalance very strong adverse solicitations. We may add that there are passages similar to the above, in his work "On Hamilton," in pp. 588, 9, and in p. 605.

As to such other impulses as those mentioned in the text, Dr. Bain draws especial attention to them (p. 433). Singularly enough he adds, that they "are cases of action where we cannot discover any connection between pleasure enjoyed or pain averted, and the energy of active devotion made manifest": a statement which seems at first sight to subvert his whole theory. He says however, that "we must look for the explanation of this influence, which traverses the proper course of volition, in the undue or morbid persistency of certain ideas in the mind." In various parts of his works, Dr. Bain lays stress on these "fixed ideas"; and it is by no means easy to see, how he

* "implies, that his desire of performing that action is not so strong, as his desire of acting in accordance with morality.*

"So much on the particular case of *pausing*. Other cases again no doubt exist, exemplifying what I have called *vacillation* and *vibration* of will. The devoted son e.g., whom I just now mentioned, may fall in love; and there will at times be much *vacillation* and *vibration*, between his respective desires, of seeing the young lady, and of solacing his mother's old age. Such cases, however, are very easily explained on my principles; or rather, indeed, my principles would lead me *a priori* to be sure, that there *must* be these cases of *vacillation* and *vibration*. Where the motives on one side are *notably* stronger than those on the other, there results a definite and decisive spontaneous impulse; but where the motives are very nearly balanced, there must result (on the same principles) *vacillation* and *vibration*. During a closely balanced conflict of motives, there is not a single instant in which there does not pass across the mind some thought, which adds strength to, or takes it from, one or other of the contending powers. Some time then must necessarily elapse, before the balance adjusts itself between forces, neither of which is for any two successive instants the same; and this time is of course one of *vacillation* and *vibration*.† If the relative power of the two motives is constantly changing, no wonder that the resultant is constantly changing also.

"Here then is the simple doctrine of determinism; which I take to be a mere interpretation of universal experience, a statement in words of what every one is internally convinced

reconciles his language concerning them with his general theory. One mode of doing so is that given in the text. In some passages he seems to imply a different explanation: viz. that these fixed ideas imply a certain mild form of quasi-insanity; and that acts, done under their influence, are not properly volitions. We see no reason for pursuing further this inquiry; because our reader will see clearly as we proceed, that it can in no way affect our own argument.

* "If I elect to abstain" from murder "in what sense am I conscious that I could have elected to commit the crime? Only if I had desired to commit it with a desire stronger than my horror of murder; not with one less strong" (Mill "On Hamilton," p. 583).

† The last sentence is almost verbatim Mr. Mill's ("On Hamilton," p. 584). An opponent had objected, that "balancing one motive against another is not willing but judging." Mr. Mill replies: "The state of mind I am speaking of is not an intellectual but an emotional state. If there were any indispensable act of judging in this state, it would only be judging which of the two pains or pleasures was the greatest; and to regard this as the operative force, would be conceding the point in favour of necessarianism."

" of.* Every human being at every moment is infallibly determined by the law of his nature to choose that course of conduct, which is apprehended by him as the more pleasurable or the less painful."

Now we are disposed to agree with by far the larger part of all this; and here is in fact a hopeful augury for the discussion, because by consequence the issue is so very much narrowed. We object indeed entirely, as a matter of words, to using the term "motive" in its deterministic sense; for to our mind a large share of the confusion which has so overspread the controversy, has originated in the equivocal use of this term. We will adopt therefore the word "attraction," in a very similar sense to that which determinists express by the term "motive." We will call by the name of an "attraction" every thought, which proposes some pleasure, positive or negative, to be gained by some act or course of action; and we will call one attraction stronger than another, if the pleasure proposed by the former is apprehended as greater,—is more attractive at the moment,—than that proposed by the latter. If the thought proposes "positive" pleasure it will be a "positive"—in the other case a "negative"—attraction.

This terminology being understood—it is very plain (as determinists urge) that every man, during by far the greater part of his life, is solicited by conflicting attractions; and it is further a manifest and undeniable matter of fact that, in the very large majority of such instances, a certain definite and decisive inclination or impulse of the will spontaneously ensues. Further we are thoroughly disposed to agree with Mr. Mill, that this spontaneous inclination or impulse is due to the greater strength of attraction on the prevailing side; or in other words to the greater pleasurable (positive or negative) anticipated at the moment, from one course of action as compared with the other. So strong and constant is the observed gravitation of human nature towards immediate pleasure, that on this particular head Mr. Mill's theory seems to us thoroughly reasonable and well grounded. Nor again is this theory (to our mind) best refuted by dwelling on those instances of pause, or again of vacillation and vibration, to which reference has above been made; although we are very far from regarding the deterministic exposition of those instances as at all sufficient. But we think that the opposition between determinism and indeterminism is by no means so clearly brought out by such cases, as it is by the far more numerous ones, in which the will's spontaneous impulse is

* These are Mr. Mill's words in his "Logic" (vol. ii. p. 422).
2 A 2

definite and decisive. The whole argument then (in our view) should be made to turn on one most simple and intelligible issue.

We beg our readers then to fix their attention on that definite and decisive spontaneous impulse of the will,* which is so very common a phenomenon, and to which we have so often referred. We entirely agree with Mr. Mill, as we just now said, that this spontaneous impulse of the will is infallibly determined at each particular moment, by the balance of pleasurable as apprehended at that moment. But the whole deterministic argument rests from beginning to end on the assumption, that men *never resist this spontaneous impulse*: whereas we confidently affirm, as an experienced fact, that there are cases of such resistance—numerous, unmistakable, nay, most striking. What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience, is this. At some given moment, my will's *gravitation*, as it may be called, or spontaneous impulse is in some given direction; insomuch that if I held myself *passively*,—if I let my will alone—it would with absolute certainty move accordingly: but *in fact* I exert myself with more or less vigour to *resist* such impulse; and then the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely opposite direction. In other words, we would draw our readers' attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of two very distinct phenomena. On the one hand (1) my will's gravitation or spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction; while on the other hand at the same moment (2) its actual movement is quite divergent from this. Now that which "*motives*"† affect, is most evidently the will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, gravitation. The determinist then, by saying that the will's movement is infallibly determined by "*motives*," is obliged to say that the will never moves in opposition to its spontaneous impulse. And in fact he does say this. All determinists assume as a matter of course, that the will never puts forth effort, for the purpose of resisting its spontaneous impulse. We on the contrary allege, that there is no mental fact more undeniable, than the frequent putting forth of such effort.‡ And on this critical point issue is now to be joined.

* It may be better to point out, that Dr. Bain sometimes (e.g. in p. 442) uses the term "spontaneous impulse"—he nowhere (we believe) says "*spontaneous impulse of the will*—in a sense fundamentally distinct from our own.

† For convenience sake in this paragraph we use the word "*motives*" as determinists do.

‡ As it is very important to avoid all possibility of cavil, it will be perhaps better to add one further explanation of the exact point at issue. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain hold, that in each case the spontaneous impulse or inclination

Before commencing our argument however, there are one or two further questions of terminology to be settled. And first, how shall we define the word "motive"? Our own acceptation of it may be thus set forth. We premise the obvious truth, that some ends are aimed at for their own sake, and others only for the sake of the former class: the former we will call "*absolute*," the latter "*relative*" ends. To these two classes of ends correspond two classes of "*motives*." My "*ultimate motive*" in a course of action is my resolve of pursuing some absolute end or ends, with a view to obtaining which, I begin and continue that course of action. And what an "*ultimate motive*" is in relation to an *absolute* end or ends, precisely that is an "*immediate*" or "*intermediate*" motive in relation to a *relative* end or ends. We say "*end or ends*," because it is one of the most familiar among mental phenomena, that men often aim simultaneously at many ends. A youth

of the will is determined by the *balance of immediate pleasure*; and (taking into account the various explanations they give of their statement) we are so far entirely in accord with them. But our own essential argument would not be affected in the slightest degree, if this theory of theirs were disproved. And it is worth while, at the risk of being thought tedious, to make this clear.

The essence of determinism is the doctrine, that at any given moment the will's movement is infallibly and inevitably determined by circumstances, (1) internal and (2) external; i.e. (1) by the intrinsic constitution and disposition of the will, and (2) by the external influences which act on it. Now no one doubts that in every man, during far the larger portion of his waking life, there exists what we have called a definite and decisive spontaneous impulse of his will; and determinists allege, that circumstances (internal and external) determine the will's actual movement, *precisely by determining its spontaneous impulse*. It is the very essence of determinism therefore to allege, that the will's actual movement is never divergent from its spontaneous impulse.

But it is a different question altogether, and one entirely irrelevant to the deterministic controversy, to inquire *what* is exactly the fixed relation which exists, between circumstances on the one hand and the will's spontaneous impulse on the other. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain adopt on this question the balance-of-pleasure theory; and here we agree with them. But quite imaginably philosophers might arise (though we think this very improbable) who should adduce strong arguments for some *different* theory on the subject. Now this, as our readers will see, is a cross-controversy altogether, and in no way affects the issue between determinism and its assailants. We have ourselves assumed, throughout our article, the balance-of-pleasure theory as confessedly and indisputably true; because (1) we account it the true one, and because (2) it is held by all the determinists we ever heard of: but nothing would be easier than to mould our argument according to any different theory which might be established. The question, between determinists and ourselves, is not at all how the will's spontaneous impulse is *formed*, but exclusively whether it is ever *resisted*. Determinists as such say that it is never resisted, and indeterminists as such maintain the contrary.

e.g. applies himself to study, partly for the sake of enjoying its pleasure, and partly for the sake of his future temporal advancement. Where the end is single, we may call the motive "simple"; where there is more than one end, we may call the motive "complex."

So far we are on common ground with determinists. But *they* hold that the "resolve of pursuing some absolute end" is simply synonymous with the "desire of some preponderating pleasure," positive or negative. For the sake therefore of making ourselves more intelligible to our Catholic readers, we will proceed a little further. Whatever absolute end I aim at, is always either "bonum honestum" or "bonum delectabile"; or (in other words) it is either the practising of some virtuousness or the enjoying of some pleasure. So far as this truth is needed in our future argument, we shall not fail to prove it: here we assume it. My "ultimate motive" then, in any act or course of action, will always be either (1) my resolve of practising some virtuousness; or (2) my resolve of enjoying or trying to enjoy some pleasure; or (3) some combination of such resolves. In the first two cases my motive is "simple"; in the last it is "complex." We need hardly add how often it happens, that such "resolves,"—however real and influential—are implicit or unreflected on.

So much on the word "motive": but now further. We have already expressed our conviction, that at any given moment the will's spontaneous impulse (of which we have said so much) is infallibly determined by the preponderance of pleasure proposed. The thought of this preponderating pleasure may be called the "preponderating attraction," or "the resultant of co-existing attractions." Again, we have often to speak of the will's "spontaneous impulse": this we will sometimes call the will's "preponderating" impulse; or, for brevity's sake, we may omit the adjective altogether, and speak of the will's "impulse." Resistance to this impulse may be called "anti-impulsive effort" issuing in "anti-impulsive action."

The determinist then denies, that there is any such thing in man as anti-impulsive effort, or (*a fortiori*) as anti-impulsive action. According to his theory, not only the will's spontaneous impulse, but its actual movement, is at every moment infallibly determined by the balance of pleasure. He readily admits that men often put forth great efforts—sometimes most intense efforts—in response to their preponderating attraction of the moment: witness the case above mentioned, of brave soldiers engaged in battle. But he alleges that such effort is always in *response*,

and never in *opposition*, to their preponderating attraction ; and that this must inevitably be the case, while human nature remains what it is.* On our side, if we expressed our full mind, we should say that all men in full possession of their faculties have a true moral power,—and by no means unfrequently exercise it,—of anti-impulsive action : and that of course, therefore, they may be no less free when they yield to their will's impulse, than when they resist it. In our present argument however (as we have explained), the ideas of "power" and "freedom" are to be put in abeyance, and we are to speak only of experienced facts. It is our purpose then here to prove against the determinist, that—so far from anti-impulsive efforts and action being non-existent—they are by no means rare ; nay, that in one particular class of men they are among the commonest and most unmistakable phenomena in the whole world.

We need hardly say that, in our view, devout Theists are immeasurably the most virtuous class of human beings. Consequently, in our view, devout Theists will, with absolute certainty, immeasurably exceed other men in their anti-impulsive efforts ; for the simple reason, that they immeasurably exceed other men in the vigilant care with which they adjust their volitions by a standard which they consider supremely authoritative.† Nor have we any hesitation in saying, that able and thoughtful men could never have even dreamed of so monstrous a theory as determinism, had they not been densely and crassly ignorant of the practical working of devout Theism. Here in fact is one of those instances, by no means few, in which a devout Christian possesses no ordinary advantage over irreligious men, in his power of investigating truth. He could as easily doubt that he *experiences* temptation, as that from time to time he *resists* it ; or, to put the thing more distinctly, he could as easily doubt that at times the preponderating impulse of his will is towards some pleasurable which he accounts unlawful,—as he could doubt that at this or that given moment he is *resisting* such impulse. We will not however

* We cannot understand the determinists' objection to the word "necessarianism," as expressing their doctrine. According to that doctrine, so long as my nature remains what it is, my volitions are infallibly determined by circumstances external and internal. On the one hand, I have no power of altering my nature ; on the other hand, I have not, nor have had, any power of controlling those past and present circumstances, which in combination infallibly and inevitably determine my volition. How can one imagine a more complete "necessitation" of my whole conduct ?

† It may be better distinctly to explain that, according to Catholics, it is simply a man's grave fault (no less than his unspeakable calamity) if he is not a Theist.

begin with considering the practical working, in this respect, of devout Theism ; we will begin with that great majority of mankind, who are, either in theory or at least in practice, irreligious. Even such men do from time to time resist their will's preponderating impulse ; whether for the sake of acting virtuously, or (much more frequently) for the sake of promoting their permanent worldly interest. And as our whole appeal is of course necessarily to experienced facts, we must be pardoned a certain familiarity of illustration. We will begin with such a case as the following :—

I have for some time past been a reckless spendthrift, and am well aware that I am travelling rapidly along the road to ruin ; though my temperament is such, that the positive attraction of present pleasure greatly preponderates over the negative attraction of escape from a direly calamitous future. One fine day however in my travels I come across a wretched and squalid creature, who recounts to me his history ; and I find that its earlier part is a precise parallel of my own. The sight of his abject and deplorable condition produces on me a profound impression, and the idea of him is ever haunting me. While this impression remains fresh, there is a complete reversal in the relative power of those attractions which solicit me ; and whenever the thought enters my mind of squandering money, the memory of what I have seen promptly redresses the balance, and the definite decisive impulse of my will is towards economy. Time however passes on, and my memory of the poor creature I met with becomes fainter ; until at last, on some occasion when I am very specially drawn to some tempting indulgence, the decisive and definite impulse of my will is towards wasting money in its purchase. Is it, or is it not, infallibly certain from the laws of human nature, that I shall yield to this impulse ? Are there, or are there not, cases in which a person so circumstanced—even though in no way under the influence of religious motives—by means of anti-impulsive effort, holds back his will, and fixes his thoughts again on the ruined spendthrift he has seen ; until a lively counter-attraction has resulted, and the will's preponderating impulse has changed its direction ? Let an inquirer honestly examine his own past consciousness, and let him appeal to the testimony of others : we are very certain what the answer will be.

It will be said perhaps, that at last there is no very courageous or heroic resistance here ; seeing that the will's impulse, though definite and decisive, was by no means intense. The answer however is easy. Firstly, if one unmistakable case of anti-impulsive effort be established, the

deterministic theory is overthrown. Secondly, we are the very last to allege, that any very courageous or heroic resistance to preponderating impulse will be found, except in devout Theists.

Our second illustration shall be taken from a far humbler and more commonplace event. A, B, and C, three young brothers, go to a dentist. He tells them all the same thing: "You have not been taught the proper way of brushing your teeth. If you don't take more time over it than is now your habit, and if you don't perform the operation in the way I have just shown you, you will lose all your serviceable teeth before you pass the prime of life." The three of them accept his statement as true. A has always had a perfect horror of false teeth. The thought of such a danger is vividly present with him every night and morning, when the tooth-brush is in his hands; and he spontaneously obeys the dentist's admonition. B by temperament cares little for the future; accordingly, in a very few days he has forgotten all about the dentist, and goes on just as he did before. Neither of these cases evidently includes any phenomenon inconsistent with determinism. C's history however is different. For two or three weeks indeed his will's preponderating impulse leads him to take the requisite trouble. One morning however, when the wind is southerly and the sky cloudy, he is in a hurry to get his breakfast over and start off hunting; and his very decided impulse is to make his tooth-brushing a most perfunctory operation. He distinctly remembers however the dentist's warning; and he knows well enough that if he once begins to neglect it, there is imminent danger of confirmation in a bad habit. These thoughts are clearly and distinctly in his mind, though not so vividly as to preponderate over the opposite attraction. Nevertheless—to use an equestrian simile such as he would himself love,—he pulls himself up, and reins himself in; he dwells on the thoughts which are so clearly and distinctly in his mind, until they become vivid, and the balance of attraction is changed to the opposite side. Determinists say that such a case as this never happens; that the laws of human nature forbid it. Will any candid inquirer on reflection endorse their dictum?

We may appeal indeed to the universal voice of mankind, which on a matter of observed fact is the most irrefragable of authorities.* It is quite proverbial and in every one's mouth,

* Mr. Mill ("On Hamilton," p. 581, note) speaks with contempt of "accepting Hodge as a better authority in metaphysics than Locke or Kant." But we think there is much truth in his opponent's affirmation, "that no philosopher, unless he be one in a thousand, can see or feel anything that is inconsistent with his preconceived opinion."

that man has a real power of following reason where it conflicts with passion. Now men would not surely have come to believe in such a power, had they not observed numerous facts in corroboration; especially each man within the sphere of his own intimate self-experience.

Further, considering how very small a proportion of mankind can look on their own habitual conduct with satisfaction if they choose carefully to measure it even by their own standard of right,—emphatic stress may justly be laid on the universal conviction, that there *is* such a thing as sin and guilt. There could be no sin or guilt, if every one's conduct were infallibly and inevitably determined by circumstances; and what a balm therefore to wounded consciences is offered by the deterministic theory! Yet so strong and ineradicable in the mass of men is their conviction of possessing a real power against temptation, that they never attempt to purchase peace of mind by *disclaiming* that power. But (as we have already urged) how could such a conviction have possibly come to possess them, had they not frequently experienced that power in its actual exercise? *

We cannot doubt then, that even the mass of men, who live mainly for this world, do by no means unfrequently (however languidly and falteringly) oppose themselves to the spontaneous impulse of their will. For our own part indeed we hold confidently, that those cases of vacillation and vibration, to which we have more than once referred, are often results of this circumstance. Many of these cases doubtless can be explained in the way suggested by Mr. Mill; but certainly not all. In several of them, we are confident, the fact is, that the will first languidly and falteringly resists its own spontaneous impulse, and then (for want of due energy) sinks back into acquiescence; that another languid effort presently succeeds, to be again followed by relapse; and so on possibly

* Mr. Mill at times has certainly a singular way of expressing his ideas on determinism. In his work on Hamilton (p. 575, note) he puts this question, with an obvious implication that it must be answered in the negative: "If I am determined to prefer innocence to the satisfaction of a particular desire, through an estimate of the relative worth of innocence and the gratification,—can this estimate, while unchanged, leave me at liberty to choose the gratification in preference to innocence?" Why plainly,—on Mr. Mill's principles—to whatever extent I may more highly *estimate* the *worth* of innocence as compared with the gratification, I am often inevitably driven to choose the latter in preference to the former. According to him, this result will inevitably ensue, whenever the balance of pleasurable-ness is on the side of gratification. How strange that he should speak of "*estimating* the relative *worth*" of two objects, when he meant to express "*balancing* their relative pleasurable-ness." He seems ashamed of his own theory, when he has to face it.

for a considerable period of time. Still,—though all men do from time to time put forth some anti-impulsive effort,—it follows obviously (as we have already said) from our philosophical principles, that very far the most signal illustrations of the doctrine we are defending will be found in the devout Theist's resistance to temptation. Nor has the determinist any right to ignore such facts, because he himself may believe that no God is cognisable and that devout Theism is a superstition. If it be unmistakably proved that those who hold and act on a certain belief (however *untrue* he may consider that belief) do put forth great (or indeed any) anti-impulsive effort—he is bound in reason to abandon his theory. We will proceed then to exhibit, as clearly as we can, those facts to which we invite his attention. To Catholics they are familiar, and the determinist may easily (if he chooses) convince himself of their truth. Nor is there any reason why, in stating them, we should adopt the artificial course of veiling our own hearty sympathy with piety, or our conviction that those who are not devout Theists are like poor sheep going astray. It suffices, if we carefully avoid all “*petitio principii*”; if we never assume the truth of Theism as any part of our premisses; if we state distinctly and articulately the facts which we are alleging in argument.

Before we begin this task however, we will make one or two preliminary remarks, which will enable us to accomplish it better. Our readers therefore will understand, that what immediately follows is no integral part of our argument, but only an *introduction* thereto. And the first of these preliminary remarks is, that a devout Theist thinks very far more than another of merely *interior* acts. He will feel it a sacred duty to contend most earnestly against his will's impulse, though solicited thereby to no other offence than an evil thought; whether it be of impurity, of anger, of impatience, of pride, of vain-glory.

Our second preliminary remark is, that to those who have trained themselves in habits of virtue, virtue itself supplies an attraction: often an exceedingly powerful one; * and which

* What is here said in the text may at first cause a certain difficulty in the mind of some Catholics, which we had better remove. Our comment however will be more appropriately placed in a note, because it is so complete a digression from our general argument.

It is held by the large majority of theologians and appears to us indubitably true, that no act is virtuous, which is not directed “*actually*” or “*virtually*” to “*bonum honestum*”—to a virtuous end. Suppose e.g. I meet a poor man, who is a singularly worthy recipient of alms. At the same time I neither know this fact, nor think of inquiring about it; but I give him some money,

by itself suffices to counterbalance a large number of opposite gratifications. Acts of love towards God, of gratitude towards Christ, of zeal for God's glory are often in a pious man extremely pleasurable: nay even such acts as resignation to God's will in trouble and patience under cruel insults, not unfrequently carry with them special sweetness of their own. The peace also of subdued passions and a good conscience may afford a pleasure which "passeth all understanding." At times again, the thought of heaven is most bracing and exhilarating. Then there are negative attractions also, which act powerfully on the side of virtue. The knowledge of that remorse, which will assuredly follow a good man's momentary lapse from virtue; the fear of hell or of purgatory; all these may act very strongly on the emotions. Then—as our supposed determinist set forth in his exposition of doctrine at the commencement of our article—there are negative attractions, which are very powerful without being emotional at all.* The difficulty e.g.

merely to obtain his services as guide to some beautiful scenery in the neighbourhood. The act is *materially* most virtuous, because the man is so worthy a recipient; but any one would be supremely absurd, who should account it a *formally* virtuous act of almsgiving.

The difficulty then in the text which may at first strike a Catholic is this: how can virtue ever supply an "attraction"? An act, done merely for the sake of pleasure, is no virtuous act at all; and if it be *not* done for the sake of pleasure, how in such cases can virtue be said to supply an *attraction*? The answer however is simple. An act need not be *motived* by pleasure at all; and yet a very large amount of pleasure may be annexed to its performance, whether by the ordinary laws of human nature or by God's special intervention. Take the instance above given. Suppose I had known the poor man to be a most worthy recipient of alms: and had given him money, not in return for any service whatever, but exclusively from my remembrance how highly our Blessed Lord praised almsgiving; and that forasmuch as I did it to the least of His disciples, I did it to Him. No Catholic will deny that this act was most virtuous: yet I might have derived far more pleasure from this thought of Christ, than I should have obtained from the most beautiful scenery to which the poor man could have guided me.

We do not of course at all deny, that in very many cases there is a mixture of motives. Perhaps I know very well how worthy a recipient of alms is this man; and I give him money, partly from such a reason as that just described, but partly also that I may obtain his services as guide. Different theologians pronounce differently on such a case, so far at least as regards their mode of expression. We are ourselves disposed to say, that the integral energy of the will at any such moment should be considered as consisting of two different acts; one motived by virtuousness, and the other by pleasure: that the former act is simply virtuous; and the latter is simply indifferent, neither good nor bad.

* A few words of psychological exposition will here be useful, on these non-emotional attractions; though our doctrine on them is entirely concurrent with that of Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain. Let us take our illustration from Dr. Bain's own instance of early rising. A, B, and C agree in this, that the spontaneous impulse of their will leads them on some given morning to rise

of breaking through a firmly established habit is a very powerful negative attraction, though accompanied with little or no emotion. And a similar non-emotional but strong negative attraction is experienced, when some good end is proposed by the intellect with unusual vividness; a vividness perhaps very far greater than is due to the existing strength of acquired habit: because, proportionately to such vividness, there would be peculiar difficulty and pain in *contravening* that end. Taking all these and many similar phenomena into consideration, it is easy to account for the indubitable fact, that very frequently the spontaneous impulse of a devout Theist's will is one of high virtue.

But every one well knows by experience, how singularly capricious is human emotion. The very same thoughts, which on one day or at one moment excite the keenest feeling, in another day or at another moment fail wholly of any such effect. According to the laws of human nature, this great emotional difference is probably far more considerable in the case of more susceptible and highly strung souls, than in that of ordinary mortals; nor do we doubt that God often, for purposes of probation, intensifies by special agency the working of natural laws. Every one acquainted with Saints' lives well

at an hour, when the counter-attractions are by no means weak which solicit them to stay in bed. A is thus influenced, because it is the First of September: all yesterday he was thinking of the partridges, and now that the happy day has arrived he springs out of bed with a joyous heart. B fancies he hears an alarm of fire, and starts up in a panic; while C gets up in accordance with his firm and established habit. A is influenced by a positive attraction, and B by a negative one, both acting on their will through their emotions. But consider the attraction which acts on C; or, in other words, the thought of pleasure or pain which influences his will. This thought is nothing else, than his sense of the difficulty which opposes his resisting the impulse engendered by his habit. We see at once that this thought acts powerfully on his will in the way of suggesting pain, without exciting his emotions at all. On the other hand there *would* be a strong emotion (of pain) if his impulse were *thwarted*; if e. g. he were compelled to go on for hours lying in bed, because on some bitterly cold morning he had neither clothes to put on nor means of lighting a fire.

So far we are entirely at one with determinists. For the sake however of giving one further instance of the contrast between their theory and our own, we may add that *we* admit a fourth case; that of D, whose spontaneous impulse would lead him to lie in bed, but who, for the sake of some good end, resists that impulse and gets up. The determinist must deny that such a case is possible, so long as the laws of human nature remain what they are.

Dr. Bain, in his treatment of moral habits (pp. 500-519), speaks, so far as we have observed, in entire consistency with his deterministic theory. For our own part we hold, that anti-impulsive efforts are immeasurably the most effective means of strengthening a good habit: but Dr. Bain nowhere implies that there *are* such things.

knows the vicissitudes, between spiritual rapture on one side and spiritual desolation on the other, which constitute one principal probation of those most highly favoured among mankind.

This statement, then, brings us to the particular fact, on which we lay stress in our present controversy. At some given moment, some holy man finds suddenly a strongly preponderating impulse of his will soliciting him to some act, which he regards with intense disapprobation as a grievous offence against his Creator. He still of course retains that very considerable negative attraction to good, which is caused by his habits of virtue: but his *emotions* in that direction are for the moment in abeyance; while those leading in the opposite direction are for the moment so abnormally excited, as vastly to predominate over the opposite attraction. Here, then, we have a crucial test of the deterministic theory. The enormous balance of pleasurable-ness is on the side of yielding to the temptation: and according to determinists therefore, the holy man (by the very necessity of human nature) yields irresistibly thereto; as irresistibly, as a physical point yields to the resultant of the forces which attract it. We need hardly say, how violently such a statement is opposed to the most undeniable facts. Nor indeed need we confine our attention to persons of saintly attainment: the case of any devout Theist will suffice. Let it once be understood what *is* the deterministic theory, and no one, acquainted with the most ordinary facts of Catholic experience, can hear it advocated without amazement. For the deterministic theory comes simply to this, that resistance to predominating temptation* is not so much as possible under the existing laws of human nature. There is no single Catholic, who has at any time so much as attempted to lead a devout life, who does not know the reverse of this by his own quite unmistakable self-experience. You might as well try to persuade him that he is never *visited* with predominating temptation, as that he never resists it; nay, you might as well try to persuade him that the rain does not wet, that the wind does not blow, that the sun does not warm. As we said before, no pious man can possibly hold determinism, as soon as he comes to see what is meant by the term.

It has been maintained indeed by determinists, that no

* A person may be said to be visited by "temptation," whenever he is solicited by any attraction towards forbidden pleasure; even though such attraction be more than counterbalanced by other opposite ones. By using the term "predominant" temptation then, we mean to express a case, in which the attractions towards forbidden pleasure preponderate over their opposites, so that the will's spontaneous impulse is in the sinful direction.

psychological analysis is possible of such a phenomenon as resistance to predominating temptation; that the relation between intellect and will, as testified by experience, implies an absolute dependence of volitions on the motives intellectually proposed. When we come (in a later part of this article) to treat objections, we will answer this in detail; here we will but make a brief remark. There is no experienced fact in the whole world more conspicuously manifest, than that pious men very frequently do resist predominant temptation. If then there be a psychological theory which would lead validly to the conclusion that no such resistance ever takes place,—such theory is by that very circumstance shown demonstratively to be false. On the other hand,—if it were really the case that the phenomena of resistance have not yet been satisfactorily analyzed by scientific men,—that would be no ground for disbelieving what experience so urgently testifies, but only for working at the indicated psychological problem. No explanation at all adequate has yet been discovered of the phenomena of dreams; but men do not on that ground deny, that there *are* such things as dreams. However (as we shall set forth a little further on) we think ourselves, that the psychological explanation commonly given by indeterminists is in substance entirely sound and sufficient.

There are two further facts, which we allege to be testified by experience; and we will here set them forth, not because we can lay any stress on them in our controversy with determinism, but merely for the sake of avoiding possible misconception. It is a very frequent phenomenon—we hold—that a devout man, even when his will's spontaneous impulse leads to an entirely virtuous act, proceeds nevertheless by an effort to make his act more virtuous (i.e. more efficaciously directed to the virtuous end) than it otherwise would be. On the other hand it is not unfrequent, that a man *partially* resists some temptation, but not with sufficient energy for the avoidance (as Catholics consider) of mortal sin.

We have now set forth, sufficiently for our purpose, those broad facts of human action, which make it so obviously certain that determinism is false. At the same time our exposition will have shown, how innocent we are of a charge frequently brought against indeterminists, that they disparage the inestimable importance of virtuous habits and of a good moral education. What can be more important for the cause of virtue, than that the spontaneous impulse of men's will should be as virtuous as it can possibly be made? And what other agency is there (on our theory) which on the whole tends to make that impulse virtuous, comparably with the

effect produced by good habits and good education? Zealous indeed as the Church has ever been in upholding Freewill, still more conspicuous has been her zeal for her children's moral and religious training.

One further question remains to be asked. What are the *motives* which actuate a man, when he resists his will's spontaneous impulse? In every instance, by far the easiest course is to act in *response* to that impulse: and no one will take the trouble of resisting it, except for some unmistakably worthy motive; some clear dictate of reason. There are two and two only classes of motives, which occur to our mind as adequate to the purpose. First, there is the resolve of doing what is right. We consider ourselves to have shown irrefragably in January, 1872, that there are various acts, cognisable under certain circumstances to be base, detestable, forbidden by a Supreme Ruler; and certain others excellent, noble, approved and counselled by this Supreme Ruler. Here then is one most worthy motive for resisting my will's spontaneous impulse; whenever that impulse solicits me to something detestable and forbidden, or even to something less excellent than another proposed alternative. Another motive, which often suggests itself, is my desire of promoting my permanent happiness, in the next world or even in this. It happens again and again, that my will's spontaneous impulse solicits me to some act which—even if I consider this world alone—is known by me as likely to result in misery; or at all events in much less happiness, than I should otherwise enjoy. Here it is a plain dictate of reason that I resist that impulse, which otherwise would lead to consequences so disastrous. It is an observed phenomenon, we contend, that men do at times resist the spontaneous impulse of their will, when induced so to do by one or other of these two classes of motives: * but where such motives are away, it seems to us a matter of course, that every one is always led by his predominating attraction.

With one further explanation, we bring to a close our positive exposition of the doctrine we would maintain. It

* We do not of course for a moment deny, that determinists include both the pleasurable-ness of virtue and the pleasurable-ness of promoting a man's own permanent interest among the attractions which influence his will. But it is a matter of every-day experience, that the pleasurable-ness of this or that immediate gratification is more attractive than these at some given moment. And what we allege is, that men not unfrequently resist such preponderating attraction, for the sake of practising virtue or of promoting their own permanent interest.

regards the distinction drawn by Mr. Mill, between mere "determinism" and "fatalism." We here differ (we think) from the large majority of his opponents; for we cannot but hold that he establishes his point (see his work "On Hamilton," p. 601). Fatalists maintain that the will can exercise no influence over the character; and Mr. Mill may earnestly deny this (as he does), without at all affirming that the will has any power of resisting its own spontaneous impulse. Mr. Mill of course quite admits, that mere determinism is as absolutely contradictory to Freewill, as is fatalism itself. But the practical bearing of the point at issue is excellently expressed by him, in a note replying to an opponent, at pp. 602, 3.

Suppose that a person dislikes some part of his own character, and would be glad to change it. He cannot, as he well knows, change it by a mere act of volition. He must use the means which nature gives to ourselves, as she gave to our parents and teachers, of influencing our character by appropriate circumstances. If he is a fatalist, he will not use these means, for he will not believe in their efficacy . . . but if he is a [determinist and] if the desire is stronger than the means are disagreeable, he will set about doing what, if done, will improve his character.

We are now to consider the very numerous objections, that have been raised against indeterminism: a consideration which (we venture to say) will at every step put in clearer light the irrefragable truth of that doctrine, against which they are brought. It will be in various ways however more convenient to consider these objections, as brought, not merely against indeterminism, but against the full doctrine of Freewill. Nor is such a procedure in any way unfair to our opponents, but the very contrary; for it does but offer them a larger target to shoot at. Hitherto then we have been merely alleging, as an experienced fact, that men often do resist their will's spontaneous impulse: but in the next article of our series we are to maintain, as a doctrine *deducible* from the experienced fact, that they possess the *power* of resistance; and that, possessing it, they act with true freedom on every relevant occasion, whether they exercise that power or no. This is the doctrine of Freewill; and we are now to treat the various objections, which have been raised against it by determinists.

It is difficult to marshal Mr. Mill's objections in due order; because he is directly answering, not our doctrine, but Sir W. Hamilton's. We gladly give all honour to Sir W. Hamilton, for his zealous advocacy both of Theism and of Freewill: but there are particulars on which we widely differ from him; and indeed we regard Reid as both a sounder and abler,

though of course a very much less learned, philosopher. Indeed we think Mr. Mill obtains unreasonable advantage on many philosophical questions, by replying to Hamilton's statements and arguments, rather than to Reid's. At all events we have not ourselves to do with any of Mr. Mill's objections, except those which are relevant against our own doctrine. We will take every care however, that no one of those objections shall fail to be distinctly stated and examined by us, either in this or in a following article of our series; and we will supplement them with all the others known to us, which have been advanced by Dr. Bain and others of his school.

I. The first objection we consider, shall be that to which we have already expressly referred; viz., that no satisfactory psychological analysis has ever been alleged, of such an act as resistance to the will's spontaneous impulse. We have already said that, if this were really the case,—seeing that the *fact* of such resistance is undeniable—no other inference would be legitimate, except perhaps that psychologists have been wanting in perspicacity. We think, however, that the account of the matter, commonly given by libertarians, is true and sufficient; viz., that the will can for a moment suspend its movement, and then proceed to a choice of the motive on which it shall proceed to act. But perhaps it will be more satisfactory, if we work the matter out with more detail. We will take therefore, as our special instance, that of a devout Theist, resisting strong predominant temptation: because it is this which, far more than any other, displays the phenomena of Freewill; and because what we say of this, can be applied without much difficulty to all other cases.

We will suppose then a holy man, resisting some predominant temptation to mortal sin. Our own view of what takes place under these circumstances, is such as this. In the very first instant he yields to it by necessity,* because his will has had no time whatever to collect its self-determining power. In the next instant he does two things: he suspends the act of consent, and he looks up to Almighty God for strength and help. We may add that such prayer continues with great intensity (though often perhaps implicitly) through the whole ensuing conflict. After the second instant (as we may call it) we arrive at the critical point. Much more probably than not,—

* According to Catholic terminology, the very first assaults of temptation are called "*motus primò primi*"; and to these the will consents without any sin. They are followed by "*motus secundò primi*"; and even to these the will may consent without mortal sin.

since he is so holy a man,—even before the temptation began, God was implicitly at least in his thoughts: but otherwise—according to the experienced laws of *habit*—the very presence of temptation summons into his mind some virtuous thought, distinct or confused as the case may be. From the motives which present themselves, he rapidly chooses such as seem most hopeful for success. Sometimes it may happen, that such thoughts speedily excite the appropriate sensible devotion; and that his will's impulse at once changes its direction. At other times—though very little sensible devotion may be excited—yet the good motives are so vividly set before his mind, that they constitute a very strong non-emotional attraction, and that in this case also the will's impulse is speedily changed. At other times, lastly, the force of predominant attraction long remains on the other side, and he is left to support the arduous conflict in desolation. Students of hagiology well know S. Catherine of Sienna's fearful probation, and her heroic demeanour for so many days.* For all that long period—so it would seem—the preponderance of attraction was strongly towards forbidden gratification; and her anti-impulsive action intense and unremitting.

Such, in our view, is on the whole a true analysis of what takes place under the circumstances. Those psychologists who are not satisfied with it, must really take on themselves the trouble of discovering a better. The broad fact of resistance remains, simply undeniable.

II. A second objection, raised by determinists, often takes the form of a triumphantly asked question. Can it be gravely maintained—they ask—that a man ever acts against his strongest motive? Never was there a poorer equivocation, than this “Achilles” of our opponents. What do they mean by “acting against the strongest motive”? Do they mean “resisting the strongest attraction”? In that case it is the negative, and not the affirmative, answer to their question, which is the true paradox. Is it paradoxical to say that reason *can* resist predominant passion? or to say that it *can not*? The ne plus ultra of paradox indeed has been reached (we should think) by Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, in his work on “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.” “That any human creature,” he says (p. 294), “ever under any conceivable circumstances, acted otherwise than in obedience to that which for the time being was his strongest wish, is to me an assertion as incred-

* We need hardly say, that Catholics attribute this moral power of resisting grave temptation to the agency of grace. Such considerations however are external to the present controversy.

ible and as unmeaning, as the assertion that on a particular occasion two straight lines enclosed a space." "A man's strongest wish" must be the wish which determined the spontaneous impulse of his will. Mr. Stephen then is not content with saying that men have in fact no power of anti-impulsive effort; but he adds, that to affirm their possession of that power is an "unmeaning" statement.

The only other sense in which we can understand this phrase "the strongest motive," is "the worthiest or most reasonable motive." But to understand the determinist as meaning *this*, is to suppose him in a state of absolute hallucination. If all Theists acted consistently on what they hold to be the worthiest and most reasonable motive, they would lead lives of spotless virtue.

III. Another argument, somewhat similar to the former, is frequently used by determinists. "When any change of will is produced, "they say," it is always effected by the agency of "*motives*. Let it be supposed for instance that a man is now "beginning, for the sake of his own permanent welfare, to "shun some imprudent pleasure, in which he has hitherto "indulged. Well, by the very statement of the case it is "evident that a new motive has intervened, or at all events "has received great additional vigour; viz. the desire of his "own permanent welfare. It is in exact accordance with "our doctrine, that where there is a change in the motives, "there is a change in the will's movement."

It is this argument which, more than any other, has impressed us with a sense of the evil resulting from the equivocal use of the word "motive." Of course, in *our* sense of the word, under such circumstances as the above, a new "motive" has intervened; for this means neither more nor less, than that a new resolve has been formed. But by "motive" *they* mean "the desire of some pleasure"; and this being understood, we thus rejoin.

In the first place—as far as our own experience and observation go—it is by no means universally true, that whenever a man begins to act with much greater vigour for his own permanent welfare, the thought of promoting that welfare has first become a more pleasurable and attractive thought. Often it is so, but we think that often it is not so. For argument's sake however, we will waive this demur, and will so far accept the determinists' allegation.

We proceed then to ask them this simple question. Do they mean that, whenever a man begins to renounce some imprudent enjoyment for the sake of his permanent welfare, the pleasure of promoting that welfare has first become greater

than the pleasure of that enjoyment? To answer this question in the negative, would be to abandon their doctrine; for it would be to say, that a man sometimes acts otherwise than according to the balance of pleasurable-ness: they must therefore answer it in the affirmative. But if the pleasure of promoting his own permanent welfare has become greater to the agent than the pleasure of the enjoyment, then his will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, gravitation is in favour of renouncement. The objection then, which we are here considering, turns out at last to be nothing but the expression of that opinion, with which we have credited the determinists throughout: they do but mean to say, that no man ever acts in opposition to his will's spontaneous impulse. This is the very opinion, against which we have been expressly arguing, and in disproof of which we have adduced (as we consider) such undeniable facts. It happens again and again, we are quite confident, that a man will make efforts—if he is a devout Theist, very energetic and sustained efforts—towards renouncing this or that enjoyment for the sake of his permanent welfare, at times when his thought of promoting that welfare is distinctly less pleasurable than is the enjoyment which he strives to renounce. And in saying this, we use the word “pleasurable” in the full sense given to it by Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain; as including *negative* pleasure, and also what we have called “non-emotional attractions.” The proof of course which we give of our allegation, is the fact on which we have so constantly insisted; viz. that such renouncement is often begun, in opposition to the will's spontaneous impulse.

IV. Wonderful to say, determinists sometimes accuse their opponents of holding, that men possess the power of acting without *any* motive. Nay even Sir W. Hamilton (quoted by Mr. Mill in p. 572) calls a free act a “motiveless volition.” This comes entirely from the equivocal use of the word “motive.”

V. It has often been argued by libertarians, that all men are *conscious* of freedom, and that there is an end of the matter. Against this argument, Mr. Mill raises (1) a verbal and (2) a real objection. In his verbal objection, we think he is right; in his real objection, he is most certainly wrong. We begin with the former. “We are *conscious*” he says (“On Hamilton,” p. 580) “on what *is*, not of what *will* or *can* be:” and the word “conscious” therefore is used improperly by libertarians, to express their meaning. He admits however (p. 582, note), on being taxed with inconsistency by an opponent, that in his “Logic” he used the word “consciousness” in the very sense, to which he objects in his work on “Hamilton”; as

expressing "the whole of our familiar and intimate knowledge concerning ourselves." We will use the word "self-intimacy" to express what is here spoken of. And this verbal question being disposed of, we will set forth in our own way the argument to which Mr. Mill objects, that we may consider the value of his objection.

Take an obvious illustration. I am in the habit of walking out with a stick in my hand. I know by self-intimacy, that I brandish this stick about in whatever direction I choose: in other words, I have a confused memory of numberless instances, in which I have willed to do this and the result has followed; while I also remember, that in no single case have I willed it *without* the result following. In precisely the same way, I know by self-intimacy that I resist in some degree my will's spontaneous impulse, whenever I make the attempt to do so. Then by a certain course of reasoning, the validity of which is to be defended in the next article of our series,—I infer from this latter phenomenon, that I have a *power* of resisting the impulse of my will; or in other words, that I am a free agent. Now how does Mr. Mill reply to this reasoning? Surely by a most shallow sophism. When two courses are open to us, he says ("On Hamilton," p. 582) "I feel (or am convinced) that I could have chosen the other course, if I had preferred it, that is if I had liked it better; but not that I could have *chosen* one course, while I *preferred* the other." Such a statement would not possess a moment's plausibility, were it not for Mr. Mill's ambiguous use of the terms "prefer" and "like better"; and we will begin with exposing this equivocation. In one sense I may "prefer" course A to course B at some given moment: viz. in this sense, that I am at the moment more *attracted* by the former than by the latter; that I spontaneously *gravitate* to the former course and not to the latter. And yet at the very same moment I may "prefer" immeasurably course B to course A: in this sense, that I think course B immeasurably *preferable*, as e.g. being immeasurably more conducive to my permanent happiness. Whether therefore I pursue course A or course B, in either case it may be truly said that I pursue the course which I "prefer" to the other; the course which I "like better" than the other. And it is this mere equivocation, on which Mr. Mill unconsciously rests for the *prima facie* plausibility of his argument. Passing however from words to things, let us look at the experienced facts of every-day life. Certainly we do not deny it to be a matter of frequent occurrence, that (under such circumstances as those above described) I effectively choose course A: "*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*" But Mr. Mill has to

maintain, that (under such circumstances) no human being does or ever did effectively choose course B; nay and that no human being has so much as the power of choosing it, so long as the laws of human nature remain what they are. After what has been said in the earlier part of our article, we may safely leave this question of fact to be determined by any even moderately candid inquirer.

VI. Dr. Bain (p. 540) quotes Mr. Bailey with approval, who argues that all the world in practice takes determinism for granted:—

Men are perpetually staking pleasure and fortune and reputation, and even life itself, on the very principle [of determinism] which they speculatively reject. . . . Take for example the operations of a campaign. A general . . . cannot move a step, without taking for granted that the minds of his soldiers will be determined by the motives presented to them. When he directs his aide-de-camp to bear a message to an officer in another part of the field, he calculates on his obedience with as little mistrust, as he reckons on the magnifying power of the telescope in his hand. When he orders his soldiers to wheel, to deploy, to form a square, is he less confident in the result than when he performs some physical operation—when he draws a sword, pulls a trigger, or seals a dispatch? &c. &c. &c.

As regards the external act of obedience, this kind of act is precisely of the class, which on our principles can be predicted beforehand with almost infallible certainty. When the general has issued a command, the spontaneous impulse of any given soldier's will is towards obedience; if for no other reason, because he knows that he would be at once shot down were he to hesitate: and on the otherhand neither the motive of virtue nor the motive of permanent self-interest has any place whatever on the opposite side. Now, as our readers will remember, it is a very important part of our thesis, that no human being takes the trouble of resisting the impulse of his will, unless in such resistance he is pursuing either virtue or his own permanent happiness. The facts then, here cited by Mr. Bailey, square entirely with our own theory; and those stated in his next paragraph are precisely of the same kind. As regards his remarks referring to Political Economy—which we do not however think it worth while to quote—we can only recommend him to read the first of Mr. Mill's "Essays on some unsettled questions of Political Economy," in order that he may see their fundamental fallacy.

But the very case thus placed before his readers by Dr. Bain—the case of military obedience—signally illustrates what to our mind is among the greatest blots in deterministic morality: its confining attention to exterior acts. Certain sentries e. g.

are ordered to stay at their posts for so many hours. It may be predicted with almost infallible certainty, that they will do so: because they know they will otherwise be shot; and because on the other hand there is no motive of virtue or self-interest, which can come into play in an opposite direction. Still the interior act, *commanding* this exterior one, varies indefinitely with different persons; and there is no pretext whatever for saying, that you can rely beforehand on its being this or that. A e. g. is actuated throughout by the simple motive of obedience to God's command; B, in addition to this, offers up his wearisome duty as a penance for his sins; C is animated by zeal for his country's cause; D is influenced by strong convictions on the nobleness of military obedience; E is kept where he is, by no other motive than his dislike of being put to death. And a similar remark may be made on numberless other instances, where men agree with each other as a matter of course in doing the external act, but differ indefinitely as to the spirit in which they do it. It is really difficult to determine how often (according to what we account sound moral doctrine) the good man's probation consists—not in the external act which he has to do—but in the motives for which he does it. We may safely say that, during far the largest portion of his life, his growth in virtue mainly depends, either (1) on his choice of good motives for his every-day acts; or (2) on acts altogether interior, such as patience, self-examination, humility, forgivingness, equitableness of judgment, purity, under circumstances of trial. All this is entirely external to the sphere of a determinist's thoughts.

VII. Mr. Mill alleges ("On Hamilton," p. 577) that determinism is shown to be probable, "by each person's observation of the voluntary actions of those with whom he comes into contact; and by the power which every one has of foreseeing actions with a degree of exactness proportioned to his previous experience and knowledge of the agents, and with a certainty often quite equal to that with which he predicts the commonest physical events." We deny this alleged fact entirely, so far as it bears on the issue between Mr. Mill and ourselves; but we would beg our readers in the first place to remember, what *is* that issue. We (1) heartily admit, that in every single case every man's *spontaneous impulse* of will may be predicted by me (to repeat Mr. Mill's words) "with a degree of exactness, proportioned to my previous experience and knowledge of the agent; and with a certainty often quite equal to that with which I predict the commonest physical events." We further hold (2) that no person takes the trouble of resisting this impulse with any considerable energy, except only devout

Theists ; and we hold (3) that an exterior act may be predicted in the abstract with almost infallible certainty, in all those many cases, in which there is no motive of duty or self-interest which can act in an opposite direction to the will's spontaneous impulse.* We are confident that no power of foreseeing men's conduct can be alleged as known by experience, which presents even the superficial appearance of implying any greater certainty and uniformity of human action, than might have been fully anticipated from our own doctrine. "When we speak of Aristides as just," says Dr. Bain (p. 539), "of Socrates as a moral hero, of Nero as a monster of cruelty, and of the Czar Nicholas as grasping of territory, we take for granted a certain persistence and regularity as to the operation of certain motives, much the same as when we affirm the attributes of material bodies." We assent to this in its full extent ; substituting only of course, for the word "motives," the word "attractions." Dr. Bain on his side proceeds to admit, that "the number and complication of motive forces may elude our knowledge, and render prediction uncertain and precarious." But let our readers observe this. Nowhere has Dr. Bain nor Mr. Mill nor (so far as we know) any other determinist whatever attempted to show, that this "uncertainty and precariousness of prediction" is due exclusively to "the number and complication of" attractions ; that it is not largely due to the freedom of men's will. Yet until they have shown this, they have shown nothing worth so much as a pin's head towards the establishment of their theory.

On the other hand Mr. Mill refers very reasonably to "each person's observation of the voluntary actions of those, with whom he comes into contact." Now we are confident that the careful examination of such a case will be favourable to our doctrine, rather than to his. We do not mean that any experiment can be made on another, which is absolutely crucial and decisive ;† but we do say that such an experiment will be to Mr. Mill a cause of weakness rather than of strength. Suppose such an instance as this. A widowed

* By the phrase "predicted in the abstract," we mean that it could be predicted by a person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should thoroughly penetrate the antecedent facts. We say with "almost" not "quite" "infallible certainty" ; because it may be true indeed that the exterior act prompted by my will's spontaneous impulse is not *opposed* to duty ; and yet it is possible that I shall choose another in preference, as still *better* and *more* acceptable to God.

† We say "on another" : because we have maintained that every man may make on *himself* an experiment, which shall be absolutely decisive of the fact that he can resist his will's impulse.

mother—most virtuous and wise—devotes herself exclusively to the education of her only son. She sees some critical probation of him approaching; some abnormal circumstances, from under which he will assuredly emerge, either much better or much worse than he was before. Studying carefully (as she has so long done) his temperament, tendencies, habits—she is able to calculate with a real approach to certainty, what will be the impulse of his will under these circumstances; though of course she does not intermit doing all in her power to correct and elevate that impulse. But as to how he will comport himself under the approaching crisis—on this she is profoundly anxious. The impulse itself, she well knows, will be more or less in an evil direction: will he nobly resist? or will he, reluctantly indeed but effectively, succumb? She awaits with breathless solicitude the resolution of this doubt. We maintain that such a description as this is more conformable to observed facts, than is Mr. Mill's allegation; viz. that she might be able (except for the imperfection of her knowledge and discernment) to predict beforehand her son's movement of will, just as she might predict the movement of a physical point solicited by divergent attractions.

We do not however deny that, in proportion as men have passed through the earlier part of their probation and established firm habits of virtue, in that proportion their resistance to predominant temptation (but only within certain limits) may be predicted with much confidence. But even if the power of prediction in such cases were indefinitely greater than it is, it would in no way tend to make probable Mr. Mill's theory. For consider, The whole of Mr. Mill's position rests on the allegation, that men infallibly follow the most powerful attraction of those which at the moment solicit them; insomuch that the balance of pleasurable (positive or negative) may be known with infallible certainty, by observing what that direction is, in which the will spontaneously moves. But when any one is said to resist predominant temptation, we mean by the very force of the term, that he acts in *opposition* to his spontaneous impulse; that is (according to Mr. Mill's theory itself) in opposition to the balance of pleasure. Suppose then we could even predict with infallible certainty that in this or that given case this or that holy man would resist predominant temptation—what could be reasonably inferred from such a circumstance? *This* could reasonably be inferred from it; that the said holy man will act with infallible certainty in a way directly *opposite* to that, which determinists regard as his inevitable course.

On our side we easily explain this power of probable prediction, so far as it exists: we explain it partly on psychological, partly on theological grounds. Psychologically—a confirmed habit of resistance to predominant temptation generates a vast increase of facility and promptitude in such resistance. Theologically—he who faithfully corresponds with grace in the earlier part of his probation, is (by way of reward) visited with larger and more persuasive supplies thereof in his later years. But all this is of course external to the deterministic controversy.

VIII. Mr. Mill argues “ad homines” from God’s prescience. “The religious metaphysicians,” he says (“Logic,” vol. ii. p. 422), “who have asserted the freedom of the will, have always maintained it to be consistent with God’s foreknowledge of our actions: and if with divine then with any other foreknowledge.” But we deny entirely, that God calculates future acts of the will through their fixed connection with phenomenal antecedents; because we deny that there is any such fixed connection. According to the “religious metaphysicians” in whom we repose confidence, God’s knowledge of future human acts supposes, as its very foundation, the will’s free exercise in this or that direction. It is strictly and fully, we maintain, within my own power, that God shall have eternally foreseen me as acting in this way or in that. Or rather God does not foresee anything at all, because He is external to time.*

“Nothing to Him is present, nothing past,
But an Eternal Now doth ever last.”

IX. Determinists often imply this syllogism. “If determinism were untrue, there would be no such thing as psychological, social, historical science: but by the confession of all men there is such science; therefore determinism is true.” We replied to this argument directly and expressly in April, 1867, and must refer our readers to what we there said.† Here we will only explain, that we admit the existence of psychological, social, and historical science; but deny that the existence of such science is incompatible with freewill.

* “Dei præscientia, ex doctrinâ Patrum, res liberè futuras supponit.” “In hypothesi quòd res futuræ sint, Deus eas videre debet: consequenter nempe ad liberam determinationem. . . . Cùm verum sit hominem se determinaturum ad talem vel talem actionem, hoc ipso divinæ notitiæ subest.”—Perrone de Deo, nn. 393, 400.

† This number is now out of print, and we have therefore privately reprinted the article on “Science, Prayer, Freewill, and Miracles.” Any inquirer, who may wish to examine its statements and arguments, can obtain it by applying to our publishers.

X. Determinists sometimes seem to imply an *à priori* argument, in favour of their theory. "Since physical phenomena proceed on uniform laws"—so they seem to reason—"how incredible that psychical phenomena should proceed otherwise!" Before entering however on the field of thought thus opened, we will make a very brief digression. "*Naturam expellas furcâ: tamen usque recurret.*" Antitheists, having no belief in the God who created all things, very often erect the uniformity of nature into a kind of deity. Theists would protest with horror against the very notion of change in God, as being a horrible irreverence. Quite similarly, a very large proportion of antitheists reject, not with philosophical serenity but with passionate outcry, the very notion of external interference with the course of phenomena; whether such interference be alleged as proceeding by way of freewill, or of miracles, or of God's constant action on phenomena in answer to prayer.

We now proceed to the particular objection which we are here to consider. As a preliminary however, we beg to ask determinists—who nowadays are also always phenomenists—how they came to be so certain, that physical phenomena *do* proceed on uniform laws. In our last number (pp. 32-38) we challenged phenomenists to prove, if they could, the uniformity of nature, by mere appeals to experience; and we answered one by one the arguments, by which Mr. Mill *professed* so to prove it.

However we ourselves of course entirely admit the uniformity of physical phenomena; though we contend that no proof of this truth can be derived from mere experience. We ask then, where is the *à priori* improbability of the supposition, that psychical phenomena differ somewhat in this respect from physical? Where, we ask, is the *à priori* difficulty in thinking, that every human will has a true power of interfering with psychical uniformity of action, so far as such interference is involved in its power of self-determination? Surely, the answer to this question depends altogether on the doctrine adopted concerning human morality. We quite admit that, if the utilitarian theory of morals were true, there would be a real *à priori* presumption against Freewill. But for our part we hold that moral doctrine, which we set forth to the best of our power in January, 1872; we contend that mankind have full means of knowing, that there is a Supreme Ruler, who imposes on them the obligation of obeying a multiform and multifarious moral law. But if this be so, it is absolutely incredible that the alternative should depend entirely on circumstances (external or internal) and in no

respect on their own self-determination, whether they do or do not obey that Ruler. We believe indeed that most determinists will agree with us on this particular head. In fact they are in general (we think) less keen and earnest in opposing Freewill itself, than they are in opposing that doctrine on morality, which we maintain to be the only true one.

XI. This brings us to the last objection which we shall consider in our present article ; viz. that which turns on the connection between Freewill and moral responsibility. On this critical question, Mr. Mill concerns himself of course exclusively with Sir W. Hamilton's exposition of the argument ; and as (for our own part) we dissent in some respects from that exposition, we must begin by setting forth in our own way the connection which we allege to exist, between men's cognizance of their freewill and their cognizance of their moral responsibility.

If our readers wish thoroughly to apprehend what we would urge on this matter, we fear we cannot exempt them from the necessity of reading our article on the principles of morality. At the same time we will here so express ourselves, that we may be as intelligible as we can to those who fail in that condition. At p. 49 of our number for January 1872, we imagined a man lying on his sick bed : reviewing his past actions of treachery, ingratitude, injustice, unprincipled ambition ; and judging as self-evidently true, that these actions have been "morally evil," "sinful," nay (as we added in p 51) detested and forbidden by an Existent Supreme Ruler. Let us now for argument's sake make a supposition, which we believe to be impossible. Let us suppose this hitherto repentant sinner to become firmly convinced, that he has had no real *power* of acting otherwise than he did ; that he had been, in each particular case up to the very beginning of his life, inevitably compelled by the very laws of his nature to that particular line of conduct which he pursued.* His repentance would necessarily vanish, and his judgment on his own past acts would be reversed. He would still intue clearly that such acts —if performed by a free person—would have been wicked and forbidden by a Supreme Ruler. But as he had come to think that he had not himself been a free agent, he would no more consider himself to have been *blameworthy*, than he would account a log of wood blameworthy, which had been made the cause of a frightful railway accident.

Our argument then is the following : We may infer very

* The reason why we regard this as an "impossible supposition," is because we are assuming that the man is now in earnest, and that he will not therefore blind himself to manifest facts.

confidently, that such a repentant offender as we have described is most firmly and profoundly cognizant, through self-intimacy, of his own freedom. We may infer this truth very confidently from the fact, that he so resolutely refuses as is always found the case, to lay the flattering unction on his soul, of fancying that he has *not* been free. We do not say—as Sir W. Hamilton seems to say—that men's intuition of moral evil includes an intuition of their own free will. On the contrary we do not regard their conviction of their own free-will as being a matter of *intuition* at all, but as being the result of experience and self-intimacy. Our argument is this. The firm and ineradicable conviction, with which any given repentant offender considers his moral intuitions to be applicable to his own acts, shows how firm and ineradicable is that conviction of his own free will, which his self-intimacy has produced.

We think that in hardly any part of his works has Mr. Mill displayed more signal ability, than in his argument against Hamilton, from p. 586 to p. 591: but on reading carefully through, not those pages only, but his whole chapter on Freewill, we cannot find any semblance of reply to the particular argument which we have here set forth.

We are sanguine that we have much strengthened our case, by considering the objections hitherto recited: having been enabled by such consideration to place our full meaning in clearer light; and to show, with greater variety of illustration, how conformable is our doctrine with experienced facts. One objection however remains, of a very far more serious character; though it has not been adduced either by Mr. Mill, Dr. Bain, or (so far as we know) by any other writer of their school. "If all men"—it may be asked—"possess so real a power of resisting their will's spontaneous impulse, how does it happen that this power is by comparison so rarely and inconsiderably exercised?" Against Catholics in particular, as "*ad homines*," the same difficulty may be still more urgently pressed. "You hold that Catholics at least have full moral power, not only to avoid mortal sin, but to make the pleasing God the one predominant end of their life. Yet how few and far between are those, of whom you will even allege that they do this! How amazingly few, on the supposition that all have the needful power! Again, you hold that those trained in ignorance of religion have a true moral power—without supposing any special and authenticated Revelation—to arrive at a knowledge of the One True God. Yet how hard you will find it to lay your finger on one single heathen, who in fact has done this!" The difficulty here sketched demands the most earnest attention: but its treatment will

carry us into a line of thought, entirely different in kind from what has occupied us in our present article. We will therefore postpone its discussion to a future opportunity; content with having shown, by our mention of it, how very far we are from ignoring it or wishing to slur it over. For want of a better name, we will call it the "Calvinistic" difficulty.

Another objection, which we also here pass over, is founded on statistics and calculated averages; and has been borrowed by Mr. Mill (see "On Hamilton," p. 577) from Mr. Buckle. If the Calvinistic objection is far the strongest, Mr. Buckle's is certainly the weakest, of all which have been adduced against Freewill. In fact it tells with its full force (whether that force be great or small) *against* those very philosophers who adduce it. But as its treatment will bring us across the same class of considerations which are suggested by the Calviniistic objection, we will treat the two in mutual connection.

There are no other possible replies to our argument, which we can find mentioned by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain, or which suggest themselves to our mind: but if such are adduced by any opponent, we promise to give them careful attention. Meanwhile it may be interesting to our readers and perhaps practically serviceable, if we here give a little prospectus of what we hope to accomplish on future occasions. In the next article of our series we are (1) to uphold the doctrine of causation, and then (2) to state and defend our own full doctrine on Freewill. If sufficient space still remains, we hope in the same article to answer the two objections—the Calvinistic and the Buckleian—which we have now held over; otherwise their treatment shall commence the next following article of our series. Then, with the full light which we shall have gained from these investigations, we shall return to a fuller elucidation of those doctrines on morality, which we exhibited in January 1872. That fuller elucidation, we think, will make evident two conclusions. Firstly it will make clear, that the Catholic doctrine on morality is alone true; as distinguished, not only from utilitarianism, but from every non-utilitarian theory other than the Catholic.* Secondly it will show how large an array of materials for the Theistic argument will have already been brought together, even before we directly encounter antitheists on that supreme issue.

* We need hardly say that, according to Catholic doctrine, the highest type of human virtue is that exemplified by the Saints.

ART. IV.—MR. JERVIS ON THE JANSENISTIC AND GALLICAN MOVEMENT.

History of the Church of France. By the Rev. W. HENLEY JERVIS.
London: John Murray. 1872.

IN the article on Mr. Jervis's volumes in our last number, we showed what were Rome's claims to supremacy, and her consequent action in the Primitive and Middle Ages; and we traced the struggle between Church and State from the reign of Philip the Fair down to the Civil Wars, and the supernatural revival of religion at their close. We shall now proceed to follow out this struggle to its final result in the overthrow of Christianity at the Revolution.

We are sorry to be compelled to say that Mr. Jervis, in the corresponding part of his book, grossly misrepresents the principal events in connection with Gallicanism, and betrays a blind prejudice against the Jesuits worthy of Exeter Hall. Our limits permit us to notice only his most important misrepresentations as they come before us, and to advise our readers to receive with caution all statements of his in which Jesuits are concerned.

The development of rationalism in the sixteenth century on the one hand, and the excommunication of Henry III. and Henry IV. on the other, had brought out more clearly the opposition between Catholic principles of government and Cæsarism, as defined by the Archbishop of Westminster in his recent paper. While the Church traces back all authority to God, claims for herself supremacy in spiritual things, and limits the civil power by the restraints of His laws, thus protecting human liberty, Cæsarism considers the State as its own creation alone, and claims absolute and unlimited power in both spiritual and temporal matters. The king, who represented the Oriental and Byzantine idea in Cæsarism, now claimed this despotic power in virtue of the so-called Divine Right inherent in the Crown, while the Parliament, composed of lawyers who derived their notions from Roman Pagan law, regarded the State, rather than the sovereign, as its proper depositary. But though thus at variance with each other, they were united in their opposition to the Church's independence.

The original function of the Parliament was only to administer

justice and register the royal edicts. But it acquired great importance when, through the sale of the judicial and administrative offices in the kingdom, there had been formed from the middle class of society a sort of aristocracy, known as *gens de robe*, of which it was the centre. After the death of Henry III., those of its members who belonged to the party of Politicians, separated themselves from the Catholics and the League, and retired to Tours and Châlons, where in 1591 they publicly burnt the Pope's bull, and proclaimed Gregory "the self-styled Pope," the enemy of peace and abettor of rebels. In 1593 they rejoined their Catholic brethren in Paris, and through the clever management of Pithou, the celebrated author of two books against the Pope's supremacy, obtained an ascendancy in the Parliament which they ever after retained.*

We have mentioned how in 1594 they banished the Jesuits, whom they regarded as the representatives of Catholic principles, from the part of France within their jurisdiction, but failed to prevent their recall ten years later. During the reign of Henry IV. they were kept in check; but on his death their enmity broke out, and they seized every opportunity to obtain a legal support for their own principles. With this view they constituted themselves censors of the publications of the Society throughout Europe, and on Henry's assassination condemned to the flames Mariana's book on Tyrannicide,† which had been published in Spain with the approval of Philip II. In the following November they attacked Bèllarmine's work, "De Potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus," which was addressed to James I. in defence of the English Catholics. In December, 1611, when they were called on to register Louis XIII.'s confirmation of the letters patent restoring to the Jesuits the privilege of teaching, which had been granted them by Henry IV. on October 12, 1609,‡ they not only forbade the Jesuits to interfere in education, but tried to compel them to sign a declaration denying the Pope's supremacy, and binding priests to reveal conspiracies against the King or State, with which they might become acquainted in the confessional. Again, in June, 1614, they burnt Suarez's "Defence of the Catholic Faith against the Errors of the Anglican Sect," which had been written in answer to two works by James I. In May, 1611, they found a coadjutor in Richer, Syndic of the Sorbonne, who prohibited an Ultramontane thesis, which was

* Martin, "Histoire de France," t. x. l. 60, pp. 252-321.

† It had already been withdrawn from circulation in its original form by the General of the Society.

‡ Crétineau Joly, "Hist. des Jésuites," t. iii. c. 2, p. 161.

to have been maintained at the Dominican convent of S. Jacques in the presence of the King and Queen-Regent. In the following year Richer published his well-known treatise, in which he introduced republican and revolutionary principles into Church government; but after a struggle between the Parliament and Cardinal Du Perron, his work was condemned, and he was obliged to retire from the Sorbonne. In October, 1614, the States-General met for the last time before 1789. The Third Estate being composed in great part of *gens de robe*, the attack on the Church was renewed; and a declaration, that the King derived his authority directly from God, and that no person, temporal or spiritual, had any right to dispossess him of it under any pretext whatsoever, was proposed. But the feeling of the Court and leading members of the clergy was so decidedly Ultramontane, that this, in common with all the previous attacks on the Church, failed, and only served to prove the bitter animosity of the parliamentary party.

Richelieu, who had made his first appearance in public at the States-General as the champion of the Church's authority, became minister in 1616. His administration was favourable to religion, inasmuch as he restored to the Jesuits the right to teach, and encouraged the numerous good works of the period; but in other respects it was fatal to Catholic interests. By his alliance with Protestant powers in the Thirty Years' War, he checked the Catholic reaction in Germany; while at home his imperious temper and personal ambition led him to encroach on the Church's authority, and thus to prepare the way for the violent policy of the next reign towards the Holy See and the French clergy.

Being irritated by the appearance, in 1625, of two violent political pamphlets, called "*Mysteria Politica*," by F. Keller, a Bavarian Jesuit, and "*Admonitio ad Ludovicum XIII.*," both of which were unjustly attributed to French Jesuits, he caused these books to be censured by the Sorbonne and the Parliament, and brought them before the Assembly of Clergy. In the course of the discussion, Léonor d'Estampes, Bishop of Chartres, said that "kings are not only ordained of God, but are themselves gods," and treated Ultramontane opinions as heresy. The Assembly expressed great indignation; but the Parliament, delighted with whatever shocked the Bishops, forbade further discussion and ordered the clergy to separate. The latter took no notice of the prohibition, but continued their meetings at the house of the Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld; whereupon the Parliament issued several decrees against them. Finally, Richelieu removed the affair to the

Royal Council, notwithstanding the lay character of the latter and compelled the Parliament to cease the contest, and the Bishop of Chartres to retract his accusation against the Ultramontanes.* He, however, allowed the Parliament to burn the Jesuit Santarelli's book, lately published at Rome, and to require the Jesuits to sign a declaration against the Pope's supremacy. But F. Coton evaded the attack by promising that the Society would sign whatever the Sorbonne and Assembly of Clergy had previously signed.†

Richelieu was too clear-sighted to think of separation from Rome. But he hoped indirectly to secure absolute control over the Church in France, and leave the Pope only a nominal supremacy. In 1632, Gaston, Duke of Orleans, having married Margaret of Lorraine without the King's permission, the Parliament declared the marriage null, but Urban, VIII. insisted that the sacrament was indissoluble, and refused a divorce. The affair dragged on for five years, and Richelieu was at last obliged to submit. His imperious temper was further roused by the Pope's refusal to appoint him Perpetual Legate in France, or even Legate of Avignon, and to give him bulls to be Superior of the Premonstrants and Cistercians, and to incorporate S. Maur with Cluny, of which, as well as of Marmoutier, he was already abbot. Further, his Gallican pride was wounded by the Pope's requiring, in consequence of the abuse of ecclesiastical patronage, that in future testimonials of character for the nominees of the Crown to vacant bishoprics, should be given by the Nuncio instead of the French Bishops. He consequently left several sees long vacant, threatened a National Council which would erect France into an independent Patriarchate, and even proposed to fill up the bishoprics without the Pope's institution. The finances being straitened, Dupui, a writer in his pay, published, in June, 1638, his celebrated work, "*Liberté de l'Eglise Gallicane*," which attacked all the privileges of the clergy, and subjected them to the temporal power. The Bishops condemned the book. Dupui replied. The Government, in 1639, and again in 1640, laid a heavy tax on the clergy, which, on their refusal to pay it, was levied by distraint. The clergy appealed to the Pope, who supported their claim to exemption. In 1640, Hersent, a doctor of the Sorbonne, published, under the name of Optatus Gallus, a book in which he denounced the projects of those who were

* "*Mercure Français*," t. ii. an 1625, pp. 1058-1122 ; an 1626, pp. 98-109 "*Mém. de Richelieu*," p. 387, ap. Martin, t. ii. l. 68, p. 226.

† Crétineau Joly, t. iii. c. 7, p. 423.

trying to drive France into schism. The Bishops disavowed the work. The Parliament condemned it; but included in the same decree the Bishops' sentence against Dupui. Richelieu contrived to get a Jesuit, Rabardeau, to write in refutation of Optatus Gallus, and though the Jesuits in Rome, Germany, and Spain rejected Rabardeau's doctrines, and the French Jesuits did not support them, yet the book answered Richelieu's purpose by producing the public impression that the Society favoured his cause.* De Marca also published his work, "*De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii*," on the Gallican side.

While the relations of the Crown and the Church were in this delicate position, the death of an equerry of the French ambassador in a quarrel with the Roman police, in 1639, broke off intercourse between the two courts. After some time, Mazarin was sent from Rome on a mission of conciliation, and attached himself to Richelieu. The affair of the equerry was patched up, and the Assembly of Clergy, in 1649, was induced to grant the money demanded by the Crown. But, during the debates in the Assembly, the Bishop of Autun uttered the ominous exclamation: "Do you doubt that all the property of the Church belongs to the King, and that so long as he leaves the clergy a maintenance, he may take all the rest?"

Grave as were the prospects of the future, a far more serious danger threatened religion from a deep-laid conspiracy within the Church. Two students, Jansenius and De Hauranne, better known as S. Cyran from the abbey that he afterwards held, formed a close friendship in Paris, and conceived the idea of founding a new school of theology. With this view they retired in 1611 to Bayonne, and devoted themselves to the study of the Fathers, and especially of S. Augustine. In 1616, Jansenius went to Flanders, and became Principal of the Dutch College at Louvain, and many years later Bishop of Ypres. But his study of S. Augustine was not interrupted. In 1621 the friends met, in order to form a definite plan of action, which, as their correspondence proves, they carried out with cunning and deliberate calculation. The doctrinal part fell to Jansenius, who set to work to write his "*Augustinus*"; and the practical to S. Cyran. His learning, austere life, and apparent piety gained him the friendship of all the great men of the day. Richelieu tried to attach him to his service, once saying of him in his presence, "Gentlemen, you see the most learned man in Europe." He offered him no less than five, some say

* Crétineau Joly, t. iii. c. 7, p. 443.

eight, bishoprics, besides other preferment, all of which S. Cyran refused; for, as he confided to Arnauld d'Andilly, his sole ambition was to reign over souls.* Gradually he began to speak more confidentially. To De Condren he said that the Council of Trent was only an assembly of learned men and politicians; to another priest, that the schoolmen had destroyed true theology; to S. Vincent de Paul, "God has indeed given me great light, for He has made known to me that for the last five or six hundred years there has been no Church. Formerly, the Church was a great river, but now what appears to us the Church is only mud." And when S. Vincent objected that Calvin and all other heresiarchs had said the same, he replied, "Calvin has not been wrong in all his views; he has erred only in his method of defending himself." Such doctrines quickly alienated his best friends.

He soon, however, managed to retrieve his position. Dr. Smith, chaplain to Queen Henrietta and Vicar-Apostolic of England, having tried to abrogate the privileges always enjoyed by missionaries, had been resisted by the monks and Jesuits. Richelieu and the French clergy interesting themselves in the case, S. Cyran published, in 1632, his "*Petrus Aurelius*," in which he advocated the cause of the Episcopate directly against the monks, and indirectly against the Pope. But his tone was decidedly democratic, and he lost sight of the distinctive offices of bishops, priests, and laity, and the indelible character of the Sacrament of Order, asserting that every true Christian is a competent judge of heresy, and that a Bishop who sins mortally loses his spiritual power.† The Bishops, however, saw in the book only the vindication of their own rights, and received it with such applause that S. Cyran's theological reputation was established.

Two years later he secured his future success by obtaining the control of the community of Port Royal. In a valley near Chevreuse, six leagues from Paris, had stood for centuries the Cistercian abbey of Port Royal; but, in 1626, the community had removed to Paris. At its head was Angélique Arnauld, daughter of the great opponent of the Jesuits in 1594. In 1599, when only seven years old, she had been forced into the cloister against her will, and three years later became abbess. She had long struggled in vain to escape or reconcile herself to her doom. But at length the light had broken on her that the love of God could change her prison into a paradise; and by the time she was seventeen she had

* Ste Beuve, "*Port Royal*," vol. i. p. 301.

† Martin, t. xii. l. 75, p. 83.

persuaded the whole community to join her in the strict observance of the rule and in the extraordinary austerities which her aspiring nature led her to impose on herself and them. Resolute she had stood at the closed cloister door, unmoved by her father's commands, threats, and tears; but when he came to the *grille*, and she beheld his look of agony, she fainted away. Her reform had won her a great reputation, and between 1618 and 1635 she brought many abbeys of her own Order under strict observance. But her own heart was not at peace. She yearned for a director on whom she could lean, while her strong will would not bend to those whom God sent her. She craved for a change in her religious state, and it was not till after she went to Paris that she made her vows without a secret reserve. For a few years she was under the direction of S. Francis de Sales, who induced her to subdue her proud restless nature by interior mortification instead of excessive bodily austerities, and tried to lead her by gentle ways to the love of God; nor would he let her give up her abbey and become a simple nun of the Visitation, doubtless considering that God had called her to be the reformer of the Cistercian Order. After she went to Paris, she placed herself under the direction of Zamet, Bishop of Langres, who encouraged her in dangerous mystical devotions, and placed her for a short time over the newly-founded convent of the Blessed Sacrament. Her sister Agnes now composed the "*Chapelet Secret*," which was censured by the Archbishop of Sens and the Sorbonne, and ordered at Rome to be suppressed; while the Bishop of Langres and S. Cyran defended it. S. Cyran was thus brought into close relations with Angélique, and in 1634 he became the Director of the community. He gained such power over the nuns that they substituted him for God and the Church. He revived the austerities which S. Francis had banished, and changed the whole tone of the house. With S. Francis all had tended to the love of God and His creatures, children being his especial delight. But S. Cyran ever dwelt on the awful depths of the Godhead. Even the Mother of Divine Love was terrible in her greatness, and children were the seed of the devil, doomed for the most part to eternal flames.

In 1636 he gained another great step by the conversion of Angélique's nephew, Antoine le Maître, a leading advocate, and several young priests of great promise, who formed themselves into a community with the professed object of leading a penitential life in solitude. They took up their residence at the old abbey of Port Royal des Champs till 1648, when Angélique, having returned there with a part of

her community, they removed to a farm at no great distance. Angélique's mother, five sisters, and six nieces were already within her cloister, and before long her two brothers and six nephews, with numerous friends, clustering round it, Port Royal lost its religious character and became henceforth the home of the Arnaulds, animated by their strong family love and pride, and their restless, turbulent, quibbling, and lying spirit, and forming the nucleus of a religious and political sect.

These proceedings confirmed Richelieu's previous suspicions that a dangerous sect was in course of formation, and on the 14th May, 1638, S. Cyran was carried prisoner to Vincennes, where he remained till Richelieu's death. Ceaseless efforts were made to obtain his release, but Richelieu would never hear of it; saying, "That man is more dangerous than six armies"; or, "If Luther and Calvin had been thus shut up, a great deal of bloodshed would have been saved." But S. Cyran's imprisonment did not check his work. From his dungeon he exercised absolute power over his penitents; and it was at this time that he made his most valuable conquest of Angélique's youngest brother Antoine, "le grand Arnauld," as he was called.

On May 8th, a week before S. Cyran's imprisonment, Jansenius died. He had just completed the "*Augustinus*," and had written to the Pope in respectful terms, submitting it to his judgment. His executors, however, put it at once into the press, and it came out at the fair of Frankfort in September, 1640. Its leading doctrines were, that man by the fall has lost both freewill and inclination towards good; that grace alone determines him to what is good; and this grace being dispensed according to God's arbitrary election, all men are necessitated to do either good or evil—good, if under the irresistible influence of grace; and evil, if grace is wanting. Consequently that Christ died only for the elect. Baius had published doctrines tending in the same direction, which had been condemned by Pius V. and Gregory XIII.; and there had also been a vigorous controversy on the auxilia of grace, originated by Molina in 1588, and carried on with great vigour; the Dominicans, or Thomists, accusing the Molinists of semi-Pelagianism, and the Molinists retorting that Calvinists would have no difficulty in accepting the Thomist formula. The question was submitted to the Congregation "*De Auxiliis*"; and finally Paul V. decided, in 1607, that both parties were at liberty to hold their own opinions, and forbade mutual recrimination and further discussion.

S. Cyran had long prepared his disciples for the "*Augus-*

tinus," and its appearance made a great sensation. It was at once denounced as Calvinistic and heretical. But S. Cyran made light of the charges brought against it; protesting that it was only the revival of pure Catholic doctrine in opposition to the Molinism and semi-Pelagianism of the Jesuits; thus setting aside Paul V.'s decision that Molinism *was* consistent with the Catholic Faith, and consequently *not* semi-Pelagianism, and his prohibition of discussion and recrimination. S. Cyran's defence of the "*Augustinus*" expresses the whole spirit of Jansenism, its denial of the authority of the living Church, its pretension to be Catholic without being Roman, and its dishonest policy of masking its attack on the Church by affecting to oppose the Jesuits alone. In August, 1641, a decree of the Inquisition condemned the "*Augustinus*" on the ground that the Holy See had enjoined silence on the subject; and in the following year, Urban VIII., by his Bull "*In eminenti*," renewed the censures against Baius, and prohibited the "*Augustinus*" as containing the same errors. The Archbishop of Paris repeated the prohibition. But the Sorbonne only forbade Baius's doctrines to be maintained, and refused to register the Bull, because it cited decrees of the Inquisition, which was a tribunal unknown to French law. Meanwhile the book was universally read, and on all sides were heard discussions on sufficient, and efficacious grace. Thus, through the miserable nationalism of the Sorbonne, souls were imperilled or lost, and the foundations of the Faith were sapped.

Richelieu died in December, 1642, and Louis XIII. in the following May. S. Cyran was set at liberty in August, 1643. He survived only a few weeks, but lived long enough to see the work of his life well started. His object had been to revolutionize Catholic dogma and morals. Jansenius had struck a blow at the first, and Antoine Arnauld's book, "*De la fréquente Communion*," which greeted him on his quitting his prison, was aimed at the second. This book was attacked from the pulpits of Paris; but it was cautiously worded, and, in 1645, the Jansenists obtained from the Inquisition a verbal opinion, that nothing worthy of censure had been found in it. In January, 1647, however, Innocent X. condemned as heretical a passage in the preface to the effect, that "S. Peter and S. Paul are two heads of the Church who are virtually one." The Jansenists, in their usual quibbling spirit, declared that the censure was not applicable to the passage in question.

The characteristic duplicity of the Jansenists appears clearly in this book. The practice of frequent Communion had been

for a hundred years so fully established in Italy, and within the last half-century in France, that Arnauld did not dare to attack it openly. He even disclaimed the wish to make it less frequent, or to restore the penitential discipline of the early Church. But he laid down rules which rendered frequent Communion impossible; and wherever the Jansenists dared to make the attempt, the penitential discipline of the early Church was restored. He said that no one was to communicate till his heart was entirely purified, even from the images of former sins, and filled with the perfect love of God; and that for sinners it was necessary that the habit of sin should be destroyed, and for each mortal sin a public penance extending over many months accomplished, before absolution was given. S. Vincent de Paul and all the great saints and teachers of the period, complained that this book had driven numbers from regular appearance in the Confessional and at the Altar.

Mr. Jervis's prejudices have prevented his taking a broad and true view of this subject. Frequent Communion is not peculiar to Jesuits, but is the universal practice of the Church in modern, as it was in primitive times. Arnauld's book was not aimed really against the Jesuits, but against the Church, whose doctrines and practice alone they follow. The Jansenists were not Catholics "in the strictest sense," as Mr. Jervis asserts; for not only did they hold the heretical doctrines of the Five Propositions, but they denied with S. Cyran the existence of the Church as an ever-living body.

Mr. Jervis's estimate of direction is curious. He allows that the Jesuit Fathers had gained an "unrivalled reputation," "no doubt substantially well founded," as directors, while at the same time he accuses them of adopting "various maxims and expedients which were calculated to make religion palatable to men living an ordinary life in the world, to render the outward requirements of the Gospel compatible with political ambition, with selfish indolence, or even with fashionable dissipation." Catholic confessors generally he accuses of laying "little or no stress on the necessity of inward purity and contrition of heart," and of not insisting, "even in the case of gross habitual sinners," on "satisfactory proof of penitence before admission to the Holy Mysteries." Had this indeed been the case, ordinary Catholic instinct would soon have driven sinners and saints alike from the confessionals of both Jesuits and all other confessors answering Mr. Jervis's description.*

* Jervis, vol. i. p. 390.

In 1649, Cornet, Syndic of the Sorbonne, brought before it seven propositions which he had drawn from the "Augustinus," but without mentioning its name. The Sorbonne reduced them to the five which are well known. One of those withdrawn asserted that public penance was essential to the Sacrament, and that secret confession was invalid.* The following year eighty-eight bishops, conjointly with S. Vincent de Paul, M. Olier, the heads of the religious Orders, and almost the whole of the secular clergy, laid the Five Propositions before Innocent X., who, in May, 1653, condemned them by the Bull "Cum Occasione," adding that the condemnation of these particular errors did not imply an approval of the other opinions contained in the writings of Jansenius. The Jansenists readily condemned the Propositions, but asserted that they did not express Jansenius's doctrine, which was identical with that of S. Augustine. They, therefore, still held to Jansenius; and in order to divert attention, notwithstanding that the condemnation had been obtained chiefly by the secular clergy, they still affected to treat the question as only a "duel between the Arnaulds and the Jesuits." Accordingly, they brought out in January, 1656, the first of the Provincial Letters by Pascal, the object of which was to prove that the Pope is infallible in questions of *faith*, and not of *fact*, and to discredit the moral theology of the Jesuits by misrepresentations, misquotations, mistranslations of Jesuit writings, and even malicious perversions of their sentiments by quoting works which the Society had long ago condemned.† But, as Voltaire has said, "Their object was not to speak the truth, but only to divert the public," and to prove that the Jesuits "had a deliberate intention to corrupt the morals of mankind, an intention which no sect or society ever had, or could have."‡

Pascal treated casuistry as a detestable quibbling to justify sin. But Mr. Jervis expresses himself on this subject with such fairness that we gladly quote him, merely changing the tense from the past to the present:—"Confessors" are "perpetually brought into contact with religious doubts, scruples, perplexities, and emergencies of every description; and" are "thus almost compelled to provide themselves with a code of ethics embracing, so far as it" is "possible to embrace, all the numerous problems of moral responsibility. . . . Long before the days of Loyola" the science of casuistry "was accounted an essential branch of

* Dalgairns, "The Holy Communion," part iii. c. 2, p. 281.

† Jervis, vol. i. p. 441.

‡ "Siècle de Louis XIV.," c. 37.

theological study; and, indeed" was "indispensable to the clergy in the instruction and guidance of souls."*

Simultaneously with the publication of the Provincial Letters, some of the curés of Paris denounced the teaching of the Jesuits to the Assembly of Clergy. But instead of censuring it, the Assembly ordered S. Charles Borromeo's "Instructions to Confessors" to be printed and circulated, in order "to serve as a barrier for arresting the spread of novel opinions tending to the destruction of Christian morals." M. Olier had already for fourteen years imposed this book as a guide on all the bishops and priests who studied or made retreats in his Seminary, and on the Jesuits and members of other Orders who assisted at the Easter confessions in S. Sulpice; and the Assembly had indirectly expressed their approval of it in 1650, when it gave its sanction to M. Olier's Seminary. It also now condemned Petrus Aurelius.† Mr. Jervis makes the strange assertion that Arnault's "Fréquente Communion" was taken from S. Charles's Instructions, and that the Jesuits must have been mortified at the decree of the Bishops. A visit to S. Mary of the Angels at Bayswater, which belongs to the Oblates of S. Charles, and is noted for the number of communicants, will satisfactorily prove that S. Charles has nothing in common with Jansenism or Arnault's book; and the fact that the Jesuits had been in the habit of following his rules at S. Sulpice, disposes of the insinuation that the decree was aimed at them.‡

The fair test of Jansenist rigorism and Catholic so-called lax morality is the result of each. The brilliant talents of the Port Royalists were perverted to making the Sacraments and the mysteries of conscience the subjects of popular agitation, thus exposing them to the scoffs of infidels, and instilling doubt and infidelity into ignorant minds. Angélique's precious gift of influencing others was withdrawn from the reform of her Order, and desecrated to gathering around her the offscourings of a most corrupt society. Among the favoured intimates of Port Royal was the Princesse de Guémené, the mistress successively of De Retz and half a dozen others, "who used to make escapades rather than retreats" to Port Royal, returning in the intervals to her usual life in the world.§ There were also Madame de Sablé, the slave of her cook and her perfumer, the frail and intriguing Madame de Longueville, the intensely worldly Marie de Gonzague, the notorious De Retz, the Duc de

* Jervis, vol. i. c. 13, p. 420.

† Jervis, vol. i. c. 13, p. 439.

‡ Ste Beuve, t. i. l. 1, c. 12, p. 333.

§ Ste Beuve, l. 2, c. 1, p. 373.

Luynes, and the Chevalier de Sevigné, leaders of the Fronde, and a crowd of the most profligate and frivolous representatives of Paris society, who felt instinctively that the professors of a rigorism quite beyond even their aim, could be more indulgent to their sins than the so-called lax confessors of the Church. Port Royal had also its share in the malversations of Fouquet. And when De Retz was a fugitive in Germany, refusing to resign the Archbishopric of Paris, which his treasons and his vices incapacitated him from filling, Antoine Arnauld's pen was prostituted to his service, and Angélique's money supplied the means for his scandalous excesses. While such was the spirit of Port Royal, the "lax" Catholic confessors and their penitents were carrying missions to every corner of France, founding asylums for every class of human woe, and exhausting themselves and their wealth by heroic almsgiving, deeds of active charity, and even as modern Crusaders against the Turks in Candia.

In October, 1656, Alexander VII. published the Bull "*Ad Sacram*," which condemned all who pretended that the Five Propositions were not in Jansenius, or that they were not condemned "in the sense of Jansenius." In 1661 all ecclesiastics were required to sign a corresponding Formulary.

The Jansenists made a desperate resistance, on the plea that the Pope is infallible in questions of *dogma*, but not of *fact*. Mr. Jervis justly remarks:—

The ground thus taken by the Jansenists, if examined dispassionately, must be pronounced evasive and fallacious. . . . If the supreme Pontiff be infallible in defining dogma, he must be able to declare with equal certainty that such and such dogmas are laid down in a given volume; for this may happen to be the very hinge upon which an entire controversy turns; and in the case of the Five Propositions it was actually so. . . . To pretend that the interpretation of such works is a question of fact as *opposed* to one of doctrine, is a mere abuse of language. These are not ordinary facts, but facts which are involved of necessity in controversies of faith; and with respect to *such* facts it is plain that either the Pope must be able to pronounce unerringly, or that he is not infallible at all. . . . Thus they occupied a false position, and, as the controversy proceeded, it became more and more evident that their system tended logically to the denial of a doctrine which in words they affected to maintain,—the infallibility of the Holy See.*

The Formulary was signed almost universally by the clergy, and even by many who had hitherto sided with the Jansenists, but were now convinced that they must either sign or leave the Church. Pascal, on the contrary, held that the whole party ought to leave the Church, and he and

* Jervis, vol. i. c. 14, p. 448.

Arnauld quarrelled on the subject. The schools of Port Royal were closed, the Hermits were dispersed, and all the novices, postulants, and boarders in the two convents were expelled. The nuns refused to sign, on the ground of their ignorance of the contents of a Latin book, though at the same time they insisted on the orthodoxy of the said book. In fact it was a personal matter to them. With woman's weakness, they had given their hearts to S. Cyran, and they were ready to die—nay to perish eternally, rather than condemn him. After a terrible struggle, Angélique signed on June 23rd, 1661, though only with a superscription which merely bound her generally to obedience to the Church; and her example was followed by the rest. But the struggle was too much for her, and on the 6th August she expired.

The Vicars-General of Paris, and the Bishops of Comminges, Vence, Beauvais, Alet, Angers, and Pamiers tried to obtain a modification of the Formulary, but the Pope insisted on the signature *pur et simple*. The two first bishops gave in, but the four others were inflexible.

Some delay now occurred in consequence of the quarrel with Rome about the Corsican guard, which will hereafter be noticed, and the vacancy of the See of Paris; and it was not till April, 1664, that the new Archbishop, Péréfixe, could take the matter in hand. In June, and again in August, he paid repeated visits to Port Royal de Paris, and used kindness, argument, and menaces to induce the nuns to sign the Formulary *pur et simple*. But he met only with cool impertinence and contemptuous obstinacy, and Procès-verbaux of his words and acts, with touches of merciless ridicule, were drawn up by the nuns and circulated for the amusement and derision of Paris society. On the occasion of his last visit, Angélique de S. Jean, niece and successor of "la grande Angélique," being asked her name, she informs us, "I told it them quite loud without blushing, for under such circumstances confessing our name is the same as confessing that of God."* Well might the Archbishop on his departure exclaim, "You are as pure as angels, but as proud as devils." The leading spirits of the revolt were removed to separate convents, and their place was taken by six nuns of the Order of the Visitation. At Port Royal des Champs the result was the same, and a formal excommunication was pronounced.

Thus matters remained till July, 1665, when several of the nuns who had been persuaded by Bossuet to sign, were formed into a community in the house in Paris; and all the rest

* Ste Beuve, t. iv. l. 5, c. 3, p. 128.

numbering about seventy, besides lay sisters, were brought from Paris and the various convents in which they had been confined, to Port Royal des Champs, where they remained, sequestered and guarded, without Mass and the Sacraments, till January, 1669.

The Council of State took measures to proceed judicially against the four Jansenist bishops. But there arose a difficulty, because the Gallicans pretended to the right to judge bishops in the first instance, while the Pope claimed to be their sole judge; and the death of Alexander VII. in May, 1667, suspended the proceedings. The Bishop of Comminges and F. Ferrier, a Jesuit, attempted to mediate, but Arnauld was quite intractable. Madame de Longueville, the Archbishop of Sens, and the Bishop of Châlons, all three Jansenists, then took the affair in hand; and it was agreed that the Jansenist Bishops should sign the Formulary, explain their opinions at their diocesan synods, and register them privately, and finally join in a letter to the Pope informing him of their dutiful submission. The letter was composed by Arnauld and Nicole with characteristic evasiveness and duplicity; but Clement IX., understanding that they had submitted by a sincere acceptance of the Formulary, declared himself satisfied. Rumours, however, were soon afloat that the Bishops had acted insincerely. The Pope bade the Nuncio investigate the matter thoroughly, and exact from the Bishops a certificate that they had signed in all sincerity "in conformity with the Constitutions of his predecessors." To this they consented readily, "sheltering their long-cherished conviction with regard to the 'fact of Jansenius,'" under the fancied distinction between a "*sincere* acceptance" and an "*acceptance pur et simple*." We cannot sufficiently express our surprise that Mr. Jervis should exculpate such a miserable falsehood.* The Bishop of Châlons drew up also a formal declaration that the Bishops had acted with perfect good faith; and Antoine Arnauld signed this declaration as the representative of Port Royal. After such an explicit declaration, the Pope had no just ground for doubting the good faith of the Jansenists, and he issued, on January 19th, 1669, a brief, which formally ratified what is called the Peace of Clement IX. The interdict was taken off Port Royal des Champs. But the two communities continued distinct, and from this time Port Royal des Champs alone was the centre of the Jansenist movement. The school for girls was re-opened, the Hermits returned to their old quarters, and Port Royal entered on a new era of glory, covering its internal decay.

* Jervis, vol. i. c. 14, p. 474.

It might have been hoped that peace in the Church was now restored ; but nothing could silence the restless spirits and pens of the Arnaulds. Books and pamphlets frequently appeared. The houses of Antoine Arnauld and Madame de Longueville were centres of reunion and cabal. Henri Arnauld, Bishop of Angers, tried to force on his clergy the reservation of the *fact* of Jansenius, instead of the Formulary *pur et simple*. In the affair of Pamiers, hereafter to be noticed, the Jansenists sided with the Bishop against the Crown. At each fresh stir Louis would exclaim, " Ces messieurs ! encore ces messieurs ! " At length, wearied out, and foreseeing in this restless faction without an authorized head the future enemies of his throne, he resolved to crush it effectually. On the death of Madame de Longueville in May, 1679, he sent a message to Arnauld that he disapproved of the meetings at his house, and ordered him to live like other people. Arnauld took the hint, and retired to Flanders, where he remained till his death in 1794. A few days later the Archbishop of Paris took an order to Port Royal that the Hermits were to disperse, and the novices, postulants, and pupils to be sent away, and no more to be received. Within a fortnight Port Royal was vacated by all except the professed nuns, and sank into that dying state in which it lingered on for about thirty years.

But Jansenism still lived, exhaling like the upas-tree its poison, and chilling the spirit of fervour within the Church. Devotions to our Lady and to the Person of our Lord were decied as sentimental and exaggerated. The acts of the martyrs, consecrated by immemorial tradition, were thrown aside on the very ground of their being supernatural. History was falsified ; missals and breviaries were mutilated ; cold, unbending severity took the place of unction and tenderness ; and a general languor of faith and love prepared the way for scepticism and infidelity. For convenience sake we have given the history of Port Royal to its close. We must now go back to the year 1661, when the King, on the death of Mazarin, assumed the reins of government.

Louis XIV.'s personal reign was the complete realization of Cæsarism. Belief in his own despotic power was the basis of his very identity, and the well-known "*L'Etat c'est moi*" was its simple expression. He himself tells us : " Kings are absolute lords, and have naturally full and free disposal of all the property of both the laity and clergy, to use it as wise stewards according to the needs of their State. The mysterious names of franchises and liberties of the Church, with which perhaps they may pretend to dazzle us, regard equally all the faithful, whether laics or tonsured, who are all equally the sons of this

common mother, but they exempt neither from their subjection to sovereigns." * He accepted the doctrine of his lawyers, that "the Kings of France are not simple laymen, but, so to say, of a mixed character"; † and that of his servile bishops, that "in the Consistory he was more than a judge, in the Church more than a priest." ‡

This absolute despotism was rendered possible by the circumstances of the time. The power of the nobles was annihilated by the destruction of their fortresses and the transfer to the *gens de robe* of the offices formerly their birthright. The Parliament, intimidated by its defeat in the revolt of the Fronde, was the willing instrument of the royal tyranny. The whole administration was centred in the King's Council, which was composed of men of talent from the middle class, without any independent status. Its chief member was the Controller-General, under whom were thirty intendants, and under them again sub-delegates, who controlled the whole national life; while extraordinary courts, whose judgments were guided by the King's orders alone, were established to try all cases connected with the administration. § Thus the whole kingdom was brought within the royal grasp, while the King himself was in the hands of the class most bitterly opposed to the Church.

The Church was the only independent power within the kingdom. But Bossuet has told us that "from the time the King assumed the government, and especially after Colbert became minister, the policy of humiliating Rome and strengthening the basis of operation against her, was adopted." || The privilege secured by the Concordat to certain monasteries to choose their own superior, and the difficulties raised at Rome about granting bulls in accordance with the King's wishes, were a constant source of irritation to him. He therefore gladly seized an opportunity which offered to pick a quarrel with the Holy See, in order to force his demands on the Pope.

Ambassadors in Rome at that time claimed the privilege of protecting all who dwelt within the precincts of their palaces. On pretence of defending these "franchises," some of the

* "Mémoires de Louis XIV.," ed. Dreyss, t. i. p. 209.

† Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS. de S. Sulpice, t. iv.; *Traité* manuscrit de la Régale. This and all the following quotations from the MSS. of Louis and his ministers in the Paris libraries, are taken from the "Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée de 1862," by M. Gérin, to which we refer our readers for further important details.

‡ "Procès-Verbaux du Clergé," t. v. p. 376, ap. Gérin, p. 348.

§ De Tocqueville, "State of Society in France before the Revolution of 1789," l. 2, cc. 2-4.

|| "Journal de l'Abbé Ledieu," 19 Janvier, 1700.

suite of Cardinal d'Este, the French ambassador, attacked and killed some Roman *sbirri* on duty. Louis, instead of requiring him to apologize, replaced him by the Duke de Créquy, who was notorious for his arrogant and violent temper. On the 20th August, 1662, some of the Duke's people attacked the Pope's Corsican guard, who retaliated. A fight round the palace ensued, and the ambassadress in her carriage happening to arrive on the spot where the shots were being exchanged, her page was killed and two of her servants were wounded. Though the French had been the aggressors, the Pope sent to apologize. But the Duke pretended to believe that the affray was a plot. In vain did the Pope, did Christina of Sweden, did the Cardinals* represent to Louis the true state of the case. He seized Avignon, sent into Italy seven thousand troops, and prepared fifteen thousand more to follow. He wrote to the Duke de Créquy: "You must bear in mind to include in this negotiation various favours that the Pope has hitherto refused me; as, for instance, the bulls for the abbeys of Cluny and the others which I have bestowed on my cousins, the Cardinals d'Este and Mancini . . . and ten or twelve other little favours."† And again: "Treat the Court of Rome on all occasions with harshness till it has satisfied me . . . in fact, mortify it in all ways." And later: "The only object of the noise and the loud complaints that I make, is to stun and frighten the Pope's relatives even more than hitherto, in order to afford you the means to make a peace more advantageous, and even more glorious, than I had at first thought of."‡ As a preliminary step to further negotiations, he insisted that three officers and fifty soldiers of the Corsican guard, and the *Barghello* and fifty *sbirri*, should be hanged! This demand he knew that Christ's Vicar must refuse.

Meanwhile corresponding steps were taken in Paris. At this time Ultramontane opinions were so general, that theses in support of them were frequently maintained in the various colleges. Drouet de Villeneuve having undertaken, with the consent of Grandin, Syndic of the Faculty, to maintain a thesis of this character, the Procureur-Général, De Harlay, went to speak to the King on the subject. "His Majesty having asked him what brought him to the Louvre, he answered that it was in order to inquire of him whether he wished that the Pope should have the power to take his crown from his head whenever he pleased. The King being astonished at this

* Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS. Fr., 4250, 4251.

† Ibid. 4251.

‡ Ibid. 4251.

question, he showed him and explained to him the bull *Unam Sanctam*, and the King was wonderstruck at this novelty." * This "novelty" was the bull issued nearly four hundred years before by Boniface VIII. ! The King being thus alarmed, the Parliament, on the 22nd January, 1663, at the instigation of the Advocate-General, Talon, forbade the Faculty to permit similar propositions to be maintained, and ordered them to register this decree. The Faculty resisted this encroachment on their ancient privilege of being judges of doctrine ; and it was not till after many stormy debates, that on the 4th April the decree was registered. But on the same day a similar thesis was maintained with the approbation of Grandin at the College of the Bernardins. The Parliament summoned Grandin to appear before them ; and though they had no legal jurisdiction in the matter, they suspended him. The Chancellor, Le Tellier, took great pains to induce the Sorbonne to sign a declaration asserting the parliamentary doctrine positively.† But he could not obtain more than six negative and intentionally ambiguous articles, which only declared that Ultramontane opinions were "not the doctrine of the Faculty," thus leaving these questions open, as the Council of Trent had done, and affirmed the inviolability of "the true liberties of the Gallican Church" and of the prerogatives of the "Most Christian King." But it was not defined what these liberties were ; while the frequent repetition of the words "*Most Christian*" left it doubtful whether, if the King were a *heretic*, subjects might not be dispensed from their allegiance. Thus these articles were a tacit denial of the parliamentary demand ; but the Parliament affected to be satisfied with them. Talon, however, could not conceal his vexation ; and dissatisfaction was also expressed by Cocquelin,‡ one of the deputies of 1681, and on grounds similar to those above stated, by Pinsson, a parliamentary advocate, whom Colbert consulted, and whose written criticism is extant.§

Colbert was furnished by his spies with the details of the debates of the Faculty, and with lists of the names and characters of those who had voted on the respective sides, and of the doctors and religious bodies who were for or against Rome. From these it is evident that the persons most distinguished for learning and piety, most of the doctors of the Sorbonne and other colleges, and all the members of religious

* Journal MS. of the Jansenist, Deslions, Bib. Nat., MSS. Fr. Sorbonne, 1258.

† Harlay S. Germ. 162 Bibl. Nat. MSS. Fr. 165.

‡ "Procès Verbaux du Clergé," t. v. p. 419, ap. Gérin, p. 19.

§ Bibl. Nat. MSS. Cinq-cents Colbert, vol. clv.

communities, except four or five Bernardines, forming an overwhelming majority of the Faculty, were ranged against the Parliament. The writers also significantly suggest those on whom the King's favours might be advantageously bestowed. Bossuet, who had voted against the Parliament, is described as "seeking to please all with whom he is, and adopting their sentiments when he knows them. . . . Attached to the Jesuits, and those who can make his fortune, rather through interest than inclination. . . . Whenever he comes to perceive the line of conduct which will conduct him to fortune, he will devote himself to it, whatever it be, and he may be made very useful in it."*

Mr. Jervis misrepresents the facts of this quarrel, and omits the above important details. He describes the shots fired at the carriage of the Ambassadors as an insult, instead of a pure accident; and he gives us to understand that the Six Articles expressed the opinion of the Sorbonne; whereas they were got up by the Chancellor, and, even under intimidation, were signed by only a small fraction of the Faculty.†

Meanwhile the Pope, being foiled by Louis' intrigues in his applications for aid to the other Catholic powers, was compelled to sign, in 1664, the humiliating treaty of Pisa. But he drew up a touching protest, in which he declared for the satisfaction "of his successors and posterity," that the terms of the treaty "were not the effect of his freewill, but of crushing force, pure violence, and the necessity for avoiding the greater injuries which the war that France was about to kindle in Italy, would entail on religion, on the Holy See, on all his States, and on his subjects and vassals."‡

Action against the Holy See was now suspended; but that against the Church in France was continuous throughout Louis' whole reign. Provincial Councils, which late General Councils had ordered to be held every three years, and which were essential for the maintenance of discipline, he constantly prohibited, except when required for his own purposes; for he was "alarmed at the sight of four bishops together."§ The quinquennial Assemblies of the Clergy were unavoidable, because at them the clergy made their voluntary gift to the

* Bibl. Nat., MSS. Cinq-cents Colbert, vol. clv.

† Jervis, vol. i. p. 456.

‡ Daunau, "*Essai sur la Puissance Temporelle des Papes*," ed. 1818, vol. ii. p. 172, ap. Gérin, p. 14.

§ "*Nouveaux Opuscules de Fleury*," p. 59,—"Discours sur les Libertés de l'Eglise Gallicane." This and all the subsequent quotations from Fleury are taken from the edition published in 1807, by the Abbé Emery, from the original MSS. in Fleury's own handwriting.

Crown. But Louis encroached on their free action, interfering with the election of deputies, limiting their numbers and the length of their sessions, and studiously treating them as a mere meeting of tax-payers. Secular jurisdiction also was extended; and not only civil, but even criminal, cases in which clergy were involved, were brought before civil courts; and the only resource that was allowed to the Bishops was an appeal to the King's Council, equally composed of lay judges, and nurtured in the same parliamentary maxims. As to the property of the Church, Louis carried out his declaration that it belonged to himself. In Harlay's portfolios is to be found a very curious manuscript on this subject, which, with the substitution of *State* for *King*, expresses opinions similar to those heard in the Constituent Assembly in 1790.* Louis did not, it is true, like Henry IV., give bishoprics to laymen, but he charged enormous pensions on them, and used them as the price of servile obedience to his will. The abbey which were in "commende" were given to persons, however unfit or unworthy, who had interest at court, and the King's nominees were forced on the communities that still preserved their rule, and were entitled to elect their own superiors. But unable to brook even the existence of any right independent of his will, Louis resolved to convert these accidental abuses into a permanent law. Colbert, therefore, set the learned Baluze to work to find authority for the proposed encroachment. On 11th December, 1669, the latter wrote that he had discovered in the possession of M. Camus a MS. copy of the "Verbal Declaration" of Henry III. on the subject, which was not to be found in the registers of the Council, but "which might be used to authorize the King's privileges, and serve as an example for the future."† Thus was fabricated a new "law of the kingdom" for the occasion. If the Pope refused a bull of institution, the King's brevet supplied its place. If the Pope issued a bull appointing a religious, or forbade the consecration of the King's nominee, a decree of the Parliament to overrule it was obtained, as was done by Bossuet in the case of the abbey of Rebais,‡ and by the Bishop of Tournai in that of S. Amand.§ Bossuet even applied to the Parliament, instead of the Pope, for power to reform the abbey of Jouarre, which since 1225 had possessed a Papal exemption from episcopal authority.|| It was out of a more than usually outrageous encroachment on Church property that the second great quarrel between Louis and Rome arose.

* MS. Harlay 121, 129.

† Bibl. Nat., *Mélanges Colbert*, 150.

‡ Gérin, p. 365. § Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr. 6901. || Ibid., MSS. Fr. 15697.

For centuries the French kings had possessed in certain churches a right called *Régale*, in virtue of which, on the demise of a bishop, they drew the revenues of the See and filled the benefices that fell vacant till his successor had taken the oath of allegiance. The second General Council of Lyons, A.D. 1274, sanctioned the *Régale* in all the churches in which it already existed, but forbade its extension under pain of excommunication. Many churches in France, especially those in Languedoc, Guienne, Provence, and Dauphiné, had been exempt from time immemorial, and consequently continued to be so. Notwithstanding, on the plea that neither a General Council, nor the acts of his predecessors, nor immemorial prescription, could alienate rights inherent in the Crown, Louis issued, in 1673 and 1675, two edicts extending the *Régale* to all the churches in the kingdom, and calling upon all the archbishops and bishops who had hitherto been exempt to take the usual oath of allegiance. All the bishops, except the two Jansenist bishops of Pamiers and Alet, obeyed, though many of them entered protests in their registers, and others, as for instance Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix, and Le Camus, Bishop of Grenoble, addressed remonstrances to the Chancellor.* All the benefices which had been filled by the Bishops of Pamiers and Alet during their respective long episcopates of thirty-six and thirty-two years were declared vacant, and given to the King's nominees. The Bishops excommunicated the intruders. The Archbishop of Toulouse annulled their proceedings, whereupon they appealed to the Pope, who had hitherto held aloof, but was now compelled to interfere. He accordingly wrote two letters of remonstrance to Louis; and as they had no effect, he addressed a third to him in December, 1679, in which he threatened to make use of the power which God had placed in his hands. The Bishop of Alet died in 1677: and the Bishop of Pamiers continuing the contest alone, his property and that of his clergy who remained faithful to him was seized; his people were punished for relieving his wants, and they were reduced, as he himself complained in a letter to the King,† to the extremity of need. He died in 1680, and an open schism broke out, the two Chapters each appointing a Vicar-General. The late Bishop's relatives and friends were banished; a community of Ursulines, founded by his sister, was dispersed; the experiment of *dragonnades* was tried; two successive anti-Regalist Vicars-General died in prison, and a third, Cerle, who

* Archives, G. 8.

† Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr., *Mélanges Renaudot* IX.

managed to live in hiding, was burnt in effigy in full canonicals, which was considered an insult to the whole ecclesiastical order throughout Christendom. On the 1st January, 1681, the Pope issued a bull excommunicating the Archbishop of Toulouse, the intruding Vicars-General and their abettors, and declaring null all the ministrations of priests holding faculties from them. The Parliament affected to believe that the bull was not genuine, and legislated accordingly. The Pope hereupon sent copies of the bull to the Jesuits, and ordered them to make it publicly known, and vouch for its authenticity. The Parliaments of Paris and Toulouse summoned the rectors of the Jesuit professed houses to appear before them, and on receiving from them the papers that had been sent to them from Rome, forbade them to take any further steps.*

Mr. Jervis has misapprehended this affair.† Had he consulted the correspondence of Louis and his ministers, he would have discovered that they, and not the Jesuits, were the real authors of the schism; that the rights in dispute were those of the French clergy, and not of the Pope; and that as the *Régale* involved spiritual privileges, it was far more, and not "far less," important, than the mere nomination to bishoprics which the Concordat had granted to the Crown. He also accuses the Jesuits of acting inconsistently with the rules of their order, and obeying the Parliament rather than the Pope. But he gives us no proof of this, nor have we met with any elsewhere. The Jesuits obeyed the Pope by publicly placing the brief in the hands of the Parliament and vouching for its authenticity, and we are not aware that they received any further orders on the subject.

Another affair widened the breach. In 1645, Margaret, Duchess of Orleans, founded a convent of the Congregation of Notre Dame at Charonne, and Louis granted letters patent and authorized its endowment with a portion of the Duchess's dower, still due to her by the Crown. The abbess dying in 1677, the King nominated Marie de Grandchamps, the Cistercian Prioress of Domes, perpetual Abbess of Charonne, and on the 3rd November, 1679, the Archbishop of Paris sent her a mandate to that effect.‡ The nuns being entitled by their rule and the letters patent to elect their own abbess, remonstrated, whereupon the Archbishop sent four nuns to Lorraine, their native country, and on January 2nd, 1680, Madame de Grandchamps was installed by force. The nuns

* Martin, t. xiii. l. 85, p. 618; Crétineau Joly, t. iv. c. 5, p. 364.

† Jervis, vol. ii. c. 2, pp. 23-26. ‡ Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr. 15727.

appealed to the Pope, who ordered them to elect an abbeſs for three years, and they unanimously elected Catherine Lévesque, to whom the Pope gave a bull. The ruin of the convent was now inevitable. In order to make it appear that the Pope had encroached on the King's undoubted rights, a mandate, dated November 8th, appointing Madame de Grand-champs only provisionally, in order to restore peace, discipline, and order in pecuniary affairs, was substituted for the original one of November 3rd. But there were neither disputes nor want of discipline; and had there been, the mention by the Archbishop's secretary, Le Gendre, of the "*bizareries de cette fille et son humeur insupportable*,"* and the complaints of the nuns as to her words and actions,† prove that she was not competent to reform the community. As to their debts, the nuns protested that their assets exceeded their liabilities by 100,000 livres, independent of two sums of 28,000 and 50,000 livres due to them by the Crown, the latter being a part of the Duchess of Orleans's endowment; and that, moreover, their creditors did not press for payment.‡ The Procureur-Général wrote to Colbert to ask in what terms the King wished him to speak of the sums due by him.§ Colbert answered that they scarcely deserved a thought; that they "had always been promised, but never paid"; and that it would suffice to assign the property of the nuns to their creditors.|| Later, the Chancellor ordered the Procureur-Général to use the words, "even if the creditors should be so fortunate as to get possession of a sum of 50,000 livres ceded to the nuns by the late Duchess of Orleans,"¶ and not to mention either the King's name or the other debt. Finally, a falsified procès-verbal was drawn up,** and on the 4th January, 1681, the Parliament assigned the monastery to the creditors, and suppressed the community. The church was dismantled, the dead were exhumed, the place was secularized, and all the nuns were placed in different convents, with the exception of two sisters, who were allowed to be together.

Mr. Jervis says that some of the nuns protested against the violation of their privileges, upon which the Archbishop removed them summarily. But he omits to mention their unanimous protest, the nefarious proceedings in connection with the King's debts to them, and the suppression of the monastery.††

* "Mémoires de Le Gendre," p. 40, ap. Gérin, p. 98.

† Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr. 15727.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid. 17415.

¶ Ibid. 17416.

** "Nouveaux Opuscules de Fleury,"—Anecdotes, p. 140.

†† Jervis, vol. ii. p. 30.

The King had been greatly alarmed by the Pope's third letter, and the subsequent excommunication of the Archbishop of Toulouse had rendered it necessary that he should take some decided step. Gladly would his ministers have driven him into schism, but they seem to have been aware that his steady support was not to be relied on. Among the papers of the Archbishop of Reims is a "Mémoire" in the handwriting of Faure, a Gallican doctor of the Sorbonne and one of the deputies of 1681, with notes by the Archbishop himself, which shows how completely the ministers and the writers in their pay appreciated the position. After asserting that Ultramontane doctrines were unanimously held by the Jesuits, by all the religious orders, by many of the members of the Sorbonne, and by every one except those who had been educated in the University and the Parliament, the writer remarks that the "pious novelty" that the Pope cannot excommunicate the King is without foundation; because, as "the kings of France are subject to the Church and its chiefs in spiritual things, the Church can deprive them of these on great occasions and with the lawful forms." He says that, after a long contest, the King, being very religious, will be obliged to confess that this extension of the *Régale* is an innovation resting on no foundation except his own decree. The public and posterity will know all that has been done in this contest against "a pious and wise Pope, who fears nothing except to offend God"; and it will not be to the glory of his Majesty that he should have acted "against the property of the Church, granted to it by former kings, against the canons of the second Council of Lyons, against the most ancient ordonnance of the *Régale* registered in the *Chambre des Comptes* . . . against ancient edicts, and against the opinion of those who have written most in favour of the *Régale*." *

After many anxious consultations, it was determined that in order to create the impression that the King was supported by the clergy and a schism was imminent, an address should be prepared for signature by the Assembly of Clergy of 1680. But as their opinion against the *Régale* and in favour of the Pope's moderate conduct was well known, the address was not brought forward till after the Assembly had closed its sittings, and the signatures of the bishops were only obtained without their having had time to consider or even read it, while waiting in the King's ante-chamber to pay their final respects to his Majesty.

* Archives, G. 8.

The next step was an uncanonical meeting, known as "la petite Assemblée," composed of forty-two bishops who happened at the time to be in Paris. They met on the 19th March and the 1st May, 1681, and signed four articles approving of the *Régale* and of a book against the Pope's supremacy by Gervais, which had been condemned at Rome, censuring the Pope's conduct in the affair of Pamiers and that of Charonne, and petitioning the King to summon a National Council, or a General Assembly of the Clergy, consisting of two deputies of the first order and two of the second from each province, of whom only the former were to have votes.

The authority of the proposed assembly was the first anxiety. The Church recognizes only General, Provincial, and National Councils. There was no question of the two former, and Louis did not dare, on account of the known opinions of his clergy, to summon a National Council, to say nothing of the Pope's permission being necessary. There remained only the ordinary Assemblies of the Clergy, held for temporal purposes alone; whereas the present assembly was for purely spiritual matters. Baluze was therefore set to work to seek for precedents; but all in vain.* Portales, however, affirmed that as "the King's authorization gave the Assembly a new character, its competence had no other limit than his will!"† Thus, to start with, the Assembly was uncanonical, and its decrees were null.

The next point was the composition of the Assembly which was to represent the clergy of France. Let us see how far it did so. The revival of religion had now reached its height, and the Church of France had never before contained so large a number of bishops, priests, religious orders, and congregations eminent for piety and learning. But the opinions of this illustrious body of clergy were so well known, that it was deemed necessary to issue strict orders as to the persons who alone were to attend the Provincial Councils by which the deputies were to be elected, and also as to those who were to be elected. A form of procuration also was drawn up by the King's command, and sent by Colbert, through the Archbishop of Paris, to the other archbishops, with an explanation that the instructions to all the deputies were to be uniform,‡ that is to say, the Assembly was to be perfectly well packed, without a single dissentient vote! Nor did the deputies thus

* *Bibl. Nat.*, MS. Baluze, Armoire 6, Paquet 3, n. 1.

† "Discours et Rapport," p. 182, ap. Gérin, p. 168.

‡ *Archives Rég. du Sécrot de la Maison du Roi*, 1681.

uncanonically elected supply, by their intellectual and moral eminence, what was wanting to the Assembly in authority and canonical constitution. On the contrary, it was remarkable for the absence of all those who rendered the Church so illustrious. Not a single monk, nor member of a congregation, nor, with the exception of Bossuet and Brias, Archbishop of Cambrai, a single bishop or priest eminent for piety and learning, was to be found in it. The two presidents were Harlay, Archbishop of Paris, whose scandalous life is notorious, and Le Tellier, Archbishop of Reims, no less distinguished by his utter unscrupulousness. The remaining thirty-four bishops and thirty-eight priests were relatives or creatures of Colbert, recipients or expectants of the King's favours, several of them Jansenists, most of scandalous morals or worldly and rapacious, and all, with the exception of the Archbishop of Cambrai, noted for their servility.

The Assembly met on the 1st October, 1681, when four principal questions were presented for deliberation; viz., the Régale, the affair of Pamiers, that of Charonne, and the Declaration on the Pope's authority. The opening sermon, which had been previously submitted to the King, was preached on the 9th November at his command by Bossuet. It was a marvel of eloquence. He says of it, "The authority of the Holy See appeared to all the audience very great. I took care to exalt its majesty as much as I could; and in exposing with all possible respect the ancient [i.e. Gallican] doctrine of France, I sought to set limits to those who abuse it, and to explain it as the bishops, and not as the magistrates, understand it." * The thrilling words, "tremble at the shadow of a division from the Holy See," reassured the Pope, and secured his approbation. They lulled the King's scruples of conscience, of which he could never quite divest himself; while they conveyed a hint to the Jansenists and lawyers that there was a limit beyond which they would not be permitted to go.

From the accounts of the discussions given by Bossuet to Fleury and Fénelon, we know their details and his own opinions. † The resolution in support of the Régale was drawn up by the Chancellor and the Archbishop of Reims. But on the 6th February, 1682, Bossuet wrote to M. Derois, "that he could not go so far as to approve of the King's claim." ‡ With

* Lettre au Cardinal d'Estrées, Dec. 1, 1681,—"*Œuvres Complètes*," ed. 1841, t. xvii. p. 132.

† "*Nouveaux Opuscules de Fleury*,"—*Anecdotes*, pp. 135, 146.

‡ "*Œuvres Complètes*," t. xvii. p. 138.

regard to the affairs of Pamiers and Charonne, he said to Fleury, "Fundamentally wrong. Ill done to blame the Bishop of Pamiers, and praise the Archbishop of Toulouse. The Procès-verbal of Formaget and Benjamin false. Decrees of the Parliament cannot be supported."

The question of the Pope's authority, raised on the 24th November, was to be based on the Six Articles of 1663. Bossuet objected to its discussion, as tending to increase the existing division. But the two Le Telliers, Colbert, and the Bishop of Tournai, already known to us as the Jansenist Bishop of Comminges, were for deciding it; and the Archbishop of Paris brought an order from the King to enter upon it. Bossuet then proposed to examine tradition. But the Archbishop of Paris and Colbert pressing for immediate decision, the King gave an order to that effect. Thus even the deliberations of the Assembly were not free. The Bishop of Tournai, who was appointed to prepare the Propositions, asserted that both the Pope and the Holy See might fall into heresy. This Bossuet denied. The Bishop of Tournai insisted that the infallibility of the Pope was the necessary consequence of the indefectibility of the Holy See in matters of faith. Bossuet denied this consequence, and maintained that this indefectibility ought to be laid down as an incontrovertible principle. The Bishop of Tournai then gave up the preparation of the Propositions, and Bossuet was appointed to the task. Thus Bossuet did good service to the Holy See, as he afterwards used to say, by hindering the declaration of more extreme doctrine.*

The Four Propositions are so well known, that we shall notice only the fourth, which now stands thus:—

"The Pope has the principal place in deciding questions of faith, and his decrees extend to every church and all churches; but, nevertheless, his judgment is not irreversible until confirmed by the consent of the Church."†

This does not seem, however, to have been the form in which Bossuet drew it up; for, among the papers of Le Tellier, Archbishop of Reims,‡ and Nicolas Colbert, Coadjutor of Rouen,§ are to be seen two copies of the Propositions identical with those finally issued, down to the last clause of the fourth, which in both copies is replaced by the words "in which decrees truly, if supported by the consent of the Church, but not except with that agreement of the Head and

* "Nouveaux Opuscules de Fleury,"—Corrections, p. 21.

† Jervis, vol. ii. c. 2, p. 51.

‡ Archives, G².

§ Bibl. Nat., Mélanges Colbert, t. iii.

the members, is to be recognized the certain and sure judgment of the Holy Spirit, under which every intellect must be held captive." * Colbert's copy remains unchanged ; but in Le Tellier's this passage is scratched out, and the present clause is substituted for it. Probably in the course of the meetings and disputes which Bossuet told Fleury took place at the house of the Archbishop of Paris, Bossuet's Proposition was deemed too favourable to the Holy See, and Le Tellier inserted in the copy which he had in his hand the present amended form, of which he was possibly the author. The Bishop of Tournai relates, that when M. Feu said that the decisions of the Pope were not infallible unless confirmed by a General Council, even in that well-packed assembly there arose a murmur ; but as those who ought to have spoken did not utter a word, the dissentients dared not complain aloud.†

On the 19th March the Bishops signed the Declaration. But we learn from the Procureur-Général that most of them would gladly have retracted the next day, had they been permitted to do so.‡ Boucher, one of the doctors of the Sorbonne who were banished for opposing the King's order, also told Grandet, Curé of Angers, that many of them came to him and said, "Get us out of this scrape by what you do in the Sorbonne." § On the 11th April the Pope addressed to the prelates the brief "*Paternæ caritati*," by which he annulled their acts relative to the Régale. The Assembly, transported with anger and pride, signed on the 6th May a Protest, which begins with the words, "The Gallican Church governs itself by its own laws, and keeps inviolate its own customs, which the Gallican bishops, our superiors, will not allow to be modified by any definition or any authority." || By this Protest, the Assembly advanced to the extreme limit of the royal tether to which it had bound itself. The next step would have carried it down the abyss of schism, and from the first Louis had resolved, that under no circumstances whatsoever should that step be taken. On the 9th May he suspended the

* In fidei quoque quæstionibus præcipuas Summi Pontificis esse partes, ejusque decreta ad omnes et singulas ecclesias pertinere ; quibus quidem decretis si Ecclesiæ consensus accesserit, tum fixa rataque omnia, nec nisi in eâ capitis membrorumque consensione certum ac tutum, sub quo omnem intellectum captivari necesse sit, Spiritûs Sancti judicium agnoscendum.

† Bibl. Arsenal, MS. S. Sulpice, t. 4.

‡ Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr. 17417.

§ MS. Grandet, "*Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques*," Mai, 1867, ap. Gérin, p. 389.

|| "*Procès-verbaux du Clergé*," t. 5,—*Pièces justificatives*, p. 240, ap. Gérin, p. 328.

sittings of the Assembly, and on the 29th June he dissolved it. The Archbishop of Paris begged that the King's order might be couched in courteous terms; but his petition was refused in a supercilious letter from Colbert.

The King had issued on the 20th March an edict ordering the Declaration to be taught throughout the kingdom. But we learn from the papers of Harlay and Colbert that the clergy now leant towards Rome even more decidedly than they had done in 1663. Fleury says that the Gallican doctrine was held by the doctors who were "least pious and least exemplary in their morals," by "lawyers, and by profane and profligate politicians."* In the provinces Ultramontane opinions were so general, that the Jansenist Procureur du Roi at Clermont complained to the Procureur-Général that "this doctrine was become so common, that not only did it pass for Catholic but the contrary was considered a heresy."† On the 2nd May a deputation of the Parliament went to the Sorbonne, and ordered the Faculty to register the Declaration and the King's edict. The doctors refused to do so without deliberation, and the matter was adjourned to their next monthly meeting on the 1st June, at which it was again adjourned to 1st July. Colbert wrote in great agitation that all was lost. Consultations were held to decide whether violent measures should be adopted. But it was feared that these would make it known in Rome what were the real opinions of the Faculty; and Harlay added, that if their decision was to have any weight, care must be taken not to let it appear that any restraint was placed upon their liberty.‡

The King ordered an extraordinary meeting for the 15th June. The excitement was immense. Never had an Assembly been so numerously attended, many coming from the provinces, and others who at other times never came, now making their appearance. The debate continued till the afternoon, and was adjourned till the next day. As soon as the doctors separated, the Syndic hurried off to report at S. Germain's. A *coup d'état* could no longer be deferred. At six o'clock the next morning the Dean and six professors of the Sorbonne, the Grand-Maître and four professors of Navarre, and several other doctors, were summoned to appear before the Parliament. The President upbraided them for "having dared to defer the registration that the Court had ordered,"

* "Nouveaux Opuscules de Fleury,"—Discours, p. 78.

† "Journal des Savants," 1843, articles de M. Cousin sur Domat, ap. Gérin, p. 376.

‡ Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr. 17417.

and informed them that as they no longer merited the King's favour, their assemblies were suspended during the King's pleasure. The Registrar of the Faculty was then ordered to enter in the register of the Sorbonne the King's edict, the Declaration of the Assembly, and the decree which would be dictated to him by the Registrar of the Court. This was done forthwith, and the doctors went away.* Thus, it will be seen, the Faculty of Theology never accepted nor registered the Declaration, which was inserted by violence in their books. Eight of the doctors who had been most active in the debate, were banished to different parts of France. The excitement was so great that the King found it necessary to allay it, and the dissolution of the Assembly of the Clergy was one of the measures which he adopted.

In the preceding year the Archbishop of Reims wrote to his brother Louvois that if the present state of things continued, "it was impossible that parliamentary maxims should not be forgotten" †—thus confessing that the Faculty was at that time Ultramontane. Steps were therefore now taken to bring the doctors into "dependence on the Parliament, whom they were" henceforth "to recognize as their judge;" ‡ obnoxious professors were deposed or pensioned off; Gallican teachers were rewarded; the salaries of those who did not please the Court were withheld; and other measures were adopted to break the spirit of the Faculty and annihilate its influence. Thus religious education throughout France was usurped by the State.

The Pope took no notice of the Declaration; but when members of the late Assembly were nominated to bishoprics he refused the bulls. Louis retaliated by forbidding his other nominees to apply for bulls. The Franchises also again gave trouble. Innocent XI., on his accession, had announced that he would not receive any ambassador who did not resign them. All the courts except France acquiesced; but Louis answered, that "he had never regulated his conduct by that of others, for God had appointed him to set an example, and not to receive it." The Pope therefore published a bull abolishing the Franchises, and excommunicating whosoever should violate his rights as a sovereign. Louis totally ignored the bull, and sent to Rome the Marquis de Lavardin, who entered the city at the head of a large armed force, which he placed in guard round his palace. The Pope refused him

* Bibl. Arsenal, MS. S. Sulpice, t. iv. p. 2789, in which full particulars of the struggle between the Court and the Faculty will be found.

† Bibl. Nat., MSS. Fr. 20769.

‡ Ibid. 15728.

an audience, put under interdict the church of St. Louis in which he went to pray, and left him unmolested in the solitude of his palace. Louis restrained himself, because he hoped to obtain the See of Cologne for his dependent, the Cardinal de Furstemberg; but when the Pope gave the bull to Prince Clement of Bavaria, his anger burst forth. He seized Avignon, and appealed to a General Council, which, according to the bull of Pius II., subjected him to excommunication. But once more he had the wisdom to stop on the brink of schism, and he did not require a single bishop in the kingdom to join in the appeal.* At this critical juncture Innocent died, and his successor, Alexander VIII., being a friend of Louis, the latter resigned the Franchises and applied for bulls for his bishops. But he quickly discovered that "the Pope is a pillar that neither advances nor recedes." All Alexander's efforts to reconcile differences proving vain, in January, 1691, two days before his death, he published the Constitution, "Inter multiplices," by which he annulled the Declaration of 1682. The accession of Innocent XII. making no change in the spirit of the Holy See, Louis at length saw that he must give way. His nominees had never been required to *contradict* the doctrine of the Four Propositions, "but only to abolish an act by which the Assembly had gone so far as to limit by a decree and a decisive judgment the extent of the Pope's authority, which even the Council of Trent had abstained from doing"; and the Pope therefore demanded that the King, and each of the bishops separately, should write him a letter to this effect. There ensued a long struggle to avoid this humiliating retraction on the plea that it was not necessary, because the Declaration of 1682 was not a decree, "these Assemblies [of the clergy] having no authority to make decrees, whether in matters of doctrine or of discipline." Finally, in 1693, each bishop wrote a letter expressing his deep sorrow for the acts of the Assembly, and declaring that whatever had "been deemed to be decreed in that Assembly concerning the power of the Church and the Pontifical authority," he held "as not decreed"; and whatever had been "determined by that Assembly to the prejudice of the rights of Churches,"† he regarded "as not synodically determined." Louis himself also wrote a most respectful letter to the Pope, in which he informed him that he had given orders that his edict concerning the Declaration of 1682 was not to

* Bibl. Nat., MS. Ital. 690, MS. Harlay, S. G. 168.

† Bibl. Imp., MSS. Fr. 15727. "Mémoire du Cardinal d'Estrées," Ambassador at Rome; "Mélanges Colbert," t. iii. Full details of these transactions will be found in these MSS.

be observed.* These orders are to be found in the letters which passed between the Comte de Pontchartrain, Secretary of State, and Achille de Harlay, First President of the Parliament.†

Mr. Jervis describes the Declaration of 1682 as if it were the act of the French clergy, and totally ignores the evidence afforded by the MSS. here quoted and a mass of others which our limits have compelled us to omit, that it was the work only of the King and a handful of servile courtiers, and was regarded with disgust by the Church of France. We would fain believe that ignorance, and not dishonesty, has led to this gross misrepresentation. But what excuse can be made for the ignorance of a writer who claims the confidence of his readers by producing a long list of original documents as vouchers for his veracity, and yet, at the most critical point of his history, neglects to make use of the invaluable evidence afforded by the very actors in the events, which has for several years been before the public, has given rise to much discussion in France, and is within easy reach? We trust that, for the sake of truth, and even of his own reputation, he will completely transform this chapter of his book in the next edition.

But though the Pope's authority had been duly acknowledged by both the King and the bishops, Louis still maintained his usurped control of the Church in France. His change of intention as to the Four Propositions was carried out by the President of the Parliament and the Procureur-Général. In 1702-3, the Chancellor Pontchartrain ordered the Archbishop of Paris and Bossuet not to publish their condemnation of Simon's heretical translation of the New Testament till they had obtained the approval of a doctor whom he named. Ten years later the Jansenist Chancellor forbade Fénelon to publish his condemnation of a Jansenist book. Nor did the hardship consist only in the subjection of the Faith to lay judges; but these judges were for the most part Jansenists, free-thinkers, and even infidels.

The dependence of the Church on the State caused her serious injury in connection with the persecution of the Calvinists. This was a political measure, apparently the result of the discovery, in 1683, of a Calvinist conspiracy.‡ The Jesuits opposed it, because it checked the success of their missions among the Calvinists.§ The Pope reprobated it, saying, "The Pope, the Church, and its wisest ministers

* MS. Harlay 367, vol. xiv.

† Ibid. 165, 367, vol. iv.

‡ Martin, t. xiv. l. 86, p. 37.

§ Crétineau Joly, t. iv. c. 5, pp. 387, 391.

have too much discernment to rejoice at the exterior and apparent conversion of nearly two millions of persons, who for the most part have entered the bosom of the Church only to defile it by an infinite number of sacrileges, and to profane her most holy possession by professing the religion of Rome without any change of opinions."* In fact, this measure was a far greater blow to the Church than to the Calvinists, in consequence of the number of hypocrites, bitter enemies; and infidels hitherto masked as Calvinists, whom the State compelled her to receive into her bosom.

The interference of the State in the dispute about Quietism rendered that controversy also very injurious to religion. Madame Guyon came to Paris with a great reputation as a mystic, and was favourably received by Fénelon and many other spiritual persons; but her doctrines soon developed into Quietism, and she was condemned by Bossuet, and later by Fénelon. Vain attempts were made to reform or silence her, and at last, in 1695, Bossuet had her imprisoned at Vincennes. But not content to stop here, he stirred up an acrimonious movement against Fénelon and his "*Maxims of the Saints*." At Fénelon's own request, his book was submitted to the Pope. Had the Church been free, the censure of a mystical book would have been scarcely noticed; but now it was a question of State and of national honour. The condemnation of the book was peremptorily demanded, and Bossuet even wrote in the King's name, threatening a National Council and schism. The whole kingdom was in a flame. Jansenists and Gallicans thundered; free-thinkers scoffed; prayer and the mysteries of the interior life were held up to contempt. And when at length, in 1699, a condemnation arrived, it was in some sense a triumph to the enemies of the Church. Fénelon, however, was the true victor, through the supernatural humility with which he publicly condemned his own book and forbade his flock to read or retain it.

While the Church was thus bound hand and foot, or dragged through the mire by the State, philosophy and literature were free. In spite of King and Sorbonne, Jesuits and Dominicans, Cartesianism was adopted by all classes with wild enthusiasm, as affording scope for the great intellectual activity of the age in the only direction in which liberty existed, and as an emancipation from authority, which Cæsarism had rendered so hateful. Fontenelle carried the revolt into literature in the "*Quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns*," and by his "*History of Oracles*" and his other writings threw doubt

* MS. Harlay, 179, vol. i.

and contempt on the Faith and the Church. At the suppers of the Duc de Vendôme, and in the *salons* of the Duc de Chartres and the Prince de Conti, poets and wits vied with deists and atheists in proclaiming universal license and infidelity. Thus there sprang up noiselessly an anti-religious party, as yet without any settled principles, but ready to be developed into an anti-Christian movement. In vain did Bossuet, Fénelon, and even Leibnitz, foretell the abyss into which, through this wild chaos of thought and morals, society was rushing. Louis cared not to inquire whether his subjects believed in Jesus Christ, or even in God, so long as they were not Ultramontanes, Calvinists, or Jansenists, and his own authority was not impugned.

Amid such multiplied adverse circumstances, any religion that was less than divine must have died out. A century earlier the Church had proved her supernatural vitality by her wonderful revival, and now she proved it no less by her undyingness. Devotion to the Sacred Heart was the means by which Christianity was now preserved in France. The instrument which our Lord selected for the institution of this devotion was Margaret Mary Alacoque, only a simple nun in the Convent of the Visitation at Paray-le-Monial. She was born in 1647, and her life in religion extended from 1672 to 1690. Our Lord told her that He chose her "as an abyss of unworthiness and ignorance for the accomplishment of so great a design, in order that all might be done by Him." In repeated visions He impressed her with the wonderful love which fills His Sacred Heart, and the suffering which that Heart endured through the ingratitude of men. He said to her, "My Heart wishes to manifest itself to men, that they may be enriched by these precious treasures which I discover to thee, and which contain sanctifying graces capable of drawing them from perdition." He discovered to her the inexplicable wonders of His love, and to what an excess He had carried it in His love for men, from whom He received only contempt and ingratitude. "It is this," He said, "which I feel more deeply than all that I suffered in My Passion; for if they would return My love, I should reckon all that I have done for them as nothing, and if possible I should even wish to do more; instead of which I meet with coldness and repulses on every hand in return for all My anxiety to do them good." He desired her to communicate the first Friday in every month, and on every Thursday night to unite herself with Him in His mortal sadness and Agony in the Garden; and He told her that He had appointed her to institute this devotion in the Church. But how was she even to begin her work? In her

own community she had not a single friend. Her supernatural virtues were misunderstood, and she was despised, contemned, and insulted, as seeking singularity, a hypocrite and visionary, and even sprinkled with holy water as possessed. How her task was accomplished it would be hard to tell. It was not till 1665 that the novices, whose mistress she then was, placed on an altar a picture of the Sacred Heart. The following year the devotion was adopted in the community; but it was not till 1713 that it received the sanction of the Bishop. Meanwhile it had been indirectly authorized by Benedict XIV., and no less than three hundred confraternities had been established in other parts of France. And now its diffusion is world-wide, and thousands are flocking from all parts of Europe, and even coming, we are told, from across the Atlantic, to adore the Sacred Heart before the altar at Paray.

Louis lived long enough to discover how great had been his folly in strengthening the natural enemies of his throne by employing them to subjugate the Church on which it was based. In the year 1702, the opinion of the doctors of the Sorbonne having been demanded on the well-known "Case of Conscience," forty of them, with the secret approval of Noailles, Archbishop of Paris, revived the *fact* of Jansenius. Shortly after, among the papers of F. Quesnel, the successor of Arnauld as the head of Jansenism, were found traces of two plots to secure themselves an independent position. Alarmed at these indications of the activity of this dreaded sect, Louis applied to the Pope, Clement XI., who accordingly published in 1705 a bull which enforced all previous edicts against Jansenism. The Assembly of the Clergy accepted the bull, but only with the Gallican declaration, that obedience to the Pope's decisions is not obligatory till they have been approved by the Church through the bishops; and Noailles made a reservation on the question of *fact*. The Pope was offended, and it was only after long negotiations that the King could induce the bishops to withdraw the offensive expressions, which, however, only embodied the doctrine which he himself had been forcing on them for above twenty years. Meanwhile, in 1708, the Pope condemned Quesnel's "*Réflexions Morales sur le Nouveau Testament*," which Noailles had found in circulation, and had approved in his former diocese of Châlons. In order to prove that he was not a Jansenist, Noailles attacked Port Royal des Champs. The nuns having refused to sign the bull of 1705, authority was obtained from Rome to place them under Port Royal de Paris, which did not share their Jansenist faith. On their resistance, Noailles dissolved the community in November, 1709, dispersed the nuns in different convents,

and D'Argenson, Lieutenant of Police, was sent to demolish the Abbey. The Cemetery continuing to be a Jansenist rallying-place, D'Argenson two years later removed the bodies to a burying-ground at Magni with circumstances of outrage and insult, for which the secular power alone was responsible. But notwithstanding this anti-Jansenistic demonstration, Noailles obstinately refused to withdraw his approval of Quesnel's book. The King therefore asked the Pope to renew his condemnation of it; and the result, in September, 1713, was the famous Bull "Unigenitus," which condemned explicitly one hundred and one propositions taken from it. Noailles and seven bishops refused to accept the bull, and wrote to Rome for explanations; but the King stopped the letter. For thirty years Jansenism had been allied with Gallicanism, lending its aid to the Gallican triumph of 1682, and imparting to it its own democratic and turbulent spirit. Louis now saw in the union of the two the realization of his life-long forebodings. Though bowed down by national and family misfortunes, his imperious will was not broken, and he roused his whole power to crush the cabal.

The Parliament, the Sorbonne, and the other Universities, were compelled to register the bull. The bishops were called on to subscribe it, and all who refused, were banished or imprisoned. Noailles, encouraged by the King's great age and broken health, forbade his clergy, under pain of suspension, to sign. The King applied to Rome for permission to hold a National Council, which should depose the Archbishop; but the Pope hesitated to run the risk of such a step in the existing state of feeling in France. The death of Louis on the 1st September, 1715, cut short the negotiation. Noailles was now placed at the head of the Council of Conscience. The Sorbonne recalled its acceptance of the bull as having been compulsory. The Parliament annulled or burnt the Bishop's pastorals in support of it. For five years Jansenism and Gallicanism triumphed; till, at length, in 1720, the contending parties, weary of strife, came to an agreement. The bull, with concerted explanations, was almost universally signed, and exterior peace was restored.

The death of Louis XIV. opened a new era. A great reaction from sixty years of crushing tyranny ensued. The spiritual forces of evil which physical force had held down, but had been incompetent to subdue, broke loose, and the passionate character of the ensuing period plainly indicated an inevitable and stupendous crisis. Personal Cæsarism had expired with Louis, but only to be revived in its more oppressive form of the Cæsarism of the State. The Parliament kept up an incessant war with the Church on behalf of the Jansenists,

annulling the acts of the bishops, seizing their property, and even interfering with the administration of the Sacraments. The Jansenists co-operated by seditious pamphlets and caricatures, which stirred up the *bourgeoisie* and artisans, not to the adoption of their faith, but to hatred and contempt for the King and the clergy.* This hatred and contempt was constantly increased by the gross licentiousness of the Regency, and the still deeper depravity of the personal reign of Louis XV., when vice was covered with a thin varnish of meretricious refinement, not in order to conceal its viciousness, but to render it more attractive. Practical sensualism prepared the way for philosophic. Descartes gave place to Locke, whose political philosophy was seized with avidity. The origin of society, the essential nature of government, the rights of man, were absorbing topics of discussion. Every one had his own theory, but the fundamental ideas of all were contempt of all that was or ever had been, including themselves, wild aspirations after an imaginary perfectibility based on natural individual reason, and hatred of Christianity, not merely as being the basis of existing society, but still more because its positive character checked the moral and intellectual license which they misnamed liberty. These opinions were diffused among all classes, from the highest to the lowest, by the Encyclopædists and by secret societies,—Swedenborgians, Martinists, Freemasons, Rosicrucians, Illuminati, Mesmerists, Strict Temperance Sect, &c., all of them founded on faith in every invisible and spiritual influence except God, and forming a fanatical and propagandist atheism which attacked Christianity with indescribable fury.† These secret societies spread themselves over Europe, and hand in hand with them went the Jansenists, masking by their Christian profession the infidelity of their associates. Jansenism had been introduced into Holland at the close of the preceding century by two priests of the French Oratory. In 1724, Steenhoven, a schismatic priest, having obtained episcopal consecration privately from a single suspended bishop, Varlet, pretended on his own authority alone to revive the archiepiscopal see of Utrecht, which had been extinct for above a century. With a handful of adherents, and in spite of repeated Papal Bulls of excommunication and nullity, the line has been carried on to the present day, when it has emerged from obscurity in order to confer its own schismatic orders on

* Martin, t. xv. ll. 95, 97, pp. 163, 445.

† De Tocqueville, "State of Society in France before the Revolution of 1789," l. 3, c. 1.

the schismatic Bishop Reinkens.* Jansenism also penetrated into Spain and Portugal, and all through Italy, sometimes publicly, but more frequently in secret.† In Vienna, it appeared under Joseph II.; and later at the schismatic Synod of Pistoia, where its revolt against the faith, discipline, and devotional spirit of the Church, took a definite shape in a series of canons, which were condemned by Pius VI. in 1794.

Meanwhile, devotion to the Sacred Heart also had widely spread, escaping the direct notice of the Parliament by its unobtrusive character, but held up to ridicule by the nickname *Cordicoles*, given by the Jansenists to the members of its confraternities, and reproached after the expulsion of the Jesuits as having taken up their work. Its influence is seen in the higher tone of orthodoxy and fervour in the clergy since the days of Noailles and the Bull *Unigenitus*. It is also a significant fact that the prelates who displayed most devotion to the Sacred Heart, were subjects of special Parliamentary persecution on account of their zeal against Jansenism. Thus, Henri de Belzunce, who, in 1720, during the plague, consecrated the town of Marseilles to the Sacred Heart, had his temporalities more than once sequestered; and Languet, Bishop of Soissons, who, in 1729, published the *Life of Margaret Mary Alacoque*, was one of two prelates whose pastorals in favour of the Bull *Unigenitus* were publicly burnt. When the anti-Christian storm had actually burst, the wife and daughters of a gentleman who had been executed at Nantes for harbouring a Catholic priest, were condemned to death for the sole crime of having distributed pictures of the Sacred Heart. And, later, this emblem of God's love and man's ingratitude appeared on the banners of the loyal Catholics of La Vendée.

The expulsion and subsequent suppression of the Jesuits was the first open act of the secret conspiracy, which had been formed "to crush the infamous" (*écraser l'infâme*), the name by which Christianity was designated. The shout of exultation which burst from the infidels at their deliverance from these "great grenadiers" of the Faith, and the contempt with which they spoke of the "*canaille Janséniste*" and all the other Christians who would not be able to hold their ground against the disciplined infidel troops,‡ are very remarkable. They ought to have silenced for ever the per-

* Rohrbacher, "*Histoire de l'Église*," t. xxvii. l. 89, p. 154. 2nd Edit.

† Ranke, "*History of the Popes*," l. 8, sect. 18.

‡ "*Correspondance de D'Alembert et Voltaire*," *Lettres* 4 Mai, 1762, 30 Janviers, 2 Mars, 1764.

sistently reiterated calumnies against the Society; and they would no doubt have done so, had not the enmity against them had a preternatural source, or were passion and prejudice amenable to reason.

When at length the great crisis came, a small portion of the Jansenist body "started back in affright," but the rest advanced boldly. The Constitutional Church was the creation of forty Jansenists, who sat in the National Assembly of 1790.* The Jansenist curé, Grégoire, was the first to swear obedience to it, and his example was followed by thirty-six priests and two bishops, Talleyrand and Gobel, while amid cries of "À la lanterne!" all the rest of the clerical body stood aloof in a noble martyr spirit, ready to shed their blood rather than sully their faith. Two years later, Grégoire eclipsed even Robespierre by the savage fury with which he demanded the King's condemnation; and in the following year, while the ex-Oratorians Fouché and Lebon, were carrying the Reign of Terror through France, Gobel and his clerical associates appeared at the bar of the Convention, threw off their priesthood, and took part in the Feast of Reason, which celebrated the extinction of Christianity. On the other hand, about 50,000 Catholic secular priests, out of a total of 60,000, and almost all the religious, refused to swear, some escaping into exile, but the rest dying the scaffolds, the streets, and the floors of their prisons with their blood, or "wandering in deserts, in mountains, in dens, and in caves of the earth," "being in want, distressed, afflicted," like the prophets of old, "of whom the world was not worthy."

* Thiers, "Histoire de la Révolution Française," c. 5.

ART. V.—CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM—
MR. FITZJAMES STEPHEN.

Cæsarism and Ultramontanism. By HENRY EDWARD, Lord Archbishop of Westminster. London : Burns & Oates.

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. By JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, Q.C. Second Edition. London : Smith, Elder, & Co.

Contemporary Review for March, 1874. Art. I. "Cæsarism and Ultramontanism." By JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN. London : Strahan.

NOT so long since it was the fashionable creed, that a "hard and fast" line can be drawn between things religious on the one hand, and things political on the other; that the Church has exclusive supremacy in the former, the State in the latter; that the Church has no more right of interference within the sphere primarily political, than the State has in the sphere primarily religious; and that this simple consideration determines, as it were by a stroke of the pen, the respective provinces of Church and State. This theory was condemned by the Church from the time of its being first started: and, as viewed by reason alone, is so utterly rotten, that it must have crumbled (one would think) at the first touch: its only principle of permanence being, that it afforded plausible support to an indubitably true conclusion. Under the circumstances of modern Europe, it is indubitably the civil ruler's duty to give all Christian denominations full religious liberty; and no other way so readily presented itself for upholding this truth, as the drawing a sharp and trenchant distinction between the respective provinces of Church and State.

The result, however, has shown what might otherwise have been taken for granted; viz., that it is a course full of danger, to base a true conclusion on a false premiss. Cæsarism is more profoundly unreasonable and indefinitely more irreligious in tendency, than liberalism itself: still it is not so utterly absurd on the surface; and its advocates are able to impress both others and themselves with the notion that they have proved its truth, when all that they have done has been to disprove one particular antagonistic doctrine. Such a mode of argument, utterly unreasonable in itself, is quite violently so as addressed against Catholics; because the Church—

with all her hatred of Cæsarism—not only has given no countenance to that particular ground of opposition which has been adopted by liberals, but (as we have already said) has consistently denounced their theory.

The doctrine of Cæsarism (to speak briefly and generally) is, that all human rights rest on human law as on their foundation; that the civil ruler, as he gave them, so can revoke them; that he is at liberty to use the temporal sword for the express purpose of extirpating doctrines sincerely held as revealed truth, without any other reason for so doing, except that he accounts them prejudicial to the temporal interests of his empire. Such is the doctrine which is coming to be more and more in the ascendant among the Church's assailants. In proportion as she has been increasingly able to exhibit her true colours—in proportion as her children have grown in multitude, in zeal for her cause, in preference for things eternal over things temporal—in that proportion has a larger number of her enemies found the notion utterly intolerable, that the civil ruler is bound to permit her free development. Reviewing the argumentative basis on which this obligation has been chiefly rested by non-Catholic advocates of toleration, they find (truly enough) that nothing can well be feebler or more inconsecutive. They have fallen back therefore on that older error, which existed before liberalism was heard of, and which has far the more robust life of the two. Then, further, the same motives which have stimulated *thinkers* to the theory of Cæsarism, have stimulated *politicians* to its practice. Throughout Germany at least, that false and tyrannical doctrine is very practically carried out, in the most extreme and shameless shape which in these days would meet with endurance. And thus it happens, that each party derives additional strength from the other. The Church's oppressors become far more confident in their evil practices, by feeling that they have a theory at their back: while political writers, on the other hand, derive vastly increased animation and spirit from the circumstance, that they are actually witnessing that in the concrete which they defend in the abstract; that their theoretical speculations meet with so vigorous a practical response.

Before we turn our attention to the Archbishop's most timely and forcible denunciation of Cæsarism, it will be well to place before our readers a vivid though compressed exhibition of what is done in Germany by the Falck laws. We will not, for this purpose, cite the Archbishop or any other Catholic: we will cite a writer in the "Fortnightly Review" of last February, who is not even a Theist; Mr. Frederick

Harrison. It may be said indeed with truth that, though no Theist, he has much sympathy, as a Comtist, with the Catholic opposition to Prince Bismarck. But Mr. Morley, Editor of the "Fortnightly," expresses (p. 293, note) a hearty condemnation of Mr. Harrison's views on the subject: yet he does not even allege, that his contributor has misrepresented those laws in any single detail. The passage then, which we are about to quote, has been admitted by a distinguished advocate of the Falck laws to describe correctly their purport. "It must be remembered," says Mr. Harrison, that the laws

affect not the Catholic Church alone, but every Christian community, Lutheran, Independent, and Unitarian. A portion of the Protestant body of Prussia is as Erastian, or let us say as servile, as our own Established Church; and they have taken the new laws with the same meekness that they would take anything from the State, of which they form a mere subordinate bureau. But to a portion of the Protestant and Independent communities the new laws are as odious as they are to Catholics, and fall as heavily on them as they do on the Church.

Now what is the practical effect of these laws? First, they require as the condition of fulfilling any function in any Christian community, that the priest or minister should submit to a specified system of State education, and should have three years of theological training under a State professor. Next they require the sanction of the Government upon the appointment or the transfer of a cleric to any sacred duty, great or small, in every Christian community. Then they place the direction of the education, in every clerical training school in the kingdom, in the hands of the minister of State; and make illegal any new religious seminary, of whatever sect and however supported, including boarding schools of young persons. These, then, are the main provisions. That is to say, the State undertakes the theological training of every kind of Christian cleric, Protestant or Catholic. It regulates the appointment to every kind of clerical duty, Protestant or Catholic. And it suppresses every theological education other than its own. These three provisions are carried out by a machinery of fine, imprisonment, dismissal, and an ultimate court of lay Appeal common to the whole of the Christian communities of the kingdom. . . .

It is obvious, at a glance, that the new laws introduce as rigid a system of State intervention in religion as it is possible to conceive. It is the policy of Laud in the nineteenth century. It does not apply exclusively to Catholics, but to all Christians alike. It reduces every Christian community to the position of a Government bureau; and makes Prince Bismarck the Pope of all the religious bodies in the kingdom, other than Jews. The humblest priest or curate is forced to submit to an exclusive State training, and that in the official theology. The State undertakes to find suitable training for Catholics, Lutherans, and all phases of Christian divinity. Nay, more. The State makes itself responsible for every clerical appointment in the kingdom.

Lastly, all private seminaries are suppressed. This is not so much the creating of a new State Church ; it is rather the creating a new religious department of the State. Let us imagine the consequences of these laws applied to this country, and carried by a strong minister through the British Parliament. When this was done, Archbishop Manning and Archbishop Cullen, Mr. Spurgeon and Mr. James Martineau, Mr. Miall, Mr. Voysey, Dr. Pusey, Mr. Newman Hall, Dr. Cumming and Father Ignatius, would all be State officials ; they would all have to pass three years' theological training under a Professor, whose "scheme of study had been previously approved" by the Chairman of Quarter Sessions, or some similar functionary. The whole of the English clerical bodies, Anglican, Catholic, Wesleyan, Independent, Quaker, or Baptist, would have to pass this special theological training in a State university, and could exercise no function in their respective communities until they had the certificate of the State Professor. The whole of the Scotch Presbyterians, Established or Free Kirk, the Irish Churches, Catholic, Episcopalian, or Presbyterian, would be in the same position. The Wesleyan Conference, the Irish synods, the Catholic bishops, could not appoint a priest, minister, or curate, without obtaining the consent of Lord Aberdare. If they appointed a beadle or a lecturer without that consent, or appointed a person who had not the State certificate of theological competency, they would be liable to fine, imprisonment, and ultimate deposition. Not only every theological professor at Oxford and Cambridge would have to "submit his scheme of studies" to the President of the Council ; but every seminary in the kingdom, Catholic or Protestant, endowed or free, for priests or for boys, would have to do the same. And Lord Aberdare and Mr. Forster would be regulating the text-books for use in St. Bees', in the Unitarian Manchester New College, at the Irish Catholic colleges, and the Scotch free schools ; and it would be a matter of fine and imprisonment to start a new seminary or a new school, even by voluntary subscriptions and for purely private ends. Finally, one uniform tribunal, "the Royal Court of Appeal for Ecclesiastical Affairs," is established and legislates at once for all Christian communities. It reviews and controls every decision, sentence, or act of discipline of every religious community in the kingdom. If this tremendous development of the Privy Council were set up in this country, it would have on its hands the entire discipline and direction of the English and Irish Catholics, the Presbyterian and the Free Kirk of Scotland, and every dissenting body in the kingdom.

Prince Bismarck gives vague hints, that this prodigious legislation has been rendered necessary by the plotting of Catholic bishops and priests against the State. But he cannot be supposed to intend that this statement should be taken as serious. In the first place he has been unable to cite one single instance of this, though repeatedly challenged to do so ; secondly, had there been such plotting, this would have been an excellent reason for visiting the few guilty with con-dign retribution, but would be no reason whatever for punishing the innocent ; and thirdly (as Mr. Harrison points out)

Catholics, although the chief, are very far from being the only sufferers.

Another excuse has been put forth for this intolerable tyranny: viz. that the Vatican Definition of 1870 revolutionized the relations of Church and State. To this the Archbishop replies with irrefragable force :

I cannot doubt that the public writers who make these assertions believe them to be true ; but I am at a loss to conceive how men of undeniable ability, with the facts of history before them, can make such assertions. The governments of the world have consciously framed all their contracts and concordats with an infallible Church. The conditions on which those relations of amity were founded, were always based upon the laws and principles of an infallible Church. The question as to the *seat* of that infallibility is not temporal, or civil, or political, or diplomatic, or external, but strictly internal, domestic, and theological. The Vatican definition has not altered, by the shadow of a jot or a tittle, the relations of the civil powers of the world to the infallibility of the Church. To allege the Vatican definitions as a justification of the Falck laws, appears to me to be a blot upon the good sense or upon the candour of those who allege it. Into which of the Falck laws does the infallibility of the Pope enter ? No one can pretend to believe that it does. This declamation about the Vatican Council and the Pope's infallibility appears to me to be the evidence of a weak case. It is easy to create a prejudice against the accused when the world hates him ; and there is a motive for doing so, when the witnesses cannot agree together (pp. xv. xvi.).

A third defence has been attempted by some English Protestants, who are strangely unmindful of German state maxims. Let the Church give up, they say, the property she has received from the State, and the State will cease to interfere with her doctrine and internal discipline. Now of course the German Bishops could not assent to the State depriving the Church of her property ; for the State never gave it, and to take it away would be an iniquitous spoliation : but we may very safely say, that they would regard such spoliation as incommensurably a less calamity, than the unjust laws by which they are now oppressed. However it is simply ludicrous to think that any such alternative is open to them. What Prince Bismarck desires—we need hardly say—is not that there shall be what has been called “ a free Church in a free State ” ; for on the contrary he would regard this as about the most odious of all possible arrangements. What he desires is, that every bishop and priest be a paid functionary of the State ; and practically yield undivided allegiance, whether in temporals or spirituals, to his earthly country.

It is very curious indeed, how Protestant Englishmen, even of more than ordinary intelligence and education, lose their

head, when they contemplate the fact of a Church which they detest being persecuted by a statesman whom they choose to admire. Here is Dean Stanley—whose own sympathies (we suppose) are rather with the old-fashioned liberalism than with the new Cæsarism—jauntily and blandly propounding a somewhat remarkable theory. “It cannot be deemed an interference with religious liberty” quoth he “to demand full scope for the development of those elements within that distracted body” the Roman Catholic Church, “that” the German Government “deems most in accordance with the highest views of knowledge, of patriotism and of religion.” A writer in the “Guardian” has so clearly set forth the full meaning of this wonderful affirmation, that we are sure our readers will be glad of our placing the whole article before them. Dean Stanley himself, we believe, will be as much amazed as everybody else, by the consequences which his dictum really involves.

It is disappointing to find a theory and practice of persecution already initiated by so eminent an advocate of freedom as the Dean of Westminster—of course, as is always the case—against his own particular enemy, ecclesiastical dogmatism.

In a letter to the Protestant meeting at St. James's Hall, he praises the German Government for not only recognising the importance of religion, but “the duty of enlightening and purifying it in contact with the various grades of civilisation.” This, though capable of a pious interpretation, is the old and familiar language, by which persecution in all ages has been recommended.

But he proceeds to develop his meaning more fully. The German Government, he says, has had the wisdom to see that the Roman Church is rent by divisions, “not the less wide and deep because they are for the most part disavowed or concealed”: and he adds that—

“It cannot be deemed an interference with religious liberty to demand full scope for the development of those elements within the distracted body” [the Roman Catholic Church] “that it” [the German Protestant Government] “deems most in accordance with the highest views of knowledge, of patriotism, and of religion.”

Here we have evidently a general principle, extending far beyond the case and country to which the Dean applies it. Let us see what it would cover in England; remembering, what Dean Stanley forgets, that a Government need not be religious, because it takes on itself to meddle with religion.

We are all just now familiar with the doctrines of Mr. John Mill. Suppose them in the ascendant. Suppose a Cabinet of clever and respectable men, of the Julian type, who, on the whole, deemed it “most in accordance with the highest views of knowledge, of patriotism, and of religion,” to believe with Mr. James Mill, that there was no ascertainable Supreme Being, that the existing ideas of such a Being were one worse than another, and the Christian worse than any;—with MM. Erckmann-Chatrian, that the idea of a future life seriously interferes with the general well-being in this;—and with some modern politicians, that no man can be a really good citizen, who

does not prefer the cause of his country to the cause of his God. Taking the chances of the next twenty-five years, such a Cabinet may be said to be on the cards. And seeing how it is the fashion to interpret promises to believe, we can hardly call it off the cards that there should be found in the English Church clergymen, who would not consider themselves precluded by any notions of faith or honesty from preaching such doctrines in their pulpits. At any rate, on the cards or off the cards, the supposition will do to illustrate a principle. How would the Dean of Westminster's principle apply to it?

The Christian Church being professedly a society formed for the purpose of spreading the knowledge of God; whose very existence is based on that purpose; and which would become, or ought to become, dung and refuse in its own eyes, if it allowed any consideration to interfere with the fulfilment of that purpose;—this, we say, being the nature and history of the Christian Church, “it could not,” on the Dean's principle, “be deemed an interference with religious liberty” for such an atheistical Government (using the term as one of description, not abuse) on the ground of an alleged “division of opinion,” of the existence of which, “though for the most part disavowed or concealed,” they constituted themselves the judges without appeal, “to demand full scope for the development of those elements within the distracted body, that it deems most in accordance with the highest views of knowledge, of patriotism, or of religion.” In other words, a *philosophe* minister, whether right or wrong in his philosophy, cannot be said to infringe religious liberty, if he requires a Christian Church to permit any number of her ministers in any number of her churches, with her authority and as part of her own services, to denounce the belief in the Supreme Being, and the iniquity of making it our first object to serve Him. We, of course, do Dean Stanley the justice of believing, that he would not like this application of his canon. But can he seriously mean that it would be consistent with the principles of religious liberty? And if not, why does he say so?

If a State thinks a religion so noxious as to amount to a crime against society (like Thuggism), it may go very far in punishing that religion when appearing in overt acts, and in treating those who meet to do those overt acts as conspirators; and it may say, in defence of itself, that a crime does not cease to be a crime because it calls itself a religion. If a State subsidises a religion, it may withdraw its subsidy, subject to the usual considerations of equity, if the religion substantially changes its character, or if the State itself changes its mind, and may say in defence of itself that it does what it likes with its own. But it is pure tyranny, without any such indictment as justifies a forfeiture of rights, to claim for a Protestant civil power to require a non-Protestant religious organisation (or, of course, *vice versa*) to allow its own teachers in its own pulpits to “develop elements” which it deems irreligious.

To do Prince Bismarck justice, we are not aware that he has ever put forward so intolerable a claim.

So much on the existent *practice* of Cæsarism. We doubt not that its *theory* also has been set forth in Germany by many a courtly writer, though no such work (as far as we know) has found its way into England. Two distinguished

thinkers however have come prominently forward in this country, as champions of Cæsarism; Professor Huxley and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. Of these we regard the latter as far the more deserving of attention. We think that Professor Huxley, like Antæus, loses his strength, when removed from contact with physical tangibilities; and that his speculations, whether in metaphysical or social questions, are very unlikely to exercise any considerable influence. With Mr. Stephen the case is different. His work on "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" seems to us one of unusual power, and calculated to affect profoundly those who may study it with care.

Under these circumstances it is, that the Archbishop of Westminster has published his important Essay; and Mr. Stephen was as simply the one appropriate person to attempt its refutation, as Mr. Disraeli was the one appropriate person to succeed Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Stephen's reply appears in the "Contemporary" for March; and we are writing before the April number of that Review appears, with the Archbishop's rejoinder. Mr. Stephen promises a second paper; and we believe that the Archbishop also is to write a second time. We cannot then with advantage take any direct part in the controversy, until the principals shall have concluded; when we shall hope to give a general account of the course it has taken, and to draw the various important inferences, which it will doubtless have suggested. And we shall take the same opportunity of drawing our readers' attention to Mr. Mivart's very able articles on "Contemporary Evolution," which are also now proceeding in the "Contemporary." Even on the present occasion however, there are two things we can do. We will firstly exhibit the ground occupied by the Archbishop in his original paper. Then, secondly, we will briefly exhibit Mr. Stephen's fundamental principles on religion and morality, as specially illustrating his theories concerning ecclesiastical and civil government.

By "Cæsarism" the Archbishop understands (p. 18) "the supremacy of the civil over the spiritual."

The sovereignty of Cæsarism is absolute and dependent on no conditions; it is also exclusive, because it does not tolerate any jurisdiction above and within its own. It does not recognize any laws except of its own making.

Now, this supreme power need not be held in the hand of one man. It may be a People or a Senate, or a King or an Emperor. Its essence is the claim to absolute and exclusive sovereignty. It by necessity excludes God, His sovereignty and His laws. The sole fountain of law is the human will, individual or collective. Cæsar finds the law in himself, and creates right and wrong, the just and the unjust, the sacred and the profane. He has no Statute-book but human nature, and he is the sole and supreme interpreter

and expositor of that natural law. Therefore law, morals, politics, and religion all come from him, and all depend upon him. The Sovereign Prince or State legislates, judges, executes by its own will and hand. This sovereign power creates everything : it fashions the political constitution ; it delegates jurisdiction, revocable at its word ; it suspends or measures out personal liberty ; it controls domestic life ; it claims the children as its own ; it educates them at its will, and after models and theories of its own device (pp. 19, 20).

God has endowed men with certain indefeasible rights—not of course as against Himself—but as against the civil government ; and the essence of Cæsarism is, that the ruler disregards those rights. In addition to those more directly spiritual services which the Church has rendered to mankind, she has rendered this service also, that she has stood forth as their buckler and defence against State tyranny. “There can be no Cæsarism where Christ reigns.”

I hope that I have made clear that Christianity has redeemed man and society from Cæsarism—that is, from the unlimited despotism of man over man—and that so long as the two powers, spiritual and civil, are vested in distinct persons,* the liberty of conscience and the liberty of religion, as well as the liberty of man in his public and private life, are secured ; that where-soever the civil power or Sovereign usurps upon the spiritual liberty of the Church, and affects to exercise a supremacy over it, all liberties are at stake—the liberty of conscience, the liberty of religion, the domestic liberty of families, and the political liberty of citizens. Under Cæsarism all kinds of freedom alike are violated.

The natural antagonist of Cæsarism is the Christian Church, with all its liberties of doctrine and discipline, of faith and jurisdiction (p. 58).

It may be asked perhaps wherein at last lies the essential difference of the two powers ; why the State's supremacy in spirituals is to be accounted tyranny, while the Church's supremacy in spirituals is accounted liberty. The Archbishop's answer is simple and expressive :—

Obedience to the Church is liberty ; and it is liberty, because the Church cannot err or mislead either men or nations. If the Church were not infallible, obedience to it might be the worst of bondages. This is Ultramontanism, or the liberty of the soul divinely guaranteed by an infallible Church ; the proper check and restraint of Cæsarism, as Cæsarism is the proper antagonist of the sovereignty of God (p. 25).

By “Cæsarism” pure and simple, the Archbishop means to express what he elsewhere calls “Pagan Cæsarism.” For

* The Archbishop had previously explained, that his remarks by no means apply to the civil principedom of the Holy Father. Nowhere has Cæsarism less prevailed, than in the Pope's government of Rome.

it is evident that there is a "Christian Cæsarism"; or in other words that the State may do various things as the Church's minister, which she may not do by any supremacy of her own. This is excellently expressed by the Archbishop.

From these principles we see the difference between the Pagan Cæsarism and that which I will call the Christian Cæsarism.

1. The first regards the State as its own creation, the second as the creation of God.

2. The first is Pontiff and King over body and soul absolute and exclusive; the second is subject in all that belongs to the soul to the Divine law and to the Church of Jesus Christ.

3. The first makes religion an instrument or department of the State; the second makes it the limitation of civil power, and the protection of human liberty.

4. The first treats the Church as subject to itself; the second treats all civil power as subject to God and His law, of which the Church is the guardian and the interpreter.

5. The first regards all power, civil and religious, as derived from the people; the second regards civil power as formally from God, and the spiritual power as exclusively from God, and therefore dependent on God alone (pp. 30, 31).

The remarks we have already made imply, that in a very true sense the Church is by divine right supreme over the State: in this sense, namely, that (1) she has supreme authority on every question, which directly or indirectly touches men's eternal interests; and that (2) she has the right of deciding without appeal, what those questions are. "Any power," says the Archbishop (p. 36), "which is independent, and which can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, is ipso facto supreme."

It may be thought that there is a certain unreality in such a discussion; because the Church throughout the world is prevented to so deplorable an extent, from exercising rights which she indubitably possesses. Nevertheless—as we have often before argued—it is highly important, not for speculative purposes only but for directly practical, that her true doctrine be rightly understood. We will add therefore two further explanations.

The Archbishop does not for a moment deny—nor can it truly be denied—that those measures, which primarily concern the comforts and conveniences of life, and in which the Church does not intervene on the ground of any immoral or anti-religious tendency, are to be decided entirely according to the best judgment of the civil ruler. It is for him to legislate, according to his view of his people's highest interests, on taxation, currency, corn-laws, the electoral

franchise, the constitution of Parliament, &c. &c. On such matters—always supposing that there is no intervention of the Church founded on doctrinal and religious considerations—bishops and priests *as such* have nothing to say; but only so far as they may possess this or that privilege, in their capacity of *citizens*. It should be added moreover, as the Archbishop distinctly explains (p. vii.), “that the civil power is a creation of God, and within its own sphere has an authority and rights sanctioned by God; and where the civil power is exercised in conformity with Christianity, has a consecrated authority.”

A second explanation is even more imperatively called for. It is sometimes thought that, if Catholics obtained predominant power in any given country, they would be required by their doctrine to exercise coercion towards their Protestant fellow-countrymen, with the view of obtaining their submission to the Church. The very reverse is true. According to Catholic doctrine, disciples are to be brought into the Church by persuasion, not by coercion; and the proper purpose of the latter is, not to *bring about* Catholic unity, but to maintain it when it *has been brought about*. This is a point on which we have often insisted in previous numbers.

On the whole then, the upshot of the Archbishop's Essay seems to be, that it is the Catholic Church alone which can unite results otherwise incompatible. It is by her agency alone, and only where the whole body of citizens are Catholics, that on the one hand the civil ruler can promote their highest interest with thorough effectiveness, while on the other hand he in no degree encroaches on their religious freedom. “This,” and this only, “is the solution of the problem, *which the world cannot solve*” (p. 25).

Here a further inquiry is suggested. Civil rulers, in various parts of Christendom, are ignorant of the Church's divine authority; while in other parts, even though Catholics may be in supreme authority, there is a large intermixture of hereditary Protestants. Under such circumstances, what is the appropriate course for the civil ruler to pursue? This is indubitably a question, which demands to be frankly encountered: but it is episodic to the Archbishop's main design; and for ourselves we will postpone its discussion, until we are able to deal with the subject as a whole. We heartily agree however with the Archbishop's incidental remark (p. vii.), that the state of things now existent in England is not widely removed from exemplifying the reasonable solution of this problem.

Our readers then have now substantially before them the

thesis, which the Archbishop is prepared to defend; and we pass from him to his assailant. We have been wishing, for some little time past, to comment on Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's opinions: for there seems every probability that, for some years to come, he will be among the most prominent and effective opponents of Catholicity; against which religion indeed, he consistently exhibits the strongest animosity. We shall doubtless hereafter have to encounter him again and again, on this or that theme; and as to this particular question of Cæsarism, he will be our one direct antagonist. It may be here therefore seasonable (as we have already said) to lay some sort of foundation for our future conflicts, by the exhibition of his fundamental principles on religion and morality.

It has never been our habit, any more than it is our interest, to undervalue the intellectual ability of our opponents; and in many ways Mr. Stephen exhibits great intellectual power. On historical, political, and especially politico-religious questions, he thinks with great vigour and originality;* his language is a most skilfully chosen expression of his thoughts; and his illustrations, in which he abounds to an unusual extent, are singularly apt and expressive. We hardly ever read a volume to us so intensely interesting, as his "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," which we have named at the head of our article; though the interest of course is to a very large extent painful. Some parts of the work indeed are no less true in matter, than admirable in expression. We would mention in particular one of his favourite themes, the intimate and indissoluble connection of religion with all the highest elements of secular life. Then again we cannot but warmly sympathize with various passages, in which he denounces the shallowness and rottenness of the popular traditional liberalism, and of the prevalent cant about progress. We observe with hearty concurrence—though with no small surprise, considering his professed utilitarianism—that he ascribes to punishment a far higher end, than that of mere

* We limit our eulogy, it will be seen, to these questions. On theology, of course, Mr. Stephen does not write. In philosophy he is a phenomenist; and in fact is the originator of that amazing statement—afterwards defended by Mr. Mill—that Omnipotence could make a world in which $2+2$ should equal 5. It is characteristic of philosophical controversy—perhaps peculiar to it—that no one can adhere eagerly to either of the two great schools, without thinking somewhat meanly on the philosophical competence of those who adhere to the other. Certainly, for ourselves, we consider that the advocacy of such an opinion as Mr. Stephen's proves conclusively shallowness and confusion of thought. Doubtless he would return the compliment.

prevention (p. 162). Still more impressive to our mind (though containing here and there some incidental statements with which we cannot concur) are his remarks (p. 311 et seq.) on personal identity, and on the immense importance of that fact as an argument for the soul's immortality.*

On the other hand (as it seems to us) Mr. Stephen is utterly without the power, so largely possessed by the late Mr. Mill, of apprehending the view opposed to his own, and understanding its attractions. Then there is in his writings a pervading shallow impetuosity (if we may so express ourselves) which hurries him into really surprising self-contradictions. Again he is not only altogether out of sympathy with what Catholics call the interior life, but seems to us entirely unaware that there *is* such a thing. And thus it happens that he advocates what is about the most tyrannical theory on the State's legitimate functions which has ever been maintained in Christian times—he advocates (we say) this theory, not so much from intentional harshness towards his fellow-men, as from sheer ignorance how inestimable are the treasures of which he would deprive them. Lastly (as we shall presently exhibit at greater length), his theory on a supreme being is to our mind about the most revolting, which has ever been exco-gitated by a man removed above savage barbarism.

Before proceeding to this, it will be worth our while to present our readers with one instance of Mr. Stephen's intense—indeed really incredible—prejudice against Catholicity. "A Roman Catholic," he says in effect (p. 86), "really thinks that a wafer is God Almighty." Now let us observe the meaning of this. A wafer is an inanimate substance, made by a human being out of pre-existent materials; and Mr. Stephen affirms that Catholics regard this inanimate substance as the creator of heaven and earth. If they believed this, they would be on a level with the most grovelling, degraded, and

* We think that those of our readers who give their minds to things philosophical, will be keenly interested in the following passage; expressing as it does so momentous and solemn a truth:—"It is surely clear that our words, the sounds which we make with our lips, are but very imperfect symbols; that they all presuppose matter and sensation, and are thus unequal to the task of expressing that which . . . lies beyond and above matter and sensation. . . . It seems to me that we are spirits in prison, able only to make signals to each other, but with a world of things to think and to say which our signals cannot describe at all. It is this necessity for working with tools which break in your hand when any really powerful strain is put on them, which so often gives an advantage in argument to the inferior over the superior, to the man who can answer to the purpose easy things to understand over the man whose thoughts split the seams of the dress in which he has to clothe them" (pp. 314-5).

irreligious of savages ; and Mr. Stephen was bound therefore to weigh his grounds well, before bringing against them so frightful an accusation. But what *could* be his grounds ? The following dogmata are held with divine faith by every Catholic ; and they are pretty well all which bear on the question.

I. The Creator of heaven and earth is a spiritual Being, infinite in all perfections.

II. He exists in Three Persons.

III. The Second Person has assumed a human body and soul.

IV. His human body is simultaneously present in very many places, under the external form of bread.

Of these four dogmata, the three former are professed by a large number of non-Catholics : and it is the last alone, which is peculiar to the special objects of Mr. Stephen's aversion. When then he alleges that Catholics " think that a wafer is God Almighty," we must ask him to explain himself more definitely. Does he mean " the *substance* of a wafer " ? But Catholics are obliged to believe with divine faith, that there is *no* substance of bread in the Sacred Host ; and Mr. Stephen cannot mean that they regard a non-existent thing as God Almighty. Is he speaking then of that group of visible and tangible phenomena, which suggest the presence of a wafer ? But Catholics are obliged to believe with divine faith that these are created accidents ; and he cannot mean that Catholics regard created accidents—accidents which are actually destitute of a substance in which they may inhere—as being God Almighty. What Mr. Stephen must really intend to affirm is, that the whole Catholic philosophy about substance and accident is untenable. Well, we do not complain of him for saying this ; on the contrary, our complaint is that he does *not* say it. What he has a right to affirm from his point of view is, that Catholics hold a false philosophical doctrine (demonstrably false if you will) on substance and accident. What he does in effect affirm is, that they think that a wafer created heaven and earth. How can controversy be carried on, if the parties are to indulge in such reckless and outrageous caricature ? Mr. Stephen would not thus libel Protestants ; it is Catholics only, who are assailed by such weapons as these.

But now let us see whether Mr. Stephen's own notion of a supreme being is such, as to warrant him in casting stones at others. Here is the most definite of his pronouncements on the subject.

To the question—" admitting the existence of God, do you believe him to be good ? " I should reply—If by " good " you mean " disposed to pre-

note the happiness of mankind absolutely," I answer No. If by "good" you mean "virtuous," I reply, the question has no meaning (p. 330).

Elsewhere he calls him in effect "an infinitely wise and powerful legislator, whose own nature is confessedly inscrutable to man" (p. 323). Such is Mr. Stephen's habitual conception of the creator: he is infinitely powerful; infinitely clever; by no means "disposed to promote the happiness of mankind absolutely"; and it is simply unmeaning to say that he is virtuous, or (as Theists prefer to call it) holy.* Well at all events Mr. Stephen has no right to call such a creator by the name of "God"; for by that name is ordinarily designated an Infinitely Perfect Being. The heathens indeed used to address Jupiter as "omnipotens," while believing him to be an adulterer, a perjurer, and a parricide. "Jupiter" then is as good a name as we can think of, for the creator imagined by Mr. Stephen; and his peculiar form of atheism may well be called "Jovism." It stands out in quite curious contrast to Mr. Stuart Mill's. In what has been called (and we think truly) the most eloquent passage he ever wrote, Mr. Mill protests from the bottom of his heart against such a notion, as that mere *power* can constitute a sufficient ground for worship and allegiance. We have ourselves more than once expressed our own earnest concurrence on this matter with Mr. Mill's judgment. We must regard indeed atheism in any shape, as unspeakably debasing to the human character: but to us there is no other form of atheism so revolting as Mr. Stephen's; viz., the offering supreme homage to a non-holy Jupiter, on the ground of his being considered powerful and clever.

This idolatry of mere power is a characteristic of Mr. Stephen's philosophy, which specially harmonizes with his Cæsarism. The very essence of Cæsarism is, that it recognizes no rights except those accorded by human law; or (in other words) no rights except those accorded by that authority, which has physical force at its command. Mr. Stephen's conception of rights is entirely in accordance with his conception of a supreme being. "*Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas.*"

We proceed, from Mr. Stephen's doctrine on the creator, to his doctrine on virtue and morality. Theists, we need hardly say, account it the highest kind of morality, that they adore and love the All-holy God; and, that from love of Him and in obedience to His command, they labour (1) for the spiritual and (2) for the temporal welfare of mankind. From this sphere

* We should explain that Mr. Stephen only accounts it probable, not certain, that there exists a supreme being at all.

of morality Mr. Stephen is of course entirely excluded by his Jovism. As regards, however, the external duties of morality, he lays down (we willingly admit) the highest standard consistent with irreligiousness. The true "utilitarian standard," he says (p. 285), "is not the greatest amount of happiness altogether, but the widest possible extension of the" true "ideal of life." "Virtue" (p. 321) is "the habit of acting upon principles fitted to promote the happiness of men in general, and especially those forms of happiness which have reference to the permanent element in men." Throughout his volume, so far as we have observed, he speaks quite consistently in this strain. But unhappily, when he passes from the external duties of morality to a consideration of those mental qualities which he would account virtuous and moral, — he speaks in quite a different tone. It is not philanthropy, but rather shrewdness and pluck, which he regards as the most valuable mental possessions for each individual to cherish. We quote the very characteristic passage to which we especially refer, and which is in entire harmony with the general spirit of his volume. Those forms of religion, he says (pp. 323-4), which most powerfully promote a sense of social duty,

are those of which the central figure is an infinitely wise and powerful legislator, whose own nature is confessedly inscrutable to man, but who has made the world as it is for a prudent, steady, hardy, enduring race of people, who are neither fools nor cowards, who have no particular love for those who are, who distinctly know what they want, and are determined to use all lawful means to get it.

In a note, he quotes with dissent some remarks of Mr. Frederick Harrison—very strange certainly as coming from such a quarter—but which express a most just criticism. "The aim of all religions," says Mr. Harrison in opposition to Mr. Stephen, "certainly of all forms of the Christian religion, has been to show how little this" type of character "corresponded to eternal realities. They have striven to make these irrepressible individualities bow before the Christian ideal; to warn these hardy giants that their triumph was not for ever, that humanity was at bottom a softer and kinder thing." Here again Mr. Stephen's Cæsarism is the natural outcome of his philosophy. It is those better and softer qualities of mind, disparaged by Mr. Stephen, that would suffer most grievously under the heavy State despotism which he desires to establish.

Thirdly, what is Mr. Stephen's view on the *sanction* of morality? *Why* should man do what he accounts virtuous?

If the Theist is asked why he should practise morality, nothing can be more simple and intelligible than his answer. Reason, he will say, tells me with certainty, that act A is intrinsically evil; that act B is intrinsically better than act C; that what is intrinsically evil is forbidden also by my All-holy Creator, and what is intrinsically better is on that very account more acceptable to Him; that it is intrinsically detestable to disobey Him, and intrinsically better to consult His preference; lastly, that my eternal interests are in no other way so well promoted, as by my keeping His holy Will before my mind in all the events of life as they occur. Such, we say, is the Theist's doctrine on the sanction of morality: what is Mr. Stephen's? If no Jupiter were believed in, he answers,—or even if a Jupiter *were* believed in but not also a future state (p. 322)—there would be no sanction for virtue at all; no reason why any one should trouble himself about the welfare of his fellow-creatures. But any competent inquirer, he thinks, who examines carefully the facts of life, will infer from them as a very probable conclusion, (1) that there is such a Jupiter; and (2) that (though it is unmeaning to speak of him as virtuous) he is a promoter and commander of what Mr. Stephen accounts virtue. Here then is the sanction of morality; for, as Jupiter has all the power in his hands, men would be great fools who ran counter to his wishes.

It would occupy us at far too great length, if we cited all the passages in which this doctrine is expressed; but we will give two. One indeed we are bound to quote; because we have already extracted part of it, and Mr. Stephen might not unjustly accuse us of unfairness if we did not exhibit the whole.

To the question, "admitting the existence of God do you believe him to be good?" I should reply, if by "good" you mean "disposed to promote the happiness of mankind absolutely," I answer, No. If by "good" you mean "virtuous," I reply, the question has no meaning. A virtuous man is a being of whom we can form an idea more or less distinct; but the ideas of virtue and vice can hardly be attached to a being, who transcends all or most of the conditions under which virtue and vice arise. If the further question is asked, "what moral attributes do you ascribe to this being, if you ascribe to him any at all?" I should reply, I think of him as conscious and having will, as-infinitely powerful, and as one who, whatever he may be in his own nature, has so arranged the world or worlds in which I live, as to let me know that virtue is the law which he has prescribed to me and to others. If still further asked, "Can you love such a being?" I should answer, love is not the word which I should choose, but awe. The law under which we live is stern and as far as we can judge inflexible; but it is noble, and excites a feeling of awful respect for its author, and for the constitution established in the world which

it governs, and a sincere wish to act up to it, and carry it out as far as possible. If we believe in God at all, this, I think, is the rational and manly way of thinking of him.

Here we pause for a moment to ask, what Mr. Stephen can mean by these words "noble" and "respect." The word "noble," in Mr. Stephen's context, implies that there is a certain intrinsic moral excellence in the actually existing Jovine law, as compared with some other code which the Jupiter might imaginably have enacted. But the very notion of intrinsic moral excellence is directly inconsistent with Mr. Stephen's utilitarianism. In our article on Mr. Mill's moral system (Jan. 1872) we set forth this point in detail; and we hope to do so again, with special reference to Mr. Stephen, when the series of philosophical articles with which we are engaged shall have brought us again to the same point. Here we must content ourselves with a passing protest.

Then there is a feeling of "awful respect" for his Jupiter, which he thinks is (or ought to be) excited in men's mind, by a contemplation of the fact, that the said Jupiter has prescribed beneficence as the means of best winning his favour. What kind of "respect" can this possibly be? We could thoroughly understand Mr. Stephen's meaning, if he inferred from such a fact that the supreme being is benevolent or otherwise holy: but this is the very inference, which he emphatically disclaims. Surely mere power and cleverness are no titles to "respect"; unless indeed Mr. Stephen would say, that good Christians ought to respect the Devil.

We will now proceed to another passage, italicising a word or two here and there.

Is there a God who cares for human society — a Providence? If not, morality is simply *a matter of fact*. Certain rules of conduct do *as a fact* tend to promote human happiness. The ultimate sanction of these rules is *individual taste*. Those who have a taste (which is admitted to be rare) for the good of the race as a whole, can say to those who have it not, "in our opinion you are brutes." Those who care only for themselves and for others in relation to them may reply to this, "in our opinion you are fools." And *neither party can get any farther* (p. 320).

On the contrary,

I cannot understand how a person who believed that a being, capable of arranging the physical and moral world as we know it, had, by so arranging it, tacitly commanded him so to act, could hesitate about the *wisdom* of obeying that command (p. 321).

We will summarily exhibit then Jovian morality, in the

only shape which (as far as we see) it can consistently wear; though we quite believe that Mr. Stephen himself (as *we* should say, by a happy inconsistency) will disclaim it.

"There is no intrinsic excellence in a life of devoted benevolence, as compared with a life of reckless sensuality. But by regarding carefully the facts of life, I come to a very probable conclusion, that I shall be better off under Jupiter's government by predominantly leading the former kind of life, than by leading the latter; and seeing the probability of this, I shall be a great fool if I do not act accordingly. For all I know, there may be other worlds made by other Jupiters, who prefer that their subjects shall practise reckless sensuality. As I should be a fool under present circumstances if I did not predominantly practise beneficence;—so I should be no less a fool, were I subject to one of those other Jupiters, if I did not practise reckless sensuality."

In fact Mr. Stephen's moral system may be expressed by the simple maxim, that "might makes right": and this maxim on the other hand (as we have so amply seen) is the one foundation, on which the fabric of Cæsarism is built. Mr. Stephen has at all events so far the merit of consistency; viz., that he carries, to its legitimate result in politics, the detestable principle with which he begins in ethics.

There is another philosophical doctrine of Mr. Stephen's, which plays powerfully into the hands of his Cæsarism: for he thinks that not one man out of a million has reasonable ground for his moral and religious beliefs. We are confident Mr. Stephen will admit that such is his doctrine; and we will not therefore take the trouble of accumulating passages, which prove that it is so. On the other hand Catholics hold, that all children of the Church at least have most ample ground for reasonably believing her divine authority. And there are some Catholics, ourselves among the number, who would add to this a second opinion. The religious tenets of non-Catholics contain of course an admixture of truth and falsehood in every variety of degree; and for our own part we think, that many of these men have fully sufficient ground for many of their true doctrines. It will be seen by this, with how indefinitely greater earnestness than Mr. Stephen, Catholics must respect the sacredness of individual religious convictions. And we cannot be so much surprised as we otherwise should be, that, according to Mr. Stephen, the State's mere temporal welfare and power may often be abundantly sufficient reason, for overriding and trampling on these convictions.

Here we may also commemorate Mr. Stephen's denial—we may even say his contemptuous denial—of Freewill; which we have cited in a preceding article. Such denial is very appropriate in the advocate of Cæsarism, which always tends to treat mankind as mere machines.

We have not professed to draw out a sustained philosophical argument against Mr. Stephen's moral system: our purpose has been (1) to exhibit it in what seem to us its true colours; and (2) to show its intimate connection with his Cæsarism. We have already said however, that on the earliest available occasion we will not fail to join direct issue with him on philosophical ground.

His article in the "*Contemporary*" cannot be called a reply to the Archbishop's pamphlet, but is mainly an assault on the truth of Christianity. We must say we were taken quite by surprise, at what we must consider the extraordinary shallowness of his assault on the Catholic historical argument; and we trust we may be able in a very early number to treat directly this historical argument, with special reference to Mr. Stephen's reasoning.

As far as the logic of facts is concerned, doubtless Mr. Stephen is on the winning side. His theories are more or less illustrated in almost every country of Europe; and in Germany, to an extent which must (one would think) exceed his most sanguine hopes. To what quarter on the other hand, in this nineteenth century, shall we look for any exemplification of the Archbishop's doctrine, as to the Church's due supremacy in all matters directly or indirectly bearing on religion and morality? Still truth and argument do not lose their intrinsic force, because men do not choose to look at them. And on the present occasion—as more than once before—we must express our strong sense of what Catholics owe to the Editor of the "*Contemporary Review*," for allowing to defenders of the Church a "clear stage" (they *desire* "no favour") before the general reading public. It will now be forced on the notice of non-Catholics, how very easy a triumph can be obtained by the advocate of such opinions as those maintained by the Archbishop of Westminster, over the advocate of such opinions as those maintained by Mr. Fitzjames Stephen.

Since the preceding article went to press, the April number of the "*Contemporary*" has appeared, containing the Archbishop's reply to Mr. Stephen. As might have been expected, he declines to follow that gentleman into his curious

digression on Theism and Christianity. His Grace's original statement was, that no one could deny a certain thesis, "without renouncing his Christian name, or the coherence of his reason." Mr. Stephen replies in effect, that *he* at all events—the most prominent and able English advocate of Cæsarism—*does* renounce the Christian name: a fact which, as far as it goes, obviously strengthens, instead of invalidating, the Archbishop's position. After a few incidental comments, therefore, on his assailant's anti-Theistic and anti-Christian arguments, the Archbishop resumes his own proper course of remark. He repeats his former proposition:—

All freedom of soul and conscience in men, in families, and in states, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can only come from superior authority. That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of divine right. The limitation which has changed Cæsarism into Christian monarchy is Law; and that Law the Law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation.

The Archbishop occupies his present article by showing in detail, that such has been the doctrine professed alike by Anglicans, by Presbyterians, and by Nonconformists of every name. And he concludes with pointing out, that "the answer 'we ought to obey God rather than men' carries the whole claim of divine authority." In a future article he is to show, that the principle, for which all Christian denominations have thus contended, appertains in fulness of right to that Church alone, which has come down uninterrupted and inviolate from Apostolic times, and is in communion with S. Peter's See.

For our own part, as we have said, we do not see how we can with advantage enter on the direct discussion of this noble theme, until we have before us the whole of what Mr. Stephen intends to urge in the article which he promises for an early number of the "Contemporary": while we should be still more unwise to forego the advantage which we must derive from the Archbishop's second Essay, when it shall appear. But we will not fail at the earliest possible moment to place before our readers the best summary we can of what will have been said, together with our own humble comments thereon. There is at this moment no religious truth of more urgent practical importance, than that so eloquently and forcibly proclaimed by the Archbishop; while on the other hand its theoretical treatment certainly involves one or two somewhat difficult incidental investigations.

We must not close our article without reprinting a letter of

F. Humphrey's, which appeared in the "Spectator" of April 11th.

SIR,—Will you allow me to call the attention of your readers to one point in Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's article on "Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam," in the March number of the *Contemporary Review*? That article you reviewed on its appearance, and the Archbishop of Westminster has replied to it in the current number of the *Contemporary*. The subject is, therefore, still of interest, and not too old to be out of date.

In his article, Mr. Stephen, speaking of the arguments for the existence of God, says :—"By way of showing how persistently such arguments are used, I may observe that in a volume of 'Essays on Religion and Literature,' just published under Archbishop Manning's auspices, I find Locke's argument put forward very nearly in Locke's own words, by the Rev. William Humphrey."

Take with Mr. Stephen's statement of the almost verbal agreement of my argument with Locke's the fact that I have not opened any work of Locke's for the last fifteen years, that when I did read Locke I did not study him, and that I could not now give any adequate account of his system—and this verbal agreement would be a very curious coincidence—save on one hypothesis, viz., that both Locke and I drew from the same source.

My argument—the ordinary argument from causality, remotion, and super-excellence—was derived from the scholastic philosophy, and if a reference is needed, may be found in the writings of the greatest of the Doctors of the Schools, St. Thomas Aquinas. It is, then, curious, if not careless, to quote the argument as Locke's instead of as St. Thomas's. But it is not even St. Thomas's. He did not excogitate it, and did not claim it as his own. It is the well-known argument of the Socratic philosophy, and in particular, of Aristotle. It is not the result of revelation, but the offspring of the Greek wisdom. The argument, therefore, might with as much reason be quoted as mine as called Locke's argument.

It appears to me, and I venture to propose it for the judgment of your readers, that Mr. Stephen's designation of the old scholastic argument, itself borrowed by the schoolmen from the Greek philosophy, as Locke's argument, justifies me in impeaching him of either superficiality of knowledge, or singular inaccuracy of language.—I am, Sir, &c.,

St. Mary-of-the-Angels, Bayswater, W.

WILLIAM HUMPHREY.

ART. VI.—RINUCCINI'S IRISH NUNCIATURE.

The Embassy in Ireland of Monsignor G. B. Rinuccini, Archbishop of Fermo, in the years 1645-49. Published from the original MSS. in the Rinuccini Library, by G. Aiazza. Translated by Annie Hutton. Dublin : A. Thom.

THERE are men who have played rare and striking parts in historic scenes, and possessed characters uncommon in their day, and who have yet either been denied a place in the Pantheon of history because of the stage on which their rôle was enacted, or have been blackened and misrepresented on account of their peculiar position,—it may be even on account of their peculiar virtues. Both of these destinies posterity had in store for Giovan Batista Rinuccini, the Nuncio sent by Innocent X. to direct the spiritual affairs of the Irish Confederates who in 1641 had leagued together to obtain the enfranchisement of their religion. By some writers he has been left out of the roll of remarkable ecclesiastical politicians for the simple reason that the scene of his public action was Ireland; and that he therefore fell under the neglect with which Irish matters have so long been treated by the general historian. He has been denounced by others because he was a Catholic prelate and the Pope's Nuncio, uncompromisingly devoted to the inseparable interests of the Church and of the Holy See. Yet, Rinuccini's is not a character to be passed over with contempt. In dignity and morality he contrasts strikingly with some other political Churchmen of his day, as Richelieu and Mazarin. He was all the more a distinguished man for being honest and disinterested, for those are epithets which cannot be applied to many of his contemporaries who mixed themselves up in the affairs of nations. But whereas the majority of men would not so mix themselves at all but for the hope of self-aggrandisement, Rinuccini appeared on the stage simply as the Pope's delegate, in the hope of serving the Church and the souls of the Irish Catholics, and with the avowed intention—which he faithfully fulfilled—of meddling as little as possible with such secular matters as had no bearing on the interests of religion. And the errors of judgment which he committed during the course of the stormiest and most perplexing nunciature that ever Legate experienced, resulted entirely from excess of zeal in the cause to which he had devoted himself,

and in no case from a desire of his own exaltation or well-being.

How free he was from the goading sting of worldly ambition, had been amply proved when he refused to exchange his see of Fermo for the brilliant dignity of Archbishop of Florence. It might well be imagined that no position could have held out more attractions to a man of the birth, learning, and intellect of Rinuccini. Although born in Rome, he sprang of a Florentine house, which boasted many influential and some highly-accomplished members, and owned as his natural prince Ferdinand II. de' Medici, one of the best and most gifted of his extraordinary race. Florence was then and always a choice pasture-ground of vigorous and classic minds. Although, as indeed was the case throughout Italy in the middle of the seventeenth century, the glories of her canvas had somewhat faded, her every citizen graduated in the study of the ancient authors and of his national poetry, and her society was fragrant with the genuine unaffected love of knowledge and of *belles lettres*.

Moreover to be the Archbishop of Florence was one of the highest ecclesiastical dignities in Italy. But Rinuccini would not rise in the scale of prelates, nor seek the enchanting home of his family, because he believed that he served the Church better by remaining at Fermo, where he had effected much for the benefit of both clergy and people, and had won their hearty love, notwithstanding the spirit of severe and unbending discipline which formed a salient point in his character. But though he refused to exchange his work at Fermo for the peaceful splendours of Florence, he willingly accepted the burden laid upon him by Innocent when, in 1642, that Pontiff, carrying out the designs of Urban VIII., appointed him his Nuncio to the Confederated Catholics of Ireland, who had now for four years been in arms with the object of defending their religion against a Puritan administration and a Scottish invasion, and obtaining liberty of conscience from the king whose crown they had sworn to uphold. Their struggles were followed with the closest attention, and regarded as of the first importance at Rome, whence Ireland's former efforts for emancipation from the yoke of Protestantism, in the Geraldine War and the Ten Years' War, had been watched with all the anxiety of a mother for the fate of her child; where the salvos of St. Angelo had celebrated the victory of the Yellow Ford; where Hugh O'Neill and Roderick O'Donnell, sad and weary relics of the last great conflict, had received the kindly welcome and cordial alms of Paul V., and where they now slept on Montorio.

Nothing could be clearer than the instructions with which Innocent X. armed the departing Nuncio. His first and greatest object "must be to establish in Ireland an unalterable right to the public exercise of the Catholic religion;" and with a keen appreciation of the character of Charles I., grounded on experience, the Pope warned Rinuccini to assure the Irish that whatever conditions Charles and his Ministry might propose, if not based on the liberty of the Faith in Ireland, would have no security and would be a source of disgrace and shame." To the precept then given him Rinuccini remained firm throughout all the troubled course of his Irish career: it was his pole-star amid the storms; and he was destined to find how much truer was the Pope's perception of Irish interests as he sat far away in the Vatican than was that of the most influential party among the Confederates themselves. But there was another injunction laid upon him which shows that the Pope himself suspected the fidelity of the Irish to the first part of their Oath of Association, or doubted—and as it appeared groundlessly doubted—whither the tides of ardour, patriotism, and victory might not eventually drift them. He bade the Nuncio use all his influence to restrain them in case, being accustomed to self-government, they should aim at a severance from the English crown, that being a scheme to which the Pontiff would not lend himself, his Nuncio, or his subsidies. He did not know how defective instead of excessive was their patriotism, and that dissension was to render their attempts at self-government, inaugurated so well, a terrible yet a ludicrous and proverbial failure in the eyes of all the world. Yet, with some few inevitable exceptions, the account of Irish affairs contained in Rinuccini's instructions is extraordinarily accurate and minute, and shows with what deep and careful attention they had been considered at the court of Rome. None of the events which fill up the pages of general European history; not the war of thirty years which decimated Germany, and wiped out the armies of Austria and Sweden, France and Spain; not the disturbances which surged around the Gallic throne, nor the conflict of feeble monarchy and headstrong democracy in England, excited more interest in the central city of Christendom than did the struggles of those Irish Catholics whose fidelity to the See of Rome was a reproach to many others among the Northern nations.* Probably much of the information

* It was at the Court of the Vatican alone that the importance of Irish politics was appreciated; other courts were in the habit of treating them as

received at the Vatican came from the pen of Father Scarampi, who had preceded Rinuccini as envoy from Rome to Kilkenny, and whose policy was the precursor of his own. Father Luke Wadding, too, the Franciscan annalist, who enjoyed high favour with several successive Popes, and fed his active patriotism on a constant correspondence with the "old Irish" leaders, was in himself a living chronicle of the affairs of his native island. But the mainspring of all the difficulties of Rinuccini's nunciature,—namely, the hard and fatal line which divided the Irish nation into two hostile classes—was reserved to him to discover by experience. He was also destined to find out that whosoever informed the Vatican of any possibility of Lord Ormond's being a Catholic at heart had fallen into an unaccountable and ludicrous mistake. It is a curious fact that this surmise, expressed in the secret instructions to Rinuccini, is practically contradicted in his regular instructions, where the Pope, with a severity but too well founded, speaks of the arts of the Marquis of Ormond, "a Protestant, who, although Irish, not only will never yield, save by force, to the wishes of the Catholics, but, by gaining time, hopes to create dissensions among them and to wean them from the common cause." Yet even this sentence, though it did ample justice to the diplomacy of the Marquis of Ormond, contained the very reproach which years later, in the mouth of a Puritan peer, aroused the noble but impatient indignation of the celebrated Butler. He could not make the world believe him in one matter; he could never persuade either Pope or Puritan that he was not an Irishman.

The task, then, of joining combat with the crafty minister of an insincere king,—of counselling a confederacy which had no leader,—and of directing, without meddling in secular statesmanship, spiritual affairs which were as closely bound up with those of this world as cannon and cruisers, truces and treaties, could make them,—was laid upon this high-born prelate, whom the Pope felt that he could trust, because he had had proof that in his character there was no self-seeking. Both Pope and Legate knew much of Irish matters, but they did not know Ireland; and as Rinuccini left the palace-gates of his beloved Fermo, he little dreamed what he would have to undergo before he saw his own cathedral towers again. Still his mission could have had but few charms for him

a mere by-play. History has generally followed in the wake of diplomacy. Rinuccini himself, in his "Report on the Affairs of Ireland," has not ill-expressed her fate. "Miserable Ireland," he says, "always obscured by the grandeur of England. . . . and lost in the rays of the overshadowing kingdom, shows no light which can be seen farther than a taper."

beyond the one fact that its objects were the spiritual benefit of a nation and the honour of the Church. His health, injured by severe study in his youth, had never been restored, and this mission implied a long journey and a perilous voyage. He loved the brilliant skies and the crystal air of Italy, and he must now seek a new and northern climate, where perpetual mists curtained the chilly atmosphere. For nigh twenty years his delight had been to administer, far from political distractions and combinations, the ecclesiastical and educational affairs of his diocese; he was now about to plunge into the vortex of what was in reality the great political puzzle of the seventeenth century. Like most men who take a prominent part in the affairs of nations, he was never again to enjoy rest and tranquillity of mind; like all who, in those penal ages, consecrated themselves to the service of Ireland's emancipation, he was destined to have his heart broken in the struggle.

The manner in which he conducted himself throughout that struggle is open to all to judge or misjudge as they please. There is no mystery about it. He was sincere; and his own statements of his actions, in his letters to the Pope and to different Cardinals at Rome, are a plain narrative of facts, interspersed here and there with the expression of his own few, simple, and strongly-marked characteristics. His secretary and companion in his Irish exile, Giuseppe Aiazzi, rightly judged that the publication of his letters would be a tribute to his memory as well as an aid to the disentanglement of a knotty point in history. They have now been rendered into English for the first time, with great credit to the translator, if we except one or two intrusive Italian idioms. We also somewhat object to the general title of "Embassy in Ireland," as a translation of "Nunziatura in Irlanda." "Nunciature" would have been better. A Papal Legate differs from other ambassadors, as the sovereignty of the Pope differs from that of a merely temporal monarch; his office and his duties have little in common with theirs. For the rest, Miss Hutton has succeeded in giving an old-fashioned, seventeenth-century tone to the letters and documents she translates, whilst at the same time rendering them into good modern English.

Rinuccini's troubles began before he reached the cloudy coasts of Inisfail. In Paris he already felt the peculiar influences of the extraordinary three-cornered struggle which was being carried on in the British isles. Henrietta Maria, miserable, suspicious, and more devoted to the interests of the English monarchy than to those of the Catholic Church, feared and mistrusted the Irish Confederates only in a less degree than the Puritans themselves. She openly told Spinola,

a gentleman of the Nuncio's suite, that they "made use of the Catholic religion in general as a pretext to throw off their allegiance to the king; that they did not wish to make peace with him unless they saw it to be an absolute necessity, and were always adding new petitions, and more exorbitant than the last;" whilst she secretly feared that the Archbishop of Fermo was on his way to aid them in breaking the links which bound them to the larger kingdom, itself in flames. It has often been the fate of the Irish to be accused of aiming at "complete separation," when they only demanded the pacific concession of a simple matter of justice; as often has it been the fate of ecclesiastics in high places, working single-hearted for spiritual interests, to be suspected of concealed attempts at gaining some temporal end, which in reality would under no circumstances assume much importance in their eyes. Henrietta was mistaken in both her dark surmises. We have before shown that the independence of Ireland was no part of the scheme of 1641;* that the Irish were driven, not only by religious disabilities but by physical danger, to take up arms against the Puritans to whom the king had delivered Ireland; and that Charles, in his injudicious fear of shocking the fanatic prejudices of those inexorable domestic foes, to whom he had already given juster causes of offence, chose to make himself the enemy of the confederated Catholics against their will. Yet Rinuccini, although he perceived the fact that the interests of the Irish Catholics could never be one with those of the king, owing to his peculiar character and prejudices, was as desirous of delivering him from his present perils as the Confederates had bound themselves to be through their Oath of Association; and had no idea of lending himself to any concealed schemes of national aggrandizement. "It will be my care," he wrote from Paris to Cardinal Pamphili, "if I see the Irish misuse the name of religion to cover some other interests, to restrain and direct them to the needful end, so that the desired successes once gained, considerable aid may be sent to assist the poor king, and consequently the English Catholics, but not till religion in Ireland is established securely."

But Rinuccini was too honest and single-minded to hold on

* The most violent expression of this period relative to English rule on record is contained in a letter from Rory O'More to Father Hugh Bourke, published by the Rev. C. P. Meehan in the appendix to his "Irish Hierarchy." "You seem very timorous of the English state," wrote O'More, "but you need not, for there is no hope of composition for ever, nor any means to come by it." He may, however, have referred only to the Puritans, and to the government of Parsons and Borlase.

his way successfully among the labyrinths of the diplomacy which prevailed in his day. Nobody would believe in the purity and nobility of his aims. Mazarin mistrusted him; and Mazarin, though but little love was lost between him and Henrietta, would rather serve the cause of the King of England, the cause of monarchy in general, than that of the Irish Catholics, who were subjects demanding justice of their sovereign. In fact, the Cardinal Minister, though he thought it prudent and becoming to furnish some scanty assistance to the Confederates who were so highly honoured by the Pope, felt a rather mean dislike and suspicion towards them, and was civil to the Nuncio chiefly in words and assurances. Long delays, subtractions from the grants promised, and the failure of his agreement to provide ships for Rinuccini's transport, were the result. It would not have been so had France still been governed by Richelieu, who had encouraged and aided the first resort of the Irish to arms; for Richelieu as far exceeded Mazarin in the grandeur of his political conceptions as he outstripped him in open crime. As it was, the Minister succeeded merely in sowing difficulties on the path of the Nuncio, who was severely reprimanded in letters from Rome for his delay.

At last Rinuccini set sail in a frigate which he had hastily purchased at Nantes, manned by Irishmen. He was chased at sea by a Parliamentary cruiser, commanded by a renegade named Plunket; but Plunket's cooking-galley caught fire, and he was obliged to give up the chase. At last the Nuncio's vessel arrived off the south-west coast of Ireland in the grey October weather. She had great difficulty in sighting land, so that Rinuccini marvelled to have set out to seek a kingdom which could not be found, and exclaimed that his "embassy had changed the earth into water."

It was as if Ormondism and Puritanism possessed the ancient arts of the Tuatha de Danaan, and had rendered Ireland invisible to one whom they deemed the most dangerous of invaders. But at last, guided by the chart and by some land birds, the *San Pietro* bore up the Bay of Kenmare, and Rinuccini entered the land of his Nunciature through the portal of one of the noblest of her harbours. His first shelter on Irish soil was in a shepherd's hut, where he celebrated Mass. The poor Irish flocked around him with that pious exultation in the presence among them of a Legate directly deputed by the Holy Father which belonged to the devout simplicity of their nature; and perhaps his two days at Kenmare were the most peaceful which Rinuccini spent in the land of Gael and Palesmen. From the bold and rock-bound south-

west coast he proceeded by slow stages towards the marble city which was to be the principal scene of his four years' combat. Here he was received with the utmost honour, though the weather was of the wettest. The shivering Italian and his suite beheld with horror the streaming streets, through which he proceeded under a rich canopy, while the citizens walked bareheaded in their native rain. But amid the splendours of his welcome the Nuncio was quick to take note of an almost imperceptible coldness on the part of old Lord Mountgarret, the President of the Confederation, who, though a relic of the Elizabethan war, and the son-in-law of the great Earl of Tyrone, was a Palesman still at heart, and, like Henrietta Maria, feared the possible policy of the Nuncio. Already the Papal Legate had begun to perceive "that the old party welcomed him as the minister of God, the new as the treasurer of a prince."

Rinuccini arrived in Kilkenny at a critical point in Confederate affairs; it might almost be said their turning-point. It was now four years since the exasperated Gael had been forced into their rising *en masse* under the unskilled Sir Phelim O'Neill, and their luckless attempt on Dublin Castle; since the delegates of the Norman Irish met the representatives of the Milesian aristocracy with vows of eternal friendship on Knockcroft; and since the Irish Bishops turned the ardent and awakened energies of a long dormant people into the lawful and profitable channel of the Confederation of Kilkenny. It was two years since the Confederates had stopped halfway on the road to success by agreeing to an inglorious truce with Ormond and the royal forces. They had done it because the nobles of the Pale, always secretly afraid of finding themselves alone in the land with their fellow-countrymen, insisted on delicate consideration for a king who never showed any consideration for them, except when his English difficulty pressed him so hard that he began to think it might be well to fall back upon their services. And now the question was whether or no the truce should become a peace based upon a treaty. It was just one of those moments when the king was inclined to be gracious to the Confederates, for on the 14th of June that year he had lost the battle of Naseby. Hitherto the conflict between the substantial but untrained citizens and farmers of the Parliament and the martial cavaliers of Charles had been tolerably equal; but the whole of the Parliamentary army being now formed on the model of Colonel Cromwell's "Ironsides," disaster sprang up on every side. Bridgewater, Bath, Bristol, fell before the arms of the Parliament. In the midst of these misfortunes Charles bethought him how useful he might find an army of

those Irish Papists who had held their own so valiantly against the triple phalanx of their foes. It was true that their oath bound them to obtain the liberty of their religion no less than to defend his prerogative, but he felt that he must now display the Catholic side of his Anglicanism for their benefit, having already shown them the Protestant side with so little good result to himself. But Ormond was in his way, with his dislike to the Confederates and his inability to deal with the king's changes of mind, so the Earl of Glamorgan was sent over to barter toleration for 10,000 men, much to the joy not only of the Palesmen, but of the old Irish. In the August of 1645 Charles was carrying on two negotiations at once with the Confederates; one, which had been dragging out its length for nearly a year, through the medium of his grand and terrible Viceroy, who would give no better guarantee of liberty or conscience than assurances of the king's future clemency and favours; another, new and sudden, through the Earl of Glamorgan, who pledged the king's word that the Irish Catholics should publicly exercise their religion, and should retain all the churches they then possessed.

These concessions were of course at the mercy of the next Parliament, but meanwhile the Assembly was to send to England an army of 10,000 men, to aid the sovereign who had certainly given up all claim to call them rebels when he began to treat with their Supreme Council. The treaty had been signed by Glamorgan and the Confederate Commissioners in August; but Ormond and his articles of peace were still in the way, for that the Confederates should be in alliance with the king and at war with his Viceroy would have been too absurd even for the time and scene. And Mountgarret, Muskerry, and the other lords of the Pale, tired of the desultory war and of their bond with their Gaelic fellow-countrymen, would willingly have accepted Ormond's treaty once for all had they dared.

Matters stood thus when Rinuccini, himself a new feature in affairs, made his triumphal entry into Kilkenny. He brought with him his own strong feelings in favour of the scheme which was the *raison d'être* of the Confederation, and that decisive passage in his instructions which reminded him that the principal end of his mission must be to establish the public exercise of the Catholic religion in Ireland. After the desire to accomplish this, and for the spiritual well-being of the Irish generally, ranked his hopes of benefiting the English Catholics, and of aiding the king. To combine all these purposes was his wish, and Glamorgan's treaty, if its fulfilment were properly secured, seemed to be a means to that end. As

to the English Catholics, the Court of Rome had already instructed Rinuccini to suggest that in the event of an Irish army being transported into England, they should form a cavalry force under a commander approved by the Irish general. When the army should have triumphed over the Puritans, it ought easily to secure the interests of the Catholics of England, who had sent a memorial to Ireland through the Nuncio begging that they might not be forgotten when terms were made. To Charles they had always been singularly loyal, but they knew him too well to imagine that the Irish could be so foolish as to rely upon his word.

It was not long before the keen Italian discovered that he had plunged into a vortex of disputes and difficulties. They were of three kinds—the political, the military, and the ecclesiastical. The chief disturbing element was the “Ormond legion,” as he calls it, the nobles and gentlemen, many of them connected with Ormond, over whom the Viceroy had exercised his nameless and extraordinary fascination, who had checked the progress of the Confederation in its morning of glory, and were now willing to make peace with him on any terms and leave it to his honour and the sincerity of Charles to give them what they would.

The cowardice and stupidity of this party was of itself enough to fill with indignation the sharp-sighted and valiant prelate who had come to see that their religious liberty was grounded on a secure basis; whilst, on the other hand, the “Old Irish,” intent on securing the “splendour of religion” and with some remnant of the spirit of the Blackwater and the Curlew mountains about them, aroused his fears lest they should trespass in the opposite direction. As to the four armies, he declared, forgetful of the many small successes they had actually obtained, and the many more they would have obtained but for the Cessation, that their generals used them only in the service of their own angry passions; and with Preston and Castlehaven quarrelling in Munster, Owen and Phelim O'Neill in the North, it must be admitted that there was some excuse for the charge. The ecclesiastical difficulties were the easiest to arrange, on account of the docility of the Irish to the Holy See and the ministers of the Church. Long years of partial persecution, of partial concealment, of constant apprehension, had introduced scandals from which perhaps the Irish Church would have remained free had it been wholly discountenanced, like the Church of the Catacombs. Many of the people, accustomed to hear Mass in their houses, no longer cared for the churches, and had ceased to prize the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament; and some even of

the Bishops had become more or less indifferent to the proprieties of ceremonial. But it will strike all who read Rinuccini's Report on the state of Ireland that in his first heat of fault-finding he hardly does justice to the Irish Bishops. They were the mainspring of the struggle, and the authors of the Catholic league. The first rising in the North was not their work, though they had used all their influence to restrain the violence of O'Neill's untutored multitude; but it was their work that the wild torrents of insurrection were curbed in and made to work the wheel of the Confederation. Most of them had given up ease and comfort abroad to ordain in the rough shieling and confirm on the wet hill-side; and the perils of the times often rendered a simple vestment necessary. Nearly all ranged themselves against the Ormond faction, and on the side of the Nuncio, which so far was certainly the side of common sense. The only exception was Dease, Bishop of Meath, who wished for nothing more than the permission to celebrate Mass in private, and to enjoy a contemptible peace. He usually resided with his cousin Lord Delvin, once the betrayer of Roderick of Tyrconnell, and now the submissive subject of whomsoever happened to be in power. In the beginning of the Confederation, Delvin had set himself against it, because he believed that nothing would come of it, but as it grew up into the first power in the kingdom he changed his views of its legality, and joined it. Not so the Bishop of Meath, who was a complete exemplification of the proverb that "l'obstination est la forteresse de la faiblesse." He persistently turned a deaf ear to the exhortations of the heroic Archbishop of Armagh, whilst his flock on their part began to turn a deaf ear to his own, and to enrol themselves in troops beneath the Confederate standards. Then the old man, leaving his cousin Delvin's hospitable roof, went to live at Turbotstown, and was the bane of the Nuncio's existence. Another Irish prelate of a very different stamp, Malachi O'Kelly, Archbishop of Tuam, and provisional commander in Connaught, was killed at Sligo in the time of Rinuccini, and a copy of Glamorgan's treaty was found by the Scots among his papers; whence arose grave consequences. The rest of the episcopacy, with their varied characters and varied virtues, flocked under Rinuccini's banner; for his aim was theirs. The dauntless Hugh O'Reilly, a scion of that princely house of Breffni which had lost nearly all by the Confiscation of Ulster; Heber MacMahon, the grandson of Hugh O'Neill and Judith O'Donnell, with all the fire and daring of his grandmother's race about him rather than the patient statecraft of the wily Earl, and if rash, faithful and valiant;

Nicholas French, with his erudition and his cutting pen ; and for the present at least, David Rothe, the author of the " *Analecta*."

Though Rinuccini complained of the *laissez faire* of the people of Ireland, which he set down as the consequence of conquest, he was vigorously supported by the Bishops and the Celtic nobles in that conflict with the Ormondists which began with his arrival, and ended only with his departure. He saw through all their excuses and subterfuges ; he detected and proclaimed all their negligences and oversights. He insisted on adding to Glamorgan's treaty an agreement that the Viceroy of Ireland should always be a Catholic, which would have rid the country of Ormond and all others like him for ever ; and a stipulation that the Bishops should have seats in Parliament. He objected to the Glamorgan treaty remaining secret until the Irish army had reached England, in order to shield Charles from the heightened indignation of his English subjects, whilst the Ormond treaty would be made public at once, and would abolish both the name and the power of the Supreme Council ; and he reminded them that, should any accident mar the fulfilment of the secret treaty, " the Catholics would unite with the Protestants in saying that the Irish had known well how to adjust all that touched their political and private affairs ; but all that concerned their religion they had left to chance and uncertainty." A strange accusation to be brought against a people whom one of the greatest orators of modern times justly designated " a nation of Confessors !" And yet it would have been true at the time ; though it was not the fault of the Irish people, but of those lords of the Pale and Norman Irish who, through superior wealth and influence, had come to preponderate both in the General Assembly and in the Supreme Council.

The Nuncio, however, found Glamorgan docile. Among the curiosities of these negotiations may be reckoned the advances of Charles to the Pope, consisting of a very small letter, the outside of which the Earl showed to Rinuccini, and which was never sent ; and of a short but very courteous epistle in French, addressed to himself as the Papal Nuncio. This letter was dated the 30th of April, rather to the surprise of Rinuccini, who failed to divine what could have made the king thus civil before Naseby gave his affairs the disastrous turn from which they never recovered ; but there can be no doubt that Charles even then expected some eventual good from a possible alliance with the Confederates. He said he had never before written to a minister of the Pope, but he hoped that this letter would not be the last. It was the last,

however. Soon after Glamorgan had delivered it, he went to Dublin to induce the Viceroy to guarantee the Kilkenny Treaty; and on the 26th of December he was thrown into a cell of Dublin Castle. It was done because the Puritans had got hold of the transaction through the capture of O'Kelly's papers; but Ormond would have served the king better by sending him over 10,000 of the stalwart levies of Preston and O'Neill. Certainly neither Charles nor Ormond could be called an adept in deceit; for they always deceived at the wrong time and in the wrong place. But it is very probable that had the transaction gone smoothly on, the Supreme Council would have quarrelled bitterly about the appointment of a general, and would have ended by nominating an incompetent one.

After his imprisonment, Glamorgan's release was the greatest misfortune that could befall the Confederates. On his return to Kilkenny the negotiation dragged on again, embittering all the rancours and widening the differences of the Confederates; whilst it was further perplexed by the treaty which was concluded at Rome between the Pope and Sir Kenelm Digby. The Nuncio advocated with warmth the provisions of this treaty, which he also prevailed on Glamorgan to adopt instead of his own. But while distrust on all sides delayed the conclusion of the peace which was to settle the religious rights of the Irish on a secure basis, and the Council strove hard to deceive both the Nuncio and the General Assembly, the purely political treaty with Ormond was secretly signed on the 28th of March. The Council at the same time conditionally undertook to send 10,000 men to England, of whom the first instalment were to relieve Chester, and Ormond followed up the agreement with one of his vague and lordly promises to proceed to Ulster and help O'Neill in expelling the Scots, in return for some money voted to him by the Supreme Council. Imitating his sovereign, however, like a loyal courtier, he pocketed the money and broke his promise.

This peace was not as yet made public, and was concealed from the Nuncio, whom the Council dared to deceive but did not as yet venture to defy. Yet, incredible as was the folly of Mountgarret and his party, they would not transport their troops to England until an ecclesiastical treaty was concluded through Glamorgan; and just as affairs were in train for the settlement of the difficulty, the King published an edict disavowing all that Glamorgan had done since January, and thus sealed the doom of Chester, and perhaps his own. Never was diplomatist made to look so foolish as the unfortunate Earl, whom we cannot suspect of deliberately intending to befool

his co-religionists, however much certain circumstances may appear to tell against him. If he did, he undoubtedly made himself look more foolish than they. Charles I. was the most demented of all, and drank to the dregs the results of his folly. In April Chester fell, and in May he fled to the Scottish army.

The Marquis of Ormond was a problem which Rinuccini, with all his keenness, was long unable to solve. No historian has been able to solve him, or the calm way in which, with the King's help, he ruined the King's affairs; and he was equally a puzzle to his contemporaries, excepting those who only saw in him unmitigated grandeur. Rinuccini's correspondence does not give a consecutive account of occurrences, and it is curious to note the different ideas of Ormond, and of the best means of disarming his power for mischief, which prevail in different letters. At one time the Nuncio considers him to be all deceit; at another he imagines for a brief moment that he will keep his word; now he thinks that he will grant acceptable conditions to the Catholics; now that nothing will move him to favour them. Usually he gives him up as incorrigible, and bends his hopes towards the appointment of another and a Catholic Viceroy; but sometimes he fancies that he will be converted, and will recognize the fact that he would gain much more by making himself one with the Catholics than by playing into the hands of the Parliamentarians. The passage in which Rinuccini puts forward this idea is perhaps the most disagreeable among his published documents, and the least consistent with his austere and devout character.* He openly asserts that he has suggested to Ormond, through those who were "likely to report his words to him," how much he would gain politically and in his reputation by declaring himself a Catholic; whilst at the same time he avers that the errors Ormond had imbibed in his boyhood in England were "firmly implanted in his mind," and that the High Church Marquis had declared himself incapable of believing the "presence of Christ in the sacrament." And Rinuccini was quite at a loss to name any relative or friend of the Viceroy who was likely to carry conviction to his heart.

The vexations which had succeeded each other during the first seven months of the Nuncio's sojourn in Ireland were diversified in June, 1646, by the triumph of Benburb. First

* There is another which is not quite creditable to him, contained in a letter to Cardinal Pamphili. It refers to his method of obtaining from Secretary Belling a document in which he had used expressions considered indiscreet by Pamphili; and substituting another copy in its stead.

impressions are sometimes said to be the truest, but this was certainly not the case with Rinuccini's early judgments of the Irish generals. In a letter to Cardinal Pamphili, dated April 10, 1646, he speaks of Owen O'Neill as "a strange and grasping man," whom, however, it would be impossible to remove from his chief command in Ulster. Perhaps he was provoked to this stern language by the quarrels, the obstinacy, and the insubordination of the two Ulster cousins, who had agreed only in a determination not to let their troops form any part of the army which should have gone to England. In the same letter the Nuncio expresses a favourable opinion of Preston, who had won his approbation by one of his bursts of generosity, and had given the best hopes of good service from him. In six months' time Preston's scale had flown up in the air; his weak meannesses had disgusted the Nuncio, who, in the ardour and inexorableness of O'Neill, beheld a reflex of his own; in two years' time Rinuccini was to excommunicate Preston for the purpose of protecting O'Neill. He began to change his opinion of the nephew of Tyrone after he had succeeded in reconciling him with Sir Phelim; a reconciliation which was built on sand, but which had its good effects at the time. The victory of Benburb was its reward, and Rinuccini, as he followed the tattered banners of the Scots to St. Mary's Cathedral at Limerick, felt that his lot was cast in with the lot of the "Old Irish," who alone possessed the spirit which produces victory.

According to the usual account, it was now that for the first time since his arrival in Ireland, the injudicious partiality for strong measures which was mixed up with Rinuccini's straightforwardness and sincerity began to show itself with bad results. It was at this time that he discovered the signature of the Ormond Treaty in March. For various reasons he came to the conclusion that it had been decided on before he reached the island, and delayed out of shame "that he should find it already published." Now, however, the Council were resolved that it should be ratified and proclaimed, which was carried into effect by their commissioners and by Ormond on the 29th of July, when, as the Nuncio's "Report of the Peace" satirically observes, "the supplies of His Holiness were exhausted." In vain the Nuncio, whom they feared even while they disobeyed him, asked them how, in case the Marquis should betray them, they would be able to restrain him when they had raised him above their heads, since they trembled so before him now. His threats, his scoldings, and his sarcasm were of no avail. But did he not endeavour to prevent the publication of the peace through more violent

means? Did he not prevail on O'Neill to abandon the scene of his successes in the North, and to bring his army to Kilkenny to aid the Supreme Council from whom he held his commission? Of this Rinuccini's published letters say not a word. They are full of his remonstrances and energetic regrets; of the siege of Bunratty, which he aided with his private means; and of a lingering hope that he might yet be able to secure something for the benefit of religion through the Earl of Glamorgan; but of his calling in the aid of O'Neill and his victorious Creaghts there is no hint, and apparently no thought. He speaks, however, of an offer on the part of both O'Neill and Preston to march on Dublin, an offer which he thought it his duty to decline. It would perhaps at that time have been too violent an action, though it might have proved richly productive of those splendid results which would probably have attended any bold measure; for of bold measures the Confederate war was, from beginning to end, singularly deficient, and to this deficiency it partly owed its failure. But to call away a triumphant General from the field to support a war of faction would have been a folly different in kind, but equal in degree, to that of the Supreme Council themselves, and Rinuccini does not charge himself with it. However this enigma be solved, there are three certainties in the matter; viz., that O'Neill wasted his victory, partly by delay in besieging Carrickfergus, partly by marching towards Leinster to oppose the peace; that Ormond and the Confederate Commissioners ratified and proclaimed the peace; and that the Nuncio set himself uncompromisingly against it, believing—as some have since believed of the Union—that Ireland was not bound by the act of an interested party among her rulers.

A strong reason for crediting the sincerity of Glamorgan is the fact that Rinuccini credited it. He was seldom mistaken in character; and he trusted in the good intentions of the Earl even after his imprisonment by Ormond and his rejection by Charles; and in concert with all the Bishops, who certainly expressed "the sense of the country" better than the delegates, had resolved that when Ormond should be defeated and Dublin taken, Glamorgan should be Viceroy of Ireland. For there was now no more delicacy about taking Dublin. "Negotiations are at an end, and we are at open war," wrote the Nuncio on the 21st of September. Such were the effects of the Peace of the 29th of July! Ormond, seeing that Ireland would no longer consider herself to be represented by Mountgarret and Muskerry, and that the armies of Preston and O'Neill were arrayed against the peace party, entered

into transactions with the Parliament, whilst the Nuncio, the Bishops, and the Generals charged themselves with the affairs of the nation. When Rinuccini entered Kilkenny, the virtual President of a new Confederation, he unfortunately inaugurated his rule injudiciously by throwing the members of the old Council into prison,* hardly following the dictates of the spirit in which the Pope had bidden him show himself not only "utile" but also "benignus" to all. He had now made up his mind that Glamorgan ought to succeed Ormond as Viceroy. One of the reasons which he gives for the appointment is not only intrinsically a good one, but shows that he had gauged the character of the Irish as accurately as that of Ormond himself. "All these advantages," he writes, after enumerating several which Glamorgan could boast, "are more than a sufficient answer to those who oppose the Earl simply because he is an Englishman,—a nation the Irish have never yet been able to trust; but at this moment, and when treating of the security of religion, it is better to choose a man well known to be inclined to peace, rather than an Irishman of whom his countrymen would soon become jealous, and thus throw the whole kingdom again into confusion."

It is well to remind ourselves that, deeply as Rinuccini had now mixed himself up in political affairs, he had not thereby broken his resolutions nor proved false to his instructions, except inasmuch as his imprisonment of the Council possibly exceeded his powers, and certainly the limits of prudence. But all the transactions in which he took a part had the most intimate bearing on religion and on the interests of the Church. He did not interfere with the political articles of the Ormond Treaty; he would not have meddled with it, and would have let it go its own way, had the Supreme Council secured the ratification of Glamorgan's articles, or, still better, those of Digby and the Pope. He charged himself with the affairs of Ireland, and made war upon Ormond because the peace concluded by the old Council left matters exactly where they were before the Irish took up arms, except that it would have obliged them to serve with their troops a king who was already a prisoner. In his rejection of the peace, in his overthrow of the old and already worn-out original Confederation, and his establishment of a new one with bolder spirits at its head, Rinuccini did no more than his duty. At the same time, duties should always be fulfilled

* He says nothing in his published letters of this proceeding; a fact which certainly suggests the possibility that his silence on any circumstance, even though one of importance, is no proof that it did not occur.

with as little roughness and aggression as possible; and here the Nuncio failed, and increased the number of his enemies.

As to his acceptance of the Presidency of the Council, which consisted of a peer, an ecclesiastic, and a commoner from each county, nearly all of the national party, he justified it by averring that the clergy were the movers and controllers of the new order of things, and that he, as the legitimate superior of them all, was their natural head. To prevent scandal, he publicly protested that he "did not make a single claim to jurisdiction in temporal affairs," nor did he ever contradict his words by his practice. He was also very careful not to sign any order without the addition of the signatures of other members of the Council. In these matters he was unexceptionable, as also in his conduct during the miserable siege of Dublin in the November of 1646. In his "Report on the State of Ireland," he implies a wish that O'Neill, on being summoned into Leinster to take part in the siege, "had pushed his troops unexpectedly against the city." Feebly defended as it was, he might have seized it easily whilst unhampered by the vicinity of Preston. But amid the confusions and dangers of the times, when every bold measure was construed into guilt, it would have been a daring action even for an O'Neill, and a far more daring one than this O'Neill was ever known to undertake. Rinuccini would have done it in his place. But O'Neill, like his uncle the Earl of Tyrone, had a cautious side to his character, and this was the side which the Nuncio principally saw during their early intercourse, though there was another, also strongly developed. As to the siege of Dublin, the Nuncio makes it tolerably clear that its failure was chiefly due to Preston, and to the cowardly and trimming Earl of Clanricarde, who came to his camp to tamper with him. Nevertheless he occasionally complains of O'Neill, of whom he gives a different account in nearly every alternate letter where his name occurs. In fact, Rinuccini's letters are full of contradictions, owing perhaps to the uncommon and inconsistent characters of the people with whom he had to deal. The state of religious ceremonial in Ireland; the regular orders, particularly the Jesuits; the disposition and propensities of the people, are all differently described in various documents written by the same pen. It is more astonishing to find him declaring to the General Assembly, which met in February, that he had always opposed Glamorgan's peace from the beginning; since he had certainly patronized it to some extent until he knew of the peace which was concluded between Digby and the Pope, and which the Queen disowned, as the King disowned that of Glamorgan.

But Rinuccini's difficulties were only beginning. His rule was one of but short duration, and Ireland was fast going to pieces on the shoals of dissension, short-sightedness, and passion. The General Assembly was convened on the proposal of Bishop French and Nicholas Plunket, whom the Nuncio describes as "good Catholics certainly, but at the same time not bad politicians"; an innuendo undeserved by French at least, who was always sincere, though often mistaken, like the Nuncio himself. The Assembly, though it condemned the "Peace," justified the men who had concocted it. Strangely enough, when we consider that Ireland was not Ormondist, the majority in this General Assembly were so. The fact was that the Ormondists composed the powerful party in the land, being the men who possessed the most fertile acres, and who had not been robbed of their lands by confiscation. At the same time that the Assembly met the old Council were liberated, to share the supreme power with the Nuncio, or rather to take it from him; the army of Munster passed from Glamorgan to Taaffe, and that of Preston was defeated at Dungan Hill. In this juncture O'Neill, deeply hated by the anti-Nuncionists, saved them and Kilkenny. Yet, firm adherent as he was of the ecclesiastic national party, O'Neill was not altogether an advantage to them. If Preston's passionate temper and intriguing spirit were a disgrace and a misfortune to Ormond's adherents, O'Neill's proud and headstrong character was a source of scandal to them; and the Ormondists were just the kind of people who are only too happy to be scandalized. They abused the Nuncio for everything O'Neill did; both the haughtiness of his own conduct and the aggressiveness of his soldiers were laid at Rinuccini's door. The unfortunate legate not only saw matters rapidly go from bad to worse, but was blamed for all that occurred. The supplies promised from Rome were long in coming; the Pope apparently getting tired of throwing his subsidies into the Charybdis of the Confederation. Some even among the Bishops withheld their adhesion from the Nuncio, as though they feared what he might do next; and had he been quick to perceive any flaws in his own conduct, he might have thought that his high-handed proceedings after the taking of Bunratty were responsible for a certain amount of distrust. His chief and now open enemy among the generals had been defeated by the common foe; but the only one who firmly and unflinchingly supported him was a source of a new and different kind of disquiet. In the midst of his troubles he still hoped for some kind of adjustment with the Queen and the Prince of Wales which would have set the two hostile

parties at one; and cherished a vague idea that Glamorgan, now Marquis of Worcester, of whom he speaks in enthusiastic terms in the letters dated towards the end of '47, might be nominated Viceroy in the stead of the fugitive Ormond. Yet had it been so, no doubt there would have sprung up a party among the Confederates hampering him and scheming for Ormond's reappointment.

The General Assembly, meeting again on the 12th of November, gave the Nuncio fresh trouble. The objects of the mad majority apparently were to recall Ormond and to ruin O'Neill; while at the very same time the incompetency of another of their own generals was made manifest by the defeat of Taaffe at Knock-na-Gall. Then arose that idea of foreign protection, which was suggestive of the days when a Spanish protectorate was the aim of O'Neill and O'Donnell, and which again aroused the sinking hopes of the Nuncio. Although the Confederates had given just cause of offence to the Holy See by their abandonment of their own professed aim, they now, always self-contradictory, wished to have the Pope for their protector—an honour which he wisely declined. Another prince named was Rinuccini's natural sovereign, the Grand Duke of Tuscany; and the Nuncio, feeling that in any case it would be difficult for an Irishman to reign over the Irish, even cherished a hope that if one of the Grand Duke's brothers could be called in to take his place at the head of affairs, he might "have a chance of winning the whole kingdom if the king's sons in any manner failed," which was rather hard upon the king's daughters.

But the Protector whom the dominant class really desired was the Marquis of Ormond. According to the usual ill-fortune of the national and religious party, a great number of the Ulster, Munster, and Connaught delegates, "either from poverty or some other cause," did not attend the Assembly, which was chiefly composed of the gentlemen of the Pale, whom the Nuncio bitterly designates as "the mob of Leinster." "All thoughts of a Protector are at an end," he wrote on the 8th of December, 1647. They wished to welcome the Prince of Wales to Ireland. Failing him, they wished for the reappointment of Ormond, which they eventually obtained. In the mean time they did the darkest deed which stains the annals of the Civil War. Inchiquin, changing sides for the sixth time, left the Parliament to join the Royalists; and the newly-elected Council resolved to conclude a truce with him, in order, as the Nuncio doubted not, to join with his the forces of Preston, and thus destroy O'Neill. The Nuncio came to Kilkenny, where he found himself well nigh a prisoner.

"Threats on every hand," he wrote, "were not wanting, and a Carmelite came to inform me that he had heard, under the seal, that there was a plot to take away my life." To this then had come all the brilliant hopes which attended the Nuncio's entry into the marble city! Yet he did not for a moment lose courage. A peace with Inchiquin, who stipulated that the Catholic religion should not be exercised within his quarters—a peace whose true object was a war of extermination against the only general who firmly upheld the Church's cause—could not be countenanced by the Nuncio without betraying his duty and his nature. In this extremity he seized the most direful weapon in the armoury of the Church. The Council proclaimed the truce on the 20th of May; on the 27th the Nuncio pronounced excommunication against all who abetted or respected it, and an interdict against the places where it should be observed. He then fled to O'Neill's camp at Maryborough, and only just in time; for the Council, unable to seize the Archbishop, threw the Dean of Fermo into prison.

This awful sentence is the most doubtful act of Rinuccini's nunciature. A passage in his instructions certainly conferred on him the powers "*censuras et pœnas . . . aggravare, interdictum ecclesiasticum apponere et relaxare*"; but did he use those powers with due discretion? The decree of excommunication against the Council, against Preston and his army, as the active instrument whereby the destruction of O'Neill and the humiliation of the Church were to be accomplished, might be justifiable, and its salutary effects were made evident when 2,000 of the men with whose arms Preston, in conjunction with Inchiquin, was to have crushed his rival, deserted to that rival's camp. But it was a serious responsibility to afflict with the horrors of an interdict the helpless villages and open towns where the offending armies might choose to pass or to quarter themselves. The dead unhallowed, the sinner unabsolved, the darkened lamp of the desolate sanctuary, cried against the severity of the terrible foreigner who had thus taken the bolts of Heaven into his hand. "I know of no occasion," he himself writes in his Report, "when the censure has better deserved the name of a thunderbolt." It was so in a wider sense than he imagined. Doubtless it saved O'Neill, whilst Preston, in one of his most exaggerated passions, declared that this time one or other of them must remain dead upon the field, yet dared not attack his rival. But it inflicted misery on numbers among the innocent people who had now grown accustomed to the open and splendid celebration of religious rites. Some of the Bishops who had

stood by Rinuccini in his rejection of Ormond's peace, and even of this very alliance with Inchiquin, turned against him now, and would not publish the interdict in their dioceses, maintaining that he had not power from Rome to pronounce it. Not only the craven and octogenarian Dease opposed himself, but Rothe and six others, among them "four of those who signed the condemnation of the truce." Rinuccini, with his usual vehemence, avers that "they had no other motive than the fear of losing their property, and the desire to see the faction exalted which they favoured." Yet the circumstance that they had just condemned the proceedings of the Ormondists showed, if anything could, that they did not favour that faction. Perhaps their motive might be that they would not see their flocks deprived of the offices of religion, whilst at the same time they doubted the validity of the censures. The majority of the Bishops, however, with Archbishop O'Reilly at their head, supported the Nuncio; and O'Neill, who had good reason to be grateful to him, declared his intention of defending him to the last. Henceforth, while the Nuncio remained in the land, their causes were indissolubly bound up together. After the publication of the censures, there could be nothing less than war to the knife between Rinuccini and the Ormondists.

He himself did not for a moment regret his own severity. Indeed, to judge by his correspondence, he seldom did regret his own actions; or if so, he was at least prudent enough not generally to acknowledge it. The nearest approach to such an acknowledgment with respect to the censures is his statement to Cardinal Panzirolo that "the effects of the interdict have been various"; after which he proceeds to complain of those who had not observed it. But in general his feeling appears to be one of self-complacency. From Athlone, where he had taken refuge in June, his Dean being in prison and much of his property sequestered, he wrote on the 4th of July to Cardinal Panzirolo, justifying himself in the strongest terms. "My determination," he says, "to resort to the interdict may appear a bold one, and I know that the Council will represent it at Rome as unjust; but before God and His Holiness I can prove it to have been absolutely necessary, as the last and only means of averting the downfall of religion." Whether the modern readers into whose hands his letters have fallen endorse the Nuncio's opinion of his own proceedings or not, they must surely agree with the conclusion of another of his missives from Athlone to the same Cardinal, wherein he exclaims "Nevertheless, it will be a subject of wonder to posterity, why, when the whole Con-

federation could have been secured to the King by the appointment of a Catholic Viceroy, the Queen should have persisted in an opposite course, by which the King will obtain nothing but a country weakened by intestine quarrels, and divided into so many factions that it will be impossible to know whom to trust."

There was not one who could be trusted among the Ormondists. Whatever the Nuncio's errors of judgment, whatever the faults of O'Neill's disposition, the honour of a gentleman and the devotion of a Christian found sanctuary throughout the struggle in the hearts only of the party which they headed and defended. But the Nuncio's part in that struggle was nearly over. From Athlone he fled to Galway, having a predilection for that rich and ancient quasi-Spanish port, which he fancifully described as being between two worlds; but possibly much of its charm for him consisted in its affording him an exit from Ireland, whereof he would gladly have availed himself long before had duty permitted. Here he convoked a synod, but with three hostile armies perambulating the country most of the Bishops found it difficult to reach him. The majority of them nevertheless supported him still, and equalled him in valour. His position had become insufferable. Blockaded as it were in Galway by Clanricarde; robbed of much of his property by the Council, when he was already impoverished by the large donation which he had made to the national cause; declared a rebel worthy only to be expelled from the kingdom,—his last hope was in O'Neill and Macdonell, the Marquis of Antrim, who had raised a tolerably large force, and had defeated Preston and Inchiquin in isolated battles. But their enemies were too many to permit their absolute triumph; they preserved their own existence, but failed to alter the current of affairs. Whether they might have done so or not can never now be known; but O'Neill's conduct certainly displayed an extreme of caution which is difficult to account for. He advanced victoriously to the walls of Kilkenny, and might have cut the knot of the difficulty by taking it and dispersing the Council on the spot where their web was woven; but on the approach of Inchiquin he showed that kind of prudence which seldom raises a general in the eyes of either friend or foe, and retreated into Tipperary. On another occasion he trapped Clanricarde, Inchiquin, and their army, when after keeping them at his mercy for a week he allowed them to march off unmolested. He excused himself by saying that the interests which would have hung on the battle were too important to be risked in fight, and that now he had his army, whereas if he

had fought he might have lost it. But of what use was it to keep an army which did nothing to serve the cause it existed to defend, and which, when its brightest opportunity offered, saved itself for others? Not that O'Neill's subordinates were to blame; they were eager for action, and when, as Rinuccini rather bitterly complains, the Ulster prince left unaided in Galway the Nuncio who had done and suffered so much on his behalf, Colonel Macguire entreated his general to let him push with 2,000 men into the passes of Connaught. But the worthy scion of the chivalrous house of Fermanagh was slain on the way; and the Nuncio was left to his fate, and to the powerless sympathy of the devout people of Galway. He now only waited to see whether Ormond returned and was accepted by the Council, since he held firmly to the principle that the same island could not contain himself and a heretic ruler of Catholics.

That happened which he had anticipated with horror, except for the one fact that it made it his duty to depart from Ireland. Ormond landed at Cork on the 29th of September, and proceeded leisurely to Carrick-on-Suir. On the invitation of the General Assembly he passed on to Kilkenny, which he entered amid acclamations as great as those which had greeted the Nuncio four years previously, and where the Confederation laid itself down and died at his feet. Nothing therefore was left to Rinuccini but to return to his sunny and sighed-for home; to return to the world in fact, for since his retirement to Galway his enemies had succeeded in intercepting most of his letters. Having relieved the towns from the interdict, he left powers with six Bishops to absolve private persons from the excommunication, and amid the sobs of the faithful Galwegians embarked on board his own hardly-rescued frigate, the *San Pietro*, not many days after the head of Charles I. had fallen on the scaffold. When he was already on board some members of the defunct Supreme Council came to him to be absolved from the censures. Now that he was actually leaving the Irish shores, the nation seemed to breathe forth a sigh of regret for the loss of one who, amid the bewildering politics of the time, was ever the faithful and incorruptible friend of Ireland.

Notwithstanding all that the perversity and prejudice of the King had made him suffer, none was more shocked at his fate than Rinuccini, as none had been more anxious to save him when living. But Charles always mistook his own interests. In spite of his studied enmity towards the Irish Catholics, the regicides made his dealing with them one of the charges against him; and the Nuncio was probably cor-

rect in his opinion that "the party who, as they boasted, wished to conclude this peace and recall the Marquis solely for the benefit of his Majesty, have rather hastened than retarded his death." As to the powers abroad who might have been expected to feel some indignation against subjects who had murdered their king, they cared but little for the fate of Charles. Spain leagued with the Commonwealth; and Mazarin bought his pictures. Ireland alone adhered honestly to the cause of his heir; and the consequences were, as Rinuccini had prophesied in a letter from St. Vaast, that she fell under the power of the Puritans and Cromwell's reign of terror, which she exchanged only for the bitterer perfidies of Charles II.

So ended the Irish Nunciature of Rinuccini, Archbishop of Fermo. Practically it was a complete failure. He went to Ireland to establish the public exercise of the Catholic religion in its full glory and splendour; and though the Council on its final capitulation to Ormond stipulated for such an exercise, owing, as the Nuncio justly argues, to the lessons he had taught, they had no guarantee but Ormond's word, and Ormond's authority was then more than doubtful; whilst when they held the sword in their hands the king would neither positively grant the demand, nor would they positively enforce it. Thus was allowed to ebb the tide which, "taken at the flood" would have led on a firm and united Confederation to a condition of power and consistency, and enabled them to fling back the Puritan invader and keep their temples from the defiling tread of his iron heel.

Again, Rinuccini came to help the King. But the King would not be helped. Leaning now one way, now the other, he finally decided to throw himself into the hands of men who sold him back to his enemies, rather than those who were willing to spend and be spent in his service in return for the security of their religion. Rinuccini came to be a bond of union to the Confederates; soon there was a party called by his name. Rinuccini came to help the English Catholics; they were crushed under the folly of the Irish Confederates. He returned leaving the King beheaded, the Parliament triumphant in England, a Protestant Lieutenant in Ireland, and the only Irish leader who was loyal to the Church reduced to choose between the alliance of the man who had ruined the Confederation and that of the Puritans who hated the very name of Catholic. Retired once more within his beloved Fermo, surrounded by an affectionate flock, Rinuccini was out of the storm; but it had already beaten

upon him too severely, and he died three years and six months after his return to his See, at the age of sixty-one.

Yet the failure of Rinuccini is preferable to the success of Ormond. The selfish triumph of the one is outshone by the disinterestedness of the other's defeat. Ormond ruined the affairs of every one whom he professed to serve, and yet his own career was that of an eminently prosperous man; Rinuccini failed with the failure of the cause he had espoused, and was impoverished by it, whereas Ormond was always enriched; Rinuccini's fault was excess of zeal, Ormond's was excess of diplomacy.

Rinuccini was no saint; he was not what St. Charles Borromeo would have been under the like circumstances. But he was essentially a good Catholic, uncorrupt, virtuous, and determined not to yield an iota of the Church's principles and the Church's dignity. Most of his letters possess a singularly religious tone, which was however more common in the correspondence of those days than in that of our own. Religious similes flow naturally from his pen. In the name of his frigate, the *San Pietro*, he sees a promise of the heavenly patronage of the first Pope. In the meanness of the shieling which was his earliest shelter on Irish soil, he sees a likeness to the stable of Bethlehem. He hopes in the wonders that may be wrought by prayer, and that not merely as a becoming profession of faith, but with an earnestness which shows that the spiritual were to him the most present of all realities. His courage and perseverance were of the unflinching sort which naturally results from such a character. He clung to his post until he could remain there no longer without a compromise of the Apostolic dignity. What were the difficulties of that post none can perhaps entirely appreciate save him who filled it; and a good many of them are summed up in his own exclamation to Cardinal Panzirolo,—“Blessed are the Nuncios who are on terra firma; since those on islands, if not incarcerated by man, are sure to be imprisoned at all events by Nature.”

ART. VII.—THE FALL OF MR. GLADSTONE'S
GOVERNMENT.

Address to the Electors of Greenwich. By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. *Times*, 24th January, 1874.

Five Speeches on Irish Questions. By the Right Hon. C. P. FORTESCUE. London : R. J. Bush.

Shooting Niagara ; and After ? By THOMAS CARLYLE. (*Macmillan's Magazine*, August, 1867.)

WHY and how Mr. Gladstone's Government, after a period of such unexampled prowess and achievement, came to most utter shipwreck through a blunder of the sudden, is a theme which will long exercise the speculation and research of the political critic. The causes are many, public and private ; and, as yet, it is probable we know but imperfectly those of which we know most. In the front rank stand the passions of the two nations most affected by the legislation of the last Parliament. Ireland appeared only to exhibit a sullen ingratitude for the policy which had abolished Protestant ascendancy, and turned her tenants at will into a propertyed peasantry. England bitterly resented the seeming failure of that noble effort to redress past oppression, to which she had at first given her assent with doubt and reluctance, but at last with a magnanimous and steadfast will. Yet that policy has not failed, but is a solid basis from which are already spreading, and will spread, relations of peace and goodwill between the two countries to the end of time. The Fenian conspiracy is dissolved. Mr. Isaac Butt and Mr. Philip Callan are much less difficult persons to deal with than Mr. James Stephens and General Cluseret. Agrarian crime is all but extinct. "Do not," as Lord Plunket once well and wisely said, "entertain the childish expectation that concession will operate as a charm, and that at the very moment the storm has ceased to blow, the waves will subside and the murmurs will be hushed ; but feel convinced that agitation cannot be formidable or lasting, and that in rendering justice you must obtain security."

Though, however, the supposed failure of his Irish policy first shook the power of Mr. Gladstone's Government, a host of other causes and interests arose in vengeance to answer his appeal to the country with a sentence of ostracism. The

Education Act had produced a radical division of principle in the Liberal party, and it was evident throughout last year that the pressure of the Dissenters was gradually warping the policy of the Ministry on that subject—Mr. Gladstone's own language, regarding the 25th clause, growing gradually weaker and more halting as his canvass of Greenwich progressed. This produced the real reaction, which was not so much Conservative in its character, as defensive of the principle of religious education; and the proof of this is, that while it would be difficult to name any canon of Tory policy, in the old sense of the word, on which Mr. Disraeli could carry the full force of his party with him, there would be a sure majority of not less than 150 votes, and probably many more, against any attack on the 25th clause, in the present Parliament.

Another gradually accumulating cause of the unpopularity of the Government, was not merely the inefficiency but the thorough badness of the administration of several of the great departments. Mr. Bruce's administration of the Home Office was on great occasions at once obstinate and helpless. It is to him that his party is entirely indebted for the damaging, and not altogether causeless, hostility of the publicans. It is the first time that the influence of the *cabaret*, long dominant in Continental, especially in Belgian politics, has been so seriously felt in England. Despite his monstrous surplus—we will not go quite so far as to say because of it,—Mr. Lowe's finance was bad finance, immethodic, wanting in forecast, clumsy in contrivance. If he had not been in many other ways a personage of great and of dangerous powers, his Match-tax Budget should have closed his connection with the Treasury. All his faults as an administrator were intensified by the exuberant and mischievous insolence of his temper. So far as the influence of individuals is concerned, he more than any other member of the Government (Mr. Disraeli is so far right) contributed to its fall. His relations with other officials were such as perhaps no previous British Minister ever entertained. In the simply scandalous series of departmental quarrels which were revealed on the eve of the rising of Parliament last autumn, there was certainly no sympathy with Mr. Lowe and Mr. Ayrton. When they met it was felt that Tartar met Tartar; but there was an indecency in the mere fact that a Ministry should contain two persons whose tempers suggested what Mr. Daniel Quilp might have resembled had he been reared to public life. Had they both been relieved of office then, the public would have been well content; but on the contrary, those whose conduct in the transactions disclosed was almost if not absolutely blameless, were allowed or con-

strained to resign. There was not a blot on Mr. Baxter's official character. Mr. Monsell's defence of his conduct was clear and convincing. They were both sacrificed to those influences which apparently enabled Mr. Lowe at that time to dispute the supremacy of his own Cabinet with Mr. Gladstone. For a further proof of the fact may be adduced the circumstance that Mr. Gladstone, though with body and spirit confessedly yielding under pressure of over-work, felt compelled himself to relieve Mr. Lowe at the Exchequer; Mr. Bright, with health still feeble, and influence of late necessarily declining, was reluctantly brought back to the Cabinet; while the accomplished administrative energy and the sound financial knowledge of Mr. Childers, the steady principle and good sense of Lord Ripon, were unaccountably dropped out. Had all this happened at the commencement instead of the end of the session, it is evident Mr. Gladstone could not have continued to hold office for six weeks. It was not merely a question of the relative strength or weakness of one cast of the Cabinet over the other, as that the changes, closely considered, indicated that the Premier had ceased to be master in his own house. He knew as well as the rest of the world which were the crows and which the doves, between whom he was dealing out condonation and censure.

In these days many things that are state secrets one month become ancient history the next, but we are as yet, and may long remain, ignorant of the immediate causes of the sudden dissolution. Still no doubt the inadequate reconstruction of the Cabinet in August, and especially the awkward doubt about Mr. Gladstone's double office, must have had much to say to his decision. It is easy to conceive that but for internal and personal difficulties, a better arrangement of the Cabinet might have been made in August, and if the Government thus strengthened and re-formed had met Parliament with good news from Ashantee, and with a budget containing the financial proposals announced in the Greenwich address, Mr. Disraeli might at this moment have been commencing another long spell of opposition.

But, instead, came Dissolution and the Deluge; not the democratic deluge of which we were warned of old, that should sweep away all dykes—and dukes—with its ugly rush, but a deluge warranted to strengthen dykes, and to carry dukes gently along to the top of the tree. To the astonishment of Mr. Bright and others, it suddenly transpired that England was two-thirds residuum. It also became evident that, travestying Napoleon's phrase, you had only to scratch the Rough (long enough), and you would find a Tory. Mr.

Carlyle, astonished, saw Niagara shot with the happiest results, especially to the noble lords whom he had warned in the last words of his prescient pamphlet, that their day as a governing class was done—and that it only remained for them to “go yachting to Algeria, and shoot lions for an occupied existence; or stay at home and hunt rats? Why not? Is not, in strict truth, the ratcatcher our one *real* British Nimrod now?” Nevertheless, if there was one point on which the popular voice spoke with supreme distinctness, it was on the necessity of a new Downing Street, strong in noble lords: and especially that the particular marquess, who has, of all his order, the most exalted estimate of the place of the British peer in the British Constitution, should be called on to cope with the gigantic difficulty of the Indian famine. It was not less evidently the will of the country that Mr. Disraeli should be Prime Minister, than that Lord Salisbury should be Indian Secretary. If rumour be not all wrong, that noble marquess has in quarterly reviews and otherwise, uttered lamentations almost as loud, long, and lugubrious as those of Mr. Carlyle, over the ruin brought upon the Tory policy and party by the Parliamentary Reform of 1867; and a more ingenious exercise of the peculiar powers of the late Mr. Savage Landor cannot be conceived, than an imaginary conversation on the result of their respective apprehensions and vaticinations concerning democracy and Mr. Disraeli, between the Indian Secretary and him whom his disciples revere as “the Prophet of Chelsea.”

“Nay, have not I,” said the Prophet,* “a kind of secret satisfaction of the malicious, or even of the judiciary kind, that he they call ‘Dizzy’ is to do it; that other jugglers of an unconscious and deeper type, having sold their poor mother’s body for a mess of official pottage, this clever, conscious juggler steps in: ‘Soft you, my honourable friends, I will weigh-out the corpse of your mother (mother of mine she never was, but only stepmother and milk-cow), and you sha’n’t have the pottage: ~~not~~ yours, you observe, but mine!’ This really is a pleasing trait of its sort. Other traits there are abundantly ludicrous, but they are too lugubrious to be even momentarily pleasant. A superlative Hebrew conjuror, spell-binding all the great lords, great parties, great interests of England, to his hand in this manner, and leading them by the nose, like helpless, mesmerized somnambulant cattle to such issue,—did the world ever see a *febile ludibrium* of such magnitude before? Lath Sword and Scissors of Destiny; Pickle-Herring and the three *Parcæ* alike busy in it. This, too, I suppose we had deserved. The end of our poor old England (such an England as we had at last made of it), to be not a tearful tragedy, but an ignominious farce as well.”

Has, then, the end of “our poor old England,” verily and

* “Shooting Niagara: and After?”

indeed come? The Hebrew conjuror, like Lord Chatham in Mr. Grattan's description, stands alone, the most isolated person in the Empire he governs, alone on the very pinnacle of supreme power. He has been caricatured as Samson pulling down the pillars of Parliament on Philistine Peers, rashly trustful to his strength. But has not the time come when he may be more fitly compared to that most illustrious Hebrew who led his followers long through the Desert, painfully educating them all the weary way, until at last the Promised Land is safely reached? Nor does he omit to enter. There was much prophecy as to his performances upon the British Constitution, and it is difficult to say whether Mr. Carlyle's or Lord Salisbury's was the more dismal or the more absurd. But who had the hardihood to predict that "poor old England," with Household Suffrage and the Ballot to her hands, would send up a Tory majority of one hundred, so that but for the abounding Liberalism of Scotland and Ireland, all political progress might have to be arrested, if not indeed constrained to go backwards, for a century or two? There was but one such prophet, the superlative spell-binding Hebrew conjuror himself, and it may be doubted whether he believed his prophecy a bit more than the rest of the world, until by what Mr. Carlyle might call a species of "fluke-miracle," it came to be accomplished. Mr. Carlyle predicted three proximate, if not immediate results, of Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill:—"Democracy to complete itself"—"the Church, all Churches and so-called Religions, the Christian Religion itself" to "deliquesce"—and "unlimited Free Trade." The present Parliament certainly does not look like Democracy completing itself. The demagogues, the stump-orators, the professors, fared lamentably ill everywhere except in Ireland. So far as Great Britain is concerned, it is a Parliament strong in the elements of aristocracy and property, in which Captains of Industry abound, while Chevaliers of Industry also are not wholly wanting. It has no intention of attacking any Church, or any religion. "Deliquescence," even disestablishment is far from its thought. The Dissenters are "dished" even as were the Whigs. Birmingham Leaguers and the whole Secularist sect are politically derelict. A religious education remains legally possible in England, may be even made compulsory. In fine, as to Free Trade, so far from its becoming universal, who may presume to predict how long Free Trade in (say) British coal will be permitted? Do not economists daily complain that the public opinion of democratic communities tends in the present age to become more and more Protectionist? Certainly at Melbourne and New York it is Protection against

British Industry, which is now probably past the help of Protection itself, that Democracy demands. But British Industry, which now presses for quite another kind of Protection, at present only partially attaining it by way of Strikes, is not at all minded to allow its wages to be regulated by what Mr. Carlyle calls "unlimited Free Trade."

It is, so far as we are aware, the first time in our constitutional history that a Prime Minister has secured the complete confidence of the country on the precise ground that he has no policy, and cannot undertake to have a policy, until he has been for some little time in office. Such an act of faith on the part of a nation by no means given to sentimental confidence in its public men, would be remarkable enough, if the Prime Minister were a person like Lord Chatham or the Duke of Wellington, whose actions were the best arguments and sanctions for his authority. But, justly or unjustly, the fact is, that there never was a person in Mr. Disraeli's position, who until now was so little trusted by the country at large or by his own party. In the aged bosom of our poor old England, however, confidence has in his case proved to be not a plant of slow growth: it has sprung up like the Arabian magician's tree in a single night. It is, perhaps, as well under the circumstances that Mr. Disraeli has no policy improvised, but will be content to administer things as they are, until he has looked at the state of public business, and begun to feel the ceaseless anxiety that comes of official charge. No doubt there is a great temptation to one, who, on the verge of his seventieth year, in a prosperous time, has suddenly attained the highest office, with a degree of power which he can hardly ever have expected, to take his term of authority in a spirit of meek magnanimity, and regard "whate'er is best administered as best." But power also has its temptations, and even its obligations, and it is the first time in his career that Mr. Disraeli has felt himself in possession of real power. He is honoured by the admiring confidence of his Sovereign. He controls the House of Lords, he commands the House of Commons. The Opposition is in a state of utter distraction, and hardly knows how far it has got principles to maintain or a leader to follow. At such a moment it is possible that the rumour is not unfounded which ascribes to Mr. Disraeli the ambition of "making a little history" during his period of administration. There may be a proud spirit within him, proclaiming that it is not enough to have settled the political constitution of England on a basis as solid as Magna Charta, and to have taught the Tory Party to trust implicitly to the sound sense and genial instincts of the masses. Once upon a time England had a foreign policy. In those days a Prussian

minister would not have been permitted to domineer over every Government, and by his continual intrigues bring confusion into the affairs of every state in Europe. England's trident, England's bayonets, England's purse, would have reduced Prince von Bismarck to a due sense of his place in the councils of the Continent. Mr. Pitt tried to reform Parliament, tried to settle Europe; and failed in both. Why should not Mr. Disraeli, who has succeeded in the one, attempt the other? Evidently the first step in such a task is a great navy, and we are not surprised to observe that Mr. Ward Hunt is already crying out that the British Navy is quite unworthy (as to its boilers) of the power that pretends to be the mistress of the seas.

Mr. Disraeli's party, confident in their leaders and flushed with triumph, as they are, will, nevertheless, perhaps need a considerable further education before consenting to take up Mr. Pitt's interrupted task. So in finance, they were willing to continue the malt-tax, but would hardly have agreed to sacrifice a part of the surplus to relieve starvation in Bengal, as Mr. Disraeli in one of his Bucks speeches suggested. It may be doubted, even, whether, accepting the suggestion of a sentence which fell from Sir Michael Hicks Beach lately, and which shows that the Irish Secretary is at all events no statesman, the present Tory Party would be prepared to re-establish the Protestant church and de-legalize tenant-right in Ireland. The leaders confessedly have not as yet got a policy, and when they have invented or discovered one, it is not quite clear that it will be the policy of the Party. It will be interesting to observe, as time passes and political forces play more freely, what Tory reaction really amounts to. The stars in their courses were supposed to have decided against such a possibility as a strong Tory Government, backed by a strong Tory majority, ever holding power in England again. Liberal principles were believed to be identified with Progress, the extension of civilization, and the advance of the age. That the world was, as it were, condemned to move in the track of those principles, people who were most opposed to them, in sad perplexity and murmuring more or less against Providence, admitted. There is a great Tory Party again, however, and a strong majority; but for what? It is difficult, as we have already observed, to name any great question on which the present Parliament can be said to be committed beyond a doubt, except education. In regard to education, the general election gave a great, unforeseen, and undiscounted result. If the last Parliament had continued sitting to the present time, it would almost certainly have modified the 25th clause of the Education Act, under the conviction that it was yielding to

popular pressure. Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lowe, in speeches during the general election, both spoke as if the showing a yielding disposition on this point would help to restore the confidence of the country. But the country elected a Parliament whose chief title to respect, whose strongest pervading principle is regard for religious education. If the present House of Commons should be called to divide on the 25th clause, it is not merely that every vote of the Tory majority of 50 would be cast on one side, but all the representatives of Catholic Ireland, some sixty to seventy votes, and the considerable number of moderate Liberals, who, on educational questions, hold the views of Mr. Forster and Lord Carlingford. On this one question, Mr. Disraeli is sure to keep, and even to easily treble his majority. Such a majority would not be content with merely maintaining the *status quo*, if liberty of education in a religious sense did not involve certain concessions to Irish and Catholic interests, for which the Tory Party is at present as little prepared as the Liberal.

It is impossible to avoid allusion to the Irish elections—an ungrateful task. Their main result was the election of a heterogeneous Home Rule party, numbering, nominally, some fifty votes, which, owing to the balance of power in the present Parliament, is, in the first place, a grave additional source of weakness to the side on which it sits, but which, even if the majority of the Government were less certain and solid, does not, it is superfluous to say, contain within itself those elements of moral and intellectual power which make great political causes triumph against all obstacles—as Free Trade did under the inspiring influence of Cobden and Bright, or Catholic Emancipation under that of Grattan, Plunket, and O'Connell. The Home Rule Party may be regarded as composed of three sections. There is Mr. Butt's peculiar following, a number of gentlemen who have been for some time identified with the small political association which he has founded in Dublin; there is a section composed of gentlemen, Liberal in their politics, and warm supporters not merely of Mr. Gladstone's but some of them of Lord Palmerston's Government, who found it, if not necessary, in a very high degree politic to take the Home Rule pledge in order to secure their seats, or at least to please their constituents; there is then a considerable number of the class known in American politics as "carpet-baggers," gentlemen utterly unknown to and unconnected with the constituencies they represent; who, at a day's notice, took up the cry of Home Rule very much as they might that of "Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister," or the "Repeal of the Contagious

Diseases Acts ;" and for whom were not unfrequently rejected gentlemen of long-established character and eminent public services. The right of the Irish nation to contend for a simple repeal, or for a modification of the terms of the Act of Union by all lawful political means is not to be disputed ; but the time and the mode in which agitation is pursued often involve questions that affect not only the wisdom but the honour of a country. Certainly the honour of Ireland was deeply stained by not a few of the transactions connected with the general election. There is not even one of the newly-elected who would have the hardihood to assert in his place in Parliament that Ireland did not owe to the Government of Mr. Gladstone much consideration, and even great gratitude. Nations, no more than men, are dispensed from the obligation of good feeling towards their benefactors ; and to Ireland the Government of Mr. Gladstone had been a great benefactor. It is no exaggeration, nevertheless, to say that if that Government had been the worst instead of the best Government Ireland had ever known ; if it had repealed the Emancipation Act, reimposed tithes, extended the operation of the Ecclesiastical Titles Act in the direction of recent Austrian, Swiss, and German legislation, armed the landlords with fresh powers of restricting tenure, and enforcing eviction, it could not have been more truculently and flagrantly assailed. "A nation," said Mr. Burke, "is a moral essence ;" and there are moments in the history of all nations when they seem to be possessed of foul demons ; and although Ireland in its peculiar paroxysms of popular passion is not so terrible an object as England in a fit of No Popery, or France in the full swing of a Reign of Terror, its public spirit presents on such occasions aspects not less sore and loathsome. What Irishman who has ever read them can forget the tender, terrible lines in which Moore expressed his indignant disgust at the similar outburst of insensate brutality into which the heroic purpose and massive union of the agitation for Catholic emancipation guttered down ?

The dream of those days when first I sung thee is o'er,
 Thy triumph hath stained the charm thy sorrows then wore ;
 And even of the light which Hope once shed o'er thy chains,
 Alas, not a gleam to grace thy Freedom remains !

The Athenians were not less eager to expel Aristides, the Dutch to tear John de Witt limb from limb, than the Irish populace showed itself to banish from public life every Irishman who had taken a leading part in relieving from oppression the altars and hearths of his country. It is marvellous to remember that the members of the late Government, against

whom the most inveterate malignity was manifested, had been elected for their constituencies again and again, with every display of popular confidence and enthusiasm, while the Liberal Party was still insensible to the claims of the Irish people; but that when, largely through their influence, that Party had been awakened to a sense of its public duty, and had to a great extent undone the evil legislation of three centuries in less than three years, these very men found themselves the object of unlimited execration and outrage. Mr. Monsell had been returned at the head of the poll for the county of Limerick in every election since the year 1847. He had held office under Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston. He had invariably declined the usual hustings pledges exacted from popular candidates; yet he had always been elected with the cordial confidence of the clergy and people of Limerick. He served Catholic interests in many memorable ways. No Catholic member of Parliament in our time has had an influence so considerable. But if the well-advised favour of the Crown had not raised him to the peerage, there is little doubt that his long and faithful service, and his active participation in the Irish policy of the last ministry, would not have prevented his being hustled out of public life. The Louth election stands in Irish political history, like the Clare election, unique—the one in its infamy, as the other in its glory. Ireland has given since the Union its fair tale of statesmen to the cabinets of England—the Wellesleys, the Cannings, Lord Castlereagh, Lord Palmerston, Lord Monteagle, Lord Mayo, Lord Cairns. But it has never yet happened, in the whole period of the connection between the two countries, that an Irish statesman could present himself to his constituents, bearing as the result of his tenure of office such messages of peace and testimonies of service, as the act which disestablished the Church, and the act which freed the land. This was Mr. Fortescue's peculiar, eminent, and happy privilege. The "political anatomy of Ireland"—a gloomy phrase, as old as the days of Sir William Petty, but which has not lost its significance—could not be more effectively and exhaustively studied than on the narrow field which was the scene of the election that ensued. A true and exact dissection of the history of that election would be one of the greatest services that could be rendered to political opinion in Ireland. It is impossible, at least immediately, to estimate the damage that is done to the character of a country by conduct so wanton and ungrateful. But it may at least be said that the power of the Irish popular party, which could never have been a very serious power in the present Parliament, loses

almost all its moral force through its association with such acts, and with their perpetrators.

Time is sure to avenge crimes and follies such as these ; and their first result promises to be that in the present Parliament Irish affairs are likely to be of very insignificant importance. With a Tory majority of 50, with the Liberal Party alienated, it is idle to discuss the prospects of an Irish popular party, with a cause on even the proper interpretation of which it is not agreed. From such a Parliament O'Connell deliberately withdrew to agitate. Mr. Gladstone has never been tempted by the treatment he has received to utter one word of indignation or regret. He may well await with manly patience the sure results of his policy and the grateful verdict of history. He can afford to regard with magnanimous pity or at least with silent scorn the unworthy spirit displayed with such wanton energy against himself and his colleagues. That chapter of Irish history is now closed. There will be no attempt made, we are sure, to disturb the two great settlements of religion and property which it records. A long period of Tory Government lies before us—a period which will very probably last for at least the term of two Parliaments. Mr. Disraeli's Government of Ireland will have no temptation to ambitious achievements. He will probably encourage public works, and perhaps follow the precedent established in the case of election petitions, by sending private bills to be tried by a commission taking evidence in the locality. There is always a considerable difference between the spirit of the executive in Ireland, when the Government is Tory and when it is Liberal ; and with Mr. Cross at the Home Office and Sir Michael Hicks Beach at the Castle, it may be safely predicted that Ireland will be very carefully, but at the same time very strictly administered. Already the stringent press law, which was passed in 1870, but hardly ever called into action under Lord Spencer's administration, has been set in motion against a Dublin journal of large circulation. We believe that if there should offer any occasion, or even temptation, the Castle will employ all such powers to their full extent. The spirit of impartial equity, in which Lord O'Hagan was gradually reforming the magistracy, can hardly be expected to actuate his successor ; if, indeed, he should have any successor in the ancient and eminent office of Chancellor which he filled with such distinction. A Tory Viceroy looks to the Protestant gentry when he is in office with the same reliance that a French Minister of the Interior looks to his *maires* ; and this is another guarantee that, though Mr. Disraeli's Government will hardly have any considerable legislative policy, its administration will

be vigilant and stringent. Ten years of such a policy will not delay the development of the solid : or . . . policy. Religious peace must extend, the prosperity of the Irish people in the Irish soil must increase, whether (Whig or Tory. It will be a dull time; but a good loss of decent dulness is perhaps a not inappropriate the wild unreason and gross ingratitude with which the populace conspired to hurl from power the first English Government which united its policy and its force with the cause of Ireland.

Notices of Books.

[We much regret that we inadvertently inserted in our last number a short notice criticising unfavourably Canon Estcourt's work on Anglican ordinations. The writer of that notice has of course every possible right to his own opinion on the subject; but it was not in our pages that that opinion should have been expressed, as we had published a warm commendation of the learned Canon's excellent volume.]

Sin and its Consequences. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster.
London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

IN these eight sermons on Sin and its Consequences the Archbishop of Westminster places before his flock the long familiar fundamental truths of Christianity in a simple and forcible form, which reminds us that "every scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven is like to a man that is a householder, who bringeth forth out of his treasure new things and old." They are the old, immutable, eternal truths, and yet in the unfathomable depths of their wisdom they are ever new, suggesting fresh unthought-of ideas, and interesting and impressing us as if we had never before heard them. Besides the happy development of this characteristic of Divine revelation, there are several passages specially directed to the circumstances of the present time. These cannot be too widely circulated, and therefore we quote them unhesitatingly. For instance, in the first sermon on "The Nature of Sin," the Archbishop explains that "God wrote upon the conscience of man, even in the state of nature, the outline of His own perfections"; that "the conformity of man to the will of God, to the perfections of God, is the sanctity or the perfection of the human soul"; and that in every sin there are two objects, "the law and the Lawgiver—the law of God known to us, and the Giver of that law, who is God Himself; so that we deliberately, with our eyes open and of our own free will, break God's law in God's face."

Another important truth is strongly enforced in the second sermon, on "Mortal Sin":—

"There are among us, going to and fro, as there are in foreign countries, mockers, scoffers, blasphemers, ministers of Satan, apostles of lies, who say there is no hell. . . . Satan is always endeavouring to efface this belief out of the minds of men—doing everything he can by subtle philosophy,

by specious reasoning, by appeals to the mercy of God, by wonderful exaltations of the Divine perfections, and criticisms upon the Greek Testament, by laughter, derision, scoffing, and mockery, before which many a man who is not afraid of going into battle is coward enough to run away. Satan is always endeavouring to root out the belief of eternal fire from the minds of men. I will tell you why. Because the greater multitude of men have so little hunger and thirst after God, so little aspiration after union with Him, that they are conscious only of the fear of an eternal pain to keep them from sin. If he could only efface from the minds of men the thought of eternal pain, there is nothing left to restrain them; and for this he is always labouring. There is nothing Satan loves better than to get men to laugh at him, to use his name in jest, to interlard their conversation with some reference to him in mocking levity, which very soon makes men cease to fear him, and then cease to believe in his existence. On the other hand, God is . . . perpetually reviving in every one of us the sense and belief that there is hereafter a judgment and a condemnation to eternal fire."

The sermon on "The Dereliction on the Cross" is very touching, and the more so from the absence of every attempt to work upon the feelings. It is a simple narration of facts—and what can be more touching than the awful and mysterious facts of the Crucifixion? Nothing can be better calculated to excite compunction, which His Grace tells us, all sorrows of the body, of the mind, or of the soul are intended to produce, and which is

"the sorrow of the heart that is pierced with Jesus Christ. Until we have come to the foot of the Cross, and have contemplated the Five Wounds of our Divine Saviour, and the love of the Sacred Heart through His side opened by the lance, and until we have entered into His love, and sorrowed because of that love, and because of our own want of love, and because of our own ingratitude, our sorrow is not worthy of the name of compunction. He is perfecting in you this generous sorrow. If you are suffering pains of body, unite them with the sufferings of Jesus Christ upon His Cross. If you have mental pains . . . unite them with the mental sorrows of Jesus dying upon the Cross. If you are suffering spiritual dryness, and darkness, and desolation, and distance from God, as you think, unite them with His Dereliction. Do not say, 'My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?' Say, 'My God, my God, I know well how I deserve this desolation. I know well how all my life has merited that I should be forsaken; but my hope is in Thy love, which has never forsaken those that trust in Thee.'"

In the last sermon, on "The Joys of the Resurrection," His Grace incites us to cultivate those fruits of the Holy Ghost—charity to God and our neighbour, liberty from bondage to the world and to self, and a spirit of thanksgiving and praise—which are the visible notes that we are heirs of those joys. And finally having led us from the sepulchre to the Kingdom of the Resurrection, he concludes by reminding us that

"If we be children of the Resurrection, heaven is ours: and heaven is near; we know not how long or how soon our day may be. Before Easter next we may be in the light of the Kingdom; or we may be in its outskirts, expiating and waiting for the vision of God. What matter, then, a little pain, a little sorrow, a little penance, a few crosses, if, after a little while, there be an inheritance of eternal joy?"

Essays on Religion and Literature. By various Writers. Edited by the Archbishop of Westminster. London : King & Co.

Prospectus of S. Joseph's Theological Library. Edited by Fathers S. J. London : Burns & Oates.

WE have the greatest possible pleasure in drawing the attention of our readers to the Prospectus of S. Joseph's Theological Library. It runs as follows :—

"The object of S. Joseph's Theological Library is to publish a series of Theological and Philosophical Works, written from the Roman Catholic point of view. Among Theological Works will be included Catechetical Treatises or Explanations, which are in fact the theology of the laity.

"The Theological Library will consist of Translations, works adapted from the writings of foreign authors, and lastly, original works.

"The Editors believe that such a library will prove useful to several classes of readers. In the first place it will be useful to the Catholic laity of England. Laymen in England find themselves confronted by an un-Christian, if not an anti-Christian, literature ; the English thought of the present day is tainted with unbelief and scepticism. Catholics in England cannot escape from its influence ; they must resist it, or, to a greater or less extent, they will succumb to it. It cannot be said too emphatically, or too frequently, that the safety and the strength of the Catholic are to be found in a thorough scientific knowledge of his religion.

"The attacks on revelation have descended from the professor's chair, they have discarded the folio volume, they court publicity in periodicals, magazines, unpretending duodecimos. The defences of faith must be popularized also ; theology, the science of faith, the science which defends faith, and which is built on the *data* of faith, must be popularized and must be spread about in periodicals, in pamphlets, in handy books and manuals ; the laity must learn how to answer the difficulties, often very old ones under a new dress, which are flung at them from all sides. Catholics understand fully that the Church does not fear knowledge ; she fears ignorance, she fears imperfect knowledge, but not exact and full knowledge. Truth cannot clash with truth, though the harmony of truth and truth may for a time escape our grasp. Hence the Church loves truth ; and the most searching investigation, the most extended scientific knowledge, have ever found in her a generous patron. Fanatical unbeliever ; are known to have abandoned the path of discovery in their eagerness to announce some conclusion hostile to Christian belief, and the world has again and again been assured that Christianity has received its death-blow ; but a long experience has convinced those who wage the battle of faith that nothing is to be feared from the discovery of truth, and that every true advance in knowledge will in the end become a gain to theological science.

"In the next place, the Editors look to the large number of their Protestant countrymen, who, despite many prejudices of education, are anxious or willing to learn from Catholic sources what is the faith and belief of Catholics.

"Lastly, they feel that the faith of the Catholic Church, the faith of S. Augustine and S. Thomas Aquinas, may claim a hearing from intelligent Englishmen.

"Translations will not be excluded from the Theological Library. Positivism and scepticism, in their present phase, are importations from the

Continent, and on the Continent they have called forth many distinguished Catholic writers ; the weapons and the armour of these champions may do good service in England.

"Adaptations from foreign works of known reputation will be introduced as frequently as possible, such adaptations being calculated to suit the English taste better than mere translations.

"But there are certain questions which are not handled by foreign authors in a way to catch the English reading world. These must be treated in original works. Englishmen will only listen to Englishmen on the Church and State question, on the problems of labour and capital, on the Infallibility of the Pope, on the Immaculate Conception, on sacerdotalism, on sacramentalism, on the constitution of the Church, on the difficulties of Scripture.

"The Publishers propose to open a list of subscribers to the Theological Library. As the volumes in the series will differ in size, and as it is not easy to determine the number of volumes for each year, the Publishers, instead of fixing an annual subscription, offer the following terms :—

"Those who send in their names as subscribers to the Publishers shall be entitled to receive each volume at a reduction of one-third of the published price."

There is one sentence of this Prospectus, which may be called the keynote of the whole. "It cannot be said too emphatically or too frequently, that the safety and the strength of the Catholic [educated layman] are to be found in a thorough scientific knowledge of his religion." It has seemed at times to be the impression of some, that a "thorough scientific knowledge of his religion" is hardly a suitable possession for a layman. The Editors of this series, on the contrary, not only think that such knowledge is very suitable to his position, but add that it is in it that his strength and safety are to be found. This is a truth which we ourselves have ventured to urge again and again ; and we have added the obvious inference, that scientific doctrinal knowledge is an indispensable constituent of Catholic higher education.

To our mind, the two most hopeful signs of the time in Catholic England are the new Institution for higher studies and this projected series of theological works. That the higher class of Catholic laymen be trained in a scientific knowledge of their religion, is no mere matter of literary adornment or intellectual completeness : it is a work than which no other is more intimately connected with saving souls ; not the souls merely of those who receive such knowledge, but of Catholics in every rank. We believe we can hardly exaggerate the evil results which must ensue to the Church in these islands, unless a body of Catholic laymen be available in her service, who on the one hand shall take their part on terms of full intellectual equality with their non-Catholic fellow-countrymen of the same rank, while on the other hand they are deeply saturated with the Church's spirit and thoroughly conversant with her doctrine.

At the same time, while expressing our hopes for the future, we must be careful to remember what has already been effected. The "*Academia*" was started by Cardinal Wiseman—and still more emphatically has been directed by his successor—for the express purpose of meeting the need we have mentioned. The present Archbishop in particular was among the

very first to urge the necessity of higher Catholic lay training ; and that at a time, when the evils to be dreaded from its absence were far less manifest on the surface than they are now. Of course the "Academia" was not by itself sufficient ; because isolated essays are very inadequate substitutes for full volumes. But these essays have done very important service in their place ; and the new issue, which we have here to notice, is fully equal to its predecessors. We may add, that the variety of themes handled shows sufficiently the largeness of design which has presided over the whole. The seventh (by Mr. Mivart) the eleventh and twelfth (by F. Humphrey) are on philosophy proper ; the second (by F. Christie) on the philosophy of religion ; the first (by the Archbishop himself) fifth and sixth (by Mr. Lucas) are on what have been called politico-religious questions ; the eighth and ninth (by Dr. Laing) and in some sense the tenth (by Mr. Doherty) are on the relations of physical science to religion ; the third (by the late Prior Aylward) on those most singular phenomena of our time, included in the term "spiritism" ; while the fourth (by Mgr. Patterson) is on "the religious condition of Germany," a matter at this moment of the most vital practical importance, yet one on which Englishmen in general, and even English Catholics, have often no more than the most confused and misty notions as to the *facts* of the case.

It would be easy to commemorate each one of these essays successively with common-place eulogy. But we have no contributor who possesses such variety of knowledge and cultivation, that he could give a really valuable and discriminating criticism of essays so widely differing from each other in scope ; and we will content ourselves therefore by mentioning with hearty recognition one characteristic, which is common to them all. Nowhere do the writers indulge, either in vague rhetorical eulogy of the Church, or on the other hand in general, indefinite, indiscriminating invectives against her assailants. In every case definitely stated theses are defended by definitely exhibited arguments. There is no other method of controversy, by which Catholics can really make way in such times as these.

As a matter especially interesting to ourselves, we may be allowed to say how much gratified we are to find, that so competent a judge as Mr. Mivart heartily endorses (p. 227) that argument against philosophical scepticism, which we have derived from the trustworthiness of memory, and on which we have laid very prominent stress in several articles.

The Oxford Undergraduate of Twenty Years Ago. By a BACHELOR OF ARTS. London : Washbourne.

THIS is surely a somewhat one-sided book. It professes to describe "the Oxford of 1845" : now the writer of this notice lived at Oxford from 1831 to 1845 ; belonged successively to three different colleges ; and mixed with rather a large circle of acquaintance : and yet, from nothing which he ever witnessed, would he even have guessed the existence of such

scenes, as many described by the "Bachelor of Arts"; though he may have known of such by hearsay. Surely the author has depicted one particular portion of Oxford society, which may have come before his own observation, mistaking it for the whole. Our own strong impression as to the Oxford of 1845 would be, that in most colleges there was a "reading" as well as a "fast" set; that in any given college the "reading" men would be much more intimate with "reading" men of other colleges, than with "fast" men of their own; that among the "reading" undergraduates, no very small proportion were youths of sincere piety; and that no small number of tutors laboured with much zeal to foster that piety. Of course we do not mean to assert anything so preposterous, as that the religious relationship between tutor and pupil could be even compared in salutariness with what exists in a Catholic College; yet we think that there is danger of such books as the one before us producing some reaction in favour of an Institution, which is felt to be unjustly assailed.

We do not see that the frankest admission of what we have suggested would imply any recommendation of Oxford as an abode of Catholic students; on the contrary (as we have said) some reaction in *favour* of Oxford might result from an exaggeration of its faults. But in truth there is no parallel whatever between a Protestant and Catholic Oxford student. In the first place—supposing the latter to have voluntarily thither resorted,—he has (to speak generally, for there may be here and there an exception) shown a singularly unpromising disposition, by the very fact of running counter to the Church's urgent admonition and warnings.* It is not very probable, that such a person as this will be extremely particular about other moral duties. But let us suppose he were there unwillingly, as e. g. under parental coercion: still he is most differently circumstanced from his Protestant fellow-collegians. Pious Protestant youths at Oxford are a strong moral support to each other; they are placed in close contact with ministers of their religion, and have its services strongly pressed on their attention. The Catholic is in a state of religious isolation; he is shunned by far the larger part of his more pious fellow-collegians, on the very ground of his religion; nay the condition of his social intercourse with *any* must be the exclusion of religion from the conversation. Instead of having religion pressed on him, it is only by a degree of exertion and self-assertion which is rare in youths, that he will be able to practise his spiritual duties at all. The most pious tutors will think it even a point of honour never to appeal to him on religious motives. His one obvious course will be to lose sight of such motives altogether, and yield by degrees to the temptations which surround him.

At last however, it is not so much on the danger of a Protestant university to the Catholic's *morality* as on its danger to his *faith*, that the main stress has been laid by authority. For ourselves, our only surprise is

* In a former number (Oct. 1873, p. 406) we have exhibited the extremely strong language used by the Holy See on this subject. Moreover the English Episcopate, in Provincial Synod assembled, have declared that no Catholic parent can send his son to a Protestant University, "without incurring grave sin."

that it can have been *necessary* for authority to speak on this head. The imminent danger—in some cases of actual apostasy—in all of most serious detriment to loyalty and purity of faith—has to us from the first seemed so obvious, that it has been a matter of simple amazement, how pious Catholic parents (though we are well aware that some have done so) can have so much as entertained the notion of turning their sons adrift into such a wilderness.

However the Church has now definitively spoken, and there is no need of proceeding in this strain. We will only say in conclusion that, if we have expressed dissent from some of the "Bachelor of Arts" implied statements, and even some want of sympathy with the spirit in which he has written, it is not because we have less profound aversion than he has, to the very thought of young Catholics studying at Oxford.

Mary Magnifying God. May Sermons. By WILLIAM HUMPHREY, of the Oblates of S. Charles. London : Burns & Oates.

THESE Sermons are thoroughly dogmatic—and all who love our B, Lady will rejoice to have her set before them, not in any fanciful way—but as the *Woman* of Holy Scripture.

"It is a wonderful thought," says F. Humphrey, "full to us of all consolation and of strength, that the highest and noblest and most perfect of creatures, and that creature which most magnifies the Lord, and gives greatest glory to the One Creator, is of all creatures—not an angelic, but a human being (p. 1).

Father Humphrey brings out that wonderful thought in such a way that, while we are charmed by the style and the beauty of the illustrations, we are confirmed in the doctrines of our most holy Faith with regard to God's Mother. This is what we want—solid, practical, dogmatical instructions about the Second Eve, who stood beneath the Tree on which hung the Second Adam, and, through His mercy and infinite condescension, became the great Mother of mankind. We rejoice to find traces in these sermons of the thoughts of that great Catholic theologian, Suarez. Who has ever read him, when speaking of our Lady, without learning something he never learnt before?

But the reader who begins with the Preface will do well not to take Father Humphrey quite at his word, or (to be more accurate) at the obvious interpretation of what he there writes. He says that "their dogmatic character, then, will account in great measure for the language of restraint of these sermons." It may be fairly inferred from this, that the writer meant to speak with great reserve and caution, to confine himself to the technical language of the schools, and restrain himself from giving utterance to his own thoughts in his own way ; but, in truth, while careful and conscientious in all his statements, he has also not made himself by any means what is commonly called a "dull writer." Father Humphrey

begins by saying that "devotion divorced from dogma becomes mere pious sentiment." People who hear this will run away with the notion, that Father Humphrey means deliberately to be dry. But it is not so. He tells us most truly that devotion must be built up on dogma, and that is all. Certainly the devotion that is not so built up has in it the spirit of heresy, which at any moment may assert itself, and ruin the souls that are under its influence. Outward circumstances, and certain acquired habits may, and do no doubt, in many instances, hinder the tree from bearing its natural fruit; nevertheless there is always danger, because there is no real security but in the faith truly apprehended.

So far is Father Humphrey from being what is called a "dry writer," that he may be most justly called a poet. It is true he has done his best to give himself a name he does not deserve in the first words of his Preface, which are these:—

"To the readers of St. Ephrem, St. Bernard, St. Alphonsus, and Father Faber, the language of the following sermons will seem hard and cold."

Here we should be disposed to quarrel with the preacher, and confute him out of his own mouth. We have the following expressions from him:—

"*Shrouding* not only His Divinity in the *garment* of His Humanity, but His glorified Humanity itself in the *swaddling clothes* of the Sacramental species" (p. 92).

"His Sacred Heart, the *living chalice* of the Precious Blood" (p. 131).

And again, p. 139,

"Any more than the Sacred Humanity is *consumed in the furnace* of the Divinity" (p. 142).

Father Humphrey writes after all like St. Ephrem or St. Bernard, and like every other theologian who ever preached. It is impossible to avoid metaphors, or poetical forms: the man who believes must speak as he believes; and there is no reason in the world why metaphors or poetry should be allowed to convey false doctrine, or be divorced from dogma. Father Humphrey shows that they need not.

Metaphorical or poetical forms are indeed a kind of safeguard; they satisfy the feeling in a certain way, and convey the whole truth the writer wishes to convey: sometimes no other forms can do so. Still further, we must always remember that a great mass of the teaching in the Church is founded on metaphors, the whole theory of the spiritual jurisdiction is built on a metaphor,—the keys and the rock; the doctrine of the sacrament of penance on the metaphor of "binding and loosing." We cannot explain baptism itself without metaphors; and they are very frequently the safest way to convey certain truths, and to some minds the most direct. We have an example of this in p. 113. Father Humphrey thus speaks of the Assumption of our Lady:—

"The Lord, who fifteen years before had arisen into His resting place, had raised thither the Ark which He had sanctified."

Father Humphrey teaches more doctrine, and that with perfect accuracy, in this metaphorical phrase, than he could have done if he had expressed the truth in common language.

If it could be maintained that the learned preacher intended to be dry, what he has written goes to prove that a man who believes cannot be dull.

We may say, in conclusion, that the art of putting things well is largely exemplified in the volume. It may be added, also, that the doctrinal connections which are brought forward are, as a rule, not those which the reader will have been accustomed to see in sermons on the Blessed Virgin, but additional and supplementary to them.

May Papers; or Thoughts on the Litanies of Loreto. By F. PURBRICK, S.J.
London: Burns & Oates.

WE are very glad to have received F. Purbrick's attractive little volume, in time to notice it before the month of May. It consists of a series of sparkling addresses on the various titles of our Lady which occur in the Litany of Loreto. Each address contains a sort of panegyric in miniature, of one of the special virtues or prerogatives of Mary indicated by her various titles, and also a practical lesson drawn therefrom for daily life. Though originally written for the boys at Stonyhurst F. Purbrick's engaging little book will soon win its way, not only into the convent and the nunnery, but into every Catholic household which desires to pay an increased honour to the Queen of Heaven. In some respects these addresses appear to us more suited for children of an older growth than for those for whom they were in the first instance intended; both in language and thought they are sometimes out of the range of the ordinary schoolboy, adapted rather to the more appreciative piety of the educated adult than to the undeveloped character of boyhood. But there is a brightness and vivacity in them which will make them interesting to all, old and young alike; and they are written in a sprightly and lively style, which adds to their intrinsic value. The following extract furnishes a good example of the style in which the whole book is written. The reader will notice how many excellencies this one short passage exhibits; the classical allusion is extremely happy, and its application by an ingenious antithesis to Mary's care for her struggling warriors is sure to imprint itself on the memory of the reader, and to suggest to him the necessity of a manly, resolute, heroic devotion, if he would be a favourite of his heavenly Patroness:—

"It is well to notice that Mary's aid gives no countenance to sloth or cowardice; she does not come, like one of Homer's goddesses, hide her favourite in a cloud, and take him in unseen flight far away from the battlefield. She likes to see the blood and dust of the struggle upon our limbs. She shields us indeed, but she 'teaches our hands to war and our fingers to

fight.' She nerves us to 'withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand.' Then and then only does she put the palm of victory in our hands, and crown us conquerors, aye, more than conquerors, over all our enemies. This is why we read that this tower of David is hung about with a thousand bucklers, 'all the armour of valiant men; far from valiant when left to themselves, or holding themselves independent of Mary, but gloriously valiant as soon as she has brought them into her tower, and taught them the use of the proved armour with which devotion to her is fully stored.'"

We are very much reminded throughout the book of some of the devotional works of F. Faber, to whom F. Purbrick, in his Preface, acknowledges himself to be indebted. There is the same easy, familiar, and sometimes half-poetical manner of expression; classical, but not at all severely classical: there is the same vein of strong sentiment, joined at the same time to a still stronger practical instinct: there is the same love of the imagery of nature and of illustrations from familiar objects around us. If there is not the same sounding of the depths of the spiritual life, it is perhaps because any such analysis would be out of place in a series of short addresses to schoolboys.

We cannot help regretting that F. Purbrick's continual occupations and responsible position are likely to debar him from engaging in some elaborate work on the spiritual life: perhaps we may at least indulge a hope that he will ere long give us a corresponding series of addresses, on the various titles by which the Sacred Heart of Jesus is invoked in the Litany familiar to us all.

Thomas Grant, first Bishop of Southwark. By GRACE RAMSAY.
London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1874.

THE life of Bishop Grant will be read with intense interest by th numerous persons who loved him as a father and friend, or revered him as a saint. We use this word unhesitatingly, for we are only following the example of our Holy Father, who habitually spoke of him as the "*piccolo santo*," and on hearing of his death, exclaimed, with emotion, "Another saint in Paradise." Of Irish parentage, but born in France, where his father's regiment was quartered with the Army of Occupation, he displayed through life the special virtues of his race. Unwavering faith, devotion to the Blessed Sacrament and our Lady, supernatural humility, patience, forgetfulness of self, and charity that knew no limits, seemed, had it been possible, to have been natural to him, while a joyous playful spirit threw an indescribable charm around him. The picture which Miss Ramsay draws of his childhood is most attractive, and the more so, because there is no jarring break between the child and the man, the same childlike innocence and simplicity running through his life to its close. Even while he was the pet of his father's regiment, indulged with unlimited access to the drums, and trotting along merrily by the side of the drummer when on march, he would frequently say, "I should like to

be a bishop"; and others seem to have had a strange presentiment on the subject. When he was only eight years old an old lady bequeathed a gold cross that had belonged to S. Thomas of Canterbury to "little Tommy when he became a bishop." When he was only twelve, another lady said to Dr. Briggs, whose Mass he had been serving, "What a very odd Mass you had this morning! It was served by a bishop and a priest"—he being the bishop, and a little friend the priest. When he was Rector of the English College at Rome, a third lady, whom he had received into the Church, gave him a gold chain for his pectoral cross; and so convinced were the students that the cross would one day arrive, and that meanwhile the chain would have been given to the poor, that they actually stole the latter, and handed it on from generation to generation till the long-predicted event came to pass.

We cannot quite agree with Miss Ramsay that his life was "so outwardly insignificant," and "made so little noise in its time." The revival of the hierarchy was one of the great events of contemporary English history, and in it and its results he took a leading part. When he was leaving Rome, the Secretary of Propaganda said, "The English clergy will never have his like as agent again. When the Pope or Propaganda sees Dr. Grant's handwriting, they know it is all right." He won similar confidence from English statesmen whose doors were closed against all other Catholics, but to whom his humility gained him access; and whenever information on Catholic matters was wanted in Downing-street he was applied to. To him in great measure Catholic soldiers and sailors owed the blessing of being nursed by nuns during the Crimean War and all the religious concessions made to them within the last twenty years. In the discussion of Catholic questions he had a prominent share. In Synod he strongly opposed the establishment of a Catholic College at Oxford or Cambridge; and in his Pastoral of 1867 he compared the delusion of parents, in exposing their sons to temptation by sending them to Protestant colleges, to the conduct of the Great Tempter, whose promise to Eve they virtually repeated to their children, too often with similar results. His love of orphans, soldiers, and the poor, and his universal sympathy were most touching. His personal influence was felt in every corner, we might almost say by each individual in his diocese, and far beyond its limits by his episcopal brethren, and by many others of all classes whom his wide-spread reputation for sanctity drew to him for advice or consolation. Well might the English bishops, as they stood round his coffin, say, "His place is now vacant amongst us, and there is no man in England who can fill it." To such a subject, and to Miss Ramsay's graphic portraiture, it is impossible to do justice in our present limits; but we hope to be able ere long to devote an article to them.

We cannot, however, close this notice without expressing our regret at the appropriation (p. 80) to England of Ireland's ancient title, "The Isle of Saints." From the earliest times Irish, English, and continental writers, Catholic and Protestant alike, have given this title exclusively to Ireland. Even Camden, whose strong feelings in favour of England and against Ireland are notorious, said that "England *might* truly be named a

most fruitfull Island of Saints," but that Ireland actually "*was* termed *Sanctorum Patria*, that is, *the* native country of Saints." * The appropriation of the title to England was an invention of Dr. Lingard's in his "*Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church*" † so recently as 1806; and though he was generally careful to fulfil, by copious references to authorities, what he states in his preface to be an author's duty, yet this assertion rests on his own authority alone. Cardinal Wiseman seems, solely on the word of his intimate and learned friend, to have introduced the term into the Prayer for the Conversion of England. But since Archbishop Manning, when his notice was called to the subject, corrected the prayer, in which England is now styled only "*an* Island of Saints," and the Pope, in his letter of 1870 to Sister Mary Frances of Kenmare, declared that Ireland "*was* justly styled *The Island of Saints*," ‡ the error ought to have been extinct. We trust, therefore, that the mistake, which no doubt has been made inadvertently, will be corrected in future editions of the life of him whom we hope to be one day authorized to venerate as a fresh star in Ireland's aureola of Sanctity. What fairer title can England covet than her own glorious one of "*Mary's Dowry*," which, in the name of her who has "*destroyed all heresies*," holds out the bright promise that the land that in far distant ages was devoted to her, will eventually return to its allegiance?

Who is Jesus Christ? By the Right Rev. BISHOP HEDLEY. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

THE answer to the above vital question Bishop Hedley has given in five lectures, with remarkable simplicity, depth, and clearness. He rejects the method of dry controversy, because, as he says, "*the acuteness of man's tongue can argue many things into doubt or into certainty*;" and he therefore prefers "*to set forth the truth as the Catholic Church holds it, and let it convince men's minds by the very power of its own light*." In so doing he anticipates and clears away the difficulties which have been created, not only by perverse, but even by well-meaning persons in their ignorant and rationalistic attempts to explain it. A happy instance of his method is to be found in his commentary on the grand thought of the opening chapter of S. John's Gospel—"That the Word was God, and the Word was made Flesh."

"The Word! We must anxiously trace back the past in order to understand what is meant by a term like this. Our steps must measure back many an old and worn-out road before we can get to that standing-place

* "*Britannia*"—English Saxons, p. 137; Ireland, p. 67, ed. 1610.

† Vol. ii. p. 89.

‡ The whole case is fairly stated in a little book, "*Insula Sanctorum*," published by Washbourne, 1872.

where John stood when he burst forth with that sublime beginning. We must listen to discussions in the Alexandrian Museum; and, farther back, to Platonic dialogues in Athenian groves. We must turn over mysterious books of Scripture, in which uncreated Wisdom is treated as God, and yet as distinct from a Divine Personality. The *word* of a man was, primarily, the uttered sound, pregnant with sense, which told the hearer what the speaker thought. But, secondarily and more deeply, it was the thought itself—the conception of the mind—formulated and rounded off in an idea. In all philosophies there was and is, a mystery and a cloud about this conception, idea, *word*. It is distinct from the mind or intelligence itself, because it rises out of it as a bubble rises on the surface of the spring, to be succeeded by another and another. And yet it lies so close against it and around it, that it seems to have no being which is not the very being of the mind. A man makes his thought; it is the very substance of his mind; it is the very growth of that subtle seed which we call intelligence; and yet a man's thought oftentimes stands up beside him like a shadow of himself, haunting him, ruling him, torturing him, or soothing him. Such is the thought or conception of a human mind; the *word* of a man which Plato reasoned on, and Philo used as a mirror to catch reflexions from the clouds. But if the *logos* of a finite mind was such a subtle thing, what power of thought or language could discuss the Logos of the mind of God? The Infinite has an infinite intelligence. That intelligence is ever active, or rather, it is ever act. What is that act? What is the word of God? It is God, and yet It is not the Father. It is begotten by God; by an eternal begetting. It is consubstantial with the Father; there is only one God. Yet It, and not the Father, was made Flesh. And the Word made Flesh was Jesus Christ. This great mystery is called the Incarnation. It is a mystery, and a deep and dark mystery; yet not all dark."

In the second lecture Bishop Hedley brings out the truth of the Incarnation more clearly by setting before us its reverse in the Arian, Nestorian, and Unitarian heresies; the last of which, he says,

"Is held, either consciously or unconsciously, by multitudes who belong to Churches which profess belief in the Trinity, and prescribe prayer to Jesus Christ. The essence of Unitarianism is the denial of all mystery and of all revelation proper. It believes in Christianity, but not in its supernatural character, or its finality, or its perfectness as a guide to man's steps, and an answer to his aspirations."

We cannot quite agree with his lordship that Nestorianism "is no longer of any account in the world of religious thought;" for we think that it lies at the bottom of the Protestant aversion from the worship of our Lady, and from devotions to the Sacred Heart, and all similar ones addressed specially to the Sacred Humanity. He who believes that Mary is the Mother of God, and that the Sacred Humanity is God's "*very own*," cannot possibly see anything irrelevant or exaggerated in either this worship or these devotions.

In the third lecture on "Redemption" the Bishop indirectly controverts the very common Protestant view, which places the justice and mercy of God in such contrast, as almost to create a Manichæan duality; and he exhibits "the culminating point of the Incarnation" in "the shedding of the Blood of the Incarnate Word," not as an act by which "God punished the innocent for the guilty," but as an unfathomable mystery of

"measureless Love," through which Divine Justice, both as to the propitiation for sin and the adoration due from the creature to his Creator, was fully satisfied by "the *acceptance* and *offering*" of the suffering of the Cross "by a free human will," and man was brought to "love God not only with the love of *appreciation* but with the love of *tenderness*."

In the fourth lecture the necessity for "a ministry of grace, or in other words, a system of external ordinances administered by men, on which Justification and Sanctification in ordinary course depend," is explained with great clearness. The final lecture on "The Abiding Presence" is devoted principally to removing the ordinary irrational objection to Transubstantiation as impossible.

"No one knows what material substance is, and yet you presume to assert that the Body of Christ cannot exist unless you can see It and handle It. . . . That it cannot be present unless It be palpable and gross, and that It cannot come down upon the altar without ceasing to be present in the heavens. No one but the unreflecting and the ignorant will deny that material substance, whatever it is, can exist without producing any effect upon other material substances. . . . The truth is that people are taught in these days that things are *nothing but appearances*. A bodily substance, say the philosophers, is a bundle of experiences. . . . But it is not likely the world will ever knowingly and willingly adopt a view which comes to this, that nothing exists except one's own feelings. . . . Those who hold that Things are really the causes of what the senses feel, must admit that Things and their effects can be separated, and must listen to the word of Revelation when it asserts that Jesus Christ is present in the Sacrament, though the eye of man sees Him not."

Finally "after we have read, and spoken, and discussed, yes, and prayed and suffered—still it remains that we kneel and adore the Blessed Sacrament before we can truly know who is Jesus Christ."

Man and Apes: an Exposition of Structural Resemblances and Differences bearing upon Questions of Affinity and Origin. By ST. GEORGE MIVART, F.R.S., V.P.Z.S., Lecturer on Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at St. Mary's Hospital. London: Robert Hardwicke, 192, Piccadilly. 1873.

IN endeavouring to give some idea of the line taken in this comprehensive and painstaking essay, it will be well to begin by explaining at what point it takes up the question of the descent of man.

We scarcely need to remind our readers that the theory of the origin of species by transmutation was first brought into general and serious discussion by Lamarck, who, like those who have succeeded him, argued (1) that "the greater the abundance of natural objects assembled together, the more do we discover proofs that everything passes by insensible shades into something else; that even the more remarkable differences are evanescent, and that nature has, for the most part, left us nothing at our disposal for establishing distinctions, save trifling, and, in some respects, puerile peculiarities"; * and (2) that the changes produced in a relatively short period

* Lyell, "Principles of Geology," vol. ii. p. 249 (eleventh edition).
VOL. XXII.—NO. XLIV. [New Series.] 2 K

of time by domestication, change of habitat, &c., warrant us, under these circumstances, in concluding that, in the far longer period supposed by geology to have elapsed since the first appearance of life, plants and animals may have altered so much as to have passed from one species to another. His first argument was intended to clear the ground, by showing the non-existence of the chasms by which species had been imagined to be separated. As long, he said, as we take only what comes to hand, and do not stir beyond the steps of our own doors, the lines of demarcation which separate species appear to be well defined; but as soon as we extend our observations to other countries, and, by means of fossils, to geological ages, we find that the gaps which seem to remove one species from another are gradually filled by newly-discovered forms, and at the same time perceive that a single species often includes races and varieties differing in characters as important as, or more important than, those by which we have been accustomed to mark off one species from another. Using time as a lever, and the facts of domestication as a fulcrum, he then in his second argument sought to cross the lesser interval which his first argument left between species and species. It was now incumbent on him to point out, if possible, an agency or agencies capable of effecting the change (*causa adequata*), and actually operating in nature (*causa vera*). He decided that the transformation was the result of two combined forces,—a natural tendency to improvement, and the wants and desires of the creatures to be improved. Of these, however, the first was not a *causa vera*. The existence of a tendency to improvement can be no more than a generalization from a number of facts showing progressive adaptation of organisms to their environments, and cannot be assigned as a cause of that improvement itself.* As an example of the supposed operation of the second cause we may cite the case of “otters, beavers, waterfowl, turtles, and frogs, which were not made web-footed in order that they might swim;† but their wants having attracted them to the water in search of prey, they stretched out the toes of their feet to strike the water and move rapidly along its surface. By the repeated stretching of their toes, the skin which united them at the base acquired a habit of extension, until, in the course of time, the broad membranes which now connect their extremities were formed.”‡ This ingenious speculation possesses a certain superficial plausibility so long as we confine ourselves to the examples alleged in its support; but even this plausibility vanishes when we endeavour to apply it to organic nature as a whole, for the entire kingdom of plants, which constitute the larger portion of living beings, is devoid of consciousness, and therefore incapable of want or desire. And want, and consequent desire, even where they exist, have no power to produce directly such changes in the organism as are required by transmutationism.

* Of the same character appears to be Professor Owen's doctrine of derivation,—that one species changes into another because it has an innate tendency to change.

† The reader will notice the bearing of this on the design-argument.

‡ “Principles of Geology,” vol. ii. p. 254.

Let it be observed, however, that in this speculation three principles are set in motion by Lamarck to account for transmutation:—*variability*, in the second argument; *heredity*, in the supposition that the peculiarities acquired by the ancestors would be transmitted to the descendants; and the *struggle for life*, as illustrated, *e.g.*, by the ancestors of the web-footed animals learning to swim. Each of these three principles runs through the whole of organic nature. There is a struggle for life, not only consciously among animals, but likewise, though unconsciously, among plants, for, *e.g.*, each species by the mere ground that it occupies and the seeds which it scatters about it, is inimical to the existence and multiplication of the others in the same locality. Heredity and variability would at first sight appear to be mutually exclusive; but there is a sphere for the action of each, and the operation of both may be seen any day on comparing the children of the same parents. All these are *causæ veræ*, causes the activity of which is known by evidence independent of the hypotheses they are employed to support. At first sight, however, it would appear that of themselves they could produce nothing but confusion, but are incapable of securing a *gradual accumulation* of variations in a *definite direction*, such as would, in time, and in the absence of restraining causes, produce species with characteristics as definite as those which exist in nature. And if variability, heredity, and the struggle for life would produce merely a confused multitude of increasing variations in which all constancy and definiteness of type were absent, transmutationism would for this reason require some such guiding and controlling principle as Lamarck introduced in desire and tendency to improvement. But a little reflection will show that this is not the case. If (as continually happens) a multitude of organisms accidentally vary in a multitude of ways, those whose variations are of a kind advantageous to them in the struggle for life—those who are the fittest for that struggle—will be as it were selected by nature from among those whose variations are prejudicial, or useless and a mere dead weight; they will, in other words, have a better chance of surviving and consequently of propagating offspring in whom, through heredity, their peculiarities will as a rule be more frequently present. Thus not all sorts of variations indifferently, but rather certain definite kinds of variations, will be preserved; and the constant repetition of this process will give us that gradual accumulation of variations in a definite direction, which is required for the production of new species.

This, it is plain, is neither more nor less than the principle of natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, which was first pointed out by a Mr. Matthews in a work on Naval Timber or Arboriculture (1831), and has been rediscovered and so much insisted on by Mr. Darwin. From the preceding observations it will have been perceived that it is undoubtedly a *vera causa*. But it does not thence follow that it has produced all the effects which Mr. Darwin has ascribed to it. Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind what is the significance of natural selection being said to be a *vera causa*. It is a cause, not of origination, but of preservation. It is not a cause which acts with forethought or design. We must not imagine that it is capable of originating anything, as many, to judge from the way

in which they speak, seem to imagine it to be. It can originate nothing ; it can merely lay hold of variations which happen to occur, and *ex natura rei* it fixes * those which happen to be useful ; but it has no power of producing or of even to the slightest degree favouring the production of useful variations, and might have to wait for thousands of years for the occurrence of one which was useful. Further, in order for it to be proved that an existing peculiarity may have been due to natural selection, it must be proved not only that it is useful in its now developed condition, but that its possession would have been an advantage during the time when it was passing through those inchoate and rudimentary stages through which, according to the theory of cumulative variations, it passed to its present state. And the variations on which natural selection may be supposed to have worked must be, on the one hand, sufficient to afford scope for the action of such an agency as natural selection is, and, on the other hand, of the same kind as those observable in nature : for to postulate variations of any other description would be to postulate a *causa non vera*. It was obvious to Mr. Darwin that natural selection is by itself incompetent to give account of all the changes which the transmutation theory supposes to have taken place ; he therefore supplemented it by two other principles, sexual selection, and correlation of growth. Sexual selection is the preservation of variations in consequence of the preference of males for females, or of females for males, in which those variations show themselves. It is chiefly used to account for the *beauty* of animated nature,—for the plumage of birds, the wings of butterflies, the brightly coloured spots on the bodies of monkeys, and the like. In proving that anything was probably due to sexual selection it has of course to be shown that the alleged reason of preference was really such, and, besides, the variations must have accumulated by sensible increments ; the observations made above of natural selection are, moreover, evidently true of sexual selection also. The principle of correlation of growth is that an organism which varies in one particular, also, in a multitude of cases, varies in a number of other particulars. Breeders, for instance, believe that long legs are almost invariably accompanied by an elongated head. Hairless dogs have imperfect teeth ; long-haired or coarse-haired animals are, it is said, apt to have long or many horns ; it appears that white sheep are liable to be injured by certain plants, while the dark coloured varieties escape ; and cats which are white and have blue eyes are generally deaf. In these and the like cases certain peculiarities are evidently correlated together : the one being present the other or others, for some reason or another, are present also. Correlation of growth is used to account for apparently useless peculiarities, for, although the preservation of useless peculiarities cannot be due to the direct action of natural selection, if a useless peculiarity is correlated with a useful one, natural selection, by preserving that which is useful, will preserve the useless one as well. But wherever correlation is used it must be independently proved to exist ; and while on the one hand it may account for the indirect preservation of useless structures or forms of

* If no restraining cause exist and prevent it from doing so.

structure, it is to be remembered that it may just as readily on the other hand prevent natural selection from preserving a structure possibly beneficial, if, as in some of the cases referred to above, it is correlated with something else, the possession of which would be a disadvantage in the struggle for existence.

It is not antecedently improbable that Mr. Darwin should have exaggerated the extent of the operation of these three causes; for not only would parental affection act upon him, but there is a fascination about large generalizations, on account of the economy of mental labour which they effect. Science, however, does not advance by fascinations. Mr. Darwin, again, has gathered together an immense number of cases in which the laws which he has discovered may be imagined, at least at first sight, to have acted; and this is what everyone who has a theory to support tries to do. This, again, gives a charm to the theory itself; another thing which gives a charm to it is the extreme ease with which superficially it may be applied to individual cases; and few of his readers know anything more of the instances he brings forward than what he himself tells them. The very number of the instances precludes the careful examination of each of them. But the question is entirely one of details. In order to come to a justified conclusion whether and to what extent natural and sexual selection and correlation of growth have been at work, requires careful and painstaking examination of the details of each instance in which their action is asserted. Hence the propriety, nay necessity, of taking some prominent and well-known case, which may be made a test-question (as far as any one case can fairly be a test-question) of the general validity of the transmutation theory in the form in which it is now generally propounded by those who hold it.

Now this is precisely what Mr. Mivart has done in "Man and Apes;" from which our readers will at once understand what is the general character of the book, and what the position occupied by it in the Darwinian controversy. Confining himself to the question of the descent of man, he begins by dividing the mammalian vertebrates into twelve orders, of which the last two are the *Cheiroptera* or bats, and the *Primates*,—a term which he prefers to *Quadrumana*, inasmuch as "anatomically, the foot of apes agrees far more with the foot of man than with his hand, and similarly, the ape's hand resembles man's hand and differs from his foot," and "estimated physiologically, or according to use, the hand throughout the whole order remains the prehensile organ *par excellence*, while the predominant function of the foot, however prehensile it be, is constantly locomotive."* The *Primates* he distinguishes into two sub-orders: the first, *Anthropoidea*, containing man and the apes; while the second, *Lemuroidea*, contains the "half-apes," *i.e.*, the lemurs and the animals most like them.† Both these

* P. 88. This criticism carries with it the destruction of *Bimana* as a distinct order, and the assignment of the species *Homo*, which alone it contains, to the *Primates*. This was the Linnean classification.

† Pp. 8, 9, sqq. By *man* is of course meant man considered in regard of the material part of his nature,—man considered zoologically, under

sub-orders he then proceeds to divide into three families: the *Lemuroideæ* into *Lemuridæ* (*Indrisinæ*, *Lemurinæ*, *Nycticebinæ*, *Galaginæ*), *Cheiromyidæ* (containing the Aye-Aye only), and *Tarsiidæ* (containing the Tarsier only), and the *Anthropoideæ* into *Hominidæ* (containing man only), *Cebidæ* (consisting of the apes of the new world, with a dental formula different from that of man, and nostrils separated by a considerable interval), and *Simiadæ* (the apes of the old world, more closely resembling man, with a dental formula the same as his, and the nostrils separated only by a narrow partition, as in him). The *Cebidæ* of this classification is therefore the same as the platyrrhine apes, and includes both the *Cebidæ* and *Hapalidæ* of other classifications; while the *Simiadæ* is the same as the catarrhine or narrow-nosed apes, which are peculiar to the old world as the platyrrhine apes are to the new, and are besides distinguished by never having a prehensile tail. The family *Simiadæ* Mr. Mivart again divides into three sub-families, *Simiinæ*, *Semnopithecinae*, and *Cynopithecinae*. Of these the *Simiinæ* are the anthropoid apes of other authors, and consist therefore of the three genera *Hylobates* (the Gibbons), *Simia* (the Orang Outang), and *Troglodytes* (the Chimpanzee and the Gorilla). Under *Semnopithecinae* he places only the genera *Semnopithecus* and *Colobus*, and *Cynopithecinae* is constituted by the Macaques (*Macacus*), the small long-tailed African monkeys (*Cercopithecus*), and the Baboons (*Cynocephalus*). From this outline of his classification it will be perceived that Mr. Mivart's *Anthropoidea* is a much larger designation than that of "anthropoid" apes, of which we have all heard so much of late.

Mr. Mivart now* proceeds to institute a most searching and comprehensive examination of the details of the anatomy of the members of the order *Primates*, their exoskeleton, the conformation of their limbs, the relative size, shape, number of the bones of which their several skeletons are composed, the absence or presence of particular muscles, the size of the different parts of their brains and the arrangement of the convolutions, the conformation and order of succession of their teeth, and many other points. Here his abundant knowledge of comparative anatomy shows to great advantage; nor has anything been as yet published on the subject which will bear comparison with this part of "Man and Apes." Mr. Huxley's lectures on "Man's Place in Nature" are bald and jejune by the side of it; and Professor Owen's monograph on the Gorilla treats only of that special subject.

The essential argument of the book is founded on this comparison; and is an answer to Lamarck's first argument. It is not true, as to this particular case of the order *Primates*, that in proportion as our knowledge becomes less incomplete, the gaps between man and the apes are gradually filled up, so that he may be believed descended from them. But the resemblances to him, which collectively make an imposing array, instead of gradually accumulating as we ascend the order, are so scattered and

which aspect alone he can be a subject of *zoological* classification,—not man considered in regard of the totality of his nature, and therefore transcending zoology.

* Pp. 14-171.

dispersed among the animals of which it is composed, and, where they occur, so accompanied by special dissimilarities, that it is impossible to fix on any single species, or common ancestor of several species, from which he may have descended by correlation of growth and natural and sexual selection. Thus, for example, the Gorilla is of all the *Simiinae* least like man in the development of the bony ridges on the skull for the attachment of muscles, in the arrangement of the cerebral convolutions, of the circumvallate papillæ, and of the liver; the Chimpanzee is least like man in the shortness of the lower limbs; the Orang, in the formation of the sternum and the relative length of several bones; and the Gibbons, in the length of the limbs and of the foot compared with the hand, in the structure of the tongue, and in the form of the upper grinding teeth. Again, some or other of the baboons excel all the higher apes in resemblance to man as to certain points; some or other of the *Cebidæ* resemble man more than do the bulk of the *Simiadae* in sixteen points (given on p. 169); while among the Lemuroidea the Lemurs and Indris have a more completely opposable and better formed thumb than any other ape whatever; and in other "Half Apes" the upper grinding teeth are furnished with an oblique ridge as in man, the anterior spinous process of the ilium is more human than that of any other ape, and the dog teeth are sometimes almost on a level with the other teeth, while the "diastema," or break, which may be well seen in the mouth of a dog, is absent. These are but a few out of the many examples brought forward by Mr. Mivart; we shall now give his essential argument in his own words:—

"If the number of wrist bones be deemed a special mark of affinity between the Gorilla, Chimpanzee, and man, why are we not to consider it also a special mark of affinity between the Indris [which also has eight carpal bones only] and man?

"If the 'bridging convolutions' of the Orang go to sustain its claim to supremacy, they also go far to sustain a similar claim on the part of the long-tailed, thumbless Spider Monkeys.

"If the obliquely ridged teeth of *Simia* and *Troglodytes* point to community of origin, how can we deny a similar community of origin, as thus estimated, to the Howling Monkeys and Galagos?

"The lower American apes meet us with what seems 'the front of Jove himself,' compared with the gigantic but low-browed denizens of tropical Western Africa.

"In fact, in the words of the illustrious Dutch naturalists, Messrs. Schroeder, van der Kolk, and Vrolic, the lines of affinity existing between different Primates construct rather a network than a ladder. . . . But, it may be replied, the spontaneous and independent appearance of these similar structures is due to 'atavism,' and 'reversion,'—to the appearance, that is, in modern descendants, of ancient and sometimes long-lost structural characters, which formerly existed in more or less remote hypothetical ancestors. Let us see to what this reply brings us. If it is true, and if man and the Orang are diverging descendants of a creature with certain cerebral characters, then that remote ancestor must also have had the wrist of the Chimpanzee, the voice of a long-armed ape, the blade-bone of the Gorilla, the chin of the Siamang, the skull-dome of an American ape, the ischium of a slender Loris, the whiskers and beard of a Saki, the liver and stomach of the Gibbons, and the number of characters before detailed, in which the various several forms of higher or lower Primates

respectively approximate to man. But to assert this is as much as to say that low down in the scale of Primates was an ancestral form so like man that it might well be called an *homunculus*, and we have the virtual pre-existence of man's body supposed, in order to account for the actual first appearance of that body as we know it—a supposition manifestly absurd if put forward as an explanation. Nor if such an *homunculus* had really existed, would it suffice to account for the difficulty. For it must be borne in mind that man is only one of many peculiar forms. The body of the Orang is as exceptional in its way as that of man is in another. The little Tarsier has even a more exceptional structure than has man himself. Now, all these exceptional forms show cross relations and complex dependencies as involved and puzzling as does the human structure, so that in each several case we should meet with a similar network of difficulties, if we sought to account for existing structural characters through the influence of inheritance and 'natural selection.'

"It may be replied that certain of these characters have arisen in total independence, and this reply is no doubt true; but how are we to discriminate between those which are inherited and those which are independently acquired? Structures, like strong teeth or powerful claws, obviously useful in the struggle for life, may well be supposed to have independently appeared, and been preserved time after time; but what characters could well be thought, *a priori*, less likely to be independently acquired than a more or less developed chin, such as man shares with the Siamang alone, or a slightly aquiline nose, such as that found in the Hoolock Gibbon and often in the human species? Can either character be thought to have preserved either species in the struggle for life, or have persistently gained the hearts of successive generations of female Gibbons? Certainly seductiveness of this sort will never explain the arrangement of the lobes of the liver, or the presence of an oblique ridge on the grinding surfaces of the back teeth.

"Again, can this oblique ridge of the grinding teeth be supposed to have arisen through life necessities? and yet, if it is a real sign of genetic affinity, how comes it to be absent from the man-like Gibbons, and to reappear for the first time in American apes, and among others in the aberrant and more or less Baboon-like howling monkeys?

"The same remark applies to the condition of the wrist-bones of man, the Chimpanzee, [the Gorilla,] and Indris. If this condition arises independently, and is no mark whatever of genetic affinity, what other single character can with certainty be deemed to be valid evidence of the kind?" —"Men and Apes," pp. 174-180.

The twelve remaining pages of the book are occupied by a statement of Mr. Mivart's opinion that these and the like facts do not tell against his own special doctrine of evolution* (how psychological considerations may affect it as to man and apes is, he says, another matter), and by some arguments in support of this statement.

* With reference to his opinion, see the "Vestiges of Creation," tenth edition, p. 155.

The Life of the Blessed John Berchmans. By FRANCIS GOLDIE, of the Society of Jesus.

The Life of the Blessed Peter Favre, of the Society of Jesus, first Companion of S. Ignatius Loyola. From the Italian of Father Giuseppe Boero, of the same Society. Burns & Oates. 1873.

ALTHOUGH the life of B. Berchmans was issued rather the first of these volumes, we shall chiefly consider that of B. Favre, as it was the most important in its results and general influence on others. It is certainly remarkable—and it gives another link to the chain of evidence testifying to the completeness of the training in the Society of Jesus—that both these lives, together with the rest of the group of its holy men proposed to our veneration, yield the most distinctly various patterns of different ranks and offices in religious life: B. Berchmans of students or scholastics, B. Alphonsus Rodriguez of lay brothers, S. Stanislaus of novices, Cardinal Bellarmine and others of theologians. B. Favre we should distinguish as a pattern of the foundation-stones of a new religious order, which, next to the founder, are of such vital importance in determining its spirit and fervour. It is a pleasing coincidence that the first disciple of the Visitation, as well as the great first disciple of S. Ignatius Loyola, should have borne the holy and eminent name of the Savoyard Favres. Peter Favre was born in 1506, at Villaret, in the heart of inaccessible mountains, and if he belonged to some remote branch of the eminent president of the Savoy Parliament, who was the brother-like friend of S. Francis de Sales, there is no evidence of it in his worldly condition, which was much like that of the other peasants and shepherds of Villaret, though the family had filled the offices of notary, counsellor, and mayor in the commune, which belonged to the diocese of Geneva. But, as his biographer says, “the parents of B. Peter possessed more important distinctions than any of this world, being richly endowed with solid piety, steadfast religion, and Christian virtues.”

When he was about seven years old, Peter had a little flock of sheep given into his charge, and he took advantage of this employment to lead his sheep to hidden spots of sweet pasture among the mountains, where he could kneel down and satisfy his devotion in prayer. A spring of the freshest water is still shown near Villaret, which, it is said by local tradition, sprang forth at the little shepherd's prayer, when one hot day his flock were gasping with thirst. Whether miraculous or not, the waters of this spring have never yet been known to dry up. About it Peter used to gather his sheep, and then went off to hear mass at the Church of S. Jean de Sixt; when he came back, the sheep were always there, just as he left them.

Next to his love of prayer, little Favre showed a very early zeal for souls. He was accustomed from his first days of sheep-tending to gather about him a number of other boys and girls employed in the same way, when he would teach them the Catechism, the Rosary, and all the prayers

that he knew. He also pointed out, in a very loving, gentle way, their various childish faults, and tried to stir them up to make little acts of Christian virtue. On Sundays, he used at times to climb upon a large stone, and ask people to listen to what he had to say about God. Grown-up men and women then would gather about him, marvelling with tears at the beautiful things he said, and afterwards giving him offerings of a little money and fruit. He always divided the fruit immediately among the poorest children, and took the money home to his mother. Peter soon besought his parents to send him to school, and at last obtained the favour of going to Thonon, where he learnt reading, writing, and Latin, and was then sent to an excellent little college at La Roché, under a holy and learned priest, Dr. Veillard, where he remained nine years, mastering Greek as well as Latin and other studies, as far as his master could carry him. It was then advised that he should go to the famous University of Paris, which was at that time the central focus of learning in Europe. Peter Favre was then just nineteen (1525). His college companion from the beginning was Francis Xavier of Navarre, with whom he soon became intimate, and he was often called upon in the lectures by his master to interpret and explain obscure passages of Aristotle. He soon took his bachelor's and licentiate's degrees; in 1530 he passed as a doctor, and publicly read philosophy to the students in the university. Just at that time Ignatius Loyola had gone to S. Barbara's College to begin his studies, and was put under Favre to repeat his philosophical course. The two men immediately understood and appreciated each other, and while Favre was de Loyola's master in science, he became his pupil in spiritual knowledge, by which he gained great light and peace of soul. Ignatius soon made known to him his plan of going to the Holy Land to convert the infidels, and Favre solemnly engaged himself as his companion in the enterprise. Francis Xavier was the third to join it; and with this small beginning the "Knights of Jesus" sprang armed to the great conflict, in which for more than three hundred years they have never laid their lances in rest.

After his studies were nearly or quite ended, Favre went to spend seven months with his father at Villaret, where he was of much use in strengthening the mountain people in the faith against the inroads of Calvinism. Then he returned to Paris, and went through the *Spiritual Exercises* under Ignatius Loyola with extraordinary fervour, fasting for six days from food or drink, and enduring the cold of one of the bitterest Paris winters without fire or bed. This retreat was in preparation for his ordination as priest, and he said his first Mass on S. Mary Magdalene's day, 1534; in the August of the same year, on the Assumption, the celebrated meeting of Montmartre took place, when the (now) ten companions of Ignatius bound themselves by vows during Favre's Mass to go to the Holy Land, or wherever else the Pope should send them for the conversion of the heathen. In all other things they placed themselves at the disposal of Ignatius, whom they tacitly recognized as their guide.

In 1537, as continued war prevented the little band from going to Palestine, Ignatius, with Favre and Laynez, went to Rome to offer themselves to the Pope, who immediately appointed Favre Expositor of the

past evils and upon the heroic courage of the apostolic men who confronted them without dismay. At Cologne the Archbishop-Elector, Hermann, called Bucer and Melancthon into his diocese purposely that they might spread their errors, while ecclesiastics of every rank had fallen away almost openly into a sinful life, and without actually marrying, had associated women with their households. Their wretched flocks, in many instances not the least inclined either to forsake the faith of their fathers or to live evil lives, had their faith stolen from them by blasphemous falsehoods and desecration of the sacraments, and became corrupted in their morals by the lives of their superiors, so that when Favre returned to Cologne he was filled with burning zeal, indignation, and grief at the state of things. He toiled incessantly night and day to strengthen and purify the clergy and nobles, gave the *Exercises* to many, heard multitudes of confessions, and restored many of the convents and clergy to a strict and regular life. He was only restricted in this great work by obedience, which obliged him to travel to Portugal and leave the results of his labours to Canisius, who finally succeeded in obtaining the removal of the obnoxious and obstinate Archbishop of Cologne. Favre was the chief founder of the colleges of Coimbra, Alcalà, and others, and was reaping a vast harvest in Spain, when the Pope asked him of Ignatius Loyola to be his theologian at the Council of Trent. He therefore returned to Rome in 1546, where he was soon seized with a malignant attack of fever, and died, worn out with intense, unceasing toil, at a little past forty years of age. Instead of recommending him, as usual, to the prayers of the Society, S. Ignatius advised the Fathers to ask his help and intercession.

The Second Part of the volume, somewhat longer than the Life, contains the "Memorial" or diary of Peter Favre, full of beautiful spiritual notes and thoughts, which occurred to him on the different feasts of the year, or in meditation. It furnishes a perfect mine of spiritual treasures for the soul. These notes fully show the exceeding simplicity and unaffected humility of B. Favre, who set down in his diary exactly what struck him at the moment, without a shadow of self-consciousness or human respect. Once, in Spain, as he was going to say Mass, some one stopped him and asked him to hear his confession; upon which Favre replied that he was willing to be "the Lord's broom." Thinking of his own expression afterwards, he compared himself to a broom which gets dirty and unbound itself while sweeping for others:—

"Notwithstanding, I found great devotion in offering myself to Christ as a broom for His house, always ready to cleanse souls. I also desired that all our Society might be designed by God to cleanse the Church, that He might make use of it as a preparatory and mean utensil; and for this intention I offered the Mass of the Holy Cross,* beseeching God that after having on earth performed the part of a *mean broom, of which lowly office even I am not worthy*, He would one day admit me to the glory of heaven."

The translation of B. Favre's life is admirably done. It is evidently faithful and exact, while free from the stiffness, involution, and long-windedness into which translations from the Italian are apt to fall.

* It was September 14th.

F. Goldie's *Life of B. Berchmans*, though closely following, as he says, the memoir of F. Cepari, the Rector of the Roman College while Berchmans was there, must be reckoned an original life, and it is drawn up with a vigour and freedom which show great power of biographical writing. While following closely the facts and spirit of the preceding annalists, F. Goldie has given in his volume characteristic incidents and distinctive details, which are more or less valuable, according to the purpose for which the book may be read. The old house at Diest, between Antwerp and Mäestricht, the sign of "The Great and Little Moon," belonging to the elder Berchmans, a shoemaker, is still to be seen, though it is nearly three hundred years since John Berchmans was born there in 1599. The shoemaker of Diest, however, like many other trading Flemings, was of an old and honourable family, which had filled various offices in the magistracy. He strongly opposed his son's entry into the Society, but was overcome by the irresistible fervour of his vocation. The whole course of his short career of two-and-twenty years is full of spiritual instruction, and the account of his last illness and death is beautifully given. Both these lives are careful additions to the series.

Life of S. Philip Benizi. London: Washbourne. 1874.

THE *Life of S. Philip Benizi* is the second of the New Series of Oratorian Lives of the Saints. It is translated from a French work published in Marseilles in 1672; and though not in regular hagiological form, its spirit and style are so exclusively devotional that it is well suited for spiritual reading. S. Philip Benizi was born of noble Florentine parents, on the Feast of the Assumption, 1233. Many remarkable circumstances of his birth and childhood were presages of his future sanctity; but the most striking was the supernatural foundation, on the very day of his birth, of the Order of Servites, in which he afterwards took such a leading part. On that day our Blessed Lady appeared at the same moment, but separately, to seven men of the first families in Florence, and inspired them with an ardent desire to renounce the world and devote themselves to God's service. They accordingly retired to Mount Senario, a steep and solitary mountain about three leagues from Florence, where they built a small church and spent their time in prayer and penance. Six years later, at the suggestion of the Pope's legate, they formed themselves into the Order of Servites for men, into which great numbers of persons from all parts of Italy pressed for admission; and soon after a second Order for women, and a third for persons of both sexes living in the world, were established. Above twenty years elapsed before they were joined by Philip Benizi, who, though attracted from childhood to religion, had adopted the medical profession in obedience to his parents. Every important step in Philip's life was taken under the direct guidance of our Lady, and his vocation to the Servites was the result of a vision which he had before the celebrated miraculous picture in the chapel of the Annun-

ciata in the mother-house of the Order near Florence. From humility he entered as a lay brother ; but so undoubted was his sanctity, that his superiors insisted on his becoming a priest and filling different important offices, till in 1362 he was elected General. Though the Order had now spread through Italy, France, and Germany, so great had been the spirit of fervour and union that animated its members, that it had not yet been found necessary to draw out a formal rule. Philip's first work was to form a rule from the various constitutions which the four Generals, his predecessors, had issued, and after some delay and difficulty, to obtain the authorization of the Holy See ; and hence he has often, though erroneously, been styled the founder of the Order. Italy was during this century ravaged successively by the troops of the Emperor Frederick II. and his successors, and those of Charles of Anjou, and every state and town was torn by the rival factions of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. Philip's great work was going from town to town exerting his influence to support the Pope's authority, to heal dissensions, and to restore religion. He also spent two years in Germany with a similar object, and he founded numerous houses of the Servites in both these countries, as well as in France. He sent missionaries into Tartary, where the Order spread widely ; and though after a time communication between the East and West was broken off, Servite Fathers from India appeared in Italy in 1536, and again in 1600. He gave the habit of the third Order to S. Juliana Falconieri, who so completely reorganized it that she is generally considered its foundress. Devotion to our Lady's Dolors was S. Philip's chief attraction, and extraordinary love of the Blessed Sacrament was the characteristic of S. Juliana ; and hence these two devotions have been regarded by their descendants as their peculiar heritage.

"*Vitis Mystica*;" or, *the True Vine, &c.* Translated, with Preface, by the Rev. W. R. BERNARD BROWNLOW, M.A., Priest of the Diocese of Plymouth. Washbourne. 1873.

WE heartily recommend this excellent translation of the beautiful treatise to which S. Bernard's name is so often attached that the Church, always willing rather to give than to take away, has sanctioned the use of it in the more modern offices of the Sacred Heart and the Five Wounds. In his useful preface, Mr. Brownlow gives Mabillon's dictum, "*non est S. Bernardi*," and adds that "a slight acquaintance with S. Bernard's writings is sufficient to convince the reader that he is not the author of the *Vitis Mystica*." Referring altogether the question of critical inquiry to the learned, to whom it belongs to track these rocky paths, we rather betake ourselves, and most gladly, to the green pastures and flowery meads opened to us by the treatise itself, where, in truth, the sheep of Christ may "go in and out," and browse at will on the fresh herbage springing richly on every side. To whomsoever it was given to possess the love and know-

ledge poured out in this little book, he was one who had the leisure and repose, without which no man can fully taste and see the graciousness of God ; and for the want of which the intellectual faculties of our own day, as well as the feelings and devotion—with which leisure would seem at first sight to have more to do—are withering and drying up. Mr. Brownlow has done well in proposing the comparison of the *Vitis Mystica* with "Hervey's Meditations," long reckoned as a book exciting to fruitful piety by Protestants. Also he has some excellent remarks on the difference between the abundant outward and barren use of Scripture texts and phrases by Protestant writers, and the light thrown by the Fathers by clothing Divine ideas in the language of the inspired books. It is the difference, in fact, of "wandering clouds without water," driven hither and thither by the wind, and the fertilizing rain-cloud, dropping fruitfulness in a dry land.

Beginning with "I am the True Vine," the author develops the subject throughout forty-seven, chiefly short, chapters, excellent for meditation. The Pruning of the Vine, or humiliations of Our Lord ; the Digging about It, which are the Snares and Christ's Wounds ; the Bonds assumed in obedience—a very beautiful exposition ; the Culture and Beauty of It ; Its Leaves, containing a full and exquisite development of the Seven Words from the Cross ; the Flowers of the Vine, continued through thirty chapters ; and the Fruit, with which the treatise concludes. The variety and naming of the flowers of the Vine may be looked upon by some as fanciful and, possibly, far-fetched. But—and this must never be overlooked—it belongs to the blessed gifts of leisure and spiritual repose to elaborate and carry out principles into minute detail ; as it also belonged to the Carthusians and Cistercians of the twelfth century to devote every least faculty of the being to God. The fancy which could discern spiritual analogies and characters in every weed and bud, in the various sorts of birds and leaves of trees ; the loftier imagination which could connect these with the attributes of God, or throw light through them upon the mysteries of faith, thus proving the great truth that the imagination is given by God to be a most able instrument for the discernment of truth ; these qualities, fed by the continual nourishment of the whole course of the Scriptures, distinguish the writings of the monks of that day, and lend to their solid abundance a special charm.

There is one chief motive which, among others, leads us to rejoice in the able translation of treatises full of tenderness like the *Vitis Mystica*. In an age in which Strauss, and after him Renan, have inaugurated a fresh phase of enmity to Our Lord as God, and when an amazing variety of insidious attacks are made upon His Divinity, His Person and Office, or His Revealed Word, it is especially necessary to look to our armour and our strongholds, as well as to our choice of weapons, that the enemy may not carry the war into our own country, or cripple and disable our faith. And as there is no stronger support to faith than the stirring up of love, and as love comes by knowledge, so we should by every means and zeal, add to our knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. We, too, following the life of our Great Pattern, must dig about our vineyard and

feed it with fresh nourishment, must pluck out its weeds, and gather up its stones into a wall, looking to its hedges and defences, and repairing its watchtower, lest we should be struck unawares between the joints of our armour. And above and more than all, we must wait upon Him, in Whom only we can look for any growth, and treasure up every fact of His life and every word from His lips, that our love may be refreshed from day to day.

“O good Jesus, true Vine, and Tree of Life, which is planted in the midst of Paradise! Lord Jesus Christ, whose leaves are for healing, and whose fruit is unto life everlasting! Thou Blessed Flower! Fruit of Thy most pure Virgin Mother, without whom none is wise, for Thou art the Wisdom of the Eternal Father, vouchsafe to refresh my weak and barren mind with the bread of understanding and the water of wisdom; that by Thy opening, O Key of David, things which are hidden may be revealed to me, and by Thy shining, O true Light, things which are dark may be made clear; so that through me, Thy humble servant, by Thine own manifestation and enlightening, both we who speak and they who hear may together have eternal life. Amen.”

Such is the opening prayer, and such the spirit, of this unknown monk of the twelfth century.

Meditations for Every Day in the Year, and for the Principal Feasts. By the Ven. Father NICHOLAS LANCICIUS, of the Society of Jesus; with a Preface by the Rev. George Porter, S.J. Burns & Oates. 1874.

IT is an exceedingly hard task to write a good book of meditations. The gifts necessary for performing it are so many and varied, that at first sight we are inclined to despair of ever finding them all, or even a sufficient majority of them, in any one individual, unless indeed he have the direct supernatural aid which S. Ignatius is related to have received when he was composing his spiritual exercises. The very first requisite in a writer of meditations is a high degree of sanctity; and this, we all know, is not to be found at every turn. The second in importance is perhaps a wide experience and thorough knowledge of human nature; else the meditations will be such as to suit minds resembling that of the writer, but will have no attraction for those differently constituted. Besides this, a power of putting common truths in a forcible and striking way is very necessary, as well as a good acquaintance with Scripture, a concise style, and a picturesque representation of the scenes and persons which form the subject of the meditations. Last of all, great judgment is required in combining skilfully, and in their due proportions, appeals which will come home to the affections, the reason, and the will.

Most of these qualifications were possessed in quite an extraordinary degree by F. Lancicius, and their effects reproduce themselves in the meditations before us. His life was that of a saint, and was distinguished by gifts and graces which are evidences of no common holiness. One fact is recorded of him which is of interest because it bears directly on his

literary labours. In return for an act of heroic obedience, which involved the loss of all that he had written during long years of patient study—he had, during the latter portion of his life, the singular gift of being able to turn at any moment to any passage in any author, although hitherto entirely unknown to him, which might serve to illustrate the subject on which he was writing. Hence the wonderful accumulation of quotations and examples from Scripture, from the Fathers, and from spiritual writers generally, which we find in every page of his works. But holiness was not his only qualification as a writer of meditations. As Spiritual Father at the Roman College, as rector successively of several different colleges in Poland, and as Provincial of Lithuania, he had a wide experience of the needs and yearnings of human nature, while his naturally affectionate disposition gave him that skill in appealing to the affections which is one of the distinguishing features of his meditations. But in his appeal to the affections, he never loses sight of the practical end which is to be kept in view: like a true son of S. Ignatius, he makes the play of the affections, as well as the conclusion of the understanding, always subordinate to the exercise of the will; the fruit to be gained by the meditation, the action which is to follow in daily life, this is always the prominent idea which is set before the mind of the reader. For this reason F. Lancicius' Meditations will be found most valuable, not only to religious, for whom they were originally intended, but to all those who desire to consecrate their daily life by devoting some portion of it to regularly express and systematic meditation.

The translator has therefore done good service in bringing such a book within the range of English readers, while F. Porter's excellent little preface contains many valuable hints on the method of meditation. We would especially call attention to his suggestion that we should always try and picture to our minds some actual scene, as a means of fixing our minds on our subject, and recalling our thoughts if they wander. This suggestion is one which all who use this book will find of great practical value, especially as the historical side of the subject is not very prominently brought forward by F. Lancicius in the Meditations themselves.

Ignace Spencer et la Renaissance du Catholicisme en Angleterre. Par M. L'ABBÉ DE MADONNE. Paris: Charles Douniol.

"I HAVE not sinned against light," words taken from Father Newman's "Apologia," form the key-note of this volume. The idea running through it is that England has not sinned against the light, and is again close to the light of God. It is an idea very prevalent on the Continent. We who live at home can hardly be expected to sympathize with it. If any country has sinned against the light it is England,—not by her people, but by those who ruled over her spiritually, and who have made her fall so low in God's sight. She is the lowest of the nations, as to all

supernatural gifts, understanding nothing about that higher life which could lift her poor children up to heaven. She is the only nation in which *pauperism* exists—poverty, of course, is to be found everywhere—and that, her bitter curse, is due to England's rejection of God's Church. There was no such thing known in old Catholic days as pauperism; but the fault lay, we hold, as we have more than once explained, with those who betrayed England. Contrast the state of England with that of Italy now, after so many years of revolution. All Italy's bishops are faithful,—you could count upon your fingers all her unfaithful priests.

Sowers and Reapers. A Sermon preached in the Church of the Ever Faithful Virgin, Norwood, on the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. Sunday, Sept. 14th, 1873. By the Rev. HENRY J. COLERIDGE, of the Society of Jesus. Burns & Oates.

THIS sermon, preached by Father Coleridge on the 25th anniversary of the foundation of Norwood Convent and Orphanage, is of general application to the great principle, not only of casting in seed, and good seed, but of its silent growth under the Spirit of God. Referring to the material wealth of the earth's fruits, just then gathered or gathering in, the preacher refers to the spiritual harvest of that orphanage which has so truly brought forth an hundred-fold from its one grain of corn from Calvados, and is distinguished by its bountiful gladdening of the heart of Bishop Grant amid the toils and spiritual destitution of much of his diocese. Many principles of the divine and secret growth of charity are admirably touched upon in this sermon. In the natural harvest

“The same man sows and reaps. If a man sows what he does not reap, we consider him unfortunate; if a man reaps what he has not sown, we think that he has invaded or usurped the work of another. But in the kingdom of God, the spiritual harvest, it is not so. . . . The joys of this world may be such as men do not like to share with others; in the heavenly kingdom there are no lonely glories, no solitary incommunicable joys. Rather all joys there are intensified by being shared and repeated and reflected; the law of charity rules them, as it rules all else, and the joy of the sower is deeper because of the joy of the reaper, and each rejoices in the other, and finds his own heart expanded with ineffable delight by the other's return of love.”

So again, speaking of the two distinct works of man and of God, in the casting and growth of seed, the subject is developed in a passage—too long to give entire—in which the natural and supernatural agencies are set out and clothed in that clear and most attractive form which fills the mind with suggestive thought.

“Apostles go forth, or bishops rule, or priests teach; the visible ministry of the Church brings home the sacraments to rich and poor, young and old. The Church has her leaders, her champions, her defenders, her benefactors, her servants in temporal matters, in literature, in controversy,

in her social and secular struggles. . . . This is the part of man ; but all the while, unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it ; unless the Lord keep the city, he watcheth in vain that keepeth it. The grace of God it is that unfolds the principle of life, acting in a thousand ways on the soul of each person or in the hearts of many, illuminating, warning, kindling, urging, ripening, strengthening. It is grace that must cleanse what is stained, water what is dry, heal what is wounded and diseased, grace that must put docility in the place of stiffness, pliancy in the place of hardness, which must make the cold heart glow with love, and guide the steps that have wandered, towards the home and the embrace of their Father.* The condescension of God in the Incarnation involves all that wonderful and tender system in which His grace is administered to us by men like ourselves. Still man may sow the seed, but the harvest is from God. If man is able to put in the sickle, it is because, where his agency can never reach, the blade, the ear, the corn have been matured by supernatural forces."

The preacher passes on to point out how our Blessed Lord "traces lovingly all the stages—first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear"—of the seed's growth, and the whole analysis is marked by unusual completeness, tenderness, and beauty.

Holy Places. Their Sanctity and Authenticity. By F. PHILPIN DE RIVIERES. London: Washbourne.

FATHER PHILPIN DE RIVIERES' very interesting book appears most opportunely, at a time when pilgrimages, which had been deemed characteristics of barbarous and benighted ages alone, have been revived in this civilized and enlightened nineteenth century, and have been assailed by freethinkers and Protestants with the usual weapons of scepticism, prejudice, and ridicule. He traces back the existence, in all ages and among all nations, of places invested with real or supposed sanctity, to the universal tradition of the fall of man and the consequent curse upon the earth, and to the intuitive feeling that this curse can be reversed only through the communication of God to man, whose office it is "to elevate and offer" inanimate nature "to God," and thus "to draw down sanctity and benediction upon the earth." Thus, it naturally followed that a peculiar reverence was felt for the places where Divine communications had been made. He shows that this central truth of natural religion is more distinctly expressed by the Incarnation. Instead of sanctifying creation by merely uniting it in some ineffable way with the Omnipresent Godhead, God the Son yearning, so to say, for the free gift of man's love and a permanent abode with him, assumed a human body with all its limitations and relations, so that henceforth He was

* "Lava quod est sordidum,
Riga quod est aridum,
Sana quod est saucium."

localized, had a country, a birthplace, a family, and friends; and the privileged spots which He selected for His visible Bodily Presence were necessarily sanctified above all others. F. Philpin proceeds to consider the subject historically, as it appears in the Old Testament, under the New Law, in the Catholic Ritual and Liturgy, and in the constancy with which the Church has always struggled to defend her Holy Places, assaults on which both she and her enemies have identified with attacks on her faith. Finally, he takes up the question of authenticity, under the heads of extraordinary and ordinary supernatural, demoniacal, natural, historical, archæological, and architectural evidence. This part of the work enters so fully into details, that we must content ourselves with recommending it, and especially the chapters about Jerusalem, Nazareth, and Loreto, to our readers, as most instructive and interesting. The author writes in a liberal and enlightened spirit, and while he plainly shows that the most natural as well as the most scientific solutions of obscure points are to be found in ancient traditions, he avoids hasty, final conclusions till further researches shall have cleared up all archæological difficulties, and issued, as he is firmly convinced they will do, "in a more perfect knowledge of, and a deeper love for, the Holy Places."

Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical. By J. H. NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Pickering.

A FULL half of this volume is occupied with a treatise on "the cause of the rise and successes of Arianism," which F. Newman wrote as recently as in February, 1872, and which has not before been published. The title of this treatise hardly gives sufficient indication of its contents; for in its course are introduced various incidental doctrinal discussions of extreme interest. The treatise is preceded by four Latin dissertations, more or less compiled from his earlier works, which he published at Rome in 1847. We suppose there are few persons in England who can supply any criticism worthy the name on these works; and most certainly the present writer is not in the number; but we hope on an early occasion to place before our readers a connected view of F. Newman's writings on the great Arian controversy.

The treatise is succeeded by some notes on the Apollinarian heresy, put together as early as 1835, but now first published. Next comes his famous Essay on S. Cyril's formula, which was published in the "*Atlantis*," of July, 1858. The two concluding papers are (1) an article on "the *Ordo de Tempore*," published in the "*Atlantis*," of February, 1870; and (2) one on the Rheims and Douay versions of Scripture, published in the "*Rambler*" of July, 1859.

This volume would increase, if increase were possible, our marvel at the extraordinary range of F. Newman's powers and studies.

God our Father. By a Father of the Society of Jesus. author of the
 "Happiness of Heaven." Baltimore: J. Murphy & Co. London
 Washbourne.

THE chief merit of this little book seems to us to lie in its being, while by no means dry, so thoroughly theological. The great and consoling thought that God is our Father, both in the order of nature and in that of grace, is well brought out, while those who are troubled about their past sins will derive much comfort from the way in which this thought is applied to their own special wants.

We subjoin the following extract:—

"It is evident that looking upon God as our Father fills us with perfect confidence in His infinite mercy, and eventually gives us peace of conscience. It does more. The thought that God is really our loving Father is a very sun, under whose rays our souls receive the warmth and health which enable them to grow in strength and perfection; while narrow-minded views of God, which represent Him almost exclusively as a terrible Judge, prevent their rapid growth, and even introduce in them dangerous diseases."

The author is, perhaps, better known by another work which he has published, called the "Happiness of Heaven," and which has been most favourably received in America. The present work comes before us with the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop of Baltimore.

The Pope and the Emperor. Nine Lectures by Very Rev. J. L. SWEENEY, O.S.B., D.D. London: Burns & Oates.

THIS volume of Lectures carries out a truly admirable conception into felicitous execution. The general truth urged is, that in every age the kingdoms of this world attempt to tyrannize over the kingdom of God, and that in every age they are speedily worsted: and the moral of course applies to the existent German persecution.

In his first Lecture F. Sweeney begins with the Founder Himself of the Christian Kingdom; and exhibits the relations of our Blessed Lord "with the two Herods and Pontius Pilate." From Christ we are led to his Apostles: "SS. Peter and Paul with Nero." "The Popes and Emperors of the three first centuries" are commemorated in the third Lecture; and in the fourth, "The Popes and the successors of Constantine." In this Lecture, we may mention, F. Sweeney maintains (p. 66) S. Liberius's complete innocence of the charge often brought against him, of having signed an heretical formula. The three next Lectures are respectively on "S. Gregory VII. and Henry IV.," "the Popes and the Kings of England"; "the Popes and the Revolution." The eighth Lecture is on the dealings

of Pius IX. with the circumstances of the present day ; and the ninth is a general summary of the course.

Not the least happy thought is F. Sweeney's motto. "Passus sub Pontio Pilato"; here is the momentary defeat at the hand of this world's potentate: "Resurrexit"; here is the speedy and permanent victory over his assault.

Meditations for the Use of the Clergy, for every day in the year, on the Gospel for the Sundays, from the Italian of Mgr. Scotti. Revised and edited by the OBLATES OF S. CHARLES. Vol. II. London: Burns & Oates.

THE clergy will no doubt welcome this second volume of meditations, so well known and appreciated in the Holy City. It comes to them, too, under high authority. We hardly consider it right to criticise a book so closely touching the interests, and the defects of those who are the ministers of the Church's sacraments, and the dispensers of God's graces,—taken up as they are into the priesthood of Him, Who is a Priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech.

But we may be allowed to say that we have read with perfect delight one or two of the meditations, as, e.g.,—"Mary, the pattern of good ground,"—"The Mother of the Divine Shepherd shares in His pastoral title."

It is not for us to say how often the priests of God's Church should speak of God's Mother, but the more the faithful generally think, speak, and write of her, whom S. Antoninus called the Good Shepherdess, who daily feeds the Church with the blessed fruit of her womb, the Bread of Angels, which was formed, and which is ministered to us in the Sacrament of the Altar—so much the more will devotion spread to the Heart of the Good Shepherd.

Principles of Modern Physiology, with their applications to the training and discipline of the mind and the study of its morbid conditions. By Dr. CARPENTER, M.D., LL.D. London: H.S. King.

DR. CARPENTER has been so kind as to send us this work for notice. We have had no time to master its contents; but we have read enough of it to testify, that it is written in a genuinely scientific and earnest spirit, and that several of its conclusions have an important connection with theology on its philosophical side. We hope in our next number to give a fuller account of this volume.

Cherubini: Memorials illustrative of his Life. By EDWARD BELLASIS, Barrister-at-law. London: Burns & Oates.

THE spirit in which this biography is written is one of such honest enthusiasm for the renowned musician, so justly entitled the "prince of modern composers for the Church," that it cannot fail of moving and carrying away its general readers; while its scrupulous conscientiousness in all matters of detail, as relating both to the more important events of his life and the dates of his compositions, evinces a care in the compiling of the entire work, which will make it a reliable as well as interesting study for the more scientific peruser, and give it a high value amongst the records (alas so few!) of the chief composers of the last and present centuries.

Cherubini was a Florentine by birth, but spent the greater part of his life in Paris—which was consequently the scene of most of his labours and triumphs. His name stands out prominently amongst those of his great competitors (who numbered in their ranks Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn, Hummel, and Paisiello), and is invested with a halo of renown, which alone would place his individual merit beyond question.

Although his triumphs began at an early period of his life, and he was spared much of the distress and poverty which form a melancholy trait in the lives of some of his illustrious contemporaries, it was not until he had attained his 61st year that he gained the position which his pre-eminent talents had so long merited. In 1841 he was appointed Director of the Conservatoire, the first musical Academy in France. This confirms the view that he was considerably in advance of his age: the grandeur and severity of his style were not likely to be easily appreciated by an audience accustomed to the old Italian operas—the "tender and voluptuous charm of whose melodies had enervated and corrupted their taste for such force and vigour, as that by which his works are so strongly characterized."

His personal character seems to have had much in keeping with his compositions; a ruggedness of exterior, and somewhat rude though honest brusquerie covering many fine qualities. His friends, and they were not a few, evinced a marked affection for him, while the "veneration in which his pupils held him reached to fanaticism," p. 264. His modesty may be exemplified by his refusal to dedicate his chief opera, "*Les Deux Journées*," to Haydn; saying, "no, as yet I have written nothing worthy of such a master." His power of administration shone forth during his Directorship of the Conservatoire, which he completely reformed.

The devotional side of his character is constantly brought before us by his biographer, whose touching description of many of his religious works must be read to be done justice to. No one could have given that thrilling analysis of the Requiem Mass in D minor, which may be found in p. 341, without also giving a convincing proof of how thoroughly he has entered into Cherubini's spirit, and how capable he is of appreciating his deep devotion and faith. The fact of the words "*Laus Deo*" being found at the beginning and end of all this great composer's church music is perhaps a

key to the secret of his power of stirring so vividly the religious emotions of his Catholic hearers.

Mr. Bellasis' vigorous defence of his ecclesiastical compositions delights us: "if he is to be called theatrical, then he has made theatrical music devotional," p. 188. One more trait in his character we must mention, his love and talent for drawing; this and botany were his chief relaxations—another instance of how often these sister arts go hand in hand.

To lovers of music we can confidently recommend this most interesting life; it is enriched and enlivened by many anecdotes, and also by observations which show how justly Mr. Bellasis enters into the true spirit of his subject. He makes the following remark, when speaking of Haydn, that though his music "is not, on the whole, deep, yet it is like *an old friend whose voice sounds pleasantly*. There is nothing unintelligible in it; you cannot fancy it other than it is; you wonder it was not, so to speak, found out before," p. 193. We sincerely hope that Cherubini will not be the sole musician, to whose memory Mr. Bellasis's rare qualifications shall be devoted.

Ebba. London: R. Washbourne.

THERE are thoughts in this French work, which we value highly; for instance, the suggestion about the slowness with which the Creator works. The thought, of course, is not original, being taken from F. Faber's beautiful and most spiritual work, "Growth in Holiness," ch. ix.; but it is set before us again in a way that enables us to say that the author has himself mastered F. Faber's thought, and—if we may use such an expression—re-created it. At the same time we would not have our readers suppose that there is no original thought in this work. There is, although it will not be every one who will appreciate it.

La Genèse des Espèces: Etudes Philosophiques et Religieuses sur l'Histoire Naturelle et les Naturalistes contemporains. PAR H. DE VALROGER, Prêtre de l'Oratoire. Paris: Didier et Cie. London: Burns & Oates.

"**L**A Genèse des Espèces" is a review of the transmutation theory in all its extent and on general principles. It is written in a clear and interesting style, and the author, who was, he tells us, "Mitité, dans ma jeunesse, à l'étude des êtres organisés par deux années de travaux anatomiques," is well acquainted with the literature of the subject. Perhaps the most interesting portions of his book are the second part, 'La Genèse des Espèces et la Science Française,' and the paragraphs in which he

describes the lives and work of some contemporary naturalists. We can here do no more than indicate some of the general conclusions at which he arrives.

He treats the question of the Origin of Species in a sense opposed to Transmutationism, believing that the hypothesis of successive creations, partly destroyed and partly removed from one country to another by alternate subsidence and upheaval of sea and land, furnishes the most probable explanation of the phenomena. But he does not believe that the transmutation theory is in itself opposed to religion. It can, he tells us, be reconciled with the text of Genesis by means of explanations possessing more or less likelihood, and can be brought into more or less remote connection with ideas put forth by the Fathers and by Catholic Theologians.*

"The most severe orthodoxy allows them immense periods of time about which they may exercise their powers of conjecture as to what passed in prehistoric times."

It must not be supposed, however, that F. Valroger would regard extension of transmutationism to the body of man as orthodox. On the contrary, he reproduces (pp. 107-123) Mr. Wallace's arguments against Mr. Darwin's application of their common theory to the special case of the "Descent of Man." The "Descent of Man," however, he proposes to make the subject of a special work, and therefore does not treat of it at large in this volume. The argument that if the theory holds in other cases, it ought to hold in the case of man also, he regards as mere jumping at a conclusion; and he refers (p. 127) with approbation to the DUBLIN REVIEW as stipulating for "the necessary reservations concerning the origin of man."

In connection with transmutationism, F. Valroger treats also of the bearings of the hypothesis of Spontaneous Generation on religion. "Christian Theism," he decides, "has no interest either way in the discussions on Spontaneous Generation." Spontaneous Generation, if proved, would rid the transmutation theory of the necessity of appealing to that special intervention of Creative Power to which Mr. Darwin, when he spoke of life having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few

* "An English Naturalist," he observes, referring to Mr. Huxley, "who wanted to make people believe in the radical incompatibility of science and religion, has nevertheless pretended that the text of the Bible and the Catholic tradition are absolutely irreconcilable with either the hypothesis of successive creations, or with that of the filiation of species by evolution and transmutation; according to him, Scripture and Creation compel us to hold that the world was created in six days of twenty-four hours each (Contemporary Review, Nov. 1871). Another English Naturalist, Mr. St. George Mivart, more sober-minded and better informed, has refuted this paradox, supporting himself by the authority of M. Frayssinous, Cardinal Gousset, Father Perrone, Father Pianciani, Cardinal Wiseman, the Rev. Professor Molloy, &c. See 'Evolution and its Consequences' (From the Contemporary Review, Jan. 1872)."

simple forms, attributed the first introduction of life on the earth. It would thus add to the symmetry of the theory, which otherwise lies open to the objection, "Why if there were one intervention, might there not have been two, three, or any number? Why should not each species have been specially created?" And it is the opinion of many transmutationists that, on the transmutation theory, Spontaneous Generation is necessary to account for the existence in our own day of the lowest forms of vegetable and animal life, which otherwise ought (they say) to have been ages ago developed into higher forms. If, therefore, it were finally and certainly proved that there is no such thing as the appearance of life in matter previously non-living, a blow more or less severe would be struck at the transmutation theory; but this is a merely accidental circumstance, and does not affect the intrinsic merits of the question. The hypothesis of Spontaneous Generation was actually held by the Fathers and the Schoolmen. As Christians, moreover, we are concerned less with the *fact* than with the *rationale* of Spontaneous Generation. Supposing for a moment that a living creature had been seen or known to begin to live in a vessel which had previously contained nothing but inorganic matter, the question for us would be, what took place when the non-living began to live? And the answer which any one would give to this question would be determined by the opinion held by him as to the nature of life. Every one would interpret the facts according to his own theory; and legitimately; for the nature of what takes place in the evolution of life depends on the nature of the life evolved.

As to the nature of life F. Valroger is what we should call a Theistic Vitalist: and this opinion the present writer believes to be the true one. But, like an eminent Italian biologist, Prof. Frederico Delpino, he does not confine himself to saying that vital phenomena are due to a vital agency; he adds that it is an immaterial agency. "Evidemment il existe, dans chaque sorte d'animaux, un principe spécifique immatériel" (p. 292). But no Catholic is, as a Catholic, obliged to hold that in all living beings there is a vital principle. F. Tongiorgi, for instance, who for some years taught philosophy in the *Collegio Romano*, in his "*Institutiones Philosophicæ*" (vol. iii. p. 18, ed. 1864, Brussels), gives it as his opinion that there is no "vital agency" in plants. Neither the "vital" nor the physical theory of life, moreover, can be directly used either for or against the transmutation theory. The "vital" theory, in so far as it is biological, is the theory of an agency utterly unknown save through effects which it produces; and the laws of its operation, and among others those which have to do with the transmutability or non-transmutability of species, must therefore be determined exclusively by the facts, and not by any *à priori* reasonings as to the nature of the vital agency. And on the other hand, granting for a moment the truth of the physical theory of life, the molecular movements which make a being a living being—their velocity, their direction, their combination, the way in which the system of movements is maintained,—is utterly unknown to us. Therefore we cannot argue from it. For anything we know to the contrary, the internal molecular arrangement, and the system of molecular movements, by which the

orum of a particular species is constituted living, may be such that its equilibrium would be destroyed by the unknown molecular changes necessary for transmutation ; and whether this is the case or not will have to be ascertained, not by what is in effect an argument *ad ignorantiam*, but by appeal to the evidence producible from other quarters for and against the transmutation theory. Indirectly, however, by supposing a system of continual interpositions with the physical order of nature, the vital theory finds a place for special creations more readily than the physical theory does.

The Life of S. Vincent de Paul. By the Rev. R. F. WILSON. Rivingtons.

THIS is a simple and unpretending life of the great Apostle of Charity. It is limited almost exclusively to the narration of his active labours, without any attempt to portray his inner, spiritual life, of which an Anglican clergyman would necessarily be an incompetent judge. We can therefore recommend it strongly to both Catholics and Protestants, notwithstanding that the former will here and there meet with a few words that will seem to them rather odd. For instance, the unmeaning term "to celebrate" is occasionally, though not always, substituted for the more simple and correct expression, "to say Mass."

Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought. Edited by Rev. J. H. BLUNT. London : Rivingtons.

THIS bulky volume has been sent to us for notice. We cannot do better, than present our readers with the commencement of the amusing article on "Roman Catholics" :—

A sect, originally organized by the Jesuits out of the relics of the Marian party of clergy and laity in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and further organized into a Donatist hierarchy by Cardinal Wiseman in the year 1850.

The name is found in use as early as the year 1564. . . . In a wide sense, all members of churches or sects recognized by the Pope as in communion with himself are often called Roman Catholics, but the name is more strictly applicable to the English sect. . . . They were not thoroughly organized into a sect until the arrival of the Jesuits, the first of whom came over in the year 1581 ; and had it not been for the work of these enemies of Catholic unity, the Roman Catholics would probably have been reabsorbed by the Church.

Consolation for the Sick and Afflicted. Translated from the French by
ANNA T. SADLIER. New York: Sadlier & Co.

THIS little book comes to us with the recommendation of the Bishop of Montreal. It was compiled while the small-pox was raging as a pestilence in that city in 1872, and it is well calculated to teach patience to the sick, confidence to the dying, and resignation to the bereaved. It contains many examples and sentiments of the Saints; and, finally, a collection of prayers and meditations designed, as the author tells us, "to show how to live in a Christian manner so as to deserve a holy death."

Holy Places. Rome: De Federicis.

THE object of this pamphlet is to fill up a gap in the otherwise excellent English handbooks for Rome, by directing the Catholic visitor to the places which are memorials of the Saints who have lived in the city. It will be valuable to those whose time or opportunities do not permit them to seek for detailed information in M. Bleser's valuable work "*Rome et ses Monuments.*" It is also a guide to the Holy House of Loreto; and closes with an interesting letter from S. Benedict Joseph Labré, written on his journey on foot to Rome and Loreto.

Nazareth. By MRS. CASHEL HOEY, with a Preface by the Rev. F. Humphrey Oblate of S. Charles. London: Burns & Oates.

WE earnestly recommend this interesting work, with its most valuable and seriously written preface, to our readers. In the latter they will find matter for much thought; in the former they will discover how, thanks to the ladies of Nazareth, they can help forward a noble cause.

It is often said that there are so many good works to which we English Catholics are bound to contribute, that we ought not to assist other works out of our own land. Those who think so we would refer to F. Humphrey's preface for the contrary opinion. There they will find three reasons for helping the Congregation of the Ladies of Nazareth, both in France and in Galilee. We will here give one of those reasons,—he is alluding to Protestant proselytism:—"It is from England that their enemies come. It is English ladies who obstruct their work. It is English influence and the power of English money that they have contend against. They may fairly then, look to London, the source of the evil, as the source also of the antidote."

The very name of Nazareth, the village "of flowers," where, if we may believe recent travellers, the flowers are brighter in colour and richer in profusion than in any other part of the Holy Land, goes to the heart at once, speaking to us both of Him and of Her who were as the rose of the field and the lily of the valley. We trust that this little work may be

widely circulated, and that its effect will be to bring help to the Ladies of Nazareth, and that it may be to them as "the flower of roses in the days of spring."

The Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Christians; translated from the Greek fragments preserved by Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria.
Re-printed and edited by WILLIS NEVINS. Williams & Norgate.

THIS work was, as we are informed in the prefatory notice, privately printed in 1809, at the expense of Mr. W. Meredith, and the copies, not many in number, were destroyed.

Its republication is opportune ; for the spirit of unbelief, almost—if we may use the expression—incarnate in the Emperor Julian, is again abroad. It is curious to see what little progress the unbelievers in Christianity have made. They have invented no new argument, except so far as modern science has by its half-knowledge of nature enabled them to put some old objection in a new form. The Emperor Julian had the whole might of the Roman Empire to back him, but he had to cry out "*Galilæe vicisti.*" So will it be with all our modern Julians. But Julian did something more than make objections, he tried to rebuild the temple which God had overthrown. The result we know ; and so let those who would do likewise understand in time.

Rupert Aubrey of Aubrey Chase, an Historical Tale of 1681.
By REV. T. J. POTTER.

SINCE we have received this work, its talented author has passed away from the world. We can conceive very few works more meritorious than to place the history of the martyrs in an agreeable form before the young. The memory of Oliver Plunket, Archbishop of Armagh, must ever be dear to all Catholics of these kingdoms, and, if possible, F. Potter has made it to us dearer still. He has gone to his reward, but his work will follow him.

In the preface he tells us that he does not wish the book to be considered "as a novel, or even as a novelette . . . because it sometimes happens that a writer is criticised and condemned for not succeeding in that which it never entered into his mind to attempt." To our mind F. Potter has perfectly succeeded in what he meant to do. May he rest in peace.

Notes of the Wandering Jew, or, the Jesuits and their Opponents. Edited by JOHN FAIRPLAY, Esq. Dublin : McGlashan & Gill.

WE cannot say that we like the form in which this work is cast ; but it can hardly fail to do good. Apparently, as we gather from the advertisement, it was first published in London, 1845. The author, it is

stated, was not a Catholic. If this be true, his testimony is all the more valuable. We have found some careful explanation on such subjects as the "Spiritual Exercises" and, above all, "Spies and Informers." The latter of all the chapters has pleased us the most. It sums up so completely the prejudices of those who speak against the Society, and who, by making inane objections—very prejudicial however both to the Church and to the Society, are trying to ruin both—that we feel sure the book will succeed. For our own part, however, we do not think that the original writer was a Protestant, and therefore the work is hardly what it pretends to be. We are not convinced by the evidence alluded to at p. 48.

The Truce of God. A Tale of the Eleventh Century. By G. H. MILES.
Baltimore: Murphy & Co. London: Washbourne.

ANYTHING that brings back to our minds the great S. Gregory VII., the hero-Pope, who sacrificed himself for the Church of God, and obtained her triumph, must be of use. The tale now before us we have not found very interesting, but we cannot speak too highly of the spirit which pervades it. Others may take in it more interest than we have done. We should be glad, for we hold it as a most important part of the education of the young that they should have right views about the Middle Ages, and especially about the Pontificate of S. Gregory VII. With Protestant historical books constantly within their reach, where they will only hear of *Hildebrand*, they must be taught to bow down before the Saint, whose dear shrine at Salerno, we regret to say, is still so little honoured.

Simple Tales. London: R. Washbourne.

THIS is a collection of simple stories, for the most part founded on facts within the author's experience. It belongs to a class of books, of which the want is generally much felt by Catholic parents; being calculated to interest the young without being professedly religious, and yet instinct with religious thought and feeling. There is a pretty tale of the boy who for five months watched nightly for his father, and at last, on his death-bed, won him from the vice of drunkenness. There is also the little French girl, who, in childish faith, wrote a letter to her dear Mother Mary, and got an answer which she doubted not came direct from heaven. Among the easy rhymes with which the stories are interspersed, we were glad to find the pretty legend of how the robins got their red breasts. Finally there is a touching history of martyrdom in the present day, in connection with a widowed mother's prayer. The frontispiece is pretty, and the excellent taste with which the printing and binding are executed render it very appropriate for a Christmas present.

INDEX.

ACTA ET DECRETA variorum Conciliorum recentiorum Collectio Lacensis, *noticed*, 231.

AMERICAN POETS, 302-325 : national character of American poetry, 302 ; its obligations to Indian traditions and to American scenery, 303 ; graphic description of a swamp, 304 ; truthfulness of American poets in their pictures of scenery, 306 ; extracts from Longfellow's and Emerson's poems, 308 ; the early efforts of American poets, 309 ; Mrs. Sigourney and William Cullen Bryant, 310 ; the religious feeling in Bryant's poems, 311 ; Longfellow's "Hiawatha," 312 ; its high purpose, 313 ; popularity of his "Evangeline" in spite of its metre, 315 ; its Catholic aspect, 316 ; his success in translation, 317 ; Bayard Taylor's poems, 317 ; the dramatic beauty of his "Lara," 318 ; his feeling dedication of that poem to Whittier, 319 ; his successful translation of the Iliad, 319 ; specimens of American Catholic poetry, 320 ; the poems of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 321 ; their pathos, 322 ; extracts from them, 324 ; their good common sense, 324.

Anglican Orders : a few Remarks in the form of a Conversation, *noticed*, 262.

ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER (THE) ON THE SACRED HEART, 146-161 : a new era in ecclesiastical history, 146 ; F. Newman on the preaching of Christ, 146 ; the Catholic's sure weapon, 148 ; cause of the fresh burst throughout Europe of devotion to the Sacred Heart, 149 ; the Archbishop's Sermon on the Pilgrimage, 150 ; Dr. Nicholson's attack upon the Archbishop, 150 ; adoration due to the Sacred Humanity and the Sacred Heart, 151 ; the able rejoinder of "Catholicus" to Dr. Nicholson, 151 ; the term, "Deification," 154 ; patristic examples of the use of the word "deified," 154 ; objections raised by the *Guardian*, 155 ; reply to them, 156 ; objections raised by Dr. Nicholson, 158 ; difficulty in understanding of what he accuses the Archbishop, 158 ; proof of Anglican heterodoxy on the Incarnation derivable from the controversy, 160 ; Lord Shaftesbury's sympathy with Roman Catholics, 161.

Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Christians, *noticed*, 503.

BAIN (Dr. A.), The Emotions and the Will, *reviewed*, 226.

Bellasis (Mr. E.), Cherubini: Memorials illustrative of his Life, *noticed*, 467.

Blunt (Mr. J. H.), Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought, *noticed*, 501.

Bowles (Miss E.), Eagle and Dove, *noticed*, 262.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM—MR. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 402-423 : the liberalistic theory on toleration, 402 ; Cæsarism a reaction against this, 403 ; increasing oppression of the Church, 403 ; Mr. Frederick Harrison on the Falck laws, 404 ; excuses for their tyrannical nature, 406 ; defence of them by English Protestants, 407 ; the Archbishop's Essay, 409 ; his defence of the Church against Cæsarism, 410 ; contrast between Pagan and Christian Cæsarism, 411 ; he does not deny to the State supreme power in civil matters, 411 ; ignorance of civil rulers of the Church's divine authority, 412 ; Mr. Stephen's work, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," 413 ; its interesting character, 413 ; his doctrine on a supreme being, 414 ; its repulsiveness to Catholics, 415 ; his idolatry of mere power, 416 ; his doctrine on morality, 416 ; his remarks on the sanction of morality, 417 ; intrinsic moral excellence inconsistent with his utilitarianism, 419 ; summary of his moral system, 420 ; congeniality of his general doctrines with his Cæsarism, 420 ; apparent success of his theories, 421 ; the Archbishop's reply to Mr. Stephen, 421 ; continuation of a discussion of the subject promised, 422 ; letter of F. Humphreys on Mr. Stephen's work, 423.

Carlyle (Mr. T.), Shooting Niagara, and After, *reviewed*, 450.

Carpenter (Dr.), Principles of Modern Physiology, *noticed*, 496.

CATHOLIC HIGHER STUDIES IN ENGLAND, 187-204 : increased development of Higher Studies, 187 ; the Archbishop's Circular, 187 ; sanction given to the opinion consistently advocated in the DUBLIN REVIEW, 188 ; advantage of a scheme having been actually set on foot, 189 ; the purposes which such a scheme may promote, 190 ; laxity in religious matters among non-Catholics, 191 ; momentous services which may be rendered by an institution for Higher Studies, 192 ; the special work of higher education, 193 ; the particular proposal put forth, 196 ; formation of a Catholic higher college under Mgr. Capel, 197 ; the connection with the London University, 198 ; two advantages from the connection, 199 ; objections to the London examinations, 200 ; difference between Catholic and non-Catholic philosophy, 202 ; need for the Philosophical professor to supplement the instruction derivable from treatises, 203.

CHURCH ARCHITECTURE, 210-227 : recapitulation of the arguments in the two former papers on the subject, 211 ; the requirements of a style of architecture really suited for a Christian church, 213 ; the Gothic fulfils the majority of them, 214 ; the Italian is better at least in one respect, 215 ; serious objections to both styles, 218 ; necessity for a new style combining the advantages of both, 220 ; suggestions for the new style, 223 ; hopes of a style which will satisfy the requirements of all parties, 226.

Coleridge (Rev. F.), Sowers and Reapers, *noticed*, 492.

Consolation for the Sick and Afflicted, *noticed*, 502.

Contemporary Review for March, 1874 : Art. I., "Cæsarism and Ultramontanism," *reviewed*, 402.

Correspondence : F. Newman on the Spiritual Advantages of Higher Education, 265.

DORNER (Dr. J. A.), History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany, *noticed*, 244.

EBBA, *noticed*, 498.

Embassy in Ireland of Mgr. G. B. Rinuccini, Archbishop of Fermo, *reviewed*, 424.

Essays on Religion and Literature, *noticed*, 464.

FAIRPLAY (Mr. J.), Notes on the Wandering Jew, *noticed*, 503.

FALL (THE) OF MR. GLADSTONE'S GOVERNMENT, 450-461 : causes of the loss of authority in the Government, 450 ; the principle of religious education the chief cause of the reaction, 451 ; the inefficiency of some of the ministers another, 451 ; the reconstruction in August, 452 ; the dissolution, 452 ; unexpected result of the elections, 454 ; Mr. Disraeli's position, 455 ; his future policy, 456 ; the Education question and the new Parliament, 456 ; the Irish elections, 457 ; the diversified elements resulting from them, 457 ; ingratitude of the Irish electors, 458 ; notably at Limerick and Louth, 459 ; Mr. Gladstone's position, 460 : Mr. Disraeli's government of Ireland, 460.

Fitzpatrick (Mr. Walter), The Great Condé and the Period of the Fronde, *noticed*, 264.

Fortescue (Right Hon. C. P.), Five Speeches on Irish Questions, *reviewed* 450.

Funk (Dr. F. X.), Zins und Wucher, *reviewed*, 69.

GLADSTONE (Right Hon. W. E.), Address to the Electors of Greenwich, *reviewed*, 450.

God our Father, *noticed*, 495.

Goldie (Rev. F.), Life of the Blessed John Berchmans, *noticed*, 483.

HANS BREITMANN'S BALLADS, *reviewed*, 302.

Hedley (Right Rev. Bishop), Who is Jesus Christ ? *noticed*, 473.

Hewlett (Mr. H. G.), Autobiography, Memoir, and Letters of Henry Fothergill Chorley, *noticed*, 259.

Histoire de la Campagne de 1866, rédigée par la Section du Corps Royal d'Etat Major, sous la direction de S. E. le Général Moltke, *reviewed*, 267.

Hoey (Mrs. Cashel), Nazareth, *noticed*, 502.

Holmes (Mr. O. W.), The Poet at the Breakfast Table, *reviewed*, 302.

Holy Places, *noticed*, 502.

Humphrey (Rev. F. W.), Mary Magnifying God, *noticed*, 468.

JERVIS (MR.), ON THE CHURCH OF FRANCE, 100-145 : general character of

Mr. Jervis's work, 100 ; his contradictions and false history, 100 ; the patriarchal authority of the early Popes over the whole Church, 101 ; Mr. Jervis's charge of usurpation against the Popes, 104 ; Philip the Fair's attacks upon the liberties of the Church, 105 ; the Popes at Avignon, 106 ; commencement of the Great Schism, 106 ; the Councils of Constance and Bâle, 107 ; end of the schism and election of Martin V., 107 ; decline of the power of the clerical order in France, 108 ; the Pragmatic Sanction, 109 ; the Concordat of Francis I., 110 ; rise of Calvinism in France, 110 ; attempts to suppress it, 111 ; scandalous behaviour of Francis I. in clerical matters, 112 ; plots of the Huguenots, 113 ; meeting of the States-General at Orleans, 114 ; the Ordonnance d'Orleans, 114 ; the Colloquy of Passey, 116 ; the Cardinal of Lorraine at Trent, 117 ; opposition by the Court of France to the proceedings of the Council, 118 ; alarming state of religion in France, 119 ; rising of the Huguenots, 120 ; terrible excesses in the religious wars, 121 ; death of the Duke of Guise, 122 ; the Pacification of Amboise, 122 ; the second and third Wars of Religion, 123 ; the Massacre of S. Bartholomew, 123 ; failure of the policy of Catherine de' Medici, 124 ; the League, 124 ; hypocritical conduct of Henry III., 126 ; he murders the Duke of Guise and his brother, 127 ; assassination of Henry III., 128 ; Catholics and Protestants on tyrannicide, 128 ; accession of Henry IV., 130 ; overtures of Mayenne to Philip II. of Spain, 130 ; spirited conduct of Sixtus V., 131 ; abjuration of Henry IV., 132 ; revolt of the Huguenots, 134 ; deplorable state of Catholicity in France at this time, 135 ; its revival, 136 ; Cardinal de Perron and S. Francis de Sales, 137 ; S. Jane Frances de Chantal, 138 ; Madame d'Acarie, 139 ; S. Vincent de Paul founds the Congregation of Missions, 140 ; the high estimation in which he was held, 141 ; foundation of Seminaries by M. Olier, 144 ; their successful progress, 144 ; remarkable religious revival in France at the present day, 145.

JERVIS (MR.), ON THE JANSENISTIC AND GALRICAN MOVEMENT, 362-401 :

prejudice of Mr. Jervis against the Jesuits, 362 ; difference between Catholic principles of government and Cæsarism, 362 ; burning of Pope Gregory's Bull by the Politicians in 1591, 363 ; banishment of the Jesuits from France, 363 ; opposition of the French Parliament to the Jesuits, 363 ; Richelieu becomes minister, 364 ; his conduct on the whole inimical to Catholic interests, 364 ; Richelieu and the Church in antagonism, 365 ; short-lived rupture between France and Rome, 366 ; Jansenius and S. Cyran found a new school of theology, 366 ; Angélique Arnauld, the Abbess of Port Royal, 367 ; her great influence, 368 ; S. Cyran appointed Director of Port Royal, 368 ; he is imprisoned in Vincennes, 369 ; death of Jansenius, 369 ; posthumous publication of his "Augustinus," 369 ; it is condemned by the Holy See, 370 ; death of S. Cyran, 370 ; Arnauld's book "De la fréquente Communion," 371 ; condemnation by Innocent X. of seven propositions drawn from Jansenius's "Augustinus," 372 ; Pascal's "Provincial Letters," 372 ; desecration of Port Royal, 373 ; comparison between the Jansenists and

the Catholic Confessors, 374; condemnation of the Jansenists by Alexander VII., 374; opposition of the Port Royal nuns to agree to the condemnation, 374; closing of the Port Royal schools, 375; judicial proceedings against the Jansenists, 376; absolute despotism of Louis XIV., 377; it was one of the results of the times, 378; the Church the only independent power in the realm, 378; fracas in Rome between the French ambassador's retinue and the Pope's guard, 379; harsh proceedings of Louis XIV. in consequence, 379; conflict between the Parliament and the Faculty of the Sorbonne, 380; encroachments of the King upon the Church, 382; further differences between France and Rome, 384; secularization of the convent of Narbonne, 385; the Assembly of Clergy in 1682, 386; its uncanonical character and composition, 387; Bossuet's opening sermon, 388; differences among the members of the Assembly, 389; signing of the Declaration, 390; reviving feeling of the Clergy in favour of Rome, 391; the Declaration repudiated by the Bishops and King, 293; injury to the Church by the forced conversion of the Calvinists, 395; the rise of Cartesianism, 395; Margaret Mary Alacoque, 396; the Devotion to the Sacred Heart, 397; death of Louis XIV., 398; licentious state of society after his death, 399; the expulsion and suppression of the Jesuits, 400; persecution of the priests in the Reign of Terror, 401.

Jervis (W. H., M.A.), *History of the Church of France, from the Concordat of Bologna, A.D. 1516, to the Revolution, reviewed*, 100, 362.

Jesuits in Conflict, *noticed*, 243.

LA MARMORA (General A.), *Un po' più di Luce sugli Eventi Politici e Militari dell' Anno 1866, reviewed*, 267.

Lancicius (Ven. F. Nicholas), *Meditations, noticed*, 490.

Landriot (Mgr.), *Promenades autour de mon Jardin : Conférences aux Dames du Monde, reviewed*, 162.

Lecky (W. E. H.), *History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe, reviewed*, 69.

Lepidi (Rev. F. Alberto), *Examen Philosophico-theologicum de Ontologismo, noticed*, 228.

Letters to and from Rome in the years A.D. 61, 62, and 63, *noticed*, 242.

Lettre de M. le Comte de Chambord à M. de Chesnelong, *reviewed*, 204.

Life of S. Philip Benizi, *noticed*, 487.

Life of the Blessed Peter Favre, of the Society of Jesus, first Companion of S. Ignatius Loyala, *noticed*, 483.

Littledale (Dr. R. F.), *The Religious Education of Women, reviewed*, 162.

Lowell (J. R.), *The Biglow Papers, reviewed*, 302.

MACMILLAN'S MAGAZINE, December, 1873: Art. I., "Galileo and Papa Infallibility," *noticed*, 230.

Madame Swetchine, *sa Vie et ses Œuvres, reviewed*, 162.

Madonne (M. l'Abbé de), *Ignace Spencer et la Renaissance du Catholicisme en Angleterre, noticed*, 491.

Meditations for the Use of the Clergy for every Day in the Year, on the Gospel for the Sundays, *noticed*, 496.

Miles (G. H.), The Truce of God, *noticed*, 504.

Mill (J. Stuart), An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, *reviewed*, 1, 326.

———, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, *reviewed*, 1, 326.

———, Autobiography, *reviewed*, 1.

MILL'S (MR.) DENIAL OF FREE WILL, 326-361 : Mr. Mill the ablest champion of Determinism, 326 ; primary necessity in controversy of understanding your opponent's position, 327 ; Mr. Mill's theory stated in detail, 327 ; the spontaneous impulse of the will affected, the Determinists say, by motives, 334 ; our denial of that fact, which is the exact point at issue, 334 ; discussion of various questions of terminology, 335 ; on anti-impulsive action, 336 ; Determinism opposed to observed facts, 337 ; the power to follow reason when it conflicts with passion, 340 ; such power more frequently exercised than Determinists admit, 340 ; facts in proof of the preceding, 341 ; the capriciousness of human emotion, 343 ; the Determinist theory daily proved to be false, 344 ; the motives which actuate a man when he resists his will's spontaneous impulse, 346 ; Determinism and fatalism, 347 ; answers to objections against indeterminism, 347 ; the first objection that no analysis has been alleged of resistance to the will, 348 ; the second, that no man acts against his strongest motive, 349 ; the third, that any change of will is effected by the agency of motives, 350 ; Mr. Mill's objections to man's consciousness of freedom, 351 ; reply to one of his objections, 352 ; Mr. Bailey on Determinism, 353 ; comments on his remarks, 354 ; Mr. Mill alleges that Determinism is shown to be probable in certain cases, 354 ; in the abstract we agree with him in those cases, 355 ; on the connection between Freewill and moral responsibility, 359 ; statement of two further objections, 360.

MILL'S (MR.), PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION, 1-38 : Mr. Mill's Autobiography, 1 ; his ideal of good, 6 ; his strange pertinacity in a belief in atheism, 8 ; the Catholic's position in an argument against such belief, 9 ; Mr. Mill's irreligion due to personal sin, 9 ; the abstruse nature of his early studies, 10 ; his ignorance of elementary Christian doctrines, 12 ; such ignorance is shared by other antitheistic philosophers, 14 ; on the necessary character of mathematical axioms, 15 ; Mr. Mill's aggressive and affirmative philosophical position, 16 ; his position examined on mathematical axioms and the rule of certitude, 17 ; our general argument stated, 18 ; Mr. Mill on the early acquisition of geometrical truths, 19 ; reply to his argument, 20 ; we maintain that what each man's existent faculties actually testify is known to him as certainly true, 24 ; Mr. Mill contends that man can only be certain of present facts, 24 ; continuation of the argument, 26 ; his attempted distinction between two kinds of complex ideas, 27 ; summary of the preceding argument, 29 ; other propositions concerning necessary truth, 30 ; can the uniformity of nature be proved by experience ? 32 ; Mr. Mill's reply to the DUBLIN

REVIEW on this question, 33 ; Mr. Mill's reply to Dr. Ward upon Miracles, 35 ; failure of his attempt to build a philosophy on the basis of experience, 38.

Miller (Sr. Joaquin), *Songs of the Sierras*, *reviewed*, 302.

Mivart (Mr. St. George), *Man and Apes*, *noticed*, 475.

NEWMAN (Dr. J. H.), *Miscellanies from the Oxford Sermons and other Writings*, *noticed*, 232.

———, *Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical*, *noticed*, 494.

Nicholson (Dr.), *Accusation of the Archbishop of Westminster*, *reviewed*, 146.

OXFORD UNDERGRADUATE (The) of Twenty Years ago, *noticed*, 466.

PERIN (M. Charles), *L'Usure et la Loi de 1807*, *reviewed*, 69.

Potter (Rev. F.), *Rupert Aubrey of Aubrey Chase*, *noticed*, 503.

Prospectus of S. Joseph's Theological Library, *noticed*, 464.

PRUSSIAN AND ITALIAN DIPLOMACY IN 1866, 267-301 ; no moral improvement in modern diplomacy, 267 ; the influence which public opinion has upon it, 268 ; striking contrast between La Marmora and Bismarck, 268 ; difference in principles of the Berlin and Turin Cabinets, 269 ; mission of La Marmora to the Prussian Court, 270 ; its success, 270 ; La Marmora forms a cabinet at Florence, 271 ; proposes to purchase Venetia from Austria, 273 ; Prussia bids for the alliance of Italy against Austria, and concludes a commercial treaty with Italy, 273 ; General Govone is sent to Berlin, 274 ; crafty dealing of Bismarck, 275 ; he proposes a treaty binding Italy to support Prussia, 278 ; approaching rupture between Austria and Prussia, 279 ; attitude of France, 280 ; pacific protestations of Austria, 281 ; Count Benedetti's opinion of Bismarck, 283 ; Bismarck's double dealing, 283 ; treaty between Prussia and Italy, 285 ; pretended disarmament of Austria and Prussia, 286 ; preparations of Prussia for war, 288 ; uncertainty as to France in the approaching war, 289 ; anxiety of Bismarck that Italy should strike the first blow, 290 ; the dispatches of La Marmora, 290 ; anger of Bismarck at their publication, 292 ; his similarity to Napoleon I., 292 ; stormy scene in the German Parliament, 294 ; Bismarck's animosity to La Marmora, 296 ; his policy towards the German Catholics, 297 ; comments of the *Spectator* upon it, 298 ; possible danger to the German Empire from such policy, 299 ; hostile attitude in Parliament of the Alsace and Lorraine deputies, 300 ; grievances of the two annexed provinces, 300 ; arbitrary treatment of those provinces, 301.

Purbrick (Rev. F.), *May Papers ; or Thoughts on the Litanies of Loreto*, *noticed*, 470.

RAMSAY (Miss Grace), *Thomas Grant, first Bishop of Southwark*, *noticed*, 471.

Ratisbonne (Abbé T.), *Manuel de la Mère Chrétienne*, *reviewed*, 162.

Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, *noticed*, 244.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF WOMEN (THE), 162-187 ; on the necessity of keeping up with the progress of the age in education, 162 ; Dr. Littledale's paper on the religious education of women, 163 ; his arguments on personality, 164 ; their sophisticated character, 165 ; his view of the "repressive system of education," 168 ; the subjective position of women, 169 ; less under Christianity than in ancient times, 170 ; estrangement in religious matters between men and women, 171 ; caused, Dr. Littledale thinks, by the imperfect religious teaching of women, 172 ; but more, we consider, by the different temperaments of the sexes, 175 ; chief aim of a religious education, 176 ; modern Catholic women of talent, 177 ; Dr. Littledale on the conventual system, 178 ; his suggestions on the education of women, 180 ; actual state of Catholic female religious education, 181 ; on the necessity of a sound educational literature, 183 ; education in France, 185 ; Mgr. Landriot on the spiritual life, 186.

Revival of Priestly Life in the Seventeenth Century in France, *noticed*, 240.

RINUCCINI'S IRISH NUNCIATURE, 424-449 : historical neglect of Rinuccini, 424 ; his high character and freedom from ambition, 425 ; appointed Nuncio to the Irish Confederated Catholics, 425 ; Pope Innocent's instructions to him, 426 ; fear of the Pope lest the Confederates should aim at national independence, 426 ; the Pope's opinion of the Marquis of Ormond, 427 ; difficulties of the Nuncio's task, 427 ; Queen Henrietta Maria's fear of his mission, 429 ; difficulties thrown in his way by Mazarin, 430 ; his arrival in Ireland, 430 ; fresh negotiations between King Charles and the Confederates through Ormond, and also through the Earl of Glamorgan, 432 ; troubles of the Nuncio through the quarrels of the Confederate leaders, 433 ; he enlists the clergy on his side, 434 ; he opposes the Ormond treaty, but supports that of Glamorgan, 435 ; Sir Kenelm Digby's negotiation, 436 ; disavowal of Glamorgan by the King, 436 ; the puzzle Ormond was to the Nuncio, 437 ; victory of Benburb, 438 ; ratification of the Ormond treaty, 438 ; the Nuncio's faith in Glamorgan, 439 ; becomes President of the new Confederation of Kilkenny, 440 ; his justification of that act, 441 ; strange contradictions in his letters to Rome, 441 ; increasing difficulties of his position, 442 ; meeting of the General Assembly, 443 ; desire for a foreign Protector, 443 ; Rinuccini's interdict, 444 ; its consequences, 445 ; inaction of O'Neill, 446 ; triumph of Ormond, 447 ; the Nuncio's departure from Ireland, 447 ; estimate of his nunciature, 448 ; his early death, 449.

Rivieres (Rev. F. Philpin de), Holy Places, their Sanctity and Authenticity, *noticed*, 493.

SIMPLE TALES, *noticed*, 504.

SITUATION IN FRANCE (THE), 204-210 : effect of the Comte de Chambord's letter to M. de Chesnelong, 204 ; regret on reading it, 205 ; the letter viewed as an index to the character of the Prince, 206 ; the question of the Flag, 207 ; the result of the letter was to put a veto on the restoration, 208 ; wise decision of the Assembly, 208 ; present state of parties,

- 209 ; duty of all of them to support the Government of Marshal Mac Mahon, 209 ; suspension of the *Univers*, 210.
 Southern Poems of the War, *reviewed*, 302.
 Spalding (J. L.), *Life of the Most Rev. M. J. Spalding, D.D., Archbishop of Baltimore, noticed*, 236.
 Spencer (Herbert), *First Principles, noticed*, 251.
 Stephen (J. Fitzjames, Q.C.), *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, reviewed*, 402.
 Sweeney (Very Rev. J. L.), *The Pope and the Emperor, noticed*, 495.

TAINÉ (H. A.), *History of English Literature, reviewed*, 39.

TAINÉ'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, 39-68 : the literature of a nation the reflex of its feelings, 39 ; periods of a nation's literature, 41 ; general character of M. Taine's work, 42 ; its favourable reception in England, 42 ; yet, in our opinion, the book is a failure, 43 ; M. Taine on the reconstruction of the past, 44 ; his view of Protestantism, 46 ; his philosophical view of English history contradicted by the religious attitude of England, 47 ; the anti-Catholic tone of the work, 48 ; origin of religious systems, 48 ; one fatal error of M. Taine's philosophical system, 50 ; M. Taine on the Anglo-Saxon character, 51 ; on the Normans, 53 ; his unfair preference for early Saxon hymns over those of the Middle Ages, 54 ; his want of appreciation of Chaucer and his contemporaries, 55 ; his contempt of the Schoolmen, 57 ; his views of the Renaissance in England, 58 ; a thorough mis-reading of history, 59 ; the age of inventions and the debt it owes to the Church, 60 ; the Renaissance period in poetry, 61 ; its truthful love of nature, 63 ; Mr. Carlyle's remarks upon Shakespeare, 65 ; M. Taine on Milton's position in English literature, 66 ; final summary, 67.

Taylor (Bayard), *Lars, reviewed*, 302.

USURY AND THE CANON LAW, 66-99 : recapitulation of our former argument, 69 ; commercial and necessitous loans, 70 ; on the ecclesiastical prohibition of *lucrum ex mutuo*, 71 ; need of treating the question historically, 72 ; economical situation in the Middle Ages, 73 ; immense difference between loans in the Middle Ages and at the present day, 74 ; interpretation of the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Councils regarding usury, 75 ; correspondence of the Church to successive changes in the economical situation, 76 ; early decisions of the Holy See, 77 ; recent decisions, 80 ; recognition by the Holy See of commercial loans, 81 ; views of M. Perin and M. l'Abbé Mastrofini examined, 82 ; the theory of *tituli ab usura excusantes* and *titulus legis* examined, 84 ; doctrine of the sterility of coin, 86 ; instability of the argument, 87 ; transference of the right of property by loans, 87 ; Dr. Funk's remarks on that doctrine, 88 ; statements of Bentham and of Mr. Lecky, 90 ; ignorance of the latter of Catholic modern works on usury, 91 ; summary, 92 ; M. l'Abbé Morel's work "*Du Prêt à Intérêt*," 94 ; his strange proposals, 96 ; his false views, 97 ; painful impression from reading his book, 99.

VALROGER (Rev. F. H. de), *La Genèse des Espèces*, *noticed*, 498.
" *Vitis Mystica* "; or, the True Vine, *noticed*, 488.

WESTMINSTER (The Archbishop of), *Cæsarism and Ultramontanism*, *noticed*, 228 ; *reviewed*, 402.

—————, *Circular on College of Higher Studies*, *reviewed*, 187.

—————, *Sin and its Consequences*, *noticed*, 462.


—————, *The Divine Glory of the Sacred Heart*, *reviewed*, 146.


Whitman (Walt), *Poems by*, *reviewed*, 302.

Whittier (J. G.), *Pennsylvania Pilgrimage, and other Poems*, *reviewed*, 302.

—————, *Poetical Works*, *reviewed*, 302.

Wilson (Rev. R. F.), *Life of S. Vincent de Paul*, *noticed*, 501.





THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

DATE DUE

JUN 4 1983
APR 19 1983

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 03057 8309

BOOK CARD
DO NOT REMOVE

A Charge will be made
if this card is mutilated

or not returned
with the book

GRADUATE LIBRARY
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

GL

DUBLIN-REVIE
-1874-
DOU
HARR

DO NOT REMOVE
OR
MUTILATE CARD

